Jackson ex rel. E. Doran v. Green

7 Wend. 333
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 15, 1831
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 7 Wend. 333 (Jackson ex rel. E. Doran v. Green) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jackson ex rel. E. Doran v. Green, 7 Wend. 333 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1831).

Opinion

By the Court,

Savage, Ch. J.

The question in this case is, whether the children and heirs at law of James Doran are entitled to inherit the real estate of Felix Cunningham, or whether it escheats to the state. It is contended on the part of the plaintiff that upon the death of Cunningham, the estate passed to James Doran, who was then living.

An alien cannot hold real estate by descent, though he may by purchase until office found ; but if he dies before office found, the property will escheat. An alien by the common law has no inheritable blood through which a title can be deduced, and cannot transmit the estate. 2 Kent’s Comm. 46. Naturalization gives the alien all the rights of a natural born citizen \ he thereby becomes capable of receiving property by [335]*335descent, and of transmitting it in the same way. It has also a retroactive operation; and lands purchased by an alien who is afterwards naturalized may be held by him, and transmitted by him in the same manner as lands acquired after naturalization. In the case before us, both Cunningham and Do-ran had inheritable blood, by reason of their naturalization; when the former died, his estate vested in his heirs, if he had any capable of taking; if he had none such, the estate escheated, not on the ground of alienism, but for want of heirs.

Cunningham and Doran, both being citizens, had capacity to transmit and to take by descent, provided that descent be immediate; but the difficulty in this case arises from the fact that Doran must inherit, if at all, through alien ancestors. It is stated by Coke, Co. Lit. 8, that if there be two sons subjects, the father an alien, if one of the sons be seised of land and die, the other cannot inherit, because there was no inheritable blood between the father and the sons, and when the sons cannot be heir to the father, neither shall be heir to the other ■—this doctrine must have rested upon the supposition, that the surviving brother must inherit, if at all, through the father, and as the father could not inherit, so neither should the son. A contrary doctrine was established in Collingwood v. Pace, 1 Ventr. 413. It was there held that one brother should inherit from the other, because the descent between brothers was immediate, as from father to son; not that he could derive title through the alien father. The father could never inherit from his son, though a natural born subject, because inheritances in England never lineally ascend. 2 Black. Comm. 208.

As this case must be determined according to the rules of the common law, not being embraced in any of our statute alterations, it will be proper to refer to some of the canons of descent. 1. The first rule laid down by Blackstone is, that inheritances shall lineally descend to the issue of the person who last died actually seised in infinitum, but shall never lineally ascend. 2d. The male issue shall be admitted before the female. 3d. When there are two or more males in equal degree, the eldest only shall inherit; but the females all together. 4th. The lineal descendants in infinitum of any person de[336]*336ceased shall represent their ancestor. 5th. On failure of lineal descendants, or issue of the person last seised, the inheritance shall descend to his collateral relations, being of the blood of the first purchaser; subject to the three preceding rules. 6th, The collateral heir of the person last seised must be his next collateral kinsman of the whole blood. 7th. In collateral inheritances, the male stocks shall be preferred to the female, unless where the lands have in fact descended from a female. Our statute of 23d February, 1786, altered the common law in five particulars: 1st. When the person dying seised leaves several persons lawful issue, of equal degree in lineal descent, they shall inherit equally; 2d. If such issue are of different degrees of consanguinity, they shall inherit per stirpes, and not per capita; 3d. If there be no issue, then the father, if living, inherits, unless the property came from the mother; 4th. If there be neither issue nor father, the brothers and sisters shall inherit equally, including those of the half blood, unless the property descended from an ancestor, and then it shall remain in the blood of such ancestor; 5th. If any of the brothers, &c. be dead, leaving issue, such issue shall take the share of their parent—in all other cases of descent, it was declared the common law shall govern. Our revised statutes have made several important alterations in the law of descents, which, however, need not be stated here, except one provision which may have an influence in showing the opinion of the legislature on the point in controversy in this cause; it is as follows: no person capable of inheriting under the provisions of this chapter, shall be precluded from such inheritance by reason of the alienism of any ancestor of such person.” I R. S. 754, § 22, Having thus stated the canons of the common law and our statute modifications of them, it will be seen that the case under consideration is one which must be decided by the common law. Felix Cunningham had no issue, no brothers or sisters, no uncles or aunts capable of inheriting. He did leave these relatives, but they are excluded by reason of their alien-ism ; the male line being therefore legally extinct, we must look to the female line, in the language of Blackstone, “ leaving no place untried, in order to find heirs that may, by possibility, be derived from the original purchaser.” We then [337]*337find a sister of the mother of Felix Cuningham, who, by the common law, but for her alienism, is capable of inheriting, though the mother is not. And here it may not be improper to notice an absurdity in the law of descents which was never. corrected in our own state until the revised statutes took effect, to wit, that the mother could never inherit from her children, though her sister might; but our proper business now is to ascertain who is entitled by law, though we may not see the reason of the law. That sister is Eleanor Curran, who, for aught appearing in the case, is still living in Ireland, an alien. The case states that she married a man by the name of Doran, and that she had three sons, Patrick, John and James. Patrick and John are still living in Ireland, aliens; James was naturalized in New-York, and died, leaving the lessors, his children and heirs at law. Suppose, then, that Eleanor Doran, the natural aunt of Felix Cunningham, is living, and an alien, what becomes of the estate ? But for her alienism, she would be the heir at law of Felix Cunningham, upon the facts stated in the case. Being an alien, she cannot take it, “for the law, quae nihil frustra facit, will not give her an inheritance or freehold by act of law, for she cannot keep it.” 1 Ventris, 417. I consider the argument of Ch. Baron Hale in the case of Collingwood v. Pace, as containing the correct rule of law on this subject. He states severa cases to illustrate his argument, thus : “A. and B. brothers,! A. is an alien, or attainted, and hath issue C., a denizen born ; B. purchaseth lands, and dies without issue, C. shall not inherit; for A. (which was the medius ancestor, or medium differ ens of this descent,) was incapable. Gray’s case, Dyer, 274. Again; A. and B. brothers, A. is an alien, or attainted, and hath issue C. and dies, and C. purchaseth lands and dies without issue ; B. his uncle, shall not inherit, for the reason beforegoing, for A. is the medius

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7 Wend. 333, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jackson-ex-rel-e-doran-v-green-nysupct-1831.