Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.

117 F. Supp. 2d 167, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18948, 2000 WL 1584581
CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedAugust 29, 2000
Docket399CV2338 (AHN)
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 117 F. Supp. 2d 167 (Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 167, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18948, 2000 WL 1584581 (D. Conn. 2000).

Opinion

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

NEVAS, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Barbara Izzarelli (“Izzarel-li”), brings this action against the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (“Reynolds”) under the Connecticut Products Liability Act, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-572 et seq. (“PLA”) and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 42-110b et seq. (“CUTPA”). She alleges that she suffered personal injuries as a result of her addiction to Salem cigarettes and sustained economic losses as a result of Reynolds’s unfair and deceptive acts and practices in the marketing of its products.

Now pending is Reynolds’s motion to dismiss the complaint [doc. # 19]. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.

FACTS

The following facts as alleged in the amended complaint 1 are accepted as true for purposes of this motion to dismiss.

Izzarelli was born in 1960. She started smoking Salem cigarettes in 1974, when she was fourteen years old. She continued to smoke until 1997, when she developed laryngeal cancer as a result of her addiction to Salem cigarettes. She underwent a total laryngectomy to remove the cancer and thereafter received radiation therapy.

Salem cigarettes are manufactured and distributed by Reynolds.

In count one, the product liability claim, Izzarelli alleges that Reynolds designed, manufactured and distributed defective and unreasonably dangerous Salem cigarettes in that, when used as intended, they caused laryngeal and other types of cancer and other diseases and were addictive, especially to minors. She contends that Reynolds knew of the defective and unreasonably dangerous nature of the cigarettes, and intentionally designed and manufactured them to enhance their addictive nature. She also alleges that Reynolds failed and refused to implement design changes in their cigarettes that would have reduced their addictive and harmful nature.

In the CUTPA claim, Izzarelli asserts that, beginning as early as the 1950’s and continuing through 1998, Reynolds adopted a deliberate marketing strategy for its addictive cigarettes that targeted children and adolescents to attract them to begin smoking and to induce them to continue smoking so that it could develop a long-term base of consumers. She alleges that as a result of this conduct she began purchasing and smoking Salem cigarettes and became addicted to them.

Izzarelli further asserts that Reynolds, individually and in concert with other cigarette companies, in or about 1954, entered into a wrongful scheme to defraud the American public into believing that the health and addictive nature of cigarettes had not been established. This scheme was adopted even though Reynolds and other cigarette manufacturers knew that no such scientific controversy existed. The purpose of this scheme was to enable Reynolds to establish and maintain a long- *171 term base of addicted smokers and to conceal its liability for injuries caused by smoking. The scheme continued through 1998.

In furtherance of this scheme, which was referred to as the “Open Question” strategy, Reynolds and its coconspirators made fraudulent statements about the health hazards and addictive nature of cigarettes, their knowledge of such health hazards and addictiveness, and their manipulation of the nicotine in cigarettes to increase their addictiveness. In addition, Reynolds and the other cigarette manufacturers created and funded the Tobacco Institute, a trade association that intentionally issued statements falsely maintaining that there was a bona fide scientific controversy concerning the harmful nature of cigarettes and whether they caused cancer. They also created and funded the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (later renamed the Council for Tobacco Research-USA) and falsely represented that it would undertake independent research and a full investigation into the health hazards of smoking, and disclose fully the results of such research and investigation. Reynolds also falsely represented that it and the other cigarette manufacturers would investigate and disclose any health hazards of cigarettes even though it did not intend to do so and did not do so. Reynolds also represented that, if it was ever determined that any component found in cigarettes caused or contributed to disease, it would remove that component(s), even though it knew of the existence of disease-causing components and did not intend to or attempt to remove them.

Beginning before 1973 and continuing until at least 1998, Reynolds made, directly or indirectly, material false and misleading statements including: it would lead an effort to discover and disclose the truth about the health effects of tobacco; the use of tobacco has not been proven to cause or exacerbate diseases; it did not believe its products were harmful; nicotine was not addictive; and that it did not manipulate the nicotine in tobacco products. Other U.S. cigarette manufacturers, with the knowledge and approval of Reynolds, issued similar false statements. Reynolds knew that these representations were false, but deliberately issued them as part of its continuing course of conduct to induce the public to begin and continue purchasing its products and to maintain a market for its products. Moreover, these statements were made even though Reynolds knew from its own studies and information available to it, as early as 1953, of the link between tobacco use and human disease, including cancer.

In addition, by 1972, Reynolds knew of the addictive properties of the nicotine contained in its tobacco products. Reynolds also knew that new smokers did not know of the- effects of nicotine and exploited their lack of knowledge to induce them to begin smoking and continue purchasing cigarettes. In furtherance of this goal, Reynolds deliberately controlled or manipulated the level of nicotine in its products. Reynolds recognized that it had to misrepresent. the addictive quality of nicotine and manipulate the level of nicotine so that the acceptability of its cigarettes could be maintained in the face of increasing warnings about the health hazards of smoking. It also did so in an effort to avoid liability for injuries caused to addictive smokers, because it was warned by its attorneys as early as 1980, that it could not defend continued smoking as free choice if the consumer was addicted.

Reynolds was aware that it was critical to its Open Question strategy that all tobacco companies act together to misrepresent the true nature of the research concerning the health risks of tobacco, the addictiveness of nicotine and their manipulation of the nicotine in their products. This was so because the conspiracy could only succeed if all of the conspirators maintained the truth of their misrepresentations. In furtherance of this conspiracy, the tobacco companies agreed not to conduct any in-house research to study the *172 relationship between smoking and disease, and in 1970, Reynolds disbanded its research division.

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Bluebook (online)
117 F. Supp. 2d 167, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18948, 2000 WL 1584581, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/izzarelli-v-rj-reynolds-tobacco-co-ctd-2000.