Island Creek Coal Company v. DOWCP

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedMay 15, 2025
Docket23-1708
StatusUnpublished

This text of Island Creek Coal Company v. DOWCP (Island Creek Coal Company v. DOWCP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Island Creek Coal Company v. DOWCP, (4th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 23-1708 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/15/2025 Pg: 1 of 5

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-1708

ISLAND CREEK COAL COMPANY,

Petitioner,

v.

CURTIS M. OSBORNE; DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board. (21-0611 BLA)

Submitted: March 27, 2025 Decided: May 15, 2025

Before THACKER and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: John R. Sigmond, Jason A. Mullins, PENN, STUART & ESKRIDGE, Bristol, Tennessee, for Petitioner. Brad A. Austin, WOLFE WILLIAMS & REYNOLDS, Norton, Virginia, for Respondent Curtis M. Osborne. David Casserly, Amanda Torres, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Federal Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-1708 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/15/2025 Pg: 2 of 5

PER CURIAM:

Island Creek Coal Company (“Employer”) petitions for review of the Benefits

Review Board’s (“Board”) decision and order affirming the administrative law judge’s

(ALJ) award of miner’s benefits to Curtis M. Osborne under the Black Lung Benefits Act,

30 U.S.C. §§ 901-944. Employer challenges the ALJ’s finding that Osborne suffers from

a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment. We deny the petition.

“We review the findings of the ALJ, as affirmed by the Board, to determine if they

are supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law.” Am. Energy, LLC v.

Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 106 F.4th 319, 330 (4th Cir. 2024) (alterations and

internal quotation marks omitted); see W. Va. CWP Fund v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp.

Programs, 880 F.3d 691, 697 (4th Cir. 2018) (“Smith”) (“In black lung cases, our review

is highly deferential.”). “To determine whether this standard has been met, we consider

whether all of the relevant evidence has been analyzed and whether the ALJ has sufficiently

explained his rationale in crediting certain evidence.” Hobet Mining, LLC v. Epling,

783 F.3d 498, 504 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

But “the duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence rests with the ALJ as factfinder.

And when conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant

is disabled or has pneumoconiosis, the responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ.”

Sea “B” Mining Co. v. Addison, 831 F.3d 244, 252 (4th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, in

conducting our analysis, “we do not undertake to reweigh contradictory medical evidence,

make credibility determinations, or substitute our judgment for that [of the ALJ].” Id.

Indeed, “[s]o long as an ALJ’s findings . . . are supported by substantial evidence, they

2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1708 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/15/2025 Pg: 3 of 5

must be sustained.” Epling, 783 F.3d at 504. “Substantial evidence is more than a mere

scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.” Addison, 831 F.3d at 252 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Nevertheless, “our deference to an ALJ’s factual findings is not unlimited,” as the

“ALJ must still conduct an appropriate analysis of the evidence to support his conclusion.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus, even if legitimate reasons exist for rejecting

or crediting certain evidence, the ALJ cannot do so for no reason or for the wrong reason.”

Id. at 252-53 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Furthermore, as a

condition to appellate review, an ALJ must adequately explain why he credited certain

evidence and discredited other evidence.” Id. at 253 (internal quotation marks omitted).

While “this requirement is not intended to be a mandate for administrative verbosity, a

reviewing court must be able to discern what the ALJ did and why he did it.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Generally, to establish eligibility for benefits, a miner must demonstrate that:

(1) “he has pneumoconiosis, in either its clinical or legal form”; (2) “the pneumoconiosis

arose out of coal mine employment”; (3) “he is totally disabled by a pulmonary or

respiratory impairment”; and (4) “his pneumoconiosis is a substantially contributing cause

of his total disability.” W. Va. CWP Fund v. Bender, 782 F.3d 129, 133 (4th Cir. 2015)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see 20 C.F.R. § 725.202(d)(2) (2024). “But for certain

miners, Congress has made it easier to establish eligibility for benefits.” Smith, 880 F.3d

at 695. If the miner proves that he was employed in underground coal mines or in

substantially similar conditions for at least 15 years, that he has had a chest x-ray

3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1708 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/15/2025 Pg: 4 of 5

interpreted as negative for complicated pneumoconiosis, and that he has a totally disabling

respiratory or pulmonary impairment, he is entitled to the rebuttable presumption that he

is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4); 20 C.F.R. § 718.305(b)

(2024).

Here, the parties do not dispute that Osborne worked in underground coal mines or

substantially similar conditions for at least 15 years. But the parties disagree as to whether

Osborne established that he is totally disabled due to a respiratory or pulmonary

impairment and, therefore, is entitled to the rebuttable presumption.

“[A] miner shall be considered totally disabled if the miner has a pulmonary or

respiratory impairment which, standing alone, prevents . . . the miner . . . [f]rom

performing his . . . usual coal mine work” or comparable work. 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(b)(1)

(2024). “A miner’s usual coal mine work has been interpreted to mean the most recent job

the miner performed regularly and over a substantial period of time.” Samons v. Nat’l

Mines Corp., 25 F.4th 455, 459 (6th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A miner can prove a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment through:

(1) qualifying pulmonary function tests; (2) qualifying arterial blood gas studies (ABG);

(3) a showing that [t]he miner has pneumoconiosis” and that he “suffer[s] from cor

pulmonale with right-sided congestive heart failure”; or (4) well-documented and well-

reasoned physicians’ opinions “conclud[ing] that [the] miner’s respiratory or pulmonary

condition prevents . . . the miner from engaging in” his last mining job or comparable

work. 20 C.F.R.

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