Isabella Dailey v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor

936 F.2d 241, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11876, 1991 WL 97693
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJune 12, 1991
Docket90-3572
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 936 F.2d 241 (Isabella Dailey v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Isabella Dailey v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, 936 F.2d 241, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11876, 1991 WL 97693 (6th Cir. 1991).

Opinion

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner Isabella Dailey (hereinafter “claimant”) appeals from an order of the Benefits Review Board, United States Department of Labor (“the Board”), denying her motion for reconsideration of her claim for Black Lung Benefits. The motion was denied because it was filed outside the 30-day period provided by 20 C.F.R. § 802.407 and the Board held that it could not consider an untimely motion. We have jurisdiction over this action under 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). Because we find that the Board does have the power to review an untimely motion for reconsideration, we REMAND to the Board.

I.

’ This case arises from a claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. Benefits under the Act are awardable to persons who are totally disabled within the meaning of the Act due to pneumoconiosis, or to the survivors of persons who were so totally dis *242 abled at the time of their death or whose death was caused by pneumoconiosis. Pneumoconiosis, more commonly known as black lung disease, is a disease of the lungs caused by dust which can arise from coal mine employment.

The claimant, who has acted pro se throughout this case, is the widow of Grover Dailey, a former coal miner. In 1976, Mr. Dailey filed a claim for Black Lung Benefits. His claim was denied by the Department of Labor in 1979, and Mr. Dai-ley died in 1980. The claimant filed a survivor’s claim following her husband’s death, which was denied in 1981. Claimant requested a formal hearing, which was held in July 1984.

On November 13, 1984, the Administrative Law Judge (AU) hearing the case issued a Decision and Order denying benefits. Claimant appealed to the Board. After protracted procedural delays not relevant here, the Board affirmed the AU’s denial of benefits on September 30, 1988. Federal regulations provide that a motion for reconsideration of a Board decision may be filed within 30 days of such decision. 20 C.F.R. § 802.407.

By letter dated October 28, 1988, and postmarked November 2, 1988, claimant filed a motion for reconsideration with the Board. Therein, she offered a full explanation of why she believed the ALJ’s findings to have been incorrect. On November 30, 1988, claimant wrote a letter to the Board, explaining why she was unable to mail the motion for reconsideration until November 2, 1988, and related a telephone conversation between herself and an unnamed docket clerk at the Board on October 19, 1988. Claimant stated that this person told her three times that she would have 30 days from the date of receipt of the Board’s denial decision to request reconsideration. Claimant contends that she received the Board's September 30, 1988 decision on October 6, 1988.

On December 7, 1989, the Board denied claimant’s motion for reconsideration because it was not timely filed. The Board stated:

A motion for reconsideration of a Board decision must be filed within thirty (30) days of the date on which the decision is issued. 20 C.F.R. § 802.407. Since the Board’s Decision and Order was issued on September 30, 1988, claimant’s motion for reconsideration should have been filed on or before October 30, 1988. However, since October 30, 1988 was a Sunday, the time for filing a motion for reconsideration was extended until October 31, 1988. Claimant’s letter postmarked November 2, 1988 was untimely for reconsideration; accordingly, the Board could not consider it

The Board did not review the merits of claimant’s motion, nor did the Board consider her explanation for filing the motion out of time. Rather, the Board simply concluded that it could not consider Mrs. Dailey’s motion because it was not filed within the 30-day period prescribed by 20 C.F.R. § 802.407(a). 1

Petitioner appealed to this Court. The question presented is whether the 30-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration with the Board, 20 C.F.R. § 802.407(a), is jurisdictional, as held by the Board, or whether the Board has discretion to consider such untimely motions.

II.

The question of whether the time limit for seeking reconsideration of a decision by the Board is jurisdictional has not, to our knowledge, been decided previously.

The Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (Director) contends that the time limit for filing motions for reconsideration of Board decisions under section 802.407(a) is not jurisdictional and may be enlarged by the Board within its discretion. Our review of the rules of practice and procedure governing the operation of the Board convinces us that the Director is correct. *243 Part 802 of 20 C.F.R. establishes “the rules of practice and procedure governing the operation of the Benefits Review Board.” 20 C.F.R. § 802.101(a) (1990). 2 We turn to those regulations to ascertain the procedural rules governing actions before the Board.

In stating that it “could not” consider claimant’s motion for reconsideration, the Board relied on section 802.407. That section, captioned “Reconsideration of Board decisions,” provides in relevant part:

(a) Any party-in-interest may, within 30 days from the filing of a decision ... by a panel or [sic] the Board ..., request reconsideration of such decision....

Clearly, the language of section 802.407 does not answer the question confronting us. It is silent regarding the nature and import of the 30-day period. We therefore turn to the other provisions of Part 802 for guidance.

Section 802.205, entitled “Time for filing,” concerns the time limit for filing a notice of appeal of an AU’s decision with the Board. That section provides in part that “[a] notice of appeal ... must be filed within 30 days from the date upon which [the appealable decision is filed.]” 20 C.F.R. § 802.205(a). However, that section also states that “[failure to file within the [30-day period] shall foreclose all rights to review by the Board with respect to the case or matter in question. Any untimely appeal will be summarily dismissed by the Board for lack of jurisdiction.” 20 C.F.R. § 802.205(c). This regulation makes clear that, for filing an appeal with the Board, the 30-day period of the regulations is jurisdictional.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Peabody Coal Company v. Abner
118 F.3d 1106 (Sixth Circuit, 1997)
Peabody Coal Co. v. Abner
118 F.3d 1106 (Sixth Circuit, 1997)
Mann v. OWCP
107 F.3d 21 (Tenth Circuit, 1997)
Patton v. Block Mountain Min., Inc.
47 F.3d 1170 (Sixth Circuit, 1995)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
936 F.2d 241, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11876, 1991 WL 97693, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/isabella-dailey-v-director-office-of-workers-compensation-programs-ca6-1991.