Jackson v. Sullivan
This text of 984 F.2d 967 (Jackson v. Sullivan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
40 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 3, Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 17150A
Richard JACKSON, substitute claimant for Jessie Jackson,
deceased, Social Security # got-il-trhm Appellant,
v.
Louis W. SULLIVAN, Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services, Appellee.
No. 92-2436.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Jan. 13, 1993.
Decided Jan. 29, 1993.
Anthony W. Bartels, Jonesboro, AR, argued, for appellant.
Joyce Shatteen, Dallas, TX, argued (Martin W. Long, on the brief), for appellee.
Before JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge.
BACKGROUND
Claimant, Jessie Jackson, appeals the United States District Court's decision granting the Secretary of Health and Human Services' motion for summary judgment.1 Jackson argues that the final decision of the Secretary, holding that he was able to resume his past relevant work as a parts inspector as of March 1982, is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.2 For the reasons to be discussed, we affirm the decision of the district court.
At the time of the October 21, 1982, disability review hearing, Jackson was 52 years old, had no income, and lived with his mother. He had completed the seventh grade, and his past relevant work experience included being a truck driver, a janitor, an assembler, and a parts inspector. He last worked in 1974 when he was involved in an automobile accident, sustaining injuries to his ankles, knees, legs, and hips.
On October 31, 1974, Jackson filed an application for disability insurance benefits alleging that he became unable to work on October 10, 1974, because of injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Jackson was granted a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. In 1982, a disability review was initiated and a determination was made that Jackson's disability had ceased in March 1982. Pursuant to Jackson's request, a hearing de novo before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) was held on October 21, 1982. On February 28, 1983, the ALJ, relying on medical reports, held that Jackson's disability ceased in March 1982 and that he was able to perform his past relevant work as a parts inspector, which he classified as sedentary.3 On December 14, 1983, the Appeals Council denied Jackson's request for review of the hearing decision. On December 19, 1984, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas remanded the case to the Secretary pursuant to section two of the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 for re-evaluation of Jackson's claim under the new medical improvement standard. In March of 1989, the State Agency and the Social Security Administration determined that Jackson's disability ended in March 19824 and started again in June 1983.5 Jackson requested a hearing de novo before an ALJ, but later waived an oral hearing. The ALJ issued a decision on July 24, 1990, that Jackson's disability ceased in March 1982, and that Jackson could perform his past relevant work as a parts inspector, which, according to Jackson's disability review hearing testimony, was performed on a sedentary exertional level. On March 28, 1991, the Appeals Council denied Jackson's request for review of the ALJ's decision. Thus, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Secretary.
Jackson sought review of the Secretary's final decision in federal district court. On June 2, 1992, the court granted the Secretary's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
The primary issue is whether the Secretary's conclusion that Jackson's impairments in March 1982 did not prevent him from performing his past relevant work as a parts inspector, which he determined to be performed on the sedentary exertional level, is supported by substantial evidence of the record as a whole.6
This case is troublesome because there is confusion in the record not only as to the exact nature of Jackson's past relevant job as parts inspector/factory worker, but also whether that job was indeed a sedentary job that he could perform, notwithstanding his existing disabilities in March 1982. If Jackson was still living or if there was a reasonable possibility that other witnesses could testify regarding the exact nature of his past job, we would remand. Unfortunately we do not have that luxury here. Thus, we have no alternative but to take the record as it is and make our decision.
Jackson testified at the October 21, 1982, disability review hearing regarding his past job as a parts inspector. The relevant testimony is as follows:
Q. (Questioning by ALJ) What kind of work have you done most of your life?
A. (Jackson) Well, farm, and I've worked at Grear (Phonetic) [claimant was referring to Revere Copper and Brass] for about six years and a half there, I think.
Q. What kind of place is that?
A. That's Grear copper and brass. We made war materials.
Q. What was your job there? You were inspecting parts?
A. Yes sir.
Q. What was this, just a visual inspection or did you have to use gauges and things like that?
A. I had to use gauges.
Q. Was this standing up?
A. Well, I didn't have to stand up too much, no.
Q. You sat down for most of it?
Q. Did it require a lot of lifting?
A. No, I didn't do no lifting. You know, just little old curreps (Phonetic) [probably calipers] small curreps is all I'd lift.
Q. Just weighed a few ounces?
Hearing before Kenneth Forrester, ALJ, Department of Health and Human Services, October 21, 1982, tr. at 17. In Jackson's disability report, however, he stated that his past work as a "factory worker and inspector" required him to stand eight hours out of an eight-hour day, constantly bend, constantly reach, and frequently lift/carry crates of bullet holes weighing in excess of fifty pounds and sometimes weighing one-hundred pounds.7 Obviously, if these were the physical activities required to perform his prior job, Jackson would have been incapable of performing this work in March 1982, as most agree he was then limited to sedentary work. Despite this, and despite the fact that Jackson was not fully questioned about duties his job at the copper and brass plant may have included that were nonsedentary, we must accept Jackson's description of his job that he made under oath. After carefully reviewing the record, we find that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
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