Jackson v. Jackson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 26, 2025
• Docket: 24-6266
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 26 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRYCE ANTHONY JACKSON, No. 24-6266 D.C. No. Petitioner - Appellant, 3:23-cv-05988-JLR-TLF v. MEMORANDUM* ROB JACKSON,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 17, 2025**

Before: SILVERMAN, OWENS, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Bryce Anthony Jackson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust

state court remedies. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

Initially, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a stay and

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). abeyance under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). See Blake v. Baker, 745

F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating standard of review). Jackson opposed a stay

before the district court, and the district court reasonably concluded that there was

no showing of good cause to warrant a stay. See id. at 982 (discussing good cause

showing to support a Rhines stay).

Jackson contends that the district court should have excused him from

exhausting state court remedies because of undue delay in state proceedings and

bias and corruption in the state courts. He also contends that the district court

should have ordered the state to provide additional documents and conducted a

more thorough review of the record. Jackson’s arguments are unpersuasive. The

record was sufficiently developed for the district court to address Jackson’s

exhaustion-related arguments, and the court properly rejected Jackson’s requests to

expand the record. See Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999)

(stating that a habeas proceeding “was never meant to be a fishing expedition for

habeas petitioners to explore their case in search of its existence” (internal

quotation marks omitted)). Further, upon de novo review, we agree with the district

court’s conclusion that Jackson’s failure to exhaust should not be excused. See

Alfaro v. Johnson, 862 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating standard of

review). Jackson’s allegations of bias and judicial misconduct by the state court of

appeals are conclusory and unsupported; his disagreement with the court’s rulings

2 24-6266 is insufficient to show bias. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)

(judicial rulings alone rarely support an allegation of bias). We also conclude, as

did the district court, that the record does not support Jackson’s allegations of

undue delay. At the time of the district court order, his personal restraint petition

had been pending for about 13 months, and the available record reflects that the

state court was addressing pending motions in a regular and timely fashion. See

Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 530-32 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing the

requirements of establishing undue delay); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)-

(ii).

AFFIRMED.

3 24-6266