Ives v. Addison

232 A.2d 311, 155 Conn. 335, 1967 Conn. LEXIS 556
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
DecidedJuly 13, 1967
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 232 A.2d 311 (Ives v. Addison) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ives v. Addison, 232 A.2d 311, 155 Conn. 335, 1967 Conn. LEXIS 556 (Colo. 1967).

Opinion

Ryan, J.

On October 7,1965, the plaintiff took by eminent domain, under the provisions of General Statutes (Rev. to 1966) § 13a-73 (b), the real estate of the defendant Willa Addison, hereinafter called the defendant, located in the city of Norwalk and filed his assessment of damages with the clerk of the Superior Court for Fairfield County. Damages were assessed at $25,000. Thereafter, the defendant appealed from this assessment to the Superior Court. In accordance with § 48-11 of the General Statutes, the plaintiff deposited the sum of $25,000 with the clerk of the Superior Court. Of the sum originally on deposit, there remained in the hands of the clerk the sum of $500 subject to a claim by the plaintiff for the adjustment of real property taxes on the real estate. The defendant made application for payment from the balance on hand, claiming that the sum of $458.67 should be paid to her and the balance of $41.33, to the plaintiff.

Real property taxes in the city of Norwalk laid on the assessment list of October 1, 1964, were due on October 1, 1965. They could be paid in two equal instalments, one during the month of October, 1965, and the other during the month of April, 1966. The *337 revenue raised by these taxes was to be expended for the operation of the city of Norwalk for the fiscal year September 1, 1965, through August 31, 1966. Real property taxes in the city of Norwalk to be laid on the assessment list of October 1, 1965, did not become due until October 1, 1966. They could be paid in two equal instalments, one during the month of October, 1966, and the other during the month of April, 1967. The revenue raised by the taxes laid on the assessment list of October 1, 1965, would be expended for the operation of the city of Norwalk for the fiscal year September 1, 1966, to August 31, 1967. The assessment list of October 1, 1965, was not complete at the time of the taking and would not be complete until some time after the meetings of the board of tax review in June, 1966. The taxes to be laid on the assessment list of October 1,1965, could not be ascertained until after the meeting of the board of estimate and taxation in July, 1966, for the purpose of establishing the tax rates. On the lists of October 1, 1964, and October 1, 1965, the real property taxes on the property in question were assessed against the defendant. The matter was heard by the court, and the defendant’s application was denied. Prom this decision the defendant has appealed to this court.

The defendant does not assign error in the finding of subordinate facts but attacks the conclusions of the court in denying her application. She claims that, in the apportionment of taxes assessed against real estate in the city of Norwalk, the plaintiff, as condemnor, is bound by a long-established practice, adopted by members of the Norwalk bar in the case of a sale of real estate, of apportioning and adjusting taxes on the basis of the fiscal year within which the sale occurs. The plaintiff condemnor claims *338 that taxes must be adjusted and apportioned, not on the basis of any local custom, but as determined by the assessment date established by statute.

The defendant, in her brief, presents the respective claims of the parties as follows: “If the Addison property had been sold, rather than condemned, on October 7, 1965, the buyer and seller, in accordance with prevailing practice in the City of Nor-walk, would adjust and apportion current taxes (meaning those taxes laid on the grand list of October 1, 1964, due October 1, 1965) as follows:

“Total tax $413.26, or $1.13+ per day [the defendant] Willa Addison’s share:

September 1, 1965, to October 7, 1965, — 37 days, $ 41.90

Purchaser’s share:

October 8, 1965, to August 31, 1966 — 328 days, 371.36

“In his condemnation proceedings, however, the Highway Commissioner requires that the condem-nee assume the entire tax on the grand list of October, 1964, and also a portion of the tax, not yet determined or levied, on the grand list of October, 1965. By this method, the Commissioner charges Willa Addison as follows:

“Current taxes (grand list of October 1,

1964) to be paid in full by eondemnee $413.26 Plus a portion of tax to be laid on grand list of October 1, 1965, computed from October 1 to October 7 — 7 days 7.93

For a total charge against the eondemnee of $421.19”

The defendant claims that, in consequence of the adoption of the plaintiff’s method of adjusting *339 taxes, she has not received $25,000 (the amount of damages assessed by the plaintiff as the value of the property in the condemnation) but $25,000 less the amount of the tax adjustment. She urges that she has suffered a loss substantially greater than she would have suffered, had there been a sale and that this is not fair and just compensation in accordance with law.

In the city of Norwalk, there was an accepted practice among members of the Norwalk bar, in the case of a sale of real estate, of apportioning and adjusting taxes on the basis of the fiscal year within which the sale occurred. The first question for this court to determine is whether the plaintiff, as con-demnor, is bound by this practice. When a sale takes place, the parties are at liberty to adopt whatever method of apportionment or adjustment of taxes they may choose. Since it is a matter of contract, they may accept the practice of the Norwalk bar or they may reject it. The mere fact that it is customarily done in that manner has no compelling force in a sale of real estate unless the parties agree to it. It is difficult to understand how the plaintiff can be obliged to accept this practice.

“When any person, at the time he acquires equity in real estate, expressly assumes the payment of taxes which are to become payable thereafter, he shall become liable for the payment thereof to the same extent and in the same manner as though such real estate were assessed in his name.” General Statutes (Eev. to 1964) § 12-70. Under the terms of this statute a purchaser of real estate may, by agreement, assume the payment of taxes payable at a later date, and, if he does, he shall be liable for their payment as though he were the record owner of the property at the time of the assessment. “All *340 taxes properly assessed shall become a debt due from the person, persons or corporation against whom they are respectively assessed to the town, city, district or community in whose favor they are assessed, and may be, in addition to the other remedies provided by law, recovered by any proper action in the name of the community in whose favor they are assessed.” General Statutes (Eev. to 1964) § 12-161. The record owner of the real estate as of the date of the assessments of October 1, 1964, and October 1,1965, was the defendant. “The party against whom a tax is assessed is directly liable for the tax and his duty [to pay it] is clear.” Middletown Savings Bank v. Bacharach, 46 Conn. 513, 524; Ashley Realty Co. v. Metropolitan District, 132 Conn. 551, 556, 46 A.2d 13; see Worobey v. Sibieth,

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
232 A.2d 311, 155 Conn. 335, 1967 Conn. LEXIS 556, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ives-v-addison-conn-1967.