MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Jan 23 2018, 9:16 am this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE David W. Stone IV Curtis T. Hill Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Monika Prekopa Talbot Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jaclyn M. Edgell, January 23, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 48A05-1707-CR-1508 v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Mark Dudley Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No. 48C06-1607-F6-1515
Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1707-CR-1508 | January 23, 2018 Page 1 of 7 [1] Jacyln M. Edgell appeals the revocation of her probation, raising two issues:
I. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of attempted dealing in methamphetamine; and
II. Whether the sanction of full revocation of probation was an abuse of discretion.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [3] On July 28, 2016, the State charged Edgell with Count I, Level 6 felony possession
of methamphetamine, Count II, Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe,
and Count III, Level 6 felony maintaining a common nuisance. On January 23,
2017, Edgell signed a plea agreement which included an agreement that her
executed sentence would be capped at one year. On January 30, 2017, the trial
court sentenced her to concurrent sentences of one and one-half years on each
conviction, with 176 days executed and the balance suspended to probation.
[4] On April 18, 2017, Anderson Police Detective Michael Anderson, a member of the
Madison County Drug Task Force, together with a confidential informant (“CI”),
made contact with Kyle Champion, Edgell’s husband, to set up a controlled buy to
purchase 14.5 grams of methamphetamine. Champion told the CI that Edgell
would be with him. Although Detective Anderson’s testimony and the probable
cause affidavit differ on the specific location of the meeting, it is undisputed that
the four met. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1707-CR-1508 | January 23, 2018 Page 2 of 7 [5] When Detective Anderson and the CI arrived at the agreed-upon location, the CI
called Champion, and Champion and Edgell entered the detective’s undercover
vehicle. After introductions were made, Edgell and Champion advised the
detective and the CI that any future drug transactions would have to go through
Edgell because Champion had a job. At that point, the CI handed Edgell the
$650.00 that Detective Anderson had previously given him for the
methamphetamine purchase. Edgell exited the vehicle and walked through an
empty field toward a house. Detective Anderson, the CI, and Champion waited
for Edgell for approximately an hour, during which time Edgell spoke to
Champion and the CI on the phone several times.
[6] At one point, Champion met Edgell in the field, and then Champion returned to
the vehicle and explained to the detective and the CI that Edgell’s source was
having difficulty obtaining the methamphetamine. Edgell eventually called and
informed Detective Anderson and the CI that her source was unable to provide the
methamphetamine. Edgell did not deliver any methamphetamine to the detective
and the CI that day and refunded the $650.00 she had received.
[7] On April 21, 2017, the State filed a notice of probation violation, alleging that
Edgell: a) violated the law by committing a new crime, b) failed to report timely to
the probation department, c) failed to pay her probation fees, d) failed to pay an
administrative fee, e) failed to not associate with a known felon, and f) failed not to
be at a place where illegal drugs are being used and possessed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1707-CR-1508 | January 23, 2018 Page 3 of 7 [8] At the beginning of the evidentiary hearing regarding the violation, the prosecutor
stated that Edgell’s new offense was originally charged as conspiracy to commit
dealing in methamphetamine but that the charge had since been amended to
attempted dealing in methamphetamine. The State withdrew the allegation that
Edgell associated with a known felon. Edgell acknowledged that she had failed to
pay her probation and administrative fees.
[9] The trial court found that Edgell violated her probation by committing attempted
dealing in methamphetamine and by failing to pay her probation and
administrative fees. The trial court revoked Edgell’s probation and ordered her to
execute the balance of her sentence at the Madison County Detention Center.
[10] Edgell appeals.
Discussion and Decision [11] Edgell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the revocation of her
probation and contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered
her to serve the remainder of her previously-suspended sentence at the Madison
County Jail . “‘Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a
right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.’” Jackson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 1040,
1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind.
2007)). “The trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke
probation if the conditions are violated.” Id.; see also Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a).
“Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than
incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1707-CR-1508 | January 23, 2018 Page 4 of 7 proceed.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. “If this discretion were not afforded to trial
courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be
less inclined to order probation to future defendants.” Id. Accordingly, we review
a trial court’s probation violation determination for an abuse of discretion. Heaton
v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). “An abuse of discretion occurs where
the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or
when the trial court misinterprets the law.” Jackson, 6 N.E.3d at 1042.
[12] Probation revocation is a two-step process. Id. “First, the trial court must make a
factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually
occurred.” Id. (citing Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008)). “Second, if
a violation is found, then the trial court must determine the appropriate sanctions
for the violation.” Id.
I. Probation Revocation [13] On appeal, Edgell contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support the
more serious violation of attempting to commit dealing in methamphetamine. She
concedes that the trial court could revoke her probation based on her failure to pay
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MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Jan 23 2018, 9:16 am this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE David W. Stone IV Curtis T. Hill Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Monika Prekopa Talbot Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jaclyn M. Edgell, January 23, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 48A05-1707-CR-1508 v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Mark Dudley Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No. 48C06-1607-F6-1515
Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1707-CR-1508 | January 23, 2018 Page 1 of 7 [1] Jacyln M. Edgell appeals the revocation of her probation, raising two issues:
I. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of attempted dealing in methamphetamine; and
II. Whether the sanction of full revocation of probation was an abuse of discretion.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [3] On July 28, 2016, the State charged Edgell with Count I, Level 6 felony possession
of methamphetamine, Count II, Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe,
and Count III, Level 6 felony maintaining a common nuisance. On January 23,
2017, Edgell signed a plea agreement which included an agreement that her
executed sentence would be capped at one year. On January 30, 2017, the trial
court sentenced her to concurrent sentences of one and one-half years on each
conviction, with 176 days executed and the balance suspended to probation.
[4] On April 18, 2017, Anderson Police Detective Michael Anderson, a member of the
Madison County Drug Task Force, together with a confidential informant (“CI”),
made contact with Kyle Champion, Edgell’s husband, to set up a controlled buy to
purchase 14.5 grams of methamphetamine. Champion told the CI that Edgell
would be with him. Although Detective Anderson’s testimony and the probable
cause affidavit differ on the specific location of the meeting, it is undisputed that
the four met. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1707-CR-1508 | January 23, 2018 Page 2 of 7 [5] When Detective Anderson and the CI arrived at the agreed-upon location, the CI
called Champion, and Champion and Edgell entered the detective’s undercover
vehicle. After introductions were made, Edgell and Champion advised the
detective and the CI that any future drug transactions would have to go through
Edgell because Champion had a job. At that point, the CI handed Edgell the
$650.00 that Detective Anderson had previously given him for the
methamphetamine purchase. Edgell exited the vehicle and walked through an
empty field toward a house. Detective Anderson, the CI, and Champion waited
for Edgell for approximately an hour, during which time Edgell spoke to
Champion and the CI on the phone several times.
[6] At one point, Champion met Edgell in the field, and then Champion returned to
the vehicle and explained to the detective and the CI that Edgell’s source was
having difficulty obtaining the methamphetamine. Edgell eventually called and
informed Detective Anderson and the CI that her source was unable to provide the
methamphetamine. Edgell did not deliver any methamphetamine to the detective
and the CI that day and refunded the $650.00 she had received.
[7] On April 21, 2017, the State filed a notice of probation violation, alleging that
Edgell: a) violated the law by committing a new crime, b) failed to report timely to
the probation department, c) failed to pay her probation fees, d) failed to pay an
administrative fee, e) failed to not associate with a known felon, and f) failed not to
be at a place where illegal drugs are being used and possessed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1707-CR-1508 | January 23, 2018 Page 3 of 7 [8] At the beginning of the evidentiary hearing regarding the violation, the prosecutor
stated that Edgell’s new offense was originally charged as conspiracy to commit
dealing in methamphetamine but that the charge had since been amended to
attempted dealing in methamphetamine. The State withdrew the allegation that
Edgell associated with a known felon. Edgell acknowledged that she had failed to
pay her probation and administrative fees.
[9] The trial court found that Edgell violated her probation by committing attempted
dealing in methamphetamine and by failing to pay her probation and
administrative fees. The trial court revoked Edgell’s probation and ordered her to
execute the balance of her sentence at the Madison County Detention Center.
[10] Edgell appeals.
Discussion and Decision [11] Edgell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the revocation of her
probation and contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered
her to serve the remainder of her previously-suspended sentence at the Madison
County Jail . “‘Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a
right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.’” Jackson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 1040,
1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind.
2007)). “The trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke
probation if the conditions are violated.” Id.; see also Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a).
“Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than
incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1707-CR-1508 | January 23, 2018 Page 4 of 7 proceed.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. “If this discretion were not afforded to trial
courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be
less inclined to order probation to future defendants.” Id. Accordingly, we review
a trial court’s probation violation determination for an abuse of discretion. Heaton
v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). “An abuse of discretion occurs where
the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or
when the trial court misinterprets the law.” Jackson, 6 N.E.3d at 1042.
[12] Probation revocation is a two-step process. Id. “First, the trial court must make a
factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually
occurred.” Id. (citing Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008)). “Second, if
a violation is found, then the trial court must determine the appropriate sanctions
for the violation.” Id.
I. Probation Revocation [13] On appeal, Edgell contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support the
more serious violation of attempting to commit dealing in methamphetamine. She
concedes that the trial court could revoke her probation based on her failure to pay
her administrative and probationary fees but argues that such violations rarely
support the full revocation of probation.
[14] “A person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with the culpability required
for commission of the crime, the person engages in conduct that constitutes a
substantial step toward commission of the crime.” I.C. § 35-41-5-1(a). Edgell
contends that accepting the money did not constitute a substantial step.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1707-CR-1508 | January 23, 2018 Page 5 of 7 [15] However, the evidence shows that she did more than just accept the money. The
evidence presented shows that Champion told the CI during the first phone call
that Edgell would be with him at the buy. Furthermore, when Edgell and
Champion entered the undercover vehicle, they explained to the detective and the
CI that Edgell would be responsible for any future drug deals. Edgell accepted the
$650.00 from the CI and left the vehicle to obtain the methamphetamine that they
wanted to purchase. Her efforts were made clear to the CI and the detective
through Edgell’s periodic phone calls and her meeting with Champion in a field.
Edgell tried for an hour to obtain drugs and was unsuccessful only because her
source was unable to locate any methamphetamine. Edgell argues that this
scenario does not support the determination that she had attempted to deal in
methamphetamine but rather shows nothing more than preparation to deal in
methamphetamine because she never had the methamphetamine in her possession.
Taking the money, she argues, was no more than preparation which is insufficient
to constitute attempted dealing and did not amount to a substantial step to deal
methamphetamine.
[16] We disagree. The evidence admitted at the hearing showed that Edgell acted with
the culpability required for the commission of dealing in methamphetamine and
engaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step toward the commission of
the crime.
[17] As recognized above, the State has the burden of proving the violation of a
condition of probation by a preponderance of the evidence. Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at
617. The State satisfied its burden here.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1707-CR-1508 | January 23, 2018 Page 6 of 7 II. Revocation of Entire Probation [18] Next, Edgell contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her
entire probationary time. “We review a trial court’s sentencing decision in a
probation revocation proceeding for an abuse of discretion.” Johnson v. State, 62
N.E.3d 1224, 1229-30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the
trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before the court.” Id.
[19] If a defendant is found to have violated his or her probation, a trial court may (1)
continue the defendant on probation; (2) extend the probationary period for not
more than one year beyond the original period; and/or (3) order all or part of a
previously suspended sentence to be executed. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g).
[20] We have affirmed the trial court’s determination that Edgell committed the offense
of attempting dealing in methamphetamine, the most serious of her violations.
Her attempted procurement and subsequent resale of $650.00 worth of
methamphetamine occurred less than three months after the trial court sentenced
her for drug-related felonies and placed her on probation. Committing such an
offense just after being released to probation from a previous sentence shows not
only a lack of reform but also a lack of respect for the law. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it ordered Edgell to execute her previously suspended
sentence in its entirety.
[21] Affirmed.
[22] Bailey, J., and Pyle, J., concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1707-CR-1508 | January 23, 2018 Page 7 of 7