Islam v. Sammey

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedJuly 1, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-03954
StatusUnknown

This text of Islam v. Sammey (Islam v. Sammey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Islam v. Sammey, (E.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MOHAMMAD T. ISLAM, Plaintiff, 25-CV-5441 (LTS) -against- TRANSFER ORDER HESHAM SAMMEY, et al., Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this action pro se. He asserts claims for unpaid wages against four individuals affiliated with a luxury limousine service in Queens County. For the following reasons, this action is transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. DISCUSSION Under the general venue statute, a civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . ; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). For venue purposes, a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and an “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued” resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2). Plaintiff provides addresses for all Defendants at their places of employment in Queens County. It is therefore unclear if venue of Plaintiff’s claims lies in this district under Section 1391(b)(1), based on the residence of defendants, because the complaint does not allege facts about where Defendants are domiciled.

Venue of Plaintiff’s claims also does not appear to be proper in this district under Section 1391(b)(2) based on the place where the events giving rise to the claims occurred. Plaintiff alleges that his claims occurred on June 1, 2025, in Queens County (ECF 1 at 5), and he does not allege that any substantial part of his claim arose in this district. Queens County is within the Eastern District of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 112. Because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Queens County, venue is proper under Section 1391(b)(2) in the Eastern District of New York. Even if venue is proper in the district where a case is filed, a court may transfer the case “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice” to any other district where it might have been brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In determining whether transfer is

appropriate, courts consider the following factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. Keitt v. N.Y. City, 882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). Under Section 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate in this case. The underlying events occurred in Queens County, where Plaintiff and Defendants worked. It is reasonable to expect that all relevant documents and witnesses would be in Queens County. The Eastern District of New York therefore appears to be a more convenient forum for this action.

Accordingly, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006) (“District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.”). CONCLUSION The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this Court. This order closes the case in the Southern District of New York. The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). SO ORDERED. Dated: July 1, 2025 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Keitt v. New York City
882 F. Supp. 2d 412 (S.D. New York, 2011)

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Bluebook (online)
Islam v. Sammey, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/islam-v-sammey-nyed-2025.