It's My Seat, Inc. v. Hartford Capital, LLC

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: March 30, 2021
• Docket: 2:20-cv-06378
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

O 1

2 3 4 5 6 7

8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California

11 IT’S MY SEAT, INC. et al., Case № 2:20-cv-06378-ODW (AFMx)

12 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

13 v. MOTION TO DISMISS [12]

14 HARTFORD CAPITAL LLC, et al.,

15 Defendants.

16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiffs It’s My Seat, Inc. and Vahe Shahinian brought this action against 19 Defendants Hartford Capital LLC; Bryan Stein aka Boris Shteyngart; Craig Leszczak 20 aka Craig Walters; Kevin Woodley; EIN CAP, Inc.; Russell Naftali; and Gene Slavin 21 (collectively, “Defendants”), in the Superior Court of the State of California, Los 22 Angeles County. (See Notice of Removal (“NOR”) ¶ 1, Ex. 1 (“Compl.”), ECF 23 No. 1.) Defendants Stein, Walters, and Hartford Capital removed the action to this 24 Court and moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.1 25 (Mot. to Dismiss (“Motion” or “Mot.”), ECF No. 12.) For the reasons discussed 26 below, the Court DENIES the Motion.2 27 1 Stein is the only remaining Defendant. (See Order Dismissing Defs., ECF No. 23.) 28 2 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 II. BACKGROUND3 2 Vahe Shahinian is the owner of It’s My Seat, Inc., a ticketing vendor and 3 concert promoter operating and incorporated in California. (Compl. ¶¶ 1–2.) Hartford 4 is a New York-based lender in the Merchant Cash Advance (“MCA”) industry. (Decl. 5 of Vahe Shahinian (“Shahinian Decl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 18-1; Decl. of Stas Leszczak ¶ 2, 6 ECF No. 12.) Walters and Stein are New York residents with offices in New York, 7 and are representatives of Hartford. (Shahinian Decl. ¶ 3; Decl. of Boris Shteyngart 8 aka Bryan Stein (“Stein Decl.”) ¶¶ 3, 5, ECF No. 12; Decl. of Craig Leszczak aka 9 Craig Walters ¶¶ 3, 5, ECF No. 12; Compl. ¶¶ 25–26.) 10 In January 2019, It’s My Seat, Inc. was in the market for a low rate business 11 loan when Walters contacted Plaintiffs and emailed a Hartford loan application. 12 (Compl. ¶¶ 23, 25.) On January 8, 2019, Stein contacted Plaintiffs on behalf of 13 Hartford and promised them a $750,000 line of credit (“Term Loan”), but only if 14 Plaintiffs first took a “Bridge Loan” of $250,000 for thirty days (the “Agreement”). 15 (Compl. ¶ 26; Shahinian Decl. ¶ 3.) Stein informed Plaintiffs that the Bridge Loan 16 would be in the form of a MCA to be funded by Defendant EIN CAP, with an interest 17 rate of 15% monthly. (Compl. ¶ 26.) Stein explained that Defendants would 18 transition the Bridge Loan to a Term Loan with an annual rate of 8.89% after the first 19 thirty days, so Plaintiffs would not have to pay the Bridge Loan to term at the higher 20 interest rate. (Id.) Under the Agreement, Plaintiff had to make uninterrupted daily 21 payments of $3,600 on the Bridge Loan and could not take any other loans for thirty 22 days. (Id.) Stein sent Plaintiffs the Bridge Loan documents, which Plaintiffs signed, 23 notarized, and sent to EIN CAP, per Stein’s direction. (Id. ¶ 27; Shahinian Decl. ¶ 4.) 24 The next day, Plaintiffs asked Stein what would happen if the Bridge Loan did 25 not transition to the Term Loan after thirty days as promised. (Compl. ¶ 28.) Stein 26 reassured Plaintiffs that they should “believe in the ‘sincerity in his voice,’” that there 27 3 Uncontroverted allegations in the complaint are taken as true, and any conflicts in the facts or 28 statements contained in affidavits are resolved in Plaintiffs’ favor. See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). 1 was nothing to worry about, and Stein and the other Defendants would handle the 2 transition. (Id.) Stein requested that Plaintiffs not mention the transition to EIN CAP 3 because the “paper shuffler at EIN” had “no idea about the back-end plans of EIN and 4 Hartford.” (Id. ¶ 29.) Also, when Plaintiffs received the Bridge Loan on January 10, 5 2019, $22,000 had been deducted in unexpected “funding fees,” but Stein promised 6 Plaintiffs he would return the $22,000 as a credit in the transition. (Id. ¶ 30.) 7 On February 8, 2019, as the thirty-day period was closing, Plaintiffs contacted 8 Stein to ensure all was in order for the transition. (Id. ¶ 34.) The thirtieth day came 9 and went with no word from Stein or any other Defendant. (Id. ¶ 35.) On 10 February 12, 2019, Plaintiffs again contacted Stein, requesting the status of the 11 transition from the Bridge Loan to the Term Loan. (Id.) Stein replied that it was 12 “being worked on.” (Id.) Throughout the following month, Stein “reassure[d]” 13 Plaintiffs numerous times that the transition to the Term Loan was coming, with 14 “string-along statements” such as: “I expect an update soon . . . .”; “Only update . . . 15 was ‘wait for the link’ which is positive.”; “No issue.”; “They are delayed. The file is 16 not declined. . . . I will be in touch with an update . . . .”; “I am doing everything I can 17 to get this pushed through.” (Id.) 18 Due to the delay in the transition, Plaintiffs continued making the daily payment 19 of $3,600 for seventy days, forty days longer than originally agreed. (Id. ¶ 36.) 20 Consequently, Plaintiffs faced serious financial jeopardy and were forced to obtain 21 two emergency loans from third-parties. (Id. ¶ 38.) Defendants then claimed 22 Plaintiffs’ third-party loans violated the Agreement and, on that basis, refused to 23 provide the Term Loan. (Id.) 24 On October 28, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against the eight named 25 Defendants in the Superior Court of the State of California, Los Angeles County, 26 asserting seven causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of implied 27 covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) promissory estoppel; (4) fraud; 28 (5) intentional misrepresentation; (6) negligent misrepresentation; and (7) violation of 1 California Legal Remedies Act. (See Compl. ¶¶ 42–95.) On July 17, 2020, three 2 Defendants—Stein, Walters, and Hartford—removed the action to this Court. (NOR.) 3 As of the removal, only Stein had been served. (NOR ¶ 2; Decl. of Stella Park ¶¶ 2–3, 4 ECF No. 12.) 5 On October 19, 2020, Defendants Stein, Walters, and Hartford moved to 6 dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. (See generally Mot.) The Motion is fully 7 briefed. (See Opp’n, ECF No. 18; Reply, ECF No. 19.) On November 30, 2020, after 8 granting Plaintiffs several extensions of time to serve Defendants, the Court dismissed 9 all Defendants other than Stein because Plaintiffs failed to serve them in a timely 10 manner. (Order Dismissing Defs. 2.) Thus, Stein is the only remaining moving 11 Defendant. 12 III. LEGAL STANDARD 13 Personal jurisdiction is a question of law, with the “burden of proof . . . on the 14 plaintiff to show that jurisdiction is appropriate.” Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 15 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). If a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is based 16 on written pleadings, as here, “the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of 17 jurisdictional facts.” Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 18 (9th Cir. 1977). Uncontroverted allegations in the complaint are taken as true and any 19 conflicts in the facts or statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the 20 plaintiff’s favor. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800. 21 For a federal court sitting in diversity to exercise personal jurisdiction over a 22 nonresident defendant: (1) the state jurisdictional statute must confer personal 23 jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction must 24 comport with federal constitutional due process. Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. 25 Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986). California’s 26 long-arm jurisdictional statute is coextensive with federal due process requirements, 27 making the state and federal limits coextensive. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800-01; 28 1 Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1286. Thus, the question becomes whether the exercise of 2 personal jurisdiction comports with due process. Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1396. 3 IV. DISCUSSION 4 Stein moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. 5 (Mot. 8.) For personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant like Stein to 6 comport with due process, the defendant must have “such ‘contacts’ with the forum 7 State that ‘the maintenance of the suit’ is reasonable . . . and ‘does not offend 8 traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. 9 Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., No. 19-368, --- S. Ct. ----, 2021 WL 1132515, at *4 (U.S. 10 Mar. 25, 2021) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 11 California courts may exercise jurisdiction “over a nonresident defendant if he has 12 enough continuous contacts with California to subject him to the court’s general 13 jurisdiction or if the specific cause of action arises out of a defendant’s more limited 14 contacts with the state so that California may exercise limited or specific jurisdiction 15 over him.” Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiffs 16 argue Stein is subject to both general and specific jurisdiction. (See Opp’n 7.) 17 A. General Jurisdiction 18 For general personal jurisdiction to exist over a nonresident defendant, a 19 defendant’s contact with a forum state must be so pervasive as to render them 20 “‘essentially at home’ in the State.” Ford Motor Co., 2021 WL 1132515, at *4 21 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 22 (2011)). Plaintiffs’ only argument is that other Defendants have described Stein as a 23 “local” California defendant, prior to removal. (Opp’n 7.) This conclusory assertion 24 is far from sufficient to establish that Stein is “essentially at home” in California. See 25 Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. Plaintiffs therefore fail to establish a prima facie case of 26 general jurisdiction. 27 28 1 B. Specific Jurisdiction 2 The question of personal jurisdiction, then, turns on whether Stein’s relevant 3 contacts with Plaintiffs enable this Court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction in 4 this case. Where a defendant’s contacts are “not so pervasive as to subject him to 5 general jurisdiction,” the Ninth Circuit applies a three-part specific jurisdiction test: 6 (1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he 7 purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in 8 the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. (2) The claim must be one which arises out of or results from the 9 defendant’s forum-related activities. (3) Exercise of jurisdiction must 10 be reasonable. 11 Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1287. The plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima facie 12 showing of the first two prongs, but “the burden then shifts to the defendant to 13 ‘present a compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” 14 Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 15 462, 476–78 (1985)). 16 1. Purposeful Availment 17 As to the first prong, the exact form of the inquiry depends on nature of the 18 claim. For claims sounding in contract, as in Plaintiffs’ first claim for breach of 19 contract, the Ninth Circuit applies a “purposeful availment” analysis that asks whether 20 a defendant has “purposefully avail[ed] [himself] of the privilege of conducting 21 activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its 22 laws.” Id. at 802 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).4 To have 23 purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing business in the forum, a 24

25 4 As discussed below, the Court finds it may exercise personal jurisdiction over Stein related to the contract claim. Thus, the Court need not reach personal jurisdiction related to Plaintiffs further 26 claims because, even where personal jurisdiction exists over one claim but not others, a district court may exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over remaining claims that arise out of the same 27 “common nucleus of operative facts.” Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015). As all 28 of Plaintiffs’ claims arise from the same common nucleus of operative facts concerning the Bridge Loan and Term Loan, pendant personal jurisdiction would be appropriate. 1 defendant must “have performed some type of affirmative conduct which allows or 2 promotes the transaction of business within the forum state.” Sher, 911 F.2d at 1362 3 (quoting Sinatra v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988)). 4 In evaluating the “jurisdictional significance of a defendant’s contract or other 5 business in the forum,” the Ninth Circuit applies a “practical and pragmatic” approach 6 that is neither rigid nor formalistic. Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 7 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478). “[A] contract alone does not 8 automatically establish minimum contacts in the plaintiff’s home forum.” Id. at 1017. 9 Rather, there must be “actions by the defendant himself that create a ‘substantial 10 connection’ with the forum State.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475. Courts consider 11 “prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the 12 contract and the parties’ actual course of dealing.” Id. at 479; Hall v. LaRonde, 13 56 Cal. App. 4th 1342, 1347 (1997). The origin of the contract at issue is also 14 relevant, as solicitation of business within the forum will likely amount to purposeful 15 availment. Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1195. 16 Here, Stein asserts he never traveled to California for business dealings with 17 Plaintiffs and contends no facts support Plaintiffs’ allegations of his California 18 contacts. (Mot. 10.) Yet, “physical presence in the forum is not a prerequisite to 19 jurisdiction.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014). Rather, “physical entry 20 into the State—either by the defendant in person or through an agent, goods, mail, or 21 some other means—is certainly a relevant contact.” Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, 22 as society and technology evolve, “there is no reason why the requisite minimum 23 contacts cannot be electronic.” Hall, 56 Cal. App. 4th at 1347. Thus, Stein’s lack of 24 travel to California is not determinative. 25 Plaintiffs allege numerous phone calls, text messages, electronic and regular 26 mail, and other correspondence between Stein and Shahinian on multiple dates. (See 27 Shahinian Decl. ¶ 6; see also, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 26–30, 33–35.) Stein confirms that he 28 initiated the conversation on January 8, 2019, and continued communicating with 1 Plaintiffs regarding the Agreement through March 2019. (Stein Decl. ¶¶ 9–13, 15.) 2 As alleged, these conversations included Stein’s solicitation and promises, the 3 negotiation and formation of the Agreement underlying the Bridge and Term Loans, 4 and the parties’ actual course of dealing over the relevant time period. Moreover, the 5 Agreement clearly contemplated future obligations, though relatively short term, as 6 Stein repeatedly reassured Plaintiffs that he would handle the eventual transition of the 7 Bridge Loan to the Term Loan. These affirmative acts by Stein in conducting 8 business with Plaintiffs in California are sufficient to establish his purposeful 9 availment of the forum. 10 Although Stein correctly argues that his contacts with California may not be 11 judged by the activities of Hartford or the other Defendants, his purported status as 12 independent contractor does not somehow insulate him from personal jurisdiction 13 here. (See Reply 6.) The Court evaluates Stein’s contacts with California 14 individually, Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980), and in this case, Stein is 15 arguably the primary participant in the alleged wrongdoing directed at a California 16 citizen and business, (see Compl. ¶¶ 26–35). 17 Finally, Stein argues the entirety of his involvement was merely “one random 18 call,” and not sufficient to subject him to personal jurisdiction here. (Reply 10.) But 19 this is plainly not true, particularly in light of the entire course of dealing between the 20 parties. Plaintiffs’ allegations and the declarations of both parties show that Stein was 21 substantially involved in the transactions. (See Compl. ¶¶ 26–38; Stein Decl. ¶¶ 9–14; 22 Shahinian Decl. ¶¶ 3–7.) It was Stein who offered Plaintiffs the Term Loan 23 conditioned on the Bridge Loan; Stein who explained the obligations governing 24 Plaintiffs’ receipt of the Term Loan; and Stein who repeatedly promised the eventual 25 transition of Bridge Loan to Term Loan. (Compl. ¶¶ 26–28; Stein Decl. ¶¶ 9–13.) For 26 months, Stein assured Plaintiffs that they could trust in the “sincerity in his voice,” 27 that the Term Loan was coming and merely “delayed,” and there was “[n]o issue.” 28 (Compl. ¶ 35; Stein Decl. ¶ 13.) Ultimately, Stein is responsible for both the “prior 1 negotiations and contemplated future consequences” of the Agreement, which 2 supports the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479. 3 In reaching out to Plaintiffs in California on numerous occasions to transact 4 business with a California company, Stein has “manifestly availed himself of the 5 privilege of conducting business” in California and purposely derived a benefit from 6 those interstate activities. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476; Hall, 56 Cal. App. 4th 7 at 1347. It is thus “fair to require that he account in California for the consequences 8 that arise from such activities.” See Hall, 56 Cal. App. 4th at 1347. The purposeful 9 availment prong is met. 10 2. The Claims’ Relation to Defendant’s Forum Activities 11 The next requirement is that the claims at issue “‘arise out of or relate to the 12 defendant’s contacts’ with the forum.” Ford Motor Co., 2021 WL 1132515, at *4; 13 Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1287. Even a “single forum state contact can support 14 jurisdiction if the cause of action arises out of that particular purposeful contact of the 15 defendant with the forum state.” Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et 16 L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2006) (alterations and internal 17 quotation marks omitted). 18 Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim against Stein arises directly out of his 19 contacts with the forum. Stein admits he called Plaintiffs in California to solicit and 20 conduct business in the form of the Bridge and Term Loan deal, and the contract at 21 issue stems directly from that contact. (Stein Decl. ¶ 9.) Stein’s contacts with the 22 forum state are therefore integral and essential parts of Plaintiffs’ claim. See Dole 23 Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding defendants’ 24 contacts with the forum state integral and essential to the scheme giving rise to 25 plaintiff’s claims). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claim arises out of Stein’s forum-related 26 activities in soliciting their business in California, and the second prong is satisfied. 27 28 1 3. Reasonableness 2 As It’s My Seat has made a prima facie showing of the first two prongs, the 3 burden shifts to Stein to “set forth a ‘compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction 4 would not be reasonable.” CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 5 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476–78). It is not enough that 6 a defendant show another forum is “more reasonable than California.” Sher, 911 F.2d 7 at 1365. Rather, a defendant “must show a due process violation; it must show that 8 jurisdiction in California would make the litigation ‘so gravely difficult and 9 inconvenient that a party unfairly is at a severe disadvantage in comparison to his 10 opponent.’” Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478). Courts in the Ninth Circuit 11 evaluate seven factors in making this reasonableness determination: 12 (1) the extent of the defendants’ purposeful injection into the forum 13 state’s affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the 14 defendant’s state; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the 15 dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff’s interest in convenient 16 and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum. 17 18 Dole Food Co., 303 F.3d at 1114. As no single factor is dispositive, the Court must 19 balance them. Roth, 942 F.2d at 623. 20 The main thrust of Stein’s unreasonableness argument is that he was involved 21 in only “one random transaction,” in which he played a “small and indirect part,” and 22 requiring him to travel to California to litigate would cause him “a great financial 23 burden.” (Reply 10.) Stein fails to set forth a compelling case that exercise of 24 jurisdiction would be unreasonable in this case. 25 First, the Court has already concluded that Stein purposefully injected himself 26 into California to conduct business with Plaintiffs. He took affirmative steps to solicit 27 business in California and spent months nurturing that California business relationship 28 with Plaintiffs. This factor thus weighs in favor of Plaintiffs. Second, while litigation 1 in California may be inherently burdensome on an out-of-state defendant, modern 2 “advances in transportation and telecommunications and the increasing interstate 3 practice of law” have significantly reduced any burden. CollegeSource, Inc., 653 F.3d 4 at 1080. Moreover, “[u]nless such inconvenience is so great as to constitute a 5 deprivation of due process, it will not overcome clear justifications for the exercise of 6 jurisdiction.” Roth, 942 F.2d at 623. Therefore, any burden on Stein to litigate in the 7 forum state is not so great as to sway this factor in his favor 8 Third, the “conflict of sovereignty” factor is not particularly dispositive in the 9 reasonableness analysis. See Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1199. A “minimum-contacts 10 analysis presupposes that two or more States may be interested in the outcome of a 11 dispute, and . . . potentially conflicting ‘fundamental substantive social policies’ can 12 usually be accommodated through choice-of-law rules rather than through outright 13 preclusion of jurisdiction in one forum.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 484 n.26 (citation 14 omitted). Additionally, this factor is not a very significant in cases, such as this one, 15 which involve only U.S. citizens. Brand v. Menlove Dodge, 796 F.2d 1070, 1076 n.5 16 (9th Cir. 1986); see Sher, 911 F.2d at 1365 (discussing that where two states have an 17 interest in the litigation, it can be difficult to find either one more reasonable). This 18 factor therefore weighs neutral. Fourth, California “has a manifest interest in 19 providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by 20 out-of-state actors.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 (internal quotation marks omitted). 21 As Plaintiffs are California citizens and It’s My Seat’s principal place of business is in 22 California, this factor favors Plaintiffs. See Dole Food Co., 303 F.3d at 1116 (finding 23 this factor favored plaintiff where plaintiff’s principal place of business was in 24 California). 25 Fifth, generally, “[t]he site where the injury occurred and where evidence is 26 located usually will be the most efficient forum.” Pac. Atl. Trading Co., Inc. v. M/V 27 Main Exp., 758 F.2d 1325, 1331 (9th Cir. 1985). But this factor is “no longer 28 weighed heavily given the modern advances in communication and transportation.” 1 || Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, the injury 2 || occurred in California, where It’s My Seat and Shahinian were harmed by Stein’s 3 || alleged breach of the Agreement. On the other hand, Plaintiffs are in California and 4|| Stein is in New York, so potential evidence is likely located in both fora. Therefore, 5 || this factor weighs only slightly in favor of Plaintiffs. Sixth, Plaintiffs have a 6 || substantial interest in seeking relief in California, which serves as It’s My Seat’s 7 || principal place of business and Shahinian’s residence. (Compl. 4] 1-2.) This factor 8 | favors Plaintiffs. Finally, seventh, “[w]hether another reasonable forum exists 9 || becomes an issue only when the forum state is shown to be unreasonable.” 10 | CollegeSource, 653 F.3d at 1080. Stein has not made that showing. 11 Weighing the factors, the Court finds that Stein has failed to make a compelling 12 || case that the exercise of jurisdiction in California would not be reasonable. 13 4. Summary 14 Stein purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing business in the 15 | forum; Plaintiffs’ claims arise from Stein’s contacts with the forum; and Stein has 16 || failed to make a compelling case that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be 17 | unreasonable. Accordingly, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Stein is 18 || appropriate, and the Court DENIES Stein’s Motion. 19 V. CONCLUSION 20 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Stein’s Motion to Dismiss. 21 | (ECF No. 12.) 22 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 25 March 30, 2021 26 Nt

28 OTIS D. GHT, II UNITED STATES,DISTRICT JUDGE