Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC2024-0058 ____________
ISAAC “IKE” PERLMUTTER, et al., Petitioners,
vs.
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Respondents.
June 11, 2026
MUÑIZ, C.J.
In Florida, a claimant must make a reasonable evidentiary
showing and obtain the trial court’s permission before pleading a
claim for punitive damages. Then, at trial, the standard of proof for
punitive damages claims is clear and convincing evidence. The
question is whether the clear and convincing evidence standard
applies when the trial court evaluates the sufficiency of the
claimant’s evidentiary showing at the pleading stage. We hold that
it does not. I
Harold Peerenboom initiated this lawsuit by suing Isaac and
Laura Perlmutter for defamation, alleging that the couple were
responsible for a hate mail campaign against him. The Perlmutters
countersued for defamation, theft, and invasion of privacy.
Eventually, they sought the trial court’s permission to add
counterclaims for punitive damages. The narrow issue before our
Court involves the legal standard for evaluating the evidentiary
showing that a claimant must make before being allowed to plead
such claims.
We begin by identifying some basic features of our state’s law
of punitive damages. Traditionally, those damages have been
available to address “egregious wrongdoing” that “constitutes a
public wrong.” Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla.
1986). Punitive damages are imposed not to compensate the
plaintiff, but for punishment and deterrence. Id. Given these
underlying purposes, Florida courts have long allowed juries to
consider the financial worth of the defendant in cases where the law
and facts would allow an award of punitive damages. See, e.g.,
-2- Jones v. Greeley, 6 So. 448, 449 (Fla. 1889). Importantly, even
when the plaintiff has established the predicate for an award of
punitive damages at trial, the decision whether to make such an
award is left to the jury’s discretion. St. Regis Paper Co. v. Watson,
428 So. 2d 243, 247 (Fla. 1983). In that sense, punitive damages
are fundamentally different from compensatory damages, which the
plaintiff is entitled to once the defendant’s liability has been
established. Id.
This case centers on section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, one of
many measures the Legislature has enacted over time to limit
overreach in the pursuit of punitive damages. It reads:
In any civil action, no claim for punitive damages shall be permitted unless there is a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such damages. The claimant may move to amend her or his complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages as allowed by the rules of civil procedure. The rules of civil procedure shall be liberally construed so as to allow the claimant discovery of evidence which appears reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence on the issue of punitive damages. No discovery of financial worth shall proceed until after the pleading concerning punitive damages is permitted.
Our Court has held that this provision “creates a substantive legal
right not to be subjected to a punitive damages claim and ensuing
-3- financial worth discovery until the trial court makes a
determination that there is a reasonable evidentiary basis for
recovery of punitive damages.” Simeon, Inc. v. Cox, 671 So. 2d 158,
160 (Fla. 1996) (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. King, 658 So. 2d 518,
519 (Fla. 1995)). In this case, the parties’ dispute principally
involves the first sentence of section 768.72(1) and the legal
meaning of the phrase “a reasonable showing by evidence in the
record or proffered by the claimant which would provide a
reasonable basis for recovery of [punitive] damages.”
The Legislature adopted section 768.72(1) (originally
numbered section 768.72) in 1986. See ch. 86-160, § 51, Laws of
Fla. Until that time, a claimant “could first plead punitive damages
and only then begin to look for sufficient evidence to support the
claim.” Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 635 So. 2d 106, 110
(Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Defendants had limited safeguards against
unwarranted discovery of information about their financial worth,
in part because district courts were divided over the availability of
certiorari to review nonfinal orders denying motions to dismiss or to
strike punitive damages claims. See Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage,
509 So. 2d 1097, 1098 (Fla. 1987) (highlighting the conflict in
-4- practice among the district courts).
In Tennant v. Charlton, 377 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1979), our Court
recognized that unlimited financial worth discovery could be used
unfairly to coerce settlements and to expose the “personal and
private financial affairs” of defendants “in cases where there is no
actual factual basis for an award of punitive damages.” Id. at 1170.
So we advised that, in evaluating motions for protective orders
limiting financial worth discovery under Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.280(c), trial courts could “consider, among other
things, whether or not an actual factual basis exists for an award of
punitive damages.” Id. Section 768.72(1) essentially builds on the
approach our Court suggested in Tennant.
This case also involves section 768.72(2) and (3), which the
Legislature added in 1999 (without changing the text of what is now
section 768.72(1)). See ch. 99-225, § 22, Laws of Fla. Section
768.72(2) says in relevant part that: “A defendant may be held liable
for punitive damages only if the trier of fact, based on clear and
convincing evidence, finds that the defendant was personally guilty
of intentional misconduct or gross negligence.” It then goes on to
define the terms “intentional misconduct” and “gross negligence.”
-5- Section 768.72(3) sets out the conditions under which punitive
damages can be imposed against an employer for the conduct of its
employee or agent.
By enacting section 768.72(2), the Legislature heightened the
trial-level standard of proof for punitive damages from the common-
law “greater weight of the evidence” test to “clear and convincing
evidence.” Section 768.72(2) also altered the law by codifying and
defining substantive legal standards (“intentional misconduct” and
“gross negligence”) to govern the availability of punitive damages.
Before then, the common law had provided that “[a] legal basis for
punitive damages exists where torts are committed in an
outrageous manner or with fraud, malice, wantonness or
oppression.” Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 435-36
(Fla. 1978).
The parties here disagree over whether, under section
768.72(1), Isaac and Laura Perlmutter should be permitted to plead
punitive damages in their counterclaims against Harold
Peerenboom and two other parties. As we have mentioned, the case
started when Peerenboom sued the Perlmutters for defamation and
-6- related claims. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla.
4th DCA 2023). Peerenboom and the Perlmutters had been
involved in acrimonious disputes over the management of Sloan’s
Curve, the Palm Beach community where they all lived.
Peerenboom alleged that the Perlmutters had orchestrated a series
of mailings falsely telling his friends, neighbors, and business
associates that he had committed vile acts, including murder and
child molestation.
The Perlmutters counterclaimed, alleging conversion, civil
theft, abuse of process, defamation, invasion of privacy, and civil
conspiracy. The couple maintained that Peerenboom’s accusations
about their involvement in the hate mail campaign were knowingly
false and that Peerenboom intended to intimidate them and to hurt
Isaac Perlmutter professionally. They alleged that Peerenboom and
William Douberley (an insurance company lawyer representing
Peerenboom in a different lawsuit) had used a pretextual deposition
in that case to collect the Perlmutters’ DNA from items they touched
at the deposition and then left behind. According to the
Perlmutters, Peerenboom later bullied a private lab into producing
false test results linking Laura Perlmutter’s DNA to DNA found on
-7- the hate mail; then, armed with the flawed test results, Peerenboom
allegedly lied about the Perlmutters to the Palm Beach Police
Department and to two media outlets.
Eventually, the Perlmutters filed a motion in the trial court
asking permission to amend their counterclaims to seek punitive
damages against Peerenboom, Douberley, and Douberley’s
employer, Federal Insurance Company. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(f)
(implementing section 768.72(1)). Each of the counterclaim
defendants opposed the motion. Peerenboom argued that he did
not know there was anything wrong with collecting and testing the
Perlmutters’ DNA, since both his lawyer (Douberley) and the Palm
Beach Police Department knew about it and did not object. He also
denied that there was any impropriety in the testing process itself.
Douberley argued that collecting items the Perlmutters had touched
and discarded at a deposition was not improper and that he was
not involved in either the subsequent DNA testing or the
dissemination of the results to the police and the media. And
Federal Insurance maintained that its management had no
contemporaneous knowledge of Douberley’s role in attempting to
collect the Perlmutters’ DNA.
-8- After a hearing at which it considered the Perlmutters’ written
evidentiary submission and heard legal argument from the parties,
the trial court granted the Perlmutters’ motion to amend their
counterclaims to seek punitive damages. Peerenboom, Douberley,
and Federal Insurance appealed the trial court’s order to the Fourth
District Court of Appeal. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(G). The
district court then took up the appeal en banc and reversed, with
two judges dissenting. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d at 28.
The Fourth District framed its analysis by announcing two
conclusions about the interpretation of section 768.72(1). It first
held that “a trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all
parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in
the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’ ” Id. at 33
(underscoring in original). Second, the district court explained that
it would look to the trial-level standard of proof set out in section
768.72(2) to inform its understanding of the evidentiary showing
required by section 768.72(1). Reading section 768.72(1) and (2)
together, the district court held: “[W]e interpret section 768.72(1)
and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary
determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of
-9- proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could
find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are
warranted.” Id. at 34 (underscoring in original). The district court
emphasized that the trial court, in making its “preliminary
determination,” should not itself decide whether the evidence is
clear and convincing, should not weigh evidence, and should not
determine witness credibility. Id.
Against that interpretive backdrop, the district court explained
why it thought the trial court had erred by allowing the Perlmutters
to plead punitive damages claims. At the threshold, the district
court observed that the Perlmutters had alleged “intentional
misconduct” under section 768.72(2). Id. at 35. It then explained
its conclusions that the evidence was “ambiguous” on the issue of
Peerenboom’s and Douberley’s intent and that the Perlmutters’
claims impermissibly depended on the “stacking of circumstantial
inferences,” which “could never meet the clear and convincing
evidence standard at trial.” Id. As to Federal Insurance, the district
court held that there was insufficient evidence to show that the
company had known about and approved Douberley’s acts. Id. at
37.
- 10 - The Fourth District certified that its decision conflicted with
five other district court decisions, two from the Second District
Court of Appeal and three from the Fifth. 1 In contrast to the Fourth
District, the district courts in the conflict cases did not apply the
“clear and convincing evidence” standard when assessing the
reasonableness of a claimant’s evidentiary submission in a
proceeding under section 768.72(1). For example, in Werner
Enterprises, the Fifth District said that the court’s task is simply “to
determine if there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports
the plaintiff’s position.” 362 So. 3d at 283.
The Fourth District also certified a question of great public
importance that mostly overlaps with the conflict issue. The
certified question is:
On a motion to amend to add a punitive damages claim, does section 768.72(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, when read in pari materia, require a trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of evidence identified in support of or opposition to the motion, and in the light most favorable
1. The conflict cases are: Deaterly v. Jacobson, 313 So. 3d 798 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021); Wiendl v. Wiendl, 371 So. 3d 964 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023); Estate of Despain v. Avante Group, Inc., 900 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Werner Enterprises, Inc. v. Mendez, 362 So. 3d 278 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023); and Cook v. Florida Peninsula Insurance Co., 371 So. 3d 958 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023).
- 11 - to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted?
Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d at 38 (underscoring in original).
We accepted jurisdiction upon the Perlmutters’ notice invoking
our discretionary review of the Fourth District’s decision. As we
explain below, we agree with the Perlmutters that the Fourth
District erred in its interpretation of section 768.72(1). Our answer
to the certified question is no. We quash the decision below and
remand for the district court to apply the standard for section
768.72(1) that we explain in our decision today.
II
Recall the disputed sentence in section 768.72(1): “In any civil
action, no claim for punitive damages shall be permitted unless
there is a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered
by the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery
of such damages.” The certified question raises two related but
distinct issues about the operation and meaning of this provision.
The first issue is whether a trial court applying the statute should
consider only evidence identified or put forward by the claimant, or
- 12 - whether the court should also consider an evidentiary submission
by the opponent. The second issue is whether the trial court
should consider the “clear and convincing evidence” standard of
proof when determining if the evidence shows a reasonable basis for
the recovery of punitive damages. For clarity, we will begin by
stating our conclusions on these two issues, and then we will
explain our reasoning.
First, for the reasons we set out below, in a proceeding under
section 768.72(1), the trial court should consider only the evidence
identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an
evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent.
Second, the test for deciding evidentiary sufficiency under
section 768.72(1) is whether a reasonable person could conclude,
based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed
“intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence,” as defined in section
768.72(2). Cf. Bric McMann Indus. Inc. v. Regatta Beach Club
Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 378 So. 3d 652, 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (asking
whether the claimant’s “proffered evidence provided facts from
which one could reasonably conclude that the [defendant’s]
conduct” met the statutory definition of intentional misconduct). If
- 13 - the claimant seeks to plead punitive damages against an employer
under a theory of vicarious liability, the evidentiary sufficiency test
also must ask whether a reasonable person could conclude that the
claimant’s evidence satisfies the substantive legal criteria set out in
section 768.72(3). Finally, “[b]ecause punitive damages never stand
alone,” the trial court must “review the request for punitive
damages in the context of the underlying claims.” LoanFlight
Lending, LLC v. Wood, 388 So. 3d 1027, 1031 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024);
see also Soffer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 187 So. 3d 1219, 1221
(Fla. 2016) (“[A] demand for punitive damages is ‘not a separate and
distinct cause of action; rather it is auxiliary to, and dependent
upon, the existence of an underlying claim.’ ” (quoting Liggett Grp.,
Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003))). In all
events, however, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence under
section 768.72(1) at the pleading stage, the trial court should not
apply the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof.
The trial court does not act as a fact-finder in a proceeding
under section 768.72(1). It must not weigh the claimant’s evidence,
meaning that its role is not to decide the truth of the matter. In
conducting its review, the trial court must “consider the record
- 14 - evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.” Hosp. Specialists, P.A. v. Deen, 373 So. 3d 1283,
1287 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023). Of course, the allegations contained in
the claimant’s proposed amended complaint are not themselves
evidence—the whole point of a proceeding under section 768.72(1)
is to determine whether the claimant can show reasonable
evidentiary support for those allegations.
In fairness to the Fourth District, this is not a case where the
statute’s legal meaning springs clearly from the bare language of
the text. Section 768.72(1) is unusual in that it “mixes pleading
and evidence.” Henry P. Trawick, Trawick’s Florida Practice and
Procedure § 6-22 (1987 ed.). To complicate matters further, the
statute employs vague standards (“reasonable showing” and
“reasonable basis”) that lack an established legal meaning in this
context. And our task requires us to determine the relationship
between subsections of section 768.72, subsections that the
Legislature enacted at different times without giving express
instructions about how to harmonize the old and new provisions.
Nonetheless, the words and context of section 768.72(1) lead us to
- 15 - conclude that the statute mandates a procedure that is less
complex—both procedurally and substantively—than what the
Fourth District envisioned.
On the issue of the evidence to be considered by the trial
court, we note that the text of the statute expressly contemplates a
burden of production for the claimant but mentions no role for the
opponent. The thrust of the statute is to ensure that the claimant
itself can show evidentiary support for a proposed punitive damages
claim—not to require an evaluation of the claimant’s showing in the
light of contrary evidence submitted by the opponent. Even though
section 768.72(1) undoubtedly departs from the norm by requiring
a pre-pleading evidentiary showing at all, we adopt the
interpretation that is most consistent with the ordinary rules of civil
procedure. One would expect an express command if the
Legislature intended for the trial court to evaluate competing
evidentiary submissions at the pleading stage. Cf. Debra Salisbury,
Trawick’s Florida Practice and Procedure § 11:10 (2026 ed.) (On a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “[a]ffidavits, discovery,
oral statements, or testimony cannot be used to support or attack
the pleading.”).
- 16 - Similarly, on the issue of the evidentiary sufficiency standard
under section 768.72(1), we note that the express words of the text
do not tie the reasonableness inquiry to the trial-level standard of
proof. On the contrary, the phrase “reasonable showing by
evidence . . . which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of
[punitive] damages” suggests a more straightforward and less
technical analysis. Our interpretation is anchored in reading the
words in the context of a law that governs the pleading stage of
litigation, which, of course, involves a less-than-complete record
and occurs early in the proceedings. Absent express instructions
from the Legislature, we are reluctant to read into the section
768.72(1) inquiry a consideration—the trial-level standard of
proof—that ordinarily plays no role at the pleading stage.
The textual contrast between section 768.72(1) and a related
statute supports our interpretation. Section 400.0237, Florida
Statutes, governs the pleading of punitive damages in the nursing
home context. When the Legislature enacted the initial version of
section 400.0237 in 2001, the text of the statute was materially the
same as section 768.72(1). Ch. 2001-45, § 9, Laws of Fla. Then, in
2014, the Legislature substantially amended the nursing home
- 17 - punitive damages provision. See ch. 2014-83, § 2, Laws of Fla. It
now reads:
The court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether there is sufficient admissible evidence submitted by the parties to ensure that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the claimant, at trial, will be able to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the recovery of [punitive] damages is warranted . . . .
§ 400.0237(1)(b), Fla. Stat. Unlike section 768.72(1), this provision
expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties.” And it
expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a
reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and
convincing evidence” standard at trial.
The respondents and the Fourth District read section
768.72(1) as if it mandates essentially the same procedure and
evidentiary sufficiency standard as section 400.0237(1)(b). We find
that untenable. By respecting and giving effect to the substantial
textual differences between these related provisions, our
interpretation of section 768.72(1) honors the Legislature’s choices
and protects the coherence of Florida’s statutory law. See W. Va.
Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991) (“Where a
statutory term presented to us for the first time is ambiguous, we
- 18 - construe it to contain that permissible meaning which fits most
logically and comfortably into the body of both previously and
subsequently enacted law.”).
Though we ultimately disagree with the Fourth District and
the respondents about the best interpretation of section 768.72(1),
we acknowledge that their arguments are not without force. Like
the Fourth District, the respondents emphasize that section
768.72(1) and (2) must be read together. They maintain that the
question whether there is a “reasonable basis for recovery of
[punitive] damages” necessarily requires the trial court to decide
whether a reasonable jury could find that the claimant can satisfy
the trial-level standard of proof.
The Fourth District and the respondents are undoubtedly right
that individual provisions in a statutory scheme must be
interpreted with due regard for the other parts of the legislative
plan. Indeed, one cannot apply section 768.72(1) without
accounting for the substantive punitive damages law established in
section 768.72(2) and (3). Nonetheless, we do not think it follows
that section 768.72(1) implicitly incorporates the trial-level
- 19 - standard of proof referred to in section 768.72(2). After all, the
pleading stage—even under the unique procedure mandated by
section 768.72(1)—is not the time for the claimant to prove its case.
Pleading is remote from the “trier of fact” and the factual “find[ings]”
mentioned in section 768.72(2).
To support their position, the respondents invoke an analogy
to the analysis a trial court conducts when evaluating a summary
judgment motion. Specifically, they rely on the seminal case of
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), where the
Supreme Court held that “the determination of whether a given
factual dispute requires submission to a jury must be guided by the
substantive evidentiary standards that apply to the case.” Id. at
255. Indeed, perceptive observers have noted that “[t]he language
used [in Perlmutter] is strikingly similar to the Florida standard for
summary judgment under Rule 1.510 or a directed verdict under
Rule 1.480.” Bruce J. Berman & Peter D. Webster, Berman’s
Florida Civil Procedure § 1.190:21 n.13 (2025 ed.).
But we do not think the text mandates treating a proceeding
under section 768.72(1) as something like a preemptive summary
judgment hearing. Cf. State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Plantation Square
- 20 - Assocs., Ltd., 761 F. Supp. 1569, 1580 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (“Without
attempting to determine precisely what type of showing is required
by § 768.72, the court believes it must ultimately be a lesser
standard than that required for summary judgment.”). Under our
rules of civil procedure, pleading a claim is about setting forth “a
short and plain statement of the ultimate facts showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(2). Section
768.72(1) complements that standard in the punitive damages
context by requiring the claimant to show that there is a reasonable
evidentiary basis underlying the ultimate facts that it seeks to
plead. Summary judgment, which would remain available as a
screening device later in the litigation, involves different questions
and serves a different purpose (i.e., to determine, usually based on
a more complete record, whether there are genuine factual disputes
that need resolution by the fact-finder).
Finally, we do not agree with the respondents’ suggestion that
rejecting the Fourth District’s interpretation of section 768.72(1)
will render meaningless the trial court’s gatekeeping role. Courts
applying section 768.72(1) under evidentiary sufficiency tests like
the one we announce today have frequently upheld orders denying
- 21 - leave to add punitive damages claims, and they have reversed
orders granting leave to add such claims. See, e.g., McLane
Foodservice Inc. v. Wool, 400 So. 3d 757 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024); Deen,
373 So. 3d 1283; Wiendl, 371 So. 3d 964; Five Fran, LLC v. Davis,
404 So. 3d 581 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025); Publix Super Mkts., Inc. v. Levi,
399 So. 3d 1212 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024); Friedler v. Faena Hotels &
Residences, LLC, 390 So. 3d 186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). The existence
of these precedents bolsters our confidence that our interpretation
of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute
in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.
III
For the reasons we have explained, our answer to the certified
question is no. Without expressing any view on the application of
section 768.72(1) to the facts here, we quash the decision under
review and remand so that the Fourth District can reexamine the
case under the construction of the statute we have explained today.
We express no view on the merits of the Fourth District’s analysis
as it relates to any distinct issues presented by the application of
section 768.72(3) to the Perlmutters’ claims against Federal
Insurance. We decline to address the Perlmutters’ request that we
- 22 - rule on the standard of review in appeals from orders granting or
denying leave to amend under section 768.72(1), an issue outside
the scope of the certified question and on which the district courts
are not in conflict. We approve the decisions of the Second and
Fifth Districts in the certified conflict cases 2 to the extent those
decisions are consistent with our opinion today.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, SASSO, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal Certified Great Public Importance Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions
Fourth District - Case Nos. 4D2022-1558, 4D2022-1560, and 4D2022-1562
(Palm Beach County)
Elliot B. Kula and William D. Mueller of Kula & Associates, P.A., Miami, Florida; Jesse Panuccio and Jason Hilborn of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Roy Black and Jared M. Lopez of Black Srebnick Kornspan & Stumpf, P.A., Miami, Florida; and Joshua E. Dubin of Joshua E. Dubin, P.A., Miami, Florida,
2. Deaterly, 313 So. 3d 798; Wiendl, 371 So. 3d 964; Est. of Despain, 900 So. 2d 637; Werner, 362 So. 3d 278; Cook, 371 So. 3d 958.
- 23 - for Petitioners
Jordan S. Cohen and Victoria N. Sosa of Wicker Smith O’Hara McCoy & Ford, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and Ethan A. Arthur of Wicker Smith O’Hara McCoy & Ford, P.A., Tampa, Florida,
for Respondent Harold Peerenboom
Brandt Roen and Kenneth R. Drake of Cruser, Mitchell, Novitz, Sanchez, Gaston & Zimet, LLP, Coral Gables, Florida; and Joseph H. Lang, Jr. and Jeffrey A. Cohen of Carlton Fields, P.A., Tampa, Florida,
for Respondent Federal Insurance Company
Steven J. Rothman, Travis J. Foels, and Danielle L. Jakeman of Jones Foster P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida; and Dina M. Contri and Robert L. Johnson of Sellars, Marion & Bachi, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Respondent William Marvin Douberley, Esq.
Elizabeth M. Locke, Joseph R. Oliveri, Jered T. Ede, and Eric D. Hageman of Clare Locke LLP, Alexandria, Virginia,
for Amicus Curiae Michael D. Black MD, MBA
Michael M. Brownlee and Grace Zogaib of The Brownlee Law Firm, P.A., Orlando, Florida; and William W. Large of Florida Justice Reform Institute, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Amici Curiae Florida Justice Reform Institute, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, and American Tort Reform Association
Frank Cruz-Alvarez and David M. Menichetti of Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, District of Columbia; and Cory L. Andrews of Washington Legal Foundation, Washington, District of Columbia,
- 24 - for Amicus Curiae Washington Legal Foundation
Wendy F. Lumish and Alina Alonso Rodriguez of Bowman and Brooke, LLP, Coral Gables, Florida,
for Amicus Curiae Product Liability Advisory Council
L. Martin Reeder, Jr. of Atherton Galardi Mullen & Reeder, PLLC, West Palm Beach, Florida; and Charles D. Tobin of Ballard Spahr LLP, Washington, District of Columbia,
for Amicus Curiae Cable News Network, Inc.
- 25 -