Jacob Andrew Novelozo v. Port of Seattle et al.

W.D. Washington

Jacob Andrew Novelozo v. Port of Seattle et al.

DecidedFebruary 20, 2026

Docket2:25-cv-00111

StatusUnknown

This text of Jacob Andrew Novelozo v. Port of Seattle et al. (Jacob Andrew Novelozo v. Port of Seattle et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Jacob Andrew Novelozo v. Port of Seattle et al., (W.D. Wash. 2026).

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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE 7 JACOB ANDREW NOVELOZO, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-111-JNW 8 Plaintiff, DISMISSAL ORDER 9 v. 10 PORT OF SEATTLE et al., 11 Defendants. 12

13 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 14 No. 42. Having reviewed the motion, the response, Dkt. No. 44, the reply, Dkt. No. 15 45, and all other supporting materials, the Court GRANTS the Motion and 16 DISMISSES Novelozo’s claims WITH PREJUDICE. 17 18 1. BACKGROUND 19 Pro se Plaintiff Jacob Novelozo lost his job as a maritime carpenter with 20 Defendant Port of Seattle after he refused to comply with the Port’s COVID-19 21 vaccination policy.1 22 1 The Court incorporates the background facts set forth in the August 18, 2025, 23 dismissal order, see Dkt. No. 38 at 2–6, and does not repeat them here. 1 On August 18, 2025, U.S. District Judge Marsha Pechman dismissed 2 Novelozo’s Title VII claim against the Port for failure to exhaust the EEOC’s

3 administrative process before suing it in federal court. Dkt. No. 38 at 19 (citing Fort 4 Bend Cnty., Texas v. Davis, 487 U.S. 541, 549 (2019)). Judge Pechman granted 5 Novelozo leave to amend his Title VII claim “in an effort to include sufficient 6 allegations to support the claim.” Id. But the court denied him leave to add a 7 Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) claim to his amended 8 complaint, concluding it was time barred under the statute of limitations. Dkt. No.

9 38 at 20–21. 10 Novelozo then filed his Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) on September 17, 11 2025, alleging that the Port failed to accommodate his religion in violation of (1) 12 Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and (2)the WLAD, RCW 49.60.180. Dkt. No. 41 ¶¶ 22– 13 32. The Port moves to dismiss both claims. Dkt. No. 42. 14 2. DISCUSSION 15 2.1 Legal standard. 16 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a complaint for “failure 17 to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In ruling on a motion to dismiss, 18 the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non- 19 moving party and accept all well-pleaded allegations of material fact as true. Livid 20 Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005); 21 Wyler Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. Sys., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998). 22 Dismissal is appropriate only where a complaint fails to allege “enough facts to 23 1 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 2 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads

3 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 4 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 5 (2009). 6 2.2 Novelozo’s WLAD claim remains time barred. 7 Novelozo was previously denied leave to add a WLAD claim. Dkt. No. 38 at 8 20. This alone forecloses Novelozo’s WLAD claim. But even setting the order aside, 9 his WLAD claim remains time barred. 10 A three-year statute of limitations applies to the WLAD claim. See Antonius 11 v. King Cnty., 103 P.3d 729, 732 (Wash. 2004). This period may be extended by 60 12 days when, as here, the plaintiff must exhaust their state tort administrative 13 remedies. See Castro v. Stanwood Sch. Dist. No. 401, 86 P.3d 1166, 1168 (Wash. 14 2004). The statute of limitations for WLAD failure to accommodate claims begins to 15 run when the employer informs the employee of its decision not to accommodate. 16 Albright v. State, Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. Div. of Developmental Disabilities, 17 829 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992), as corrected (Aug. 3, 1992). 18 Here, the statute of limitations on Novelozo’s WLAD claim began to run on 19 October 14, 2021, when Port informed him of its decision not to grant his 20 accommodation request. See TAC ¶ 15; see also Dkt. No. 43 at 34. He filed his 21 lawsuit three years and 94 days later, on January 16, 2025. See Dkt. No. 1. 22 23 1 Accordingly, Novelozo’s WLAD claim remains time barred, see Dkt. No. 38 at 2 20–21, and is therefore DISMISSED.

3 2.3 Novelozo’s Title VII claim fails for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 4 Turning to Novelozo’s Title VII claim, the Court finds that he has failed to 5 exhaust his mandatory administrative remedies, which is fatal to his claim. Fort 6 Bend Cnty., Texas v. Davis, 587 U.S. at 549. “In order to bring a Title VII claim in 7 federal court, a plaintiff must first exhaust their administrative remedies.” 8 Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 707–08 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. 9 § 2000e–16(c); Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 1995)). This requires 10 the plaintiff to file a charge of discrimination either with the Equal Employment 11 Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days or with a state or local agency 12 within 300 days after the unlawful employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 13 2000e-5(e)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). 14 Novelozo concedes that he did not file a charge with the EEOC or the 15 Washington Human Rights Commission (“WSHRC”). Dkt. No. 44 at 2–3. Instead, he 16 argues that he was “constructively prevented [from] timely EEOC filing.” Id. But 17 these allegations of Defendant’s obstruction are entirely unsupported by the 18 allegations in the TAC. Novelozo claims that he did not go in-person to the EEOC 19 Seattle field office. TAC ¶ 5. Rather, he made “at least four attempts to call” during 20 the day, was placed on hold, and then had to hang up “due to the end of [his] lunch 21 shift, work schedule[] or prior commitments.” Id. At no point does Novelozo claim 22 that Defendant prohibited him or otherwise obstructed his ability to access the 23 1 EEOC office. Even crediting Novelozo’s account of EEOC inaccessibility, he never 2 attempted to file with the WSHRC. Novelozo offers no explanation for his failure to

3 avail himself of this alternative. See Stephens v. UW Med. Hosps. & Clinics, No. 4 C24-1707-JCC, 2025 WL 860542, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 19, 2025) (“Plaintiff could 5 and should have sought alternative administrative relief through the … [WSHRC] 6 within the generous 300-day window to do so.”). 7 The Court declines to equitably toll or waive Title VII’s administrative 8 requirements when Novelozo “has merely failed to diligently exhaust [his]

9 administrative remedies”—“to find otherwise would defeat the purpose of an 10 administrative requirement.” Stephens, 2025 WL 860542, at *4. 11 Accordingly, Novelozo’s Title VII failure to accommodate claim is 12 DISMISSED. 13 3. CONCLUSION 14 In sum, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. The TAC is DISMISSED.

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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE 7 JACOB ANDREW NOVELOZO, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-111-JNW 8 Plaintiff, DISMISSAL ORDER 9 v. 10 PORT OF SEATTLE et al., 11 Defendants. 12

13 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 14 No. 42. Having reviewed the motion, the response, Dkt. No. 44, the reply, Dkt. No. 15 45, and all other supporting materials, the Court GRANTS the Motion and 16 DISMISSES Novelozo’s claims WITH PREJUDICE. 17 18 1. BACKGROUND 19 Pro se Plaintiff Jacob Novelozo lost his job as a maritime carpenter with 20 Defendant Port of Seattle after he refused to comply with the Port’s COVID-19 21 vaccination policy.1 22 1 The Court incorporates the background facts set forth in the August 18, 2025, 23 dismissal order, see Dkt. No. 38 at 2–6, and does not repeat them here. 1 On August 18, 2025, U.S. District Judge Marsha Pechman dismissed 2 Novelozo’s Title VII claim against the Port for failure to exhaust the EEOC’s

3 administrative process before suing it in federal court. Dkt. No. 38 at 19 (citing Fort 4 Bend Cnty., Texas v. Davis, 487 U.S. 541, 549 (2019)). Judge Pechman granted 5 Novelozo leave to amend his Title VII claim “in an effort to include sufficient 6 allegations to support the claim.” Id. But the court denied him leave to add a 7 Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) claim to his amended 8 complaint, concluding it was time barred under the statute of limitations. Dkt. No.

9 38 at 20–21. 10 Novelozo then filed his Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) on September 17, 11 2025, alleging that the Port failed to accommodate his religion in violation of (1) 12 Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and (2)the WLAD, RCW 49.60.180. Dkt. No. 41 ¶¶ 22– 13 32. The Port moves to dismiss both claims. Dkt. No. 42. 14 2. DISCUSSION 15 2.1 Legal standard. 16 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a complaint for “failure 17 to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In ruling on a motion to dismiss, 18 the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non- 19 moving party and accept all well-pleaded allegations of material fact as true. Livid 20 Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005); 21 Wyler Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. Sys., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998). 22 Dismissal is appropriate only where a complaint fails to allege “enough facts to 23 1 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 2 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads

3 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 4 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 5 (2009). 6 2.2 Novelozo’s WLAD claim remains time barred. 7 Novelozo was previously denied leave to add a WLAD claim. Dkt. No. 38 at 8 20. This alone forecloses Novelozo’s WLAD claim. But even setting the order aside, 9 his WLAD claim remains time barred. 10 A three-year statute of limitations applies to the WLAD claim. See Antonius 11 v. King Cnty., 103 P.3d 729, 732 (Wash. 2004). This period may be extended by 60 12 days when, as here, the plaintiff must exhaust their state tort administrative 13 remedies. See Castro v. Stanwood Sch. Dist. No. 401, 86 P.3d 1166, 1168 (Wash. 14 2004). The statute of limitations for WLAD failure to accommodate claims begins to 15 run when the employer informs the employee of its decision not to accommodate. 16 Albright v. State, Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. Div. of Developmental Disabilities, 17 829 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992), as corrected (Aug. 3, 1992). 18 Here, the statute of limitations on Novelozo’s WLAD claim began to run on 19 October 14, 2021, when Port informed him of its decision not to grant his 20 accommodation request. See TAC ¶ 15; see also Dkt. No. 43 at 34. He filed his 21 lawsuit three years and 94 days later, on January 16, 2025. See Dkt. No. 1. 22 23 1 Accordingly, Novelozo’s WLAD claim remains time barred, see Dkt. No. 38 at 2 20–21, and is therefore DISMISSED.

3 2.3 Novelozo’s Title VII claim fails for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 4 Turning to Novelozo’s Title VII claim, the Court finds that he has failed to 5 exhaust his mandatory administrative remedies, which is fatal to his claim. Fort 6 Bend Cnty., Texas v. Davis, 587 U.S. at 549. “In order to bring a Title VII claim in 7 federal court, a plaintiff must first exhaust their administrative remedies.” 8 Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 707–08 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. 9 § 2000e–16(c); Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 1995)). This requires 10 the plaintiff to file a charge of discrimination either with the Equal Employment 11 Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days or with a state or local agency 12 within 300 days after the unlawful employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 13 2000e-5(e)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). 14 Novelozo concedes that he did not file a charge with the EEOC or the 15 Washington Human Rights Commission (“WSHRC”). Dkt. No. 44 at 2–3. Instead, he 16 argues that he was “constructively prevented [from] timely EEOC filing.” Id. But 17 these allegations of Defendant’s obstruction are entirely unsupported by the 18 allegations in the TAC. Novelozo claims that he did not go in-person to the EEOC 19 Seattle field office. TAC ¶ 5. Rather, he made “at least four attempts to call” during 20 the day, was placed on hold, and then had to hang up “due to the end of [his] lunch 21 shift, work schedule[] or prior commitments.” Id. At no point does Novelozo claim 22 that Defendant prohibited him or otherwise obstructed his ability to access the 23 1 EEOC office. Even crediting Novelozo’s account of EEOC inaccessibility, he never 2 attempted to file with the WSHRC. Novelozo offers no explanation for his failure to

3 avail himself of this alternative. See Stephens v. UW Med. Hosps. & Clinics, No. 4 C24-1707-JCC, 2025 WL 860542, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 19, 2025) (“Plaintiff could 5 and should have sought alternative administrative relief through the … [WSHRC] 6 within the generous 300-day window to do so.”). 7 The Court declines to equitably toll or waive Title VII’s administrative 8 requirements when Novelozo “has merely failed to diligently exhaust [his]

9 administrative remedies”—“to find otherwise would defeat the purpose of an 10 administrative requirement.” Stephens, 2025 WL 860542, at *4. 11 Accordingly, Novelozo’s Title VII failure to accommodate claim is 12 DISMISSED. 13 3. CONCLUSION 14 In sum, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. The TAC is DISMISSED. 15 Furthermore, because the defects detailed above cannot be saved by further

16 amendment, the dismissal is made WITH PREJUDICE. See Int’l Longshore & 17 Warehouse Union v. ICTSI Or., Inc., 863 F.3d 1178, 1187 n.5 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. 18 denied, 138 S. Ct. 1262 (2018) (dismissal upheld where complaint cannot be saved 19 by further amendment). 20 Dated this 20th day of February, 2026. 21 A Jamal N. Whitehead 22 United States District Judge 23

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