Ixcoy-Vicente v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 9, 2026
• Docket: 25-1367
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 9 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SANDRA LUCRECIA IXCOY-VICENTE, No. 25-1367 Agency No. Petitioner, A216-962-716 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted January 7, 2026** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: RAWLINSON, M. SMITH, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Sandra Lucrecia Ixcoy-Vicente, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions

for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing her appeal

of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order denying her applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). review the denial of asylum, withholding, and CAT relief for substantial evidence.

Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). “Under this standard,

we must uphold the agency determination unless the evidence compels a contrary

conclusion.” Id. When the BIA adopts and affirms the IJ’s decision “and expresses

no disagreement” with it, as in this case, we “review the IJ’s order as if it were the

BIA’s.” Kwong v. Holder, 671 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2011). We have jurisdiction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

1. To be eligible for asylum, Ixcoy-Vicente must “demonstrate a likelihood

of ‘persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’” Sharma

v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)).

To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, she must “prove that it is more

likely than not” that she will be persecuted if returned to Guatemala “because of”

membership in a particular social group or other protected ground. Barajas-Romero

v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357, 360 (9th Cir. 2017). In this case, substantial evidence

supports the denial of asylum and withholding of removal.

First, whether reviewed for substantial evidence or de novo, Ixcoy-Vicente

did not demonstrate past persecution in Guatemala. Persecution “is an extreme

concept that means something considerably more than discrimination or

harassment.” Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1060 (quoting Donchev v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1206,

2 25-1367 1213 (9th Cir. 2009)). Ixcoy-Vicente was never seriously harmed in Guatemala, did

not face “repeated, specific” threats “combined with confrontation or other

mistreatment,” id. at 1062, was not detained, and did not suffer “‘substantial

economic deprivation that constitutes a threat to life or freedom.’” Id. (quoting

Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 2006)). While her mother and

brother were threatened by extortionists and her brother was kidnapped, those

actions were not “part of ‘a pattern of persecution closely tied to’ the petitioner

[her]self.” Id. (quoting Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009))

(alterations omitted). Although Ixcoy-Vicente’s experiences in Guatemala were at

times unfortunate, they do not rise to the level of persecution.

Second, to obtain asylum and withholding of removal, Ixcoy-Vicente must

show that the persecution was “‘committed by the government’ or, as relevant here,

‘by forces that the government was unable or unwilling to control.’” Velasquez-

Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bringas-Rodriguez v.

Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc)). Substantial evidence

supports the agency’s determination that Ixcoy-Vicente failed to make this showing,

as the record reflects that the Guatemalan government generally assisted her when

threats were reported. For example, the police investigated the kidnapping and

identity theft of her brother and arrested one of the perpetrators. And after she

reported the threats made by her husband’s cousins, a court hearing was held, and

3 25-1367 Ixcoy-Vicente obtained a mediated agreement.

Third, to show well-founded fear “[a]bsent evidence of past persecution, [an

applicant] must . . . show[ ] both a subjective fear of future persecution, as well as

an objectively ‘reasonable possibility’ of persecution upon return to the country in

question.” Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1029 (quoting Recinos De Leon v

Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 2005)). There is no well-founded fear if the

applicant “‘could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s

country,’ unless doing so would be unreasonable under the applicant’s

circumstances.” Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 648 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 8

C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii)). Here, Ixcoy-Vicente’s husband and children have been

safely living in Guatemala. Evidence in the record also shows that Ixcoy-Vicente

could work and receive familial support in Guatemala. And nothing indicates that

either the gang members who originally threatened her family, her husband’s

cousins, or the individuals who sent anonymous threats to her and her family would

be able to reach her or her family in other parts of the country.

For these reasons, substantial evidence supports the denial of asylum and

withholding of removal.1

2. As to CAT relief, we consider “whether the alien is more likely than not to

1 Because these various grounds support the denial of asylum and withholding of removal, we need not reach the IJ’s no-nexus determination.

4 25-1367 be tortured in the country of removal.” Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th

696, 704 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(4)). “To constitute torture,

an act must inflict severe pain or suffering, and it must be undertaken at the

instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official.” Andrade

v. Garland, 94 F.4th 904, 914 (9th Cir. 2024) (quotation marks and citation omitted);

see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). While “all evidence” relevant to a CAT claim

must be considered, “the existence of past torture ‘is ordinarily the principal factor

on which we rely.’” Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005)). In this case, Ixcoy-Vicente

has never experienced past torture, and nothing in the record indicates that she

would, more likely than not, be tortured in the future by or with the acquiescence of

a public official.

PETITION DENIED.2

2 Ixcoy-Vicente’s motion to stay removal, Dkt. 2, is denied. The temporary stay of removal shall remain in place until the mandate issues.

5 25-1367