Island Creek Associates, LLC v. United States

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

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ISLAND CREEK ASSOCIATES, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee

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2025-1140

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Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in No. 1:24-cv-00554-DAT, Judge David A. Tapp.

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Decided: September 16, 2026

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NICOLE DESIREE POTTROFF, Koprince McCall Pottroff LLC, Lawrence, KS, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by JOHN LEE HOLTZ, SHANE J. MCCALL, GREGORY PHILLIP WEBER.

PATRICK ANGULO, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington , DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by STEVEN MICHAEL MAGER, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, BRETT SHUMATE.

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Before DYK, REYNA, and STARK, Circuit Judges.

2 ISLAND CREEK ASSOCIATES, LLC v. US

REYNA, Circuit Judge.

Island Creek Associates, LLC appeals the judgment of the United States Court of Federal Claims dismissing its five-count complaint for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm, but on alternative grounds. The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over Counts I–III and V of the complaint because these counts are moot by corrective action taken by the government. The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over Count IV because the relief sought in Count IV is barred under the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994’s task order bar. 10 U.S.C. § 3406(f). To the extent Count IV challenges the contract to fellow awardee Precise Systems Inc., Island Creek lacks statutory standing to challenge this award.

BACKGROUND

I. SeaPort-NxG MAC

On February 14, 2018, the United States Navy (“Navy”

or “agency”) issued a solicitation for proposals for indefinite -delivery, indefinite-quantity (“IDIQ”) multiple award contracts (“MACs”), referred to in the solicitation as the “SeaPort-Next Generation” MAC (“SeaPort-NxG MAC”). 1 The solicitation contemplated a maximum of $10 billion in engineering and program management services, to be obtained from numerous awardees of a SeaPort-NxG MAC. J.A. 67.

On January 2, 2019, the Navy awarded a SeaPort-NxG MAC, Contract No. N0017819D7896, to appellant Island Creek Associates, LLC (“Island Creek”). J.A. 40. The Navy

1 An “IDIQ” contract “allows an agency to issue a broad solicitation for a general procurement goal and then more detailed solicitations for individual task orders as specific needs arise.” 22nd Century Techs., Inc. v. United States, 57 F.4th 993, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2023).

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also awarded, respectively, SeaPort-NxG MAC Contract Nos. N0017819D7533 and N0017819D8321 to non-parties Don Selvy Enterprises, Inc. (“DSE”) and Precise Systems Inc. (“Precise”). These three contracts had the same terms. Id.

There are three sections of the SeaPort-NxG MAC that together explain which companies can hold a SeaPort-NxG MAC. First, Section C.10.2 of the SeaPort-NxG MAC, titled “One Prime Contract Per Company,” provided that the agency would award only one SeaPort-NxG MAC per one “company,” also referred to as a “Prime contract holder.” J.A. 79. Section C.10.2 noted that a “[c]ompany” included “affiliates” and “Joint Ventures.” Id. This section also noted that an “affiliated company” could submit a proposal in response to a task order solicitation issued under the SeaPort-NxG MAC but that such proposal had to be submitted through the account of the “Prime contract holder and the proposal should clearly identify the affiliate as the prime.” Id.

Second, Section C.10.1 of the SeaPort-NxG MAC, titled “Definitions,” defined “[a]ffiliates” as “business concerns that are affiliates of each other if, directly or indirectly, either one controls or has the power to control the other, or another concern controls or has the power to control both.” Id.

Third, Section C.10.3 clarified how the “One Prime Contract Per Company” rule applied to joint ventures. J.A. 144. 2 Section C.10.3 provided that:

2 Section C.10.3 was not part of the original terms of the SeaPort-NxG MAC. The agency later added it to the terms of the contract via a “mass modification,” meaning the terms of all issued SeaPort-NxG MACs were uniformly modified.

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A Joint Venture and individual partners in the Joint Venture can only hold one SeaPort NxG MAC. If one partner of the Joint Venture holds a Prime MAC contract, then the Joint Venture entity cannot also hold a subsequent Prime MAC contract . Members of the Joint Venture must decide which - the Joint Venture or the individual partner - would be the Prime MAC holder.

J.A. 144.

On September 15, 2022, the U.S. Small Business Administration (“SBA”) approved DSE and Precise to participate in the SBA’s “Mentor-Protégé Program” (“MPP”) with DSE as the protégé company and Precise as the mentor company. J.A. 348, J.A. 352. 3 On October 14, 2022, DSE and Precise entered a joint venture named Secise, LLC (“Secise”). J.A. 348.

On January 4, 2024, the Navy issued its twelfth mass modification to the SeaPort-NxG MAC, giving rise to the below bid protest proceedings (“January 4, 2024 Modification ”). J.A. 349. In addition to making several other modifications to the SeaPort-NxG MAC not at issue in this appeal, see J.A. 278–319, the twelfth modification created an exception to the “One Prime Contract Per Company” rule for joint ventures participating in the SBA’s MPP. See J.A. 292. Under this exception, a joint venture could hold a SeaPort-NxG MAC, as could mentor and protégé companies . See id. In other words, as relevant here, the joint

3 The SBA’s MPP allows “small businesses with limited industry experience (protégés) [to] partner with experienced government contractors (mentors) to compete for federal procurement contracts.” SH Synergy, LLC v. United States, 165 Fed. Cl. 745, 751 (2023) (citation modified ) (quoting 13 C.F.R. § 125.9(a)).

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venture, the mentor, and the protégé could each hold a distinct SeaPort-NxG MAC. Meanwhile, for those joint ventures not participating in the SBA’s MPP, the joint venture and its constituent partners could not each hold a SeaPort- NxG MAC. The January 4, 2024 Modification implemented this new rule by modifying the (1) definition of “Affiliates ” in section C.10.1, (2) “One Prime Contract Per Company” rule in section C.10.2, and (3) definition of a “joint venture” in section C.10.3. See J.A. 292.

On January 10, 2024, the agency issued a task order under the SeaPort-NxG MAC to Secise. J.A. 351, ¶100. 4 II. Underlying Bid Protest On April 10, 2024, Island Creek filed a five-count complaint in the United States Court of Federal Claims (“Federal Claims Court”) under the Tucker Act bid protest jurisdiction provided at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). Count I challenged the agency’s “Amendment,” i.e., the January 4, 2024 Modification, as making “an exception” for SBA’s MPP joint ventures, who “could hold a SeaPort contract even if one or more of their members do.” J.A. 354, ¶117. According to Island Creek, the “[a]mendment” violated the Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) § 1.602-2(b) provision that contracting officers shall “[e]nsure that contractors receive impartial, fair, and equitable treatment.” J.A. 354, ¶113 (quoting FAR § 1.602-2(b)).

Count II challenged the agency’s “Actions,” i.e., the action of:

amend[ing] SeaPort in such a manner so as to allow contractors with [MPP] joint ventures who both

4 It is not clear from the record below whether Secise held a SeaPort-NxG MAC at the time it was awarded a task order. Compare J.A. 351, ¶¶101–02, with J.A. 351–53, ¶¶104–07.

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individually hold a SeaPort contract and whose joint venture hold[s] a SeaPort contract to maintain both contracts, giving said contractors an advantage in being able to bid either a joint venture or on their own.

J.A. 355, ¶127. According to Island Creek, the “amendment ” violated FAR § 3.101-1, which requires “[g]overnment business” to be conducted “with complete impartiality and with preferential treatment for none.” J.A. 355, ¶126 (quoting FAR § 3.101-1).

Count III challenged the SeaPort-NxG MAC’s “Provisions ,” i.e., the “amendment” which “benefit[ed] and treat[ed] [MPP] joint ventures and their component members differently with regards to ability to hold SeaPort IDIQ contracts simultaneously and remain eligible for awards whereas other joint ventures [could] not.” J.A. 356, ¶133. According to Island Creek, the “amendment” violated FAR § 16.505(b)(1), which provides that for orders under MACs, the “contracting officer must provide each awardee a fair opportunity to be considered for each order exceeding the micro-purchase threshold issued under multiple delivery-order contracts or multiple task-order contracts .” J.A. 356, ¶132 (quoting FAR § 16.505(b)(1)).

Count IV, unlike counts I–III, did not directly challenge the January 4, 2024 Modification but rather the agency’s “Fail[ure] to Conduct Conflicts Analysis and Mitigation Required by FAR 9.504 and 9.506.” J.A. 356. These two FAR provisions concern steps the agency must take to evaluate whether an organizational conflict of interest (“OCI”) exists between the contracting agency and potential bidders as early in the acquisition process as possible, and the steps the agency should take to address such conflicts . See J.A. 357, ¶¶138–40 (quoting FAR § 9.504(a), (c), and citing FAR § 9.506). Count IV alleged that a “significant potential conflict of interest” existed between the agency and Precise. J.A. 357, ¶141. Specifically, Jeff

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Guarnero, a Naval contracting official that was “heavily influential and involved in the administration of Seaport,” was married to Diana Sovine, a program manager at Precise who worked on the SeaPort-NxG procurement. J.A. 358, ¶¶142–43. Count IV referenced the January 4, 2024 Modification as “evidence[]” of a conflict of interest, specifically an unequal access to information conflict of interest arising from their spousal relationship that resulted in a “substantial and unfair competitive advantage” to Precise . J.A. 358, ¶¶145, 148–49.

Count V challenged the “amendment,” i.e., the January 4, 2024 Modification, as “unduly restrictive” and as “favor [ing] certain offerors without justification.” J.A. 359 (citation modified). Specifically, Count V alleged that “[t]here is no patent reasonable basis as to why [SBA’s MPP] joint ventures are favored to the exclusion of all other joint ventures .” J.A. 360, ¶163.

As relief, Island Creek requested: a) [] SeaPort [to] be amended so as to properly follow federal procurement law. b) An order that a full investigation be conducted . . . regarding the conflict of interest between Guarnero and Precise; c) An order directing the Agency to conduct proper conflicts analysis and mitigation in accordance with FAR §§ 9.504 and 9.506; d) That Jeff Guarnero recuse himself from involvement with all task order procurements containing the changed language in SeaPort; e) Any other relief that this Court deems appropriate.

J.A. 360–61.

On May 1, 2024, the Navy filed with the Federal Claims Court a notice of agency partial corrective action (“Corrective Action”) in which it noted it was going to take corrective action that at least “partially moot[ed]” Island Creek’s protest. J.A. 412–13. The Navy explained that it 8 ISLAND CREEK ASSOCIATES, LLC v. US

was going to reverse the portion of the January 4, 2024 Modification at issue in Island Creek’s protest, which included reversal of modifications to Sections C.10.1, C.10.2, and C.10.3 of the SeaPort-NxG MAC, “thereby reinstating the prior definition of ‘Affiliates,’ removing the mentor-protégé exception to the one prime contract per company rule, and reverting to the previous language concerning joint ventures.” J.A. 412.

On that same day, the Navy filed a motion to dismiss Island Creek’s complaint, arguing that its Corrective Action mooted Counts I–III and V since Island Creek “obtained all relief contemplated” by these counts, “namely the amendment of SeaPort NxG MAC.” J.A. 429–30. As to Count IV, the Navy argued this count must be dismissed as barred by the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (“FASA”), which bars a bid protest from being filed in the Federal Claims Court that is “in connection with the issuance or proposed issuance of a task or delivery order,” except in limited circumstances not at issue in Island Creek’s protest. J.A. 432–33 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 3406(f)). 5 Island Creek responded that the Corrective Action did not moot Counts I–III and V because the “underlying concern in each count is the conflict of interest that drove the modification to the SeaPort NxG IDIQ contract,” and thus

5 The Navy alternatively argued that dismissal of all counts was necessary because Island Creek lacked statutory standing under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) because it was not an “interested party” under this provision. J.A. 435–36. The Navy also alternatively argued that dismissal of a subset of counts was necessary because these counts related to contract administration and thus Island Creek first needed to comply with requirements under the Contract Disputes Act to fall within the Federal Claims Court’s jurisdiction, requirements that Island Creek had not yet completed. J.A. 430–32.

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“[s]imply changing the language back to the previous language does not resolve this concern.” J.A. 499. As to Count IV, Island Creek argued that the FASA bar did not apply because this count does not involve “a protest of any task order or even a group of task orders” but rather “a change in the underlying [SeaPort-NxG MAC]” that stemmed from a conflict of interest. J.A. 503–04.

On August 28, 2024, the Federal Claims Court granted the Navy’s motion to dismiss on the ground that Island Creek was not an “interested party” under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) and thus lacked statutory standing to bring any count in its complaint. J.A. 7–18. The Federal Claims Court declined to address the Navy’s primary arguments on mootness and the FASA bar. Id.

Island Creek timely appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a grant of a motion to dismiss. Harmonia Holdings Grp., LLC v. United States, 999 F.3d 1397, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 2021). We also review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. SRA Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 766 F.3d 1409, 1412 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

DISCUSSION

We decide this appeal based on mootness principles and the FASA bar at 10 U.S.C. § 3406(f). Wyandot Nation of Kan. v. United States, 858 F.3d 1392, 1397 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“We may affirm the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal on any ground supported by the record.”). We begin with the mootness of Counts I–III and V and then turn to the FASA’s barring of Count IV.

I. Counts I–III and V

The parties dispute whether the Corrective Action mooted Counts I–III and V of Island Creek’s complaint. See Appellee Br. 42–47; Reply Br. 21. For the following 10 ISLAND CREEK ASSOCIATES, LLC v. US

reasons, we determine that the Corrective Action mooted these counts.

“Although the Court of Federal Claims is an Article I tribunal, it generally adheres to traditional justiciability standards applicable to courts established under Article III.” Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States, 782 F.3d 1345, 1351 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Associated Energy Grp., LLC v. United States, 131 F.4th 1312, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2025). “Article III of the Constitution grants the Judicial Branch authority to adjudicate ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies .’” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90 (2013). “A case becomes moot—and therefore no longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III—when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id. at 91 (citation modified ). A defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice will not necessarily moot the litigation unless the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) “there is no reasonable expectation . . . that the alleged violation will recur , and (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” Cty. of L.A. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (citation modified ; emphases added). “When both conditions are satisfied it may be said that the case is moot because neither party has a legally cognizable interest in the final determination of the underlying questions of fact and law.” Id.

The first condition is met here because there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation pleaded in Counts I–III and V, i.e., the allegedly improper January 4, 2024 Modification, will reoccur. Put another way, there can be no reasonable expectation that the Navy will reissue a modification to the SeaPort-NxG MAC that would once again implement the challenged portions of the January 4, 2024 Modification.

Island Creek suggests, without evidence, that the government could reverse the Corrective Action and thus the

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alleged violation will likely reoccur. See, e.g., Reply Br. 21 (acknowledging the government’s representation to this court that it “permanently” reversed the January 4, 2024 Modification but arguing that “simply saying something that can be easily changed back is ‘permanent’ borders on the absurd”). Island Creek’s speculation does not rise to the level of evidence needed to overcome the presumption of good faith. “[G]overnment officials are presumed to act in good faith.” Savantage Fin. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 595 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2010). This presumption stands unless proof to the contrary is “almost irrefragable.” Galen Med. Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “Almost irrefragable proof amounts to clear and convincing evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). Below, the government represented to the Federal Claims Court it would “make permanent the suspension of the January 4, 2024 modifications.” J.A. 412. On appeal, the government represented to this court that the Navy “permanent[ly] reversed the contested contract modification . . . and there is no indication that the Navy will reinstate a modification that no longer exists.” Appellee Br. 46 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Oral Argument 14:17–14:24 (government’s counsel representing that the January 4, 2024 Modification “has been permanently suspended”). Given the presumption of good faith and the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the government’s representations made below or on appeal are false, we determine that there is no reasonable expectation that the Navy will reinstate the January 4, 2024 Modification .

The second condition is met here because the Corrective Action eradicated the effects of the “alleged violation” pleaded under Counts I–III and V, i.e., that the January 4, 2024 Modification violated the FAR when it provided joint ventures in the SBA’s MPP with an unfair advantage in the SeaPort-NxG procurement. See J.A. 354, ¶113; J.A. 355, ¶127; J.A. 356, ¶132; J.A. 359; J.A. 360, ¶163.

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The Navy’s Corrective Action rescinded the January 4, 2024 Modification as to Sections C.10.1, C.10.2, and C.10.3 such that competition for task orders under the SeaPort- NxG MAC reverted back to the previous “One Prime Contract Per Company” rule, i.e., that all joint ventures, regardless of participation in the SBA’s MPP, could not hold a SeaPort-NxG MAC if one of its constituent partners held one. Thus, the Navy’s Corrective Action eradicated the allegedly improper effects of the January 4, 2024 Modification .

Island Creek argues that the Corrective Action did not eradicate the effects of the Navy’s “alleged violation,” arguing that violation was not simply the January 4, 2024 Modification but also the “underlying concern” of OCI between the Navy and Precise. Reply Br. 21. We are not persuaded. Counts I–III and V plainly allege, and solely focus on, the alleged harms stemming from the January 4, 2024 Modification . See J.A. 353–55, ¶¶112–24 (Count I); J.A. 355–56, ¶¶125–30 (Count II); J.A. 356, ¶¶131–35 (Count III); J.A. 359–60, ¶¶153–64 (Count V). Confirming our conclusion that the Navy’s Corrective Action mooted Counts I–III and V is that the Corrective Action granted the relief that Island Creek sought in relation to these counts, i.e., that “SeaPort be amended so as to properly follow federal procurement law.” See J.A. 360. Thus, because the relief sought by Island Creek concerning the January 4, 2024 Modification “has been granted . . . the case should generally be dismissed.” Chapman L. Firm Co. v. Greenleaf Constr . Co., 490 F.3d 934, 939 (Fed. Cir. 2007). For these reasons, the Navy’s Corrective Action mooted I–III and V and we affirm the Federal Claims Court’s dismissal of these counts.

II. Count IV

We next review whether Count IV’s allegation that the Navy failed to check for and mitigate an OCI between the Navy and Precise, which arose from the spousal

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relationship between Mr. Guarnero and Ms. Sovine, falls under the FASA bar at 10 U.S.C. § 3406(f). 6 For the following reasons, we determine that it does.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1), the Federal Claims Court has jurisdiction to hear bid protests of certain federal contracts. This provision states that:

the Unite[d] States Court of Federal Claims . . . shall have jurisdiction to render judgment on an action by an interested party objecting to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a

6 Count IV also alleges that the OCI between the Navy and Precise “influenced” the January 4, 2024 Modification . See J.A. 358, ¶148. This portion of Count IV, which connects the OCI to the January 4, 2024 Modification, is moot for the same reasons Counts I–III and V are moot. Additionally, to the extent that Island Creek is protesting the award of a Seaport-NxG MAC award to Precise under Count IV, Island Creek lacks statutory standing to challenge Precise’s status as a Seaport-NxG MAC awardee. See Oral Arg. at 8:48–57 (appellant’s counsel stating that “there has yet to be an investigation [into the alleged OCI]” and that “this company [Precise] should not be allowed to be on this IDIQ”). To bring a bid protest under the Tucker Act, Island Creek must be an “interested party.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). To be an interested party for the purposes of contesting Precise’s Seaport-NxG MAC award, Island Creek would need to be an “actual or prospective bidder []”—that is, a disappointed bidder—for the contract Precise won. See Percipient.ai, Inc. v. United States, 153 F.4th 1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (en banc). However, Island Creek was a successful bidder for a Seaport-NxG MAC and could not have been an actual or prospective bidder for the contract awarded to Precise.

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proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award of a contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement.

28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1).

The Federal Claims Court’s bid protest jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) is limited by 10 U.S.C. § 3406(f), a provision in FASA which bars judicial review of protests “in connection with” the issuance or proposed issuance of task orders except in limited circumstances not at issue here (“FASA bar”). The FASA bar provides that:

[a] protest is not authorized in connection with the issuance or proposed issuance of a task or delivery order except for—(a) a protest on the ground that the order increases the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract under which the order is issued ; or (b) a protest of an order valued in excess of $35,000,000.

10 U.S.C. § 3406(f) (2026). 7 It further provides that the Comptroller General of the United States “shall have exclusive jurisdiction of a protest authorized under paragraph (1)(B),” i.e., protests of an order valued in excess of $35,000,000. Id. This statutory language “is clear and gives the [Federal Claims Court] no room to exercise jurisdiction over claims made ‘in connection with the issuance or proposed issuance of a task or delivery order.’” 22nd

7 There are two FASA bars. One applies to public contracts generally. See 41 U.S.C. § 4106(f)(1). One applies to the Department of Defense. See 10 U.S.C. § 3406(f)(1). While the text of these provisions is similar, there are different monetary thresholds over which task order protests may be heard by the Comptroller General. Here, 10 U.S.C. § 3406(f)(1) is applicable because the Navy operates under the oversight of the Department of Defense.

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Century, 57 F.4th at 998 (citation modified). We have interpreted the “in connection with” language to bar protests in which there was a direct and causal connection between the protest and the agency’s issuance, or proposed issuance , of task orders. See id. at 998–1000 (affirming decision that FASA barred bid protest of the SBA’s determination that bidder was no longer a “small business” under its regulations, which ultimately disqualified bidder from being awarded a particular task order, because there was a “direct and causal” connection between the SBA’s determination and the task order award); see also SRA Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 766 F.3d 1409, 1413 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that FASA barred bid protest of the contracting agency’s waiver of an OCI because the waiver “was directly and causally connected to issuance of [a task order], despite being executed after issuance”).

Here, there is a direct and causal connection between Count IV and the Navy’s issuance of task orders under the SeaPort-NxG MAC, and thus the FASA bar applies as to Count IV. This count alleges that the Navy’s failure to check for and mitigate an OCI between the Navy and Precise , which allegedly arose from the spousal relationship between Mr. Guarnero and Ms. Sovine, violated several OCI provisions of the FAR. J.A. 356–57, ¶¶136–41. This alleged unchecked and unmitigated OCI is directly and causally connected to the Navy’s issuance of task orders under the SeaPort-NxG MAC. Specifically, Count IV alleges that OCI skews the competition of task orders under the SeaPort-NxG MAC in favor of Precise. See J.A. 357, ¶141 (alleging that the OCI “undermines normal competition ” under the SeaPort-NxG MAC); J.A. 358, ¶145 (alleging that “an obvious risk of unequal access to information . . . arises from the spousal relationship that could result in a substantial and unfair competitive advantage for Precise . . . ”); J.A. 358, ¶146 (alleging that “obvious risk of partiality and bias . . . arises from the spousal relationship that could result in substantial and unfair competitive 16 ISLAND CREEK ASSOCIATES, LLC v. US

advantage for Precise”); J.A. 358, ¶147 (alleging that Mr. Guarnero “has acted, in fact, to exploit the conflict of interest in making awards to Precise”). Thus, even though Count IV does not explicitly reference a particular task order , the alleged OCI clearly has a direct and causal connection to the Navy’s issuance of task orders under the SeaPort-NxG MAC. See Oral Argument, 4:20–4:27 (appellant ’s counsel noting that “[t]he OCI should not just be ignored . The OCI had a significant impact on competition here.”). For these reasons, FASA bars Count IV of Island Creek’s complaint. 8 CONCLUSION

We have considered Island Creek’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons , we affirm the Federal Claims Court’s dismissal of Island Creek’s five-count complaint. We hold that Counts I–III and V are moot in light of the Navy’s Corrective Action and Count IV is barred by FASA’s provision at 10 U.S.C. § 3406(f)(1). To the extent Count IV challenges the IDIQ contract award to Precise, Island Creek lacks statutory standing to challenge this award.

AFFIRMED

8 Following oral argument, Island Creek moved for leave to supplement the record with a list of task orders “relevant to the conflict of interest arguments of the protest .” ECF No. 63 at 2-3. We deny the motion as moot. As previously discussed, Count IV, which challenges the OCI, is barred under FASA. Information about particular task orders allegedly tainted by this OCI does not change this conclusion. If anything, such information would support our conclusion that Count IV has a direct and causal connection to the issuance of task orders and thus is barred by FASA.