J-H-S

24 I. & N. Dec. 196
CourtBoard of Immigration Appeals
DecidedJuly 1, 2007
DocketID 3567
StatusPublished
Cited by112 cases

This text of 24 I. & N. Dec. 196 (J-H-S) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Board of Immigration Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
J-H-S, 24 I. & N. Dec. 196 (bia 2007).

Opinion

Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 196 (BIA 2007) Interim Decision #3567

In re J-H-S-, Respondent Decided June 7, 2007

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

A person who fathers or gives birth to two or more children in China may qualify as a refugee if he or she establishes that the births are a violation of family planning policies that would be punished by local officials in a way that would give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution. FOR RESPONDENT: Gary J. Yerman, Esquire, New York, New York

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Anne Bhargava, Assistant Chief Counsel

BEFORE: Board Panel: HOLMES, GRANT, and MILLER, Board Members.

HOLMES, Board Member:

In a decision dated February 27, 2003, an Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s application for asylum, finding that he lacked credibility, failed to establish that he suffered past persecution on account of his opposition to family planning policies, and failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. On June 28, 2004, we affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision without opinion. This case is now before us on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which rejected the respondent’s challenge to the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility determination in its October 12, 2006, order. See Jian Hui Shao v. BIA, 465 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 2006). The court remanded the case for us to consider “whether a person who fathers or gives birth to two or more children in China, in apparent violation of China’s family planning policies, may qualify on that basis alone as ‘a person who has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced’ by the Chinese government ‘to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization’ and may accordingly qualify as a refugee” under section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000). Id. at 498. Both parties have filed additional briefs on remand. On consideration of the Second Circuit’s mandate and the record in the instant case, we will again affirm the Immigration Judge’s decision and will dismiss the respondent’s appeal.

196 Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 196 (BIA 2007) Interim Decision #3567

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The record reflects that the respondent was born in Fuzhou City in the Fujian Province of China in January 1972. He married his wife in China on October 24, 1997. In March 1999, the respondent’s wife gave birth to their first child, a daughter. The respondent claims that his wife was fitted with an intrauterine device to prevent further pregnancy, but they paid to have the device removed in September 2001 and his wife subsequently became pregnant for the second time. According to the respondent, his wife missed a regularly-scheduled gynecological exam in January 2002 because she believed she might be pregnant. She went into hiding, where she ultimately gave birth to the couple’s second daughter on September 20, 2002. The respondent claims that during the time his wife was in hiding, birth control officials arrested him, detained him for 2 days, and beat him in an attempt to coerce him into revealing his wife’s hiding place. He states that he refused to reveal the information and ultimately escaped his holding cell through the help of a former classmate. Thereafter, the respondent fled to the United States, arriving in February 2002, and was in this country at the time of the birth of his second child. He filed an application for asylum in September 2002. Apart from the facts that the respondent fathered two children in China and has been present in the United States since February 2002, the respondent’s claims were found to lack credibility by the Immigration Judge, who specifically found reason to doubt the veracity of the respondent’s claim that he had a violent encounter with birth control officials in China. We affirmed that finding as not clearly erroneous in our decision and it was, in turn, affirmed by the Second Circuit. See Jian Hui Shao v. BIA, supra, at 500-01. As a result, nothing in the record indicates that the respondent had any contact with family planning or other law enforcement authorities in China. Although the Second Circuit found that the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence, the court recognized the possibility that the respondent could have presented a viable claim for relief simply by virtue of the undisputed fact that he has fathered two children in China, a country that places certain restrictions on citizens’ ability to procreate. Pursuant to the Second Circuit’s order, we must decide whether “one who fathers two children in violation of China’s family planning policy, as [the respondent] asserts he has done, may–on that basis alone, without any need for particularized evidence of past persecution or threats of future harm–qualify as a ‘refugee’ as defined by the [Act].” Jian Hui Shao v. BIA, supra, at 501 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). As we conclude below, an alien who has established that he or she has had two children in China may

197 Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 196 (BIA 2007) Interim Decision #3567

qualify as a refugee if the evidence presented establishes, on a case-by-case basis, that the births violated family planning policies in that alien’s local province, municipality, or other locally-defined area, and that current local family planning enforcement efforts would give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution because of the violation.

II. ANALYSIS A. Family Planning Policies

As an initial matter, we note that the respondent cannot meet his burden of proving that he suffered past persecution in China, given the fact that he was found to lack credibility regarding his past interactions with birth control officials in China. Therefore, the only issue for our consideration on remand is whether the birth of his two daughters in China gives rise to a well-founded fear of future persecution. The respondent bears the burden of proving past persecution, as well as his claim that fathering two daughters in China gives rise to a well-founded fear of persecution. In this case, because there is no past persecution, and therefore no rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution, the respondent must prove that he has a subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable well-founded fear of persecution. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). Assuming that the respondent has a genuine fear of returning to China, the starting point for determining whether there is objective evidence supporting this fear is proof of the details of the family planning policy relevant to each individual case. Matter of C-C-, 23 I&N Dec. 899 (BIA 2006). Although in general China’s family planning policy has been termed a “one child” policy, in practice it is apparent that deviations from the general rule of “one child” persist. See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of State, China Country Reports on Human Rights Practices–2005 [Mar. 8, 2006], available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61605.htm [hereinafter 2005 Country Reports].1 In general, China’s 2002 National Population and Birth Planning Law allows married couples to have one child as a matter of right and permits many couples to have a second within certain time frames. See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of State, China: Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions 24

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24 I. & N. Dec. 196, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/j-h-s-bia-2007.