Isenberg v. Isenberg

Opinion

Isenberg v Isenberg

2026 NY Slip Op 05087

August 26, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Susan Isenberg, respondent,

v

Mark Isenberg, appellant.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 26, 2026

2024-11343, (Index No. 34898/24)

Angela G. Iannacci, J.P.

Janice A. Taylor

Carl J. Landicino

Elena Goldberg Velazquez, JJ.

Mark Isenberg, Monsey, NY, appellant pro se.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Sherri L. Eisenpress, J.), dated October 22, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to enforce an order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, dated March 25, 2024, and to suspend the plaintiff's obligation to pay maintenance until the defendant complied with the order dated March 25, 2024, and reserved decision on those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to hold the defendant in civil contempt for failure to comply with the order dated March 25, 2024, and to impose sanctions upon the defendant.

ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order dated October 22, 2024, as reserved decision on those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to hold the defendant in civil contempt for failure to comply with the order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, dated March 25, 2024, and to impose sanctions upon the defendant is dismissed, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,

ORDERED that the order dated October 22, 2024, is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.

The parties were divorced in June 2019 by a judgment of divorce of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, which incorporated a memorandum of understanding (hereinafter the MOU). Pursuant to the MOU and an arbitration agreement executed by the parties, the parties agreed to submit to binding arbitration, before a chosen rabbi, the matter of the issuance of a Jewish divorce decree, known as a "get." In August 2022, the arbitrator issued an award directing the defendant to facilitate a Jewish divorce in a rabbinical court. The defendant did not comply with the award.

The plaintiff thereafter moved to confirm the arbitration award. In an order dated March 25, 2024, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, confirmed the arbitration award and ordered the defendant to deliver a "get" to the plaintiff immediately (hereinafter the March 2024 Chancery Division order). In an order dated April 12, 2024, the same court, sua sponte, transferred the matter to the Supreme Court, Rockland County.

The plaintiff thereafter moved in the Supreme Court, inter alia, (1) to enforce the March 2024 Chancery Division order, (2) to hold the defendant in civil contempt for his failure to comply with the March 2024 Chancery Division order, (3) to impose sanctions for each day that the [*2]defendant did not comply, and (4) to suspend the plaintiff's maintenance obligation until the defendant complied with the March 2024 Chancery Division order. The defendant opposed the motion. In an order dated October 22, 2024, the court, among other things, (1) granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to enforce the March 2024 Chancery Division order and to suspend the plaintiff's obligation to pay maintenance until the defendant complied with that order, and (2) reserved decision on those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to hold the defendant in civil contempt and to impose sanctions upon the defendant. The defendant appeals.

The appeal from so much of the order dated October 22, 2024, as reserved decision on those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to hold the defendant in civil contempt and to impose sanctions upon the defendant must be dismissed. That portion of that order did not determine those branches of the motion, which remained pending and undecided (see CPLR 5701[a][2][v]; Indictor v Indictor, 236 AD3d 879, 881).

"The First Amendment forbids civil courts from interfering in or determining religious disputes, because there is substantial danger that the state will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrines or beliefs" (Matter of Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. v Kahana, 9 NY3d 282, 286; see New Hope Christian Church, Inc. v Parks, 236 AD3d 669, 670). However, "[c]ivil disputes involving religious parties or institutions may be adjudicated without offending the First Amendment as long as neutral principles of law are the basis for their resolution" (Matter of Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. v Kahana, 9 NY3d at 286; see Jones v Wolf, 443 US 595, 602-604). The "neutral principles of law" approach "contemplates the application of objective, well-established principles of secular law to the dispute, thus permitting judicial involvement to the extent that it can be accomplished in purely secular terms" (Avitzur v Avitzur, 58 NY2d 108, 115 [citation omitted]; see Khan v Hasan, 219 AD3d 1420, 1421).

Here, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to enforce the March 2024 Chancery Division order and to suspend the plaintiff's obligation to pay maintenance until the defendant complied with the March 2024 Chancery Division order. Contrary to the defendant's contention, this matter can be decided solely upon the application of neutral principles of law without reference to any religious principles or doctrine (see Jones v

Wolf, 443 US at 602-603; Avitzur v Avitzur, 58 NY2d at 114-115). In seeking the enforcement of the March 2024 Chancery Division order, which confirmed the arbitration award, "'the relief sought by [the plaintiff] . . . is simply to compel [the defendant] to perform a secular obligation to which he contractually bound himself'" (Schwartz v Schwartz, 79 AD3d 1006, 1009, quoting Avitzur v Avitzur, 58 NY2d at 115; see Fischer v Fischer, 237 AD2d 559, 560).

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.

IANNACCI, J.P., TAYLOR, LANDICINO and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court