Iyer v. George Washington University School of Medicine and Health Sciences

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: August 1, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-0130
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SNEHA IYER,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24 - 130 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE AND HEALTH SCIENCES, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Sneha Iyer was dismissed from medical school just four weeks before her graduation.

The University cited unprofessional conduct as the reason for the dismissal. But Ms. Iyer argues

that any unprofessional conduct was a product of her documented , which

are protected disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation

Act. She has therefore sued the University for disability discrimination, retaliation, and harassment

under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, as well as for breach of contract and breach of the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing. She has also sued a dean and a clinical professor for the

intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The Defendants have moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Many of their arguments focus on factual disagreements better addressed at

a later stage of these proceedings. The Court thus denies the Defendants’ motion as to Ms. Iyer’s

discrimination and retaliation claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, as well as her

breach-of-contract claim. But the Court dismisses the remaining claims under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.

Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found., 68 F.4th 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

Sneha Iyer enrolled as a medical student at George Washington University (GW) in the fall

of 2018. First Am. Compl. (Am. Compl.) ¶ 10, ECF No. 13. And she thrived during her first two

years. See id. ¶ 19. Not only did she earn respectable grades and avoid any disciplinary issues, but

she also “excelled in her rotations” and received “outstanding letters of recommendation” from

faculty members. Id. This all culminated in her passing the United States Medical Licensing

Examination-Step 1. Id.

Her success continued for the next two years. She began her pediatrics and surgery

rotations in June 2020, and both ended well. Id. ¶ 20. She then spent a year doing research before

returning to her rotations in April 2022. Id. ¶¶ 21–22. And by July 2022, she had earned a passing

grade in her psychiatry rotation and high passing grades in her anesthesia and dermatology

rotations. Id. ¶¶ 22–23.

These accomplishments were not without setbacks. Ms. Iyer had

. Id. ¶ 24. And after working with a number of providers

throughout the years, id., she decided to register with the GW Disability Services Office in 2019,

id. ¶ 16. This put the University, its administrators, and faculty “on notice that Ms. Iyer suffered

from a disability and was entitled to academic accommodations.” Id. ¶ 17.

Ms. Iyer continued to seek treatment while in medical school.

2 This brings us to Ms. Iyer’s final year of school. She began her obstetrics/gynecology

rotation in August 2022. Id. ¶ 28. The following month, she met with Advisory Dean Steven Davis.

Id. ¶ 29. According to Ms. Iyer, he made several inappropriate comments during the meeting. Id.

He said that she looked like “a former lover of his who had been a ‘toxic’ influence in his life, and

he inquired about Ms. Iyer’s relationship history and current status.” Id. He then swore at Ms. Iyer

and said that there was no way that her physician father was proud of her. Id. Around the same

time, the preceptor of the obstetrics/gynecology rotation, Dr. Nancy Gaba, began to yell at Ms. Iyer

and berated her in front of other staff. Id. ¶ 30. She also made negative comments about Ms. Iyer

to other faculty members, and she contacted one of Ms. Iyer’s medical providers and learned that

Ms. Iyer . Id.

The obstetrics/gynecology rotation ended in October 2022. Id. ¶ 31. Ms. Iyer received a

“passing evaluation from all three evaluators, including Dr. Gaba.” Id. She also received no

negative comments about her professionalism. Id.

Things took a turn for the worse in November 2022.

3 On November 16, Dr. Gaba changed Ms. Iyer’s obstetrics/gynecology rotation grade from

passing to conditional. Id. ¶ 34. Dr. Gaba also reported some concerns about Ms. Iyer’s

professionalism to a superior, focusing on Ms. Iyer’s absences and tardiness. Id. These concerns

were relayed to the GW Subcommittee on Honor and Professionalism. Id. Meanwhile, “other

similarly situated students who [were] not disabled” were treated “more favorably[.]” Id. ¶ 55(e).

Namely, “GW faculty . . . allow[ed] those students to make up clinical rotations missed due to

illness” and “chang[ed] their failing evaluations to passing, while Ms. Iyer was not afforded the

same opportunities.” Id.

On November 18, Ms. Iyer was scheduled to interview for a residency program. Id. ¶ 35.

Dean Davis gave her an unplanned call before the interview began. Id. Ms. Iyer was already

anxious about the interview and her recent grade change, so the added stress of the call triggered

Id. She then wrote an email explaining

why rescheduling the interview was necessary, but her explanation was inaccurate because of her

ongoing . Id.

and she

complained to GW’s Subcommittee on Honor and Professionalism about her mistreatment by

Dean Davis and Dr. Gaba, id. ¶ 37.

GW had previously provided Ms. Iyer with the “GW Student Handbook.” Id. ¶ 11.

The Handbook included a “Non-Discrimination Policy,” which stated that GW “does not

unlawfully discriminate against any person on any basis prohibited by federal law, the District of

Columbia Human Rights Act, or other applicable law, including without limitation . . .

disability[.]” Id. ¶ 13. This policy covered “all programs[,] services, policies, and procedures[.]”

4 Id. The Handbook also included “Mistreatment Policies and Procedures,” which were “intended

to inform members of the Medical School community about what constitutes learner mistreatment

and what members can do should they encounter or observe it.” Id. ¶ 12. They were also “intended

to . . . prohibit learner mistreatment by any [GW] employee . . . including, but not limited to,

faculty members (pre-clinical and clinical), clerkship directors, attending physicians, fellows,

residents, nurses and other staff[.]” Id. The “Mistreatment Policies and Procedures” provided that

“GW is required to conduct a ‘Consultation Procedure’ and then a ‘Formal Complaint Procedure’

when a student files a complaint regarding mistreatment.” Id. ¶ 85.

But GW never initiated either procedure after Ms. Iyer complained. Id. ¶ 37. Instead,

on February 9, 2023, the Subcommittee on Honor and Professionalism convened to consider

concerns about Ms. Iyer. Id. ¶ 38. These concerns were raised by Dr. Gaba and others. Id. At the

hearing,

This was not enough for GW. On March 13, 2023, Ms. Iyer learned that the Subcommittee

had recommended her dismissal from the school. Id. ¶ 41. And on April 12, just four weeks before

graduation, she was dismissed from GW. Id. ¶ 43. This forced her to withdraw from the residency

program with which she had been matched, losing the chance to earn a surgeon’s salary. Id. ¶ 47.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Iyer filed her Amended Complaint on April 23, 2024. See Am. Compl. Count 1 alleges

that GW violated Title III of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by

discriminating against her because of her disability. Id. ¶¶ 49– 59. Count 2 alleges that GW violated

the ADA and Section 504 by retaliating against her for filing a complaint against Dean Davis and

5 Dr. Gaba. Id. ¶¶ 60–68. Count 3 alleges that GW violated the ADA and Section 504 by being

“deliberately indifferent” to the harassment she had suffered at the hands of faculty. Id. ¶ 78;

see also id. ¶¶ 69–81. Count 4 alleges that GW breached a contract by failing to follow the policies

described in the Student Handbook. Id. ¶¶ 82–92. Count 5 alleges that GW breached the covenant

of good faith and fair dealing when it breached the contract. Id. ¶¶ 93–101. And Count 6 alleges

that Dean Davis and Dr. Gaba engaged in the intentional infliction of emotional distress when they

harassed her and verbally abused her. Id. ¶¶ 102–107.

The Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on May 14, 2024. See Mot. Dismiss,

ECF No. 15. They argue that all six claims should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See id. at 2.

The motion has been fully briefed.

LEGAL STANDARD

“A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests whether a

complaint has properly stated a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Kursar v. Transp. Sec.

Admin., 751 F. Supp. 2d 154, 163 (D.D.C. 2010). “In evaluating a motion under Rule 12(b)(6),

the court must ‘treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true . . . and must grant [the] plaintiff

the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Donelson v. U.S. Bureau

of Prisons, 82 F. Supp. 3d 367, 370 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc.,

216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (cleaned up)). But the Court need not accept the plaintiff’s

“legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242

(D.C. Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). “[T]he court ‘may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint,

any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint[,] and matters of which . . .

6 judicial notice’ may be taken.” Donelson, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 371 (quoting EEOC v. St. Francis

Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).

DISCUSSION

The Defendants argue that all six claims should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Mot. Dismiss at 13–30. But many of their arguments sound in fact. They deny that Dean Davis

and Dr. Gaba ever engaged in inappropriate behavior, and they insist that Ms. Iyer was dismissed

from GW because of her unprofessional conduct. Id. at 2–13. They even offer twenty-three exhibits

to support their side of the story. See Mot. Dismiss, Exs. A–W, ECF Nos. 15-3–15-25. These sorts

of factual arguments are best suited for a motion for summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss.

Because the Court accepts the Plaintiff’s allegations as true, it denies the Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss as to Counts 1, 2, and 4.

But the Court dismisses the remaining three claims. First, the Court dismisses Count 3

because the Plaintiff lacks a private right of action to bring a harassment claim under the ADA and

she has conceded her claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Second, the Court

dismisses Count 5 because the Plaintiff’s allegation of bad faith is too conclusory to support a

claim that GW breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. And third, the Court dismisses

Count 6 because the alleged harassment was not part of a pattern of harassment, so it does not

amount to an intentional infliction of emotional distress.

A. Exclusion of Exhibits

As a threshold matter, the Court will address the twenty-three exhibits attached to the

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, including emails and text messages related to Ms. Iyer’s dismissal

from GW. See Mot. Dismiss, Exs. A–W. The Court will exclude all twenty-three exhibits at this

stage of the litigation.

7 “In deciding a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a court is restricted from considering

matters outside the pleadings.” Hinton v. Corrections Corp. of America, 624 F. Supp. 2d 45, 46

(D.D.C. 2009) (cleaned up); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). A court may consider “the facts alleged

in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, or

documents upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies[,] even if the document is

produced not by the plaintiff in the complaint but by the defendant in a motion to dismiss.” Hinton,

624 F. Supp. at 46 (cleaned up).

The Defendants argue that Exhibits Q and W are incorporated by reference. First, they say

that the Amended Complaint references Exhibit Q, which is the decision of the 2023 Subcommittee

on Honor and Professionalism. Reply at 5, ECF No. 19 (citing Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37–41). Not so.

The paragraphs cited by the Defendants merely discuss what occurred at the Subcommittee hearing

and allege that Ms. Iyer “was informed that the Subcommittee recommended her dismissal from

GW.” Am. Compl. ¶ 41; see also id. ¶¶ 37–41. At no point do those paragraphs mention anything

about a written decision. Second, the Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint references

Exhibit W, which is the academic accommodation provided to Ms. Iyer after she registered her

disability. See Reply at 5 (citing Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16–17). But this is not true either. The cited

paragraphs simply say that Ms. Iyer registered her disability and put the University on notice that

she “suffered from a disability and that she was entitled to academic accommodations.”

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16–17. These paragraphs do not mention written evidence of an accommodation

or even that Ms. Iyer received any accommodation in the first place.

The purported references to Exhibits Q and W are a far cry from the explicit citations that

usually trigger the doctrine of incorporation by reference. See, e.g., Mason v. Am. Prospect, Inc.,

No. 23-cv-2238, 2024 WL 4345855, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2024) (“The TAP article—which is

8 the source of Dr. Mason’s defamation claim—is extensively quoted from and referred to in the

complaint.”); Barrett v. Atl. Monthly Grp. LLC, No. 22-cv-49, 2024 WL 4119400, at *8

(D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2024) (“Barrett paraphrased the email chain in her complaint[.]”). And it is

irrelevant that Plaintiffs failed to specifically enumerate Exhibits Q and W when objecting to

incorporation. The Defendants argue that this failure amounts to a concession, rendering the two

exhibits “properly before this Court and incorporated by reference.” Reply at 2 n.1. But it cites no

case to support this argument, and the Court is unaware of such an authority. See generally

Laura Geary, The Exception to Rule 12(d): Incorporation by Reference of Matters Outside the

Pleadings, 89 U. Chi. L. Rev. 979 (2022). The Court therefore concludes that Exhibits Q and W

are not incorporated by reference.

The Defendants also argue that the Amended Complaint necessarily relies on their

proffered exhibits. See Reply at 4–5. But the “prototypical” example of a necessary document is a

contract in a claim for breach of contract. Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119,

1133–34 (D.C. Cir. 2015). There, the document being incorporated “form[s] the basis for [the]

claim[.]” Id. (cleaned up); see also id. at 1133 n.5 (collecting similar cases). The exhibits being

offered by the Defendants, on the other hand, do not form the basis for any of Ms. Iyer’s claims.

The Defendants do not provide a copy of the Student Handbook, which would form the basis for

the breach-of-contract claim. See, e.g., Hinton, 624 F. Supp. 2d at 47. They instead present the

Court with documents that form the “‘who, what, where, when, and why’ of Plaintiff’s medical

school experience and her dismissal from the program.” Reply at 4. Considering these documents

at this stage would therefore “blur the distinction between summary judgment and dismissal for

failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Millers Cap. Ins., Co. v. Hydrofarm,

9 Inc., No. 21-cv-321, 2022 WL 1773610, at *4 (D.D.C. June 1, 2022) (quoting Rose v. Bartle,

871 F.2d 331, 340 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989)).

B. Discrimination

The Court now turns to the Plaintiff’s claims in the Amended Complaint. Ms. Iyer first

claims that GW discriminated against her because of her disabilities in violation of Title III of the

ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 49–59. Title III prohibits

places of public accommodation from discriminating against an individual “on the basis of

disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). And Section 504 bars recipients of federal funds from

discriminating against an individual with a disability “solely by reason of her or his disability.”

29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Ms. Iyer’s claims survive the Defendants’ motion.

“The ADA and Rehabilitation Act are ‘virtually identical.’” Wheeler v. Am. Univ.,

619 F. Supp. 3d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2022) (quoting Harrison v. Rubin, 174 F.3d 249, 253

(D.C. Cir. 1999)). The only difference is that “the ADA’s causation standard is slightly less strict

than the Rehabilitation Act’s standard because [the ADA] does not require that the discrimination

be ‘solely’ because of an individual’s disability.” Id. (cleaned up). “The upshot is that the analysis

for these claims [is] essentially the same, save for a slight difference regarding causation.”

Id. at 18–19.

A plaintiff must plausibly allege three things to state a claim under the ADA or Section 504:

“(1) that she is qualified under the Acts; (2) that she is excluded from participation in or has been

denied the benefits, services, programs, or other activities for which the defendants are responsible

or that she was otherwise discriminated against; and (3) the exclusion, denial, or discrimination

was by reason of plaintiff’s disability.” Id. at 18 (cleaned up); see also Reid-Witt v. District of

Columbia, 486 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2020); Pierce v. District of Columbia,

10 128 F. Supp. 3d 250, 267 (D.D.C. 2015). Looking at the Amended Complaint, Ms. Iyer has

satisfied all three elements. 1

The Defendants argue that plaintiffs must also allege that the defendant engaged in “bad

faith or gross misjudgment.” Mot. Dimiss at 17 (quoting B.D. v. District of Columbia, 66 F. Supp.

3d 75, 80 (D.D.C. 2014)). But this requirement applies only when plaintiffs are bringing a Section

504 claim alongside an Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) claim. See B.D.,

66 F. Supp. 3d at 80 (saying it has been recognized “in the IDEA context”); R.S. v. District of

Columbia, 292 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2003) (saying it applies “[i]n the context of handicapped

children seeking IDEA benefits”); Holmes-Ramsey v. District of Columbia, 747 F. Supp. 2d 32,

38 (D.D.C. 2010) (saying it applies “in the context of an IDEA case”); DL v. District of Columbia,

109 F. Supp. 3d 12, 23–24 (D.D.C. 2015) (saying those who satisfy the requirement can “prevail

under Section 504 for IDEA violations”); Reid-Witt, 486 F. Supp. 3d at 8 (calling it the “standard

plaintiffs must meet to state a Rehabilitation Act claim in conjunction with an IDEA claim”). In the

higher education context, where the IDEA does not apply, Brown v. Tex. State Univ. Sys. Bd. of

Regents, No. 13-ca-483, 2013 WL 6532025, at *15 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2013), there is no such

requirement. See, e.g., Di Lella v. Univ. of D.C. David A. Clarke Sch. of L., 570 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9

(D.D.C. 2008); Wheeler, 619 F. Supp. 3d at 18–21.

1 At least for Section 504, the D.C. Circuit has listed a fourth element: “the program or activity is carried out by a federal executive agency or with federal funds.” Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Ms. Iyer satisfied this element by alleging that “GW . . . receives federal financial assistance, as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 749, including through the receipt of federal student aid funds[.]” Am. Compl. ¶ 53. Ms. Iyer also satisfactorily alleged facts supporting the conclusion that GW is a place of public accommodation under the ADA. She says that “GW is one of the premier medical schools in the country,” id. ¶ 8, and any “place of education” counts as a place of public accommodation, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J). Title III therefore applies.

11 1. Disability Status

To start, plaintiffs must have a disability to bring claims under the ADA and Section 504.

See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); see also Singh v. George Washington Univ. Sch. of

Med. and Health Scis., 597 F. Supp. 2d 89, 94 (D.D.C. 2009) (using this as the first element).

And both statutes use the same definition of “disability.” See Humphries v. Newman,

No. 18-cv-2936, 2022 WL 612657, *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2022); see also 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B)

(incorporating definitions from 42 U.S.C. § 12102). This is why “cases interpreting the ADA are

equally applicable when analyzing a claim under the Rehabilitation Act.” Badwal v. Bd. of Trs. of

Univ. of D.C., 139 F. Supp. 3d 295, 308 (D.D.C. 2015) (citations omitted).

“A plaintiff has a disability if he or she (1) suffers from an impairment, (2) the impairment

limits an activity that constitutes a major life activity, and (3) the limitation is substantial.” Id.

(citation omitted). This should be “construed in favor of broad coverage” of individuals. Id.

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)). The Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges all three facts.

First, Ms. Iyer alleges that she suffers from several impairments, including

Second, Ms. Iyer claims that her impairments limit major life activities. She specifically

says that

12 map well onto two major life activities identified by Congress:

See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).

The Defendants do not address these symptoms. See Mot. Dismiss at 15–16. They instead

focus on a single allegation in the Amended Complaint about Ms. Iyer writing an inaccurate

explanation for why she needed to reschedule her residency interview. See id. Ms. Iyer says that

she wrote incorrect information because of her

. Am. Compl. ¶ 35. The Defendants

question how her symptoms could have “caused her to lie,” Mot. Dismiss at 15, but this misses the

forest for the trees: Ms. Iyer repeatedly alleges plenty of other ways that her symptoms negatively

impacted her performance. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26

, 32

34 (“She also

reported concerns . . . focused principally upon Ms. Iyer’s absences and lateness during her

rotation.”), 39

Third, Ms. Iyer alleges that the limitation is substantial. Most glaringly,

. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36, 33.

This provides a useful window into the nature of her limitations because courts are supposed to

assess them “without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures such as . . .

medication[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(I). The test for whether a limitation is substantial

ultimately turns on how her abilities to perform the major life activity compares with that of “most

13 people in the general population.” Badwal, 139 F. Supp. 3d at 310 (cleaned up). It would be hard

to argue that . Ms. Iyer

therefore alleged sufficient facts to support the conclusion that she suffers from a disability under

the terms of the ADA and Section 504.

The Defendants argue that any limitations must not have been substantial since Ms. Iyer

“alleges that she consistently excelled academically.” Mot. Dismiss at 15 (citing Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8,

9, 18–20, 22, 23, 40, 44). They cite Singh v. George Washington University School of Medicine

and Health Sciences, 597 F. Supp. 2d 89 (2009), for the proposition that longstanding academic

success is inconsistent with a disability that limits one’s ability to learn and succeed in medical

school. Mot. Dismiss at 16. In Singh, the court looked at all of the evidence presented at a bench

trial, including evidence of prior academic success, and concluded that the plaintiff’s reading

disability must not have substantially limited her performance on medical school exams as she had

alleged. See 597 F. Supp. 2d at 95–96. But there are two problems with this argument. First, Singh

reached its conclusion only after a trial, and it never said that academic success always forecloses

disability status as a matter of law. See id. Second, the plaintiff in Singh had claimed that her

reading disability substantially limited her academic performance at medical school, so her prior

academic success was highly relevant. See id. But Ms. Iyer does not allege any academic

limitations; to the contrary, she asserts that she “earned respectable grades.” Am. Compl. ¶ 18.

She instead claims that her disabilities caused her alleged “unprofessional conduct.” Id. ¶ 39.

And even those with academic prowess may sometimes struggle with professionalism.

2. Discriminatory Acts

The second element of an ADA or Section 504 claim requires plaintiffs to allege that they

were “excluded from participation in or [were] denied the benefits, services, programs, or other

14 activities for which the defendants are responsible or that [they were] otherwise discriminated

against.” See Wheeler, 619 F. Supp. 3d at 18 (cleaned up). Ms. Iyer lists several allegedly

discriminatory acts in her Amended Complaint that satisfy this element. See Am. Compl. ¶ 55.

Two noteworthy ones are that she was “dismissed . . . from the medical school based solely on

conduct attributable to her disabilities,” and that she was “denied . . . the benefit of graduating with

an M.D. degree, despite [having met] all the minimum requirements established by GW for

graduation with an M.D. degree.” Id. This latter allegation in particular makes clear that GW was

responsible for administering the benefit of a diploma.

According to the Defendants, the alleged facts show that Ms. Iyer is not qualified to earn a

medical degree. See Mot. Dismiss at 16–17. More specifically, they argue that providing a degree

to someone with the professionalism issues identified in the Amended Complaint would

“fundamentally alter the nature of earning a medical degree and undermine GW’s discretion in

awarding medical degrees.” Id. at 16. The Supreme Court has recognized that grantees covered by

the Rehabilitation Act need not make “fundamental” modifications to accommodate those with

disabilities. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985). And the text of the ADA makes plain

that the failure to make a reasonable accommodation counts as discrimination “unless the entity

can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of [the]

goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). But as should be clear from the text, “the burden of proving a fundamental

alteration rests with the defendant.” Long v. Howard Univ., 439 F. Supp. 2d 68, 78 (D.D.C. 2006).

For this reason, “‘[t]he determination of whether a particular modification is “reasonable” involves

a fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry’ that typically requires jury resolution.” Id. at 76

(quoting Staron v. McDonald’s Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1995)). The Defendants are

15 therefore hard-pressed to make this argument at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See, e.g.,

Equal Rights Ctr. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 525 F. Supp. 3d 62, 89 (D.D.C. 2021) (denying a motion

to dismiss a Title III claim in part because the question of whether a modification would

“fundamentally alter” the nature of the service “will likely be the nub of the dispute at subsequent

stages of this case” (citing Di Lella, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 8)).

Ms. Iyer alleges sufficient facts to support the conclusion that she would not have struggled

with professionalism moving forward. For example, she states that during her first two years of

medical school, she “never faced any disciplinary or professionalism problems,” Am. Compl. ¶ 18,

and she “receiv[ed] outstanding letters of recommendation from GW faculty members,” id. ¶ 19.

And even after

Id. ¶ 27. A plausible reading

of the Amended Complaint suggests that

A jury may well find that Ms. Iyer was well equipped to “function in high stress, high

stakes environments where decisions and guidance must be made quickly, accurately, and

honestly.” Mot Dismiss at 17.

3. Causation

The third element requires plaintiffs to allege that their “exclusion, denial, or

discrimination was by reason of [their] disability.” Wheeler, 619 F. Supp. 3d at 18. Remember that

“the ADA’s causation standard ‘is slightly less strict than the Rehabilitation Act’s standard because

[the ADA] does not require that the discrimination be “solely” because of’ an individual’s

16 disability.” Id. (quoting Reid-Witt, 486 F. Supp. 3d at 10–11). The Court will therefore focus on

the more stringent Rehabilitation Act standard.

Courts in this District routinely apply but-for causation in Rehabilitation Act cases.

See, e.g., Montgomery v. McDonough, 682 F. Supp. 3d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2023); Williams v. Donovan,

219 F. Supp. 3d 167, 173–74 (D.D.C. 2016); Drasek v. Burwell, 121 F. Supp. 3d 143, 154

(D.D.C. 2015); Gard v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 752 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35–36 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d,

No. 11-5020, 2011 WL 2148585 (D.C. Cir. May 25, 2011); Hollingsworth v. Vilsack,

No. 23-cv-2427, 2024 WL 4332118, at *10 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2024); Zano v. McDonough,

No. 22-cv-2748, 2024 WL 2699976, at *11 (D.D.C. May 24, 2024). This case is no different.

Section 504 prohibits discriminatory conduct engaged in “solely by reason of” an individual’s

disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). And “[f]or Rehabilitation Act claims, courts have found the

presence of the word ‘solely’ means that the causation element of intentional discrimination and

retaliation claims brought under that Act cannot be satisfied by a motivating factor test; rather, the

applicable analysis is the traditional ‘but-for’ causation standard.” Drasek, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 154

(collecting cases).

Courts have elaborated on this standard in the employment-discrimination context by

saying a plaintiff can satisfy her burden “by showing ‘that she was treated differently from

similarly situated employees who are not part of the protected class.’” Hollingsworth,

2024 WL 4332118, at *10 (quoting Brown v. Sessoms, 774 F.3d 1016, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2014)

(cleaned up)). And they look for something similar when a student brings a Section 504 claim

against her school. See, e.g., B.D., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 80 (plaintiffs failed to allege causation because

they “fail[ed] to allege any facts regarding how B.D. was allegedly treated differently from any of

his similarly situated peers”); Jackson v. District of Columbia, 826 F. Supp. 2d 109, 122–23

17 (D.D.C. 2011) (plaintiffs failed to allege causation because they “did not allege that AJP was

treated differently from non-disabled students”), aff’d sub nom, Jackson v. Henderson,

No. 11-7156, 2013 WL 500809 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 18, 2013); Di Lella, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 9 (plaintiff

failed to allege causation because his “complaint simply does not offer any plausible explanation

for how she was treated differently on the basis of her disability” (emphasis added)).

Ms. Iyer claims that “GW faculty treated other similarly situated students who are not

disabled more favorably and differently than Ms. Iyer by allowing those students to make up

clinical rotations missed due to illness, and by changing their failing evaluations to passing, while

[she] was not afforded the same opportunities.” Am. Compl. ¶ 55(e). This is a detailed allegation

that could plausibly establish causation if ultimately shown to be true.

The Defendants’ counterarguments are unconvincing. First, they say that this allegation is

an “unsupported statement relating to unspecified other students or their individual situations[.]”

Mot. Dismiss at 20. But unsupported allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

See Donelson, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 370 (courts must treat factual allegations as true when evaluating

a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)). And there is no bright-line rule requiring individuals to

be identified by name. See, e.g., Johnson v. District of Columbia, 572 F. Supp. 2d 94, 101, 112

(D.D.C. 2008) (denying a motion to dismiss ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims); see also

Second Am. Compl. ¶ 81, Johnson v. District of Columbia, 572 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2008)

(No. 07-cv-1033), ECF No. 15 (“Plaintiff is being paid less than those similarly qualified and

non-disabled employees holding positions requiring similar skills, responsibilities and efforts.”).

Ms. Iyer’s allegation is not a threadbare recital of the proposition that similarly situated individuals

were treated better than she was. See, e.g., Harris v. Mayorkas, No. 21-cv-1083, 2022 WL

3452316, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2022) (dismissing Title VII claim where the plaintiff merely

18 alleged that “[s]imilarly situated co-workers outside of [her] race were not treated in the manner

in which [she] was” (cleaned up)); see also Hollingsworth, 2024 WL 4332118, at *10 (treating the

causation analysis for Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act as co-extensive). Rather, it states that

individuals who had similarly failed or missed rotations due to illness were able to make up those

rotations and change their evaluations to passing. See Am. Compl. ¶ 55(e). This is enough to

survive a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Johnson, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 101.

Second, the Defendants argue that “other students making up missed clinical rotations due

to illness and/or changing evaluation scores for them has no bearing on Plaintiff’s alleged

disabilities of .” Mot. Dismiss at 20. The Court

struggles to understand the thrust of this argument. Ms. Iyer’s allegation says nothing about these

other students’ experiences bearing on her ; it merely alleges that other students were

allowed to make up rotations that they missed due to illness and to change their failing evaluations

to passing, while Ms. Iyer was not afforded the same opportunities. See Am. Compl. ¶ 55(e).

C. Retaliation

Turning to Ms. Iyer’s retaliation claim, she argues that GW engaged in retaliation in

violation of the ADA and Section 504. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60–68. “To prevail on a retaliation

claim under both the ADA and Section 504 . . . , the plaintiff must show (1) she engaged in a

protected activity, (2) the defendant took a materially adverse action against her, and (3) there was

a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Shinabargar v. Bd. of

Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 164 F. Supp. 3d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2016) (cleaned up). This claim, too, survives

the Defendants’ motion.

The first two elements are easily satisfied. First, Ms. Iyer alleges that she “engaged in

protected activity; including, but not limited to, when she filed complaints against Dr. Gaba and

19 Dean Davis for their mistreatment and abuse towards her that exacerbated her .”

Am. Compl. ¶ 62. And second, she alleges that she was “subjected to an adverse action when,

shortly after she filed complaints against Dean Davis and Dr. Gaba, GW dismissed Ms. Iyer from

the medical school.” Am. Compl. ¶ 63(b). Even the Defendants appear to acknowledge that

“dismissal may be an adverse action.” Mot. Dismiss at 22.

And the third element is satisfied, too. Ms. Iyer alleges that she “complained to GW’s

Subcommittee on Honor and Professionalism about her mistreatment by Advisory Dean Davis and

Dr. Gaba.” Am. Compl. ¶ 37. Then she alleges that the same Subcommittee “recommended her

dismissal from GW.” Id. ¶ 42. This is not a case where the decisionmaker had no knowledge that

she was engaging in protected activity. See Shinabargar, 164 F. Supp. 3d at 17. Also, “the events

happened closely together,” Am. Compl. ¶ 64, and “[t]emporal proximity can indeed support an

inference of causation,” Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

The Defendants argue that there is no causal link because Ms. Iyer does not allege that “any

complaints she filed against Dean Davis and Dr. Gaba pre-dated their Letters of Concern which

initiated the Subcommittee hearing.” Mot. Dismiss at 21–22. But Ms. Iyer does not claim that

those letters were the relevant adverse actions. See Am. Compl. ¶ 63. She instead claims that her

dismissal was an adverse action, and she does allege that this occurred “shortly after she filed [her]

complaints.” Am. Compl. ¶ 63(b). The Defendants also state that Ms. Iyer failed to allege that “the

Subcommittee was ever aware of any formal complaints against Dr. Gaba and Dean Davis.”

Mot. Dismiss at 22. But she sufficiently alleged that she “complained to GW’s Subcommittee on

Honor and Professionalism about her mistreatment by Advisory Dean Davis and Dr. Gaba,”

Am. Compl. ¶ 37 (emphasis added), so knowledge can be inferred.

20 D. Harassment

Ms. Iyer’s third claim is not a model of clarity. Without citing any specific statutory

provision, she says that GW violated the ADA and Section 504 by being “deliberately indifferent

to [her] harassment by GW faculty.” Am. Compl. ¶ 78; see also id. ¶¶ 69–81. The Court’s most

charitable read is that she is making two different arguments under the two different statutes.

First, Ms. Iyer appears to be arguing that GW violated the ADA by subjecting her to a

hostile work environment. See Opp’n at 12, ECF No. 18. Courts in this District have repeatedly

said that “a plaintiff who alleges that his employer intentionally created a pervasively hostile work

environment because of the employee’s disability states a cause of action for intentional

discrimination under the ADA.” Johnson v. Billington, 404 F. Supp. 2d 157, 169 (D.D.C. 2005);

see also id. (collecting cases “recogniz[ing] an ADA hostile work environment claim”).

One reason courts recognize this cause of action under the ADA is because the statutory text so

closely mirrors that of Title VII, which contains a cause of action for hostile work environment

harassment. See, e.g., Fox v. Gen’l Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2001). But Ms. Iyer

does not claim to be employed by GW; she only claims to be a medical student at the University.

See Am. Compl. ¶ 10. And at least in the Title VII context, medical students are not treated as

employees. See Hajjar-Nejad v. George Washington Univ., 873 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2012).

The Court sees no reason why this would be any different in the ADA context.

Second, Ms. Iyer originally alleged that GW violated Section 504 and the ADA through its

indifference toward her harassment. See Am. Compl. ¶ 78. But she has since conceded that she

lacks a cause of action to pursue this claim. This is because the Defendants argued in their Motion

to Dismiss that the “Plaintiff’s disability harassment claim is not covered by the Rehabilitation

Act.” Mot. Dismiss at 23 (citing Lee as Friends of M.L. v. Seed Pub. Charter Sch. of Washington,

21 D.C., No. 18-cv-2786, 2019 WL 4469285, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2019) (recognizing a Section

504 cause of action only for peer-on-peer harassment, not teacher-student harassment)). And they

said there was “no authority to support a cause of action for disability harassment” under the ADA

separate from “a hostile work environment claim.” Id. Ms. Iyer responded by insisting that she

satisfied the elements of a hostile work environment claim under the ADA, without mentioning

Section 504 or any alternative cause of action under the ADA. See Opp’n at 12–13. “It is well

understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive motion and

addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that

the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.” Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of Glob. Ministries,

284 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2003) (citations omitted), aff’d, 98 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

This includes the argument that a plaintiff lacks a cause of action. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Peters,

No. 05-cv-2071, 2007 WL 1378486, at *6 (D.D.C. May 9, 2007). Ms. Iyer therefore fails to state

a harassment claim under Section 504 or the ADA. 2

2 The Defendants argue that Section 504 protects only against “disability-based harassment by other students.” Mot. Dismiss at 23. It is true that courts in this District recognizing a cause of action for harassment under Section 504 have discussed only peer-on-peer harassment. See, e.g., Lee, 2019 WL 4469285, at *7. But the Court sees no reason why the logic underlying those opinions would not apply with equal force to teacher-student harassment. The opinions recognizing that Section 504 protects against peer-on-peer harassment rely on Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999). There, the Supreme Court held that Title IX allows plaintiffs to hold schools liable for peer-on-peer harassment. See id. at 633. Many circuits have extended this to Section 504 because the two statutes are both Spending Clause statutes with “strikingly similar” operative language. S.B. ex rel. A.L. v. Bd. of Educ. of Harford Cnty., 819 F.3d 69, 75 (4th Cir. 2016). But Title IX also creates a private right of action for teacher-student harassment. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 74–75 (1992); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 281 (1998). In fact, Davis even recognized that Title IX can be breached more easily by teacher-student harassment than by peer-on-peer harassment given the former’s “systemic effect on a program or activity.” 526 U.S. at 653. So to the extent Section 504’s right of action for peer-on-peer harassment relies on similarities to Title IX, the Court sees no reason why it would not also protect against teacher-student harassment.

22 E. Breach of Contract

Ms. Iyer next alleges breach of contract against GW. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 82–92. The Court

has diversity jurisdiction over this claim because Ms. Iyer is a citizen of Pennsylvania,

Am. Compl. ¶ 1, and GW has its principal place of business in the District of Columbia, id. ¶ 2.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. So the Court follows District of Columbia’s choice-of-law rules.

See Mosby-Nickens v. Howard Univ., 864 F. Supp. 2d 93, 99 n.2 (D.D.C. 2012).

The District of Columbia choice-of-law rules require the Court to consider

“the governmental policies underlying the applicable laws and [to] determine[] which

jurisdiction’s policy would be the most advanced by the application of its law to the facts of the

case[.]” Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37, 59 (D.D.C. 2010) (citations omitted).

The factors to consider are “(1) the place where the injury occurred; (2) the place where the conduct

causing the injury occurred; (3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and

place of business of the parties; and (4) the place where the relationship is centered.”

Id. (citations omitted). The Court will apply District of Columbia law because GW is based in the

District and all of the conduct at issue took place in the District. See, e.g., Mosby-Nickens,

864 F. Supp. 2d at 99 n.2.

Under District of Columbia law, plaintiffs bringing a breach-of-contract claim must allege

“(1) a valid contract between the parties; (2) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract;

(3) a breach of that duty; and (4) damages caused by the breach.” Inst. of Multidimensional Med.

v. Metagenics, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 3d 6, 13 (D.D.C. 2022) (cleaned up); see also Tsintolas Realty

Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C. 2009). The Amended Complaint alleges all four elements.

23 1. Contract Existence

“Under D.C. law, generally speaking, ‘the relationship between a university and its

students is contractual in nature.’” Doe v. Am. Univ., No. 19-cv-3097, 2020 WL 5593909, *11

(D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2020) (quoting Basch v. George Washington Univ., 370 A.2d 1364, 1366

(D.C. 1977)); accord Chenari v. George Washington Univ., 847 F.3d 740, 744 (D.C. Cir. 2017)

(“[T]he relationship between a university and its students is contractual in nature.”

(quoting Manago v. District of Columbia, 934 A.2d 925, 927 (D.C. 2007) (cleaned up)). “Whether

a specific university policy gives rise to contractual rights, the D.C. Court of Appeals has held,

‘depend[s] upon general principles of contract construction.’” Doe, 2020 WL 5593909, at *11

(quoting Basch, 370 A.2d at 1367).

“A contract is valid only where there is ‘both (1) agreement as to all material terms and

(2) intention of the parties to be bound.’” Mosby-Nickens, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 99 (quoting Jack

Baker, Inc. v. Off. Space Dev. Corp., 664 A.2d 1236, 1238 (D.C. 1995)). When deciding if a

university policy satisfies these requirements, the document “must be viewed as a whole and the

court should view the language of the document as would a reasonable person in the position of

the parties.” Pride v. Howard Univ., 384 A.2d 31, 34 (D.C. 1978) (cleaned up).

The Defendants argue that student handbooks do not create a valid contractual relationship

between a student and a university. Ms. Iyer counters that three portions of GW’s Student

Handbook demonstrate an intent to be bound. The Court finds that one of the three passages is

sufficient to allege a plausible breach-of-contract claim, so this claim survives.

First, Ms. Iyer alleges that GW’s “Mistreatment Policies and Procedures” are

“intended to . . . prohibit learner mistreatment by any employee of the George Washington

University, . . . including, but not limited to, faculty members (pre-clinical and clinical)[.]”

24 Am. Compl. ¶ 84; see also id. (prohibiting “retaliation against persons who bring learner

mistreatment complaints”). At first this language looks promising. It prohibits certain conduct by

university employees, and at least one court in this District has said that policy language binding

employees counts as an indication of a willingness to be bound. See Doe, 2020 WL 5593909,

at *12 (“The Policy imposes certain obligations on . . . American University community

members[.]”). But the Court “is not aware of [a case] where a court has construed a university code

of conduct’s prohibition of certain conduct as a promise to extinguish all such conduct or to

investigate all instances of reported prohibited conduct.” Stafford v. George Washington Univ.,

No. 18-cv-2789, 2019 WL 13160063, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2019). So this language does not

demonstrate an intent to be bound.

Second, Ms. Iyer alleges that GW’s “Non-Discrimination Policy” provides that “[t]he

George Washington University does not unlawfully discriminate against any person on any basis

prohibited by federal law.” Am. Compl. ¶ 87. It also says that it “covers all programs, services,

policies, and procedures of the university, including admission to education programs and

employment.” Id. Again, this language initially looks good. When a court in this District was faced

with a similar policy, it found that the language clarifying the policy’s wide scope indicated an

intent to be bound. See Doe, 2020 WL 5593909, at *11–12 (“This policy applies to all University

programs and activities.”). But GW’s Non-Discrimination Policy just says it will abide by the law,

and “promise[s] to perform . . . pre-existing legal obligation[s] . . . do[] not create mutuality of

obligation and cannot give rise to an enforceable contract.” Stafford, 2019 WL 13160063, at *2

(quoting Di Lella, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (citations omitted)). The language therefore does not

establish an enforceable contract.

25 Third, Ms. Iyer alleges that GW’s “‘Mistreatment Policies and Procedures’ provide that

GW is required to conduct a ‘Consultation Procedure’ and then a ‘Formal Complaint Procedure’

when a student files a complaint regarding mistreatment.” Am. Compl. ¶ 85. This fits the bill for

a breach-of-contract claim. “Indeed, the courts that have construed a university’s code of conduct

as a contract have enforced only the sections in which the school committed to follow specific

disciplinary procedures.” Stafford, 2019 WL 13160063, at *4 (citing Doe, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 124;

Pride, 834 A.2d at 35). It is true that courts often have more of the operative text to rely on when

making these decisions. See, e.g., Doe, 2020 WL 5593909. But a “[c]ontract claim will not be

dismissed for failure to attach the contract to the complaint.” Smith v. Wash. Post Co., 962 F. Supp.

2d 79, 86–87 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice,

¶ 10.05[4] (3d ed. 1999); see also McDowell v. CGI Fed. Inc., No. 15-cv-1157, 2017 WL 2392423,

at *7 (D.D.C. June 1, 2017) (the “liberal pleading standard” counsels against dismissal when the

contract was “not before the Court in its entirety”). Ms. Iyer therefore sufficiently alleges the

existence of a contract.

2. Duty, Breach, and Damages

The Plaintiff also alleges the final three elements necessary to state a breach-of-contract

claim. First, she identified an obligation or duty arising out of the contract when she said that the

Mistreatment Policies and Procedures “required” GW university to conduct a Consultation

Procedure and a Formal Complaint Procedure after a complaint has been filed. Am. Compl. ¶ 85.

Second, she alleged that GW breached that obligation by failing to initiate those procedures after

she filed her complaint about mistreatment by Dean Davis and Dr. Gaba. See id. ¶ 86. And third,

she claimed damages when she said that she “has suffered and continues to suffer irreparable harm,

26 injury, and damages,” listing several discrete harms. Id. ¶ 90. The Court therefore declines to

dismiss her breach-of-contract claim.

The Defendants argue that “[e]ven if [the] Plaintiff could sufficiently allege the existence

of a valid contract, her breach of contract claim fails because GW provided a rational basis for her

dismissal.” Mot. Dismiss at 26. They cite Chenari v. George Washington University, 847 F.3d 740

(D.C. Cir. 2017), for the proposition that “a breach of contract claim will fail unless there is some

allegation or evidence to conclude that there was no rational basis for the [school’s determination

of educational or professional inadequacy] or that it was motivated by fad faith or ill will unrelated

to academic performance.” Mot. Dismiss at 26. But there are two problems with this argument.

First, the rule requiring evidence that there was no rational basis for dismissal applies at

the summary judgment stage. See Chenari, 847 F.3d at 745 (“A university ‘will be entitled to

summary judgment unless the plaintiff can provide some evidence from which a fact finder could

conclude that there was no rational basis for the decision or that it was motivated by bad faith or

ill will unrelated to academic performance.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Alden v. Georgetown

Univ., 734 A.2d 1103, 1108 (D.C. 1999))); see, e.g., Smith v. Howard Univ., No. 21-cv-920, 2024

WL 1831955, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2024); Bain v. Howard Univ., 968 F. Supp. 2d 294, 297–302

(D.D.C. 2013). At the motion-to-dismiss stage, plaintiffs may allege facts, “which must be taken

as true,” that may prevent courts “from concluding that there was a discernable, rational academic

basis for . . . failing grades and [a] subsequent dismissal[.]” Paulin v. George Washington Univ.

Sch. of Med. & Health Scis., 878 F. Supp. 2d 241, 247 (D.D.C. 2012) (cleaned up). Ms. Iyer alleges

that she initially “received a passing evaluation from all three evaluators, including Dr. Gaba,”

at the end of her obstetrics/gynecology rotation. Am. Compl. ¶ 31. She also alleges that

“[t]here were no negative remarks concerning [her] professionalism” at the time. Id. This calls

27 into question whether Dr. Gaba had a rational basis for changing Ms. Iyer’s grade to conditional

and for filing concerns about her professionalism over a month after the rotation ended,

see id. ¶ 34—concerns considered by the Subcommittee on Honor and Professionalism, id. ¶ 38.

Second, Ms. Iyer’s breach-of-contract claim is not premised on her dismissal. The only

alleged portion of the Student Handbook that showed an intent to be bound was that which

guaranteed certain procedures following complaints of mistreatment. See supra, at 24–26.

Her claim is therefore premised on GW’s failure to initiate those procedures. See Am. Compl.

¶ 37. So “the case law requiring a university to show only a rational basis for its dismissal decision

is an awkward fit with this case.” Freeman, 2022 WL 4289640, at *3.

F. Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

In addition to her breach-of-contract claim, Ms. Iyer brings a claim for breach of the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 93–101. Under District of Columbia

law, “[a]ll contracts ‘contain an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, which means that

neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the

other party to receive the fruits of the contract.’” Paulin, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 247 (quoting Allworth

v. Howard Univ., 890 A.2d 194, 201 (D.C. 2006) (cleaned up)). “A party breaches this duty by

evading the spirit of the contract, willfully rendering imperfect performance, or interfering with

performance by the other party.” Id. at 247–48 (cleaned up). Ms. Iyer fails to state a claim for two

reasons. 3

First, Ms. Iyer’s theory appears to be premised on the wrong purported contracts. She says

that “GW breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by discriminating and retaliating

against Ms. Iyer repeatedly[.]” Am. Compl. ¶ 99. So her claim turns on the existence of a contract

3 The Court applies District of Columbia law for the above reasons. See supra, at 23.

28 prohibiting GW from discriminating and retaliating. But for reasons explained above,

the Non-Discrimination Policy is not a contract, and the language in the Mistreatment Policies and

Procedures prohibiting retaliation shows no intent to be bound. See supra, at 24–25. “[A] claim

for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot exist in the absence of a

contractual relationship.” Busby v. Cap. One, N.A., 772 F. Supp. 2d 268, 284 (D.D.C. 2011)

(citing Kerrigan v. Britches of Georgetowne, Inc., 705 A.2d 624, 627 (D.C. 1997)). So without a

contract prohibiting discrimination or retaliation, Ms. Iyer fails to state a claim.

Second, even if the alleged discrimination or retaliation did breach a contract, Ms. Iyer’s

allegation of bad faith is too conclusory. As the Defendants argue, Ms. Iyer has “failed to cite any

instances of bad faith or arbitrary and capricious conduct on behalf of GW.” Mot. Dismiss at 27.

She says that “GW’s bad faith motivation for breaching the contracts was deliberate and were in

conjunction with GW’s ire at Ms. Iyer filing complaints against Dean Davis and Dr. Gaba.”

Am. Compl. ¶ 99. But she provides no facts to support this. “A claim for breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot survive a motion to dismiss based on conclusory

allegations that a defendant was trying to evade the spirit of the contract.” PeaceTech Lab, Inc. v.

C5 Accelerate LLC, No. 20-cv-922, 2021 WL 106718, at *8 (D.D.C. Jan. 2021) (citing Mero v.

City Segway Tours of Washington DC, LLC, 826 F. Supp. 2d 100, 107 (D.D.C. 2011)).

The allegation that GW was motivated by ire resembles cases where an allegation of intent alone

was insufficient. See PeaceTech Lab, Inc., 2021 WL 106718, at *8 (“PeaceTech merely states that

‘[o]n information and belief, Mr. Pienaar intended to use his promises to PeaceTech to gain

influence and clout in Washington, DC, but did not intend to follow through on his and his

companies’ obligations to PeaceTech.’”). It falls short of the level of detail that has passed muster.

See, e.g., Paulin, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 248 (“The facts alleged by Plaintiff in her Complaint, taken as

29 true, do indeed meet that standard.”); see also Compl. ¶ 73, Paulin v. George Washington Univ.

Sch. of Med. & Health Scis., 878 F. Supp. 2d 241, 247 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 12-cv-86), ECF No. 1

(alleging that “Dr. Orcutt herself dismissed the preceptors from the room and proceeded to belittle

Ms. Paulin and to ask intrusive and inappropriate questions about her personal life”). The Court

therefore dismisses this claim.

G. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Finally, Ms. Iyer brings a tort claim against Dean Davis and Dr. Gaba for intentional

infliction of emotional distress. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 102–07. The Court agrees with the Defendants

that she fails to allege facts sufficient to support such a claim. While the alleged comments are

troubling, to be sure, they do not amount to the sort of conduct necessary to establish a claim for

the intentional infliction of emotional distress under District of Columbia law. 4

“[To] succeed on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must

show (1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant which (2) intentionally or

recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress.” Duncan v. Children’s Nat. Med. Ctr.,

702 A.2d 207, 211 (D.C. 1997) (quoting Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1312 (D.C. 1994).

“There is no general duty of care to avoid causing mental distress, and liability is not imposed for

all conduct which causes mental distress.” Id. at 211 (cleaned up). “Rather, a claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress contemplates acts so outrageous in character, and so extreme in

degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” Id. (cleaned up). Ms. Iyer fails to allege

facts that meet the mark.

First, she claims that Dean Davis and Dr. Gaba caused her “severe emotional distress” by

their “extreme and outrageous conduct.” Am. Compl. ¶ 103. Beginning with Dr. Gaba, Ms. Iyer

4 The Court applies District of Columbia law for the above reasons. See supra, at 23.

30 alleges that Dr. Gaba “yelled at her and berated her in front of other staff and made negative

comments about her to other faculty members.” Id. ¶ 30. But these sorts of “insults” and

“indignities” are not “beyond all possible bounds of decency” and are not “regarded as atrocious

and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Waldon v. Covington, 415 A.2d 1070, 1076

(D.C. 1980) (cleaned up).

And Ms. Iyer’s allegations about Dean Davis fare no better. She claims that he compared

her “appearance and mannerisms to a former lover of his who had been a ‘toxic’ influence in his

life, and he inquired about Ms. Iyer’s relationship history and current status.” Id. ¶ 29. She also

says that he swore at her and said that there was no way her father was proud of her. Id. It is true

that “the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has long declared that the creation of a hostile

work environment by . . . sexual harassment may, upon sufficient evidence, constitute a

prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Hoskins v. Howard Univ.,

839 F. Supp. 2d 268, 282 (D.D.C. 2012) (cleaned up). But this holding has been “limited . . .

to cases in which the plaintiff can show a pattern of harassment.” Paul v. Howard Univ.,

754 A.2d 297, 308 (D.C. 2000) (cleaned up). The “few isolated incidents” of harassment alleged

in the Amended Complaint are therefore insufficient to state a claim. Id.

Second, Ms. Iyer claims that Dean Davis and Dr. Gaba inflicted emotional distress by

“punishing her for filing complaints of harassment and abuse against them.” Am. Compl. ¶ 104.

But it is not entirely clear from the Amended Complaint what this punishment looked like.

One read is that they sent “letters of concern” to the Subcommittee as retaliation.

See Am. Compl. ¶ 63(a). Another read is that Dr. Gaba changed Ms. Iyer’s grade to “conditional,”

id. ¶ 34, and Dean Davis placed a call that flustered Ms. Iyer before her interview, see id. ¶ 35.

Either way, these allegations do not satisfy the high standard required to state a claim of the

31 intentional infliction of emotional distress. Cf. Wanko v. Catholic Univ. of Am., No. 08-cv-2115,

2009 WL 3052477, at *1–2, 5–6 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 2009) (dismissing an intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim where the plaintiff alleged that the professor of a course changed his grade

from a B to an F at the request of an assistant dean and that the defendants “conspired to retaliate

against him because of his discrimination complaints” (cleaned up)).

To be sure, the D.C. Court of Appeals has acknowledged that retaliation for harassment

complaints may sometimes be “so extreme and outrageous to permit recovery.” King v. Kidd,

640 A.2d 656, 673 (D.C. 1993). For example, in King v. Kidd, “after the plaintiff filed a formal

complaint, the employer ‘took active steps to help [the alleged harasser] defeat’ the complaint;

helped the harasser transfer the plaintiff against her will; ‘withdrew [the plaintiff’s] eligibility for

a promotion;’ asked the plaintiff to sign a statement that would in effect absolve [the harasser]

from any foul play;’ and denied the plaintiff a promotion by falsely claiming she had been

transferred ‘at her own request.’” Doe v. Lee, No. 19-cv-85, 2020 WL 759177, at *10

(D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2020) (quoting King, 640 A.2d at 672–74). But even all of that provided only

“the critical mass of evidence justifying liability” in combination with other conduct.

King, 640 A.2d at 673. The alleged retaliatory actions by Dr. Gaba and Dean Davis are weak in

comparison. Cf. Wise v. District of Columbia, No. 03-cv-310, 2005 WL 818622, at *5

(D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2025) (providing as an alternative basis for dismissal the fact that terminating an

employee for complaining about contract law violations did not amount to “conduct so outrageous

in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency”).

Ms. Iyer argues that she satisfied the pleading standard by alleging that this conduct was

“extreme and outrageous,” insisting that “the Court must accept as true all of Ms. Iyer’s factual

allegations[.]” Opp’n at 17. But this is too conclusory to survive a motion to dismiss. See Ashcroft

32 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept a complaint’s allegations

as true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere

conclusory statements.” (citation omitted)). The Court thus dismisses this claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,

ECF No. 15, as to Count 1 (discrimination under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act), Count 2

(retaliation under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act), and Count 4 (breach of contract), and it

grants the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, id., as to Count 3 (disability harassment under the ADA

and the Rehabilitation Act), Count 5 (breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing),

and Count 6 (intentional infliction of emotional distress).

A separate order will issue.

SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge

Date: March 31, 2025