Isra Fruit Ltd. v. Agrexco Agricultural Export Co.

631 F. Supp. 984, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28226
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 13, 1986
Docket85 CIV. 0909 (PKL)
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 631 F. Supp. 984 (Isra Fruit Ltd. v. Agrexco Agricultural Export Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Isra Fruit Ltd. v. Agrexco Agricultural Export Co., 631 F. Supp. 984, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28226 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).

Opinion

OPINION

LEISURE, District Judge:

In this action plaintiff, Isra Fruit Ltd. (“Isra Fruit”), alleges violations of, inter alia, Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72, as well as pendent state law claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, misappropriation of trade secrets and unfair competition. Defendants, Agrexco Agricultural Export Company Limited and Agrexco (U.S.A.) Ltd. (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Agrexco” or defendant), have moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 56 to dismiss portions of the complaint.

Isra Fruit and Agrexco were competitors in the business of importing fresh Israeli produce into the United States. Plaintiff *986 alleges that it entered the market as Agrexco’s only competitor and that Agrexco unlawfully drove it from the market, consequently restoring defendant’s monopoly. More specifically, the complaint alleges that defendant succeeded in reacquiring the monopoly by selling produce at prices below cost; engaging in discriminatory pricing; inducing plaintiff to enter into an agreement to form a jointly owned company and then, after plaintiff had discontinued its operations, breaching the agreement; and misappropriating plaintiff’s trade secrets.

Agrexco moves to dismiss the Sherman Act § 2 claims on the basis that the joint venture agreement itself was an agreement to monopolize the market and therefore plaintiff did not suffer injury “of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489, 97 S.Ct. 690, 697, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977). Agrexco contends that plaintiff’s antitrust claims are based on defendant’s refusal to proceed with an agreement to monopolize a market and pool the resulting monopoly profits with plaintiff. Defendant’s theory misconstrues the thrust of the complaint, which is that Isra Fruit entered into the joint venture agreement not to monopolize the market but, rather “to make the best of a bad situation.” Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 140, 88 S.Ct. 1981, 1985, 20 L.Ed.2d 982 (1968). Moreover, the fact that plaintiff stood to gain if the agreement were carried out does not deprive it of the right to resort to the antitrust laws. If “it is shown that the plaintiff did not aggressively support and further the monopolistic scheme ... his understandable attempts to make the best of a bad situation should not be a ground for completely denying him the right to recover which the antitrust acts give him.” Id. Defendant ignores the complaint’s allegations that its deliberate anticompetitive activities drove plaintiff to enter into the joint venture agreement, thus eliminating competition. The instant case is thus distinguishable from Brunswick, which holds that there can be no antitrust injury where the activities complained of “preserved competition.” 429 U.S. at 488, 97 S.Ct. at 697.

The rationale for allowing a party to assert an antitrust claim despite the existence of unclean hands was summarized by Justice White in his concurring opinion in Perma Life Mufflers.

When those with market power and leverage persuade, coerce, or influence others to cooperate in an illegal combination to their damage, allowing recovery to the latter is wholly consistent with the purpose of § 4 [of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15], since it will deter those most likely to be responsible for organizing forbidden schemes.

392 U.S. at 145, 88 S.Ct. at 1988 (White, J., concurring). This statement provides guidance pertinent to the circumstances portrayed by the complaint in this action. Contrary to defendants’ contention, plaintiff’s antitrust claims do not seek to enforce the joint venture agreement, but rather to utilize the antitrust laws as redress for defendants’ use of monopoly power to drive plaintiff out of business. The joint venture, according to the complaint, was an instrument employed by defendants to achieve that end. Under the teaching of Perma Life Mufflers, plaintiff’s participation in that agreement does not bar it from asserting an antitrust claim.

The allegation that plaintiff was forced to enter into the joint venture agreement by reason of defendant’s activities distinguishes this case from cases such as Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893, 102 S.Ct. 388, 70 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), where the court held that a corporation that sold its assets to a competitor did not allege Brunswick antitrust injury upon breach of the purchase agreement, because the corporation had voluntarily withdrawn from the market. Any injury incurred was related to breach of the acquisition agreement, not to any reduction of competition in the marketplace. Chrysler Corp., 643 F.2d at 1235; see also McDonald v. Johnson & *987 Johnson, 722 F.2d 1370, 1375-76 (8th Cir.1983), ce rt. denied, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 219, 83 L.Ed.2d 149 (1984). In this case, it is alleged that the joint venture agreement was entered into by plaintiff as a last gasp effort to survive defendant’s predatory and monopolistic tactics, which had already driven plaintiff to the brink of elimination from competition. In other words, defendant’s alleged anticompetitive acts gave rise to the agreement. McDonald, 722 F.2d at 1378 (antitrust standing would exist if it were alleged that a competitor “forced or attempted to force competitors to sell out to them by threats or other predatory conduct”). The use of the joint venture agreement to obtain plaintiff’s withdrawal from competition purportedly occurred in the context of defendant’s prior anticompetitive activities. Unlike the circumstances presented in Chrysler, the joint venture agreement was part of an ongoing course of alleged monopolistic activity. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 119, 68 S.Ct. 947, 952, 92 L.Ed. 1245 (1948) (inference that agreement was used as a “weapon ... in an effort to monopolize” was justified “against the backdrop of ... other monopolistic practices”). Plaintiff’s alleged injury thus stems “from that which makes defendant's] acts unlawful,” Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489, 97 S.Ct.

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Bluebook (online)
631 F. Supp. 984, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28226, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/isra-fruit-ltd-v-agrexco-agricultural-export-co-nysd-1986.