Ivory v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: August 12, 2025
• Docket: S25A0862
• Status: Published

Opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 12, 2025

S25A0862. IVORY v. THE STATE.

PETERSON, Chief Justice.

Larry Ivory appeals his convictions related to the armed

robbery and murder of Deontavious Wright. On appeal, Ivory argues

that (1) the evidence was not constitutionally sufficient to sustain

his convictions, (2) the trial court erred in denying his Bruton1

motions, and (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever.

We conclude that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient; the

statements that Ivory contends were admitted in violation of his

Confrontation Clause rights under Bruton were non-testimonial,

and so Bruton does not apply; and Ivory has failed to demonstrate

that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion

1 See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (88 SCt 1620, 20 LE2d 476)

(1968). to sever. Accordingly, we affirm. 2

The evidence at trial showed the following. In March of 2015,

Deontavious lived in an apartment with his brother Sharonte

Wright, his friend John Davis, and Davis’s sister Kiana Davis.

2 The crimes occurred on March 13, 2015. On August 28, 2015, a Fulton

County grand jury indicted Ivory and co-defendants Tony Rucker and Aaron Simmons with the malice murder of Deontavious Wright (Count 1), felony murder of Deontavious predicated on home invasion, armed robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and burglary (Counts 2, 3, 4, 5), home invasion (Count 9), armed robbery of Deontavious (Count 10), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon of Deontavious (Count 11), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon of Sharonte Wright (Count 12), burglary (Count 13), cruelty to children involving J.D. and T.B. (Counts 14 and 15), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 16). Ivory was also charged with the felony murder of Deontavious predicated on possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer (Count 6) and possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer (Count 17). Following a joint jury trial held from November 7 to 17, 2016, Ivory was found guilty of all counts except the malice murder of Deontavious (Count 1) and the aggravated assault of Sharonte (Count 12). On November 23, 2016, the trial court sentenced Ivory to life in prison for the felony murder of Deontavious predicated on home invasion (Count 2), ten years in prison for the armed robbery of Deontavious (Count 10), ten years in prison for the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon of Deontavious (Count 11), 12 months in prison for each count of cruelty to children (Counts 14 and 15), five years in prison for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 16), and five years in prison for possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer (Count 17). The remaining counts merged or were vacated by operation of law. Ivory timely filed a motion for a new trial on November 29, 2016, which was amended. On August 17, 2022, Ivory filed a notice of appeal. On January 29, 2025, the trial court denied Ivory’s motion for new trial, and Ivory’s previously filed premature notice of appeal ripened. See Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 465 (1) (796 SE2d 261) (2017). On March 20, 2025, the case was docketed to the April 2025 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 Deontavious often sold drugs out of the apartment. On the morning

of March 13, 2015, the four roommates were at the apartment with

Deontavious’s girlfriend’s three-year-old child T.B., Kiana’s four-

year-old child J.D., and the mother of John’s children, Chanteka

Lynch. A woman knocked on the door, Deontavious opened the door,

and the three co-defendants, Tony Rucker, Aaron Simmons, and

Ivory, pushed past the woman into the apartment.

Rucker entered the apartment and pointed a gun at

Deontavious’s chest; meanwhile Simmons and Ivory stood guard at

the front door. Rucker demanded Deontavious empty his pockets

and took Deontavious’s drugs and money. Rucker then forced

Deontavious into the bedroom where Kiana and J.D. were and

demanded that Kiana turn over any drugs and money. Kiana told

Rucker that she did not have any drugs or money. Rucker then

forced Deontavious back to the living room to retrieve Deontavious’s

gun; John, Sharonte, Lynch, and T.B. were in that room. After

Deontavious retrieved his gun and handed it over, Rucker shot

Deontavious multiple times.

3 After the shooting ceased, Rucker, Simmons, and Ivory ran out

of the apartment. Kiana called the police, and officers were

dispatched to the area around 10:21 a.m. Deontavious died at the

scene.

At trial, John testified that although Ivory was wearing a

mask, he recognized Ivory because he had seen Ivory around the

apartment complex wearing the same clothing. Similarly, Sharonte

testified that he had seen Ivory around the apartment complex, and

he recognized Ivory from his eyebrows, hair, fingernails (which were

usually bitten down), hand tattoos, and voice. Additionally, Lynch

testified at trial that she knew Ivory because she was friends with

Ivory’s child’s mother, April Battle, and also recognized his

distinctive blue jacket and hand tattoos.

Ivory testified in his own defense that on the morning of March

13, 2015, he was at his father’s home until around noon.

Additionally, Battle testified that on the morning of the shooting,

Ivory was with her at Ivory’s father’s home until she left around

11:00 a.m. In rebuttal, the State presented cell-site location

4 evidence, which showed that on March 13, 2015, Ivory’s cell phone

was located near his father’s home at around 9:04 a.m. But at 10:02

a.m., Ivory’s cell phone was near the apartment complex where the

shooting occurred. 3

1. Ivory contends that the evidence was not constitutionally

sufficient to support his convictions because there was no forensic

evidence connecting him to the crimes and the eyewitnesses did not

see the face of the masked assailant.We disagree.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of

constitutional due process, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdicts and inquire whether a rational trier of fact

could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)

(1979). “In conducting that evaluation, it is not the job of this Court

to weigh the evidence on appeal or resolve conflicts in trial

testimony[.]” Mims v. State, 310 Ga. 853, 854 (854 SE2d 742) (2021)

3 The State also presented evidence that Ivory was on probation at the

time of the crimes. 5 (citation and punctuation omitted).

The fact that the State did not produce forensic evidence

connecting Ivory to the crime scene “does not mean that the evidence

was insufficient.” Jones v. State, 319 Ga. 758, 761 (2) (906 SE2d 699)

(2024). “Although the State is required to prove its case with

competent evidence, there is no requirement that it prove its case

with any particular sort of evidence.” Id. (punctuation and citation

omitted). Here, the State presented evidence that a masked man

entered the apartment without permission and guarded the door

while Rucker held Deontavious at gunpoint, took Deontavious’s

drugs, money, and gun, and then shot Deontavious in the presence

of two children. Three eyewitnesses — John, Sharonte, and Lynch

— testified that Ivory was that masked man. Ivory challenges the

credibility of these eyewitnesses, but this was a matter for the jury

to resolve. See Green v. State, 304 Ga. 385, 387-388 (1) (818 SE2d

535) (2018) (“It is the role of the jury to resolve conflicts in the

evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses, and the

resolution of such conflicts adversely to the defendant does not

6 render the evidence insufficient.”). Additionally, cell-site location

data showed that Ivory’s phone was near the crime scene when the

shooting occurred, corroborating the eyewitnesses’ testimony that

Ivory was one of the perpetrators. The trial evidence was therefore

constitutionally sufficient to support Ivory’s convictions, at the very

least, as a party to the crimes. See OCGA § 16-2-20 (a) (“Every

person concerned in the commission of a crime is a party thereto and

may be charged with and convicted of commission of the crime.”);

Byers v. State, 311 Ga. 259, 265 (1) (857 SE2d 447) (2021) (“[A]

defendant need not be charged specifically as a party to the crime in

order to support a conviction based on that theory.”); Powell v. State,

291 Ga. 743, 745 (1) (733 SE2d 294) (2012) (holding evidence was

sufficient to support the defendant’s murder conviction as a party to

the crime even if the defendant’s companion, and not the defendant,

fired the fatal shot, as they were engaged in a common enterprise at

the time of the shooting and it could be reasonably inferred from the

evidence that they shared a criminal intent).

2. Ivory next argues that the trial court erred in allowing

7 Genesis Woodard, the mother of Simmons’s child, to testify about

statements Simmons made after the shooting. Specifically, Woodard

testified that in May of 2015, Simmons told her that he “didn’t kill

nobody” and “[i]t was just a robbery that went wrong.” Woodard

testified that Simmons did not tell her who he was with or who

planned the robbery. The prosecutor followed up, asking, “You don’t

remember telling Detective Berhalter that [Simmons] was with

[Ivory]?” to which Woodard replied, “No.” Ivory contends that the

trial court erred by overruling his Bruton objection to Woodard’s

testimony. But Bruton applies only to testimonial statements, not to

non-testimonial statements like Simmons’s to Woodard, so the trial

court did not err in overruling Ivory’s objection.4

“A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to be confronted by the

witnesses against him is violated under Bruton when co-defendants

4 Ivory argues that there were multiple Bruton violations, but his brief

focuses only on Woodard’s testimony about Simmons’s statements. Thus, to the extent Ivory argues that any other witness’s testimony violates Bruton, those arguments are abandoned. See Supreme Court Rule 22 (“Any enumerated error or subpart of an enumerated error not supported by argument, citations to authority, and citations to the record shall be deemed abandoned.”). 8 are tried jointly and the testimonial statement of a co-defendant who

does not testify at trial is used to implicate the other co-defendant

in the crime.” Haney v. State, 305 Ga. 785, 791 (3) (827 SE2d 843)

(2019). “A statement is testimonial if its primary purpose was to

establish evidence for use in a future prosecution.” Allen v. State,

300 Ga. 500, 504 (3) (796 SE2d 708) (2017). Here, Simmons’s

statements — which were made before his arrest to his girlfriend —

were not intended for use in a future prosecution and therefore were

not testimonial. 5 See Billings v. State, 293 Ga. 99, 104 (4) (745 SE2d

583) (2013) (“The statements by [the co-defendant] at issue here

were made to his girlfriend more than two weeks before he was

arrested; they were not a product of interrogation by law

enforcement officers during an investigation intended to produce

evidence for a criminal prosecution” and thus were not testimonial.);

see also Allen, 300 Ga. at 504 (“[The co-defendant’s] statement —

which was made shortly after the crimes and before any arrests to a

friend’s uncle rather than to police officers investigating a crime —

5 Simmons was arrested on August 9, 2015.

9 clearly was not intended for use in a future prosecution and cannot

be considered testimonial.”).

“Once a determination is made that a statement is

nontestimonial in nature, normal rules regarding the admission of

hearsay apply.” Glover v. State, 285 Ga. 461, 462 (2) (678 SE2d 476)

(2009) (punctuation and citation omitted); see also Billings, 293 Ga.

at 104. Ivory does not argue that Simmons’s statements to Woodard

constitute inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, this claim fails.

3. Finally, Ivory claims that the trial court abused its discretion

by denying his motion for severance.

A trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion to sever in a murder case in which the death penalty is not sought. When ruling on such a motion, a court should consider: (1) the likelihood of confusion of the evidence and law; (2) the possibility that evidence against one defendant may be considered against the other defendant; and (3) the presence or absence of antagonistic defenses. To show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to sever, a defendant must do more than raise the existence of antagonistic defenses or the possibility that a separate trial would have given him a better chance of acquittal. The defendant must make a clear showing that a joint trial was so prejudicial as to amount to a denial of his right to due process.

10 Saylor v. State, 316 Ga. 225, 230-231 (2) (887 SE2d 329) (2023)

(punctuation and citation omitted).

Ivory has failed to demonstrate that the joint trial was so

prejudicial as to amount to a denial of his right to due process. First,

this case involved only three defendants who were tried for largely

the same offenses relating to the same incident. The law and the

evidence were substantially the same for all of them, and the State

argued that the defendants acted together to commit the crimes. See

Saylor, 316 Ga. at 231 (2) (holding that trial court did not abuse

discretion in denying defendant’s motion to sever when the case

“involved only three defendants who were tried for almost all the

same offenses relating to the same incidents,” “[t]he law and

evidence were substantially the same for all of them, and the State

argued that the defendants acted in concert in committing the

crimes”); Virger v. State, 305 Ga. 281, 290-291 (4) 824 (SE2d 346)

(2019) (same). The jury was also “instructed on mere association,

mere presence, and parties to a crime,” and it “returned a separate

verdict for each defendant pursuant to the trial court’s instruction,”

11 demonstrating that the jury was not confused by the law and the

evidence in this case. Harris v. State, 304 Ga. 276, 280 (3) (818 SE2d

530) (2018). Moreover, Ivory does not point to any specific evidence

that was admitted against his co-defendants that the jury may have

improperly considered against him (other than his Bruton claim that

we have already rejected). Rather, Ivory argues that the evidence

against him was “qualitatively different” because the eyewitnesses

saw his co-defendant’s faces but identified him based on “far less

reliable indicia.” But “severance is not required simply because the

evidence against a co-defendant is stronger.” Saylor, 316 Ga. at 232

(2). Finally, Ivory argues that severance was required because his

co-defendant’s defenses were antagonistic. But “a defendant must do

more than raise the existence of antagonistic defenses” to

demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a

motion to sever. Id. at 231 (2). Ivory has failed to point to specific

prejudice from the antagonistic defenses that would have required

the trial court to grant his motion to sever. See Lupoe v. State, 300

Ga. 233, 242 (2) (c) (794 SE2d 67) (2016); see also Walter v. State,

12 304 Ga. 760, 763-764 (2) (822 SE2d 266) (2018) (where the evidence

showed the co-defendants acted in concert, severance was not

required where the co-defendants blamed the defendant for the

shooting and claimed that they were not present during or did not

participate in the murder). Accordingly, Ivory has failed to

demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his

motion to sever, and this claim fails.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Land, J., not participating.