Jackson v. NAPH Care

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided December 6, 2024·No. 3:22-cv-00318·Unknown

Opinion

KAVOUISE JACKSON, Case No.: 3:22-cv-00318-MMD-CSD

Plaintiff Report & Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge v. Re: ECF No. 45 NAPH CARE, et al.,

Defendants

This Report and Recommendation is made to the Honorable Miranda M. Du, United States District Judge. The action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and the Local Rules of Practice, LR 1B 1-4. Before the court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 45, 45-1 to 45-18.) Plaintiff filed a response. (ECF Nos. 46, 46-1) Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 47.) After a thorough review, it is recommended that Defendants’ motion be granted. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff was an inmate in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) when he filed this pro se a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The events giving rise to this action took place while Plaintiff was housed at Northern Nevada Correctional Center (NNCC). He was released on parole in January 2023. The court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and allowed him to proceed with an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim against defendants: Jessica Rambur, Dr. Martin Naughton (named by Plaintiff as Notton), Melissa Mitchell (named by Plaintiff as Mitchell), Nikky, and supervisory defendants Charles Daniels, Dr. Michael Minev, John Henley (named by Plaintiff as Hensley), Brian Williams, Perry Russell, and Kyle Olson (named by Plaintiff as Olsen). (ECF No. 4.) The claim is based on allegations that Plaintiff was shot in his left arm in 2011, which required surgery and the placement of a metal rod. In 2015, his scar began to open up, exposing

the metal rod. He avers that he was given daily bandages, saline, peroxide, antibiotics, ointment and a wrap for wound care, and ibuprofen for pain, but ultimately, he will require surgery to close the wound. He alleges that in February 2021, this treatment stopped and there was a refusal to schedule him for surgery. He claims that Defendants Rambur, Dr. Naughton, Mitchell, and Nikky knew he had an open wound on his left arm that needed treatment to keep it clean and free from infection, but they refused to do so, and instead, instructed him to merely use hand soap. He claims that as a result, he suffers from infections, bleeding, pain, and irritation. His claim against Daniels, Dr. Minev, Henley, Williams, Russell, and Olson is based on allegations that they knew he was suffering in pain because he appealed the denial of his treatment to them, and they failed to facilitate treatment for him.

Defendant Nikky was dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). (ECF No. 36.) Plaintiff retained counsel, Carrie Hurtik; however, Ms. Hurtik was subsequently suspended from the practice of law subject to conditions during a corresponding probationary period, and a substitution of counsel was filed with Jonathon Patterson now representing Plaintiff. (ECF Nos. 11, 21, 24.) Defendants move for summary judgment arguing they are entitled to qualified immunity because there was no Eighth Amendment violation, Defendants Rambur, Daniels, and Henley did not personally participate in Plaintiff’s treatment, and there is no case that would put Defendants on clear notice that their actions violated Plaintiff’s rights. The legal standard governing this motion is well settled: a party is entitled to summary

judgment when “the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). A fact is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 248 (disputes over facts that might affect the outcome will preclude summary judgment, but factual disputes which are irrelevant or unnecessary are not considered). On the other hand, where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, summary judgment is not appropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. “The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no

dispute as to the facts before the court.” Northwest Motorcycle Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24 (purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims"); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether a case "is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law"). In considering a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences are drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. In re Slatkin, 525 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986). That being said, "if the evidence of the nonmoving party "is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250 (citations omitted). The court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth or to make credibility determinations. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 249, 255; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court applies a burden-shifting analysis.

“When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, ‘it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’… In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine [dispute] of fact on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rest., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). In contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party cannot establish an element essential to that party’s case on which that party will have the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986).

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