Mobley, Justice.
There is no merit in the contention of the defendant that the plaintiff cannot be permitted to prove that the lease and option were executed on the same day, on December 15, 1952, although the lease bears the date of October 1, 1952. The true date an instrument becomes effective may be shown to differ from the date shown in the instrument itself. Russell v. Carr & Co., 38 Ga. 459 (1); Waynesboro Planing Mill v. Perkins Mfg. Co., 35 Ga. App. 767 (134 S. E. 831); Mutual Fertilizer Co. v. Henderson, 18 Ga. App. 495 (89 S. E. 602); Wiggins v. First Mutual Bldg. &c. Assn., 179 Ga. 618 (176 S. E. 636). The petition alleges that the letter dated December 15, 1952, and the lease dated October 1, 1952, were executed simultaneously on December 15, 1952, and were parts of a single agreement.
In their brief counsel for the defendant recognize the principle of law that a single contract may consist of, and be contained in, more than one document, and that, where this occurs, all of the writings which form the basis of-the agreement must be considered and read together, and the legal effect accorded them as though they were -contained in the same paper. However, they contend that the very language employed in the two [634]*634documents in this case shows that the letter and the lease agreement were not executed and delivered on the same day, as the petition alleges they were.
It can not be denied that the language employed in the letter dated December 15, 1952, furnishes a basis for the argument raised by the defendant. For example, the letter, addressed to the defendant, begins as follows: "You have a fifteen year lease on Hotel Hangar dated October 1st, 1952,” and counsel argues that the use of the word have indicates that the lease was actually in existence on December 15, 1952. But it is to be noticed that the lease itself, which bears the date of October 1, 1952, begins: “W. L. Irwin has rented to J. P. Dailey building known as Hotel Ha'ngar and Hotel Hangar Apartments,” which, following the same argument of defendant’s counsel, might indicate that Irwin had already leased the property to Dailey prior to October 1,1952.
This court, from a mere reading of the language of the said letter, cannot hold as a matter of law that the letter and-lease were not executed in the manner and at the time alleged in the petition.’ The plaintiff may lawfully allege and prove that a document bearing a particular date was not actually executed or delivered- or otherwise made effective on the particular date shown therein. Whether the plaintiff’s allegations as to the time of execution of the letter and the lease are true or false cannot be resolved as a matter of law from the language employed in those two documents.
The defendant contends that the option contained in the letter of December 15, 1952, is without any consideration and therefore unenforceable. The petition alleges that the lease agreement and the option letter were executed and delivered simultaneously, and the lease by its terms provides for the payment of a rental of $1,000.00 per month, while the letter provides that, upon exercise of the option, any rent paid under the lease will be credited against the purchase price set forth in the letter. As held above, this court cannot hold as a matter of law that the lease and the letter were not executed simultaneously. The agreement provides for the payment of rent, and the petition alleges that the rent was actually paid. This constitutes a sufficient consideration to support the entire contract as alleged. [635]*635Walker v. Edmundson, 111 Ga. 454 (36 S. E. 800); Crawford v. Smith, 151 Ga. 18 (105 S. E. 477); Pope v. Read, 152 Ga. 799 (111 S. E. 382); Redmond v. Sinclair Refining Co., 204 Ga. 699 (51 S. E. 2d 409); 49 Am. Jur. 141, § 120.
The defendant further contends that the contract relied upon is too vague and indefinite to be enforced by a decree of specific performance because the property, both realty and personalty,- is not sufficiently described therein. The agreement described the real property as follows: “This lease only covers ground on which the building is located with fifteen foot public alleys on East side, West side, and North side of said building and on South side or front of said building, that space between front of said building and Virginia Ave., and width of said building facing Virginia Ave., which represents 'Front Yard’ of said building. (See attached diagram).” The “attached diagram” is reproduced below:
[636]*636Counsel for the plaintiff contend that the option' covers the land encompassed within the dotted lines, and the prayer is for a decree of title thereto and also a decree granting the plaintiff a perpetual easement in and right of use for alley purposes to the land encompassed within the area shown as “public drive” on said diagram.
Counsel for the defendant state in their brief that they do not contend the description of the real property is so uncertain and indefinite that either party could reasonably misunderstand its meaning, but they contend that the plaintiff is seeking to obtain a decree of title to more land than is called for under the agreement. The defendant contends that the agreement only covers “the Hangar Hotel and Hangar Hotel Apartments building and the ground on which the building is located, together With the area representing the front yard of the building.”
“The description of land in a contract of sale is sufficiently definite where the premises are so described as to indicate the grantor’s intention to sell a particular lot of land, and is capable of practical application to the land intended to be conveyed by introduction of extrinsic .evidence. King v. Brice, 145 Ga. 65 (88 S. E. 960); Dean v. Turner, 151 Ga. 44 (105 S. E. 602).” Lewis v. Trimble, 151 Ga. 97(2) (106 S. E. 101).
It is apparent from reading the agreement as a whole that the defendant intended to describe, and actually described, that area bounded by Virginia Avenue on the south and the public alleys on the west, north and east, as the subject matter of the lease and which the plaintiff was given an option to purchase. The “ground on which the building is located” is that ground which is bounded by Virginia Avenue and public alleys shown on the sketch attached to the agreement. As shown on the diagram, the building line actually adjoins the innermost limits of the public drives on the east, west, and north. Though the building structure does not completely cover all the land, it is entirely located on the lot of land which is completely enclosed within the lines formed by the innermost limits of the public drives and the north line of Virginia Avenue, as shown on the diagram which forms a part of the agreement. The description of land contained in the agreement is sufficiently definite to in[637]*637dicate that the defendant intended to grant an option to purchase the area bounded by the public drives and the north line of Virginia Avenue, and such description can be applied to the subject matter of the instant case by the aid of extrinsic evidence in support of the further identification of the land as set out in the petition. Dean v. Turner, 151 Ga. 44 (105 S. E. 602).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Mobley, Justice.
There is no merit in the contention of the defendant that the plaintiff cannot be permitted to prove that the lease and option were executed on the same day, on December 15, 1952, although the lease bears the date of October 1, 1952. The true date an instrument becomes effective may be shown to differ from the date shown in the instrument itself. Russell v. Carr & Co., 38 Ga. 459 (1); Waynesboro Planing Mill v. Perkins Mfg. Co., 35 Ga. App. 767 (134 S. E. 831); Mutual Fertilizer Co. v. Henderson, 18 Ga. App. 495 (89 S. E. 602); Wiggins v. First Mutual Bldg. &c. Assn., 179 Ga. 618 (176 S. E. 636). The petition alleges that the letter dated December 15, 1952, and the lease dated October 1, 1952, were executed simultaneously on December 15, 1952, and were parts of a single agreement.
In their brief counsel for the defendant recognize the principle of law that a single contract may consist of, and be contained in, more than one document, and that, where this occurs, all of the writings which form the basis of-the agreement must be considered and read together, and the legal effect accorded them as though they were -contained in the same paper. However, they contend that the very language employed in the two [634]*634documents in this case shows that the letter and the lease agreement were not executed and delivered on the same day, as the petition alleges they were.
It can not be denied that the language employed in the letter dated December 15, 1952, furnishes a basis for the argument raised by the defendant. For example, the letter, addressed to the defendant, begins as follows: "You have a fifteen year lease on Hotel Hangar dated October 1st, 1952,” and counsel argues that the use of the word have indicates that the lease was actually in existence on December 15, 1952. But it is to be noticed that the lease itself, which bears the date of October 1, 1952, begins: “W. L. Irwin has rented to J. P. Dailey building known as Hotel Ha'ngar and Hotel Hangar Apartments,” which, following the same argument of defendant’s counsel, might indicate that Irwin had already leased the property to Dailey prior to October 1,1952.
This court, from a mere reading of the language of the said letter, cannot hold as a matter of law that the letter and-lease were not executed in the manner and at the time alleged in the petition.’ The plaintiff may lawfully allege and prove that a document bearing a particular date was not actually executed or delivered- or otherwise made effective on the particular date shown therein. Whether the plaintiff’s allegations as to the time of execution of the letter and the lease are true or false cannot be resolved as a matter of law from the language employed in those two documents.
The defendant contends that the option contained in the letter of December 15, 1952, is without any consideration and therefore unenforceable. The petition alleges that the lease agreement and the option letter were executed and delivered simultaneously, and the lease by its terms provides for the payment of a rental of $1,000.00 per month, while the letter provides that, upon exercise of the option, any rent paid under the lease will be credited against the purchase price set forth in the letter. As held above, this court cannot hold as a matter of law that the lease and the letter were not executed simultaneously. The agreement provides for the payment of rent, and the petition alleges that the rent was actually paid. This constitutes a sufficient consideration to support the entire contract as alleged. [635]*635Walker v. Edmundson, 111 Ga. 454 (36 S. E. 800); Crawford v. Smith, 151 Ga. 18 (105 S. E. 477); Pope v. Read, 152 Ga. 799 (111 S. E. 382); Redmond v. Sinclair Refining Co., 204 Ga. 699 (51 S. E. 2d 409); 49 Am. Jur. 141, § 120.
The defendant further contends that the contract relied upon is too vague and indefinite to be enforced by a decree of specific performance because the property, both realty and personalty,- is not sufficiently described therein. The agreement described the real property as follows: “This lease only covers ground on which the building is located with fifteen foot public alleys on East side, West side, and North side of said building and on South side or front of said building, that space between front of said building and Virginia Ave., and width of said building facing Virginia Ave., which represents 'Front Yard’ of said building. (See attached diagram).” The “attached diagram” is reproduced below:
[636]*636Counsel for the plaintiff contend that the option' covers the land encompassed within the dotted lines, and the prayer is for a decree of title thereto and also a decree granting the plaintiff a perpetual easement in and right of use for alley purposes to the land encompassed within the area shown as “public drive” on said diagram.
Counsel for the defendant state in their brief that they do not contend the description of the real property is so uncertain and indefinite that either party could reasonably misunderstand its meaning, but they contend that the plaintiff is seeking to obtain a decree of title to more land than is called for under the agreement. The defendant contends that the agreement only covers “the Hangar Hotel and Hangar Hotel Apartments building and the ground on which the building is located, together With the area representing the front yard of the building.”
“The description of land in a contract of sale is sufficiently definite where the premises are so described as to indicate the grantor’s intention to sell a particular lot of land, and is capable of practical application to the land intended to be conveyed by introduction of extrinsic .evidence. King v. Brice, 145 Ga. 65 (88 S. E. 960); Dean v. Turner, 151 Ga. 44 (105 S. E. 602).” Lewis v. Trimble, 151 Ga. 97(2) (106 S. E. 101).
It is apparent from reading the agreement as a whole that the defendant intended to describe, and actually described, that area bounded by Virginia Avenue on the south and the public alleys on the west, north and east, as the subject matter of the lease and which the plaintiff was given an option to purchase. The “ground on which the building is located” is that ground which is bounded by Virginia Avenue and public alleys shown on the sketch attached to the agreement. As shown on the diagram, the building line actually adjoins the innermost limits of the public drives on the east, west, and north. Though the building structure does not completely cover all the land, it is entirely located on the lot of land which is completely enclosed within the lines formed by the innermost limits of the public drives and the north line of Virginia Avenue, as shown on the diagram which forms a part of the agreement. The description of land contained in the agreement is sufficiently definite to in[637]*637dicate that the defendant intended to grant an option to purchase the area bounded by the public drives and the north line of Virginia Avenue, and such description can be applied to the subject matter of the instant case by the aid of extrinsic evidence in support of the further identification of the land as set out in the petition. Dean v. Turner, 151 Ga. 44 (105 S. E. 602).
In addition to a decree of title to the land mentioned in division 3 of this opinion above, the plaintiff prays for a decree granting him a perpetual easement and right of use in and to the public alleys shown on the diagram, and particularly described in the petition. It does not appear whether or not, at the time the agreement was executed by the parties, W. L. Irwin had title to the property embraced within the 15-foot public drives described in the agreement, npr does it appear whether such alleys were actually in existence at that time as public drives. However, “One who conveys a tract of land to another, with representations that such land has certain means of ingress and egress, is estopped thereafter to deny the existence of such easement, although such roadway may not be contiguous to the property purchased.” Ashford v. Walters, 160 Ga. 350 (1) (127 S. E. 758). Likewise, where an owner contracts to sell a tract of land and covenants in such contract that the purchaser shall have certain means of ingress and egress, a court of equity, on the same principles which govern the granting of specific performance of any other contractual undertaking, may enforce such covenants in favor of the purchaser. 49 Am. Jur. 144, §123.
In the instant case, the defendant gave the plaintiff an option to purchase the property “as described in said lease,” which lease expressly refers to a 15-foot public alley as adjoining the property on the east, west, and north sides. As between the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant would be estopped to deny the existence of said alleys and would be estopped to deny the plaintiff’s right to use and enjoy the said 15-foot public alleys. We are not here adjudicating that the said alleys are public alleys, or easements or otherwise. What is here held is that the lessor granted the lessee the right of use of said 15-foot public alleys in the lease agreement, and also gave the [638]*638lessee the option to purchase that tract bounded by land which the defendant described as being public alleys. As between the parties the plaintiff is entitled to a decree enforcing such covenant as against the defendant.
The defendant contends that the description of the personal property contained in the agreement is too vague and indefinite to be the basis of a decree for specific performance, and cites Gabrell v. Byers, 178 Ga. 16 (172 S. E. 227), and O’Rear v. Lamb, 194 Ga. 455 (22 S. E. 2d 74), which are two cases where this court denied a decree for specific performance of certain alleged agreements involving personal property. Neither of those cases is controlling in the instant case, although this court recognizes the general principles of law contained therein. “As a general rule, equity will not decree specific performance of contracts relating to personal property. In order to sustain a bill for specific performance of such a contract, it is necessary to allege some good reason in equity and good conscience to take the case out of the general rule.” Gabrell v. Byers, supra. The agreement in this case is entire. It involves both real and personal property, and stipulates one purchase price for the property as a whole. There is no price established for the personalty alone, or for the real estate. The entire agreement must be enforced with respect to both kinds of property, or it will fall.
The fact that real property is involved in the same contract and the fact that the purchaser would be unable to enforce the provisions respecting the realty independently of the provisions respecting the personalty clearly constitutes a good reason in equity and good conscience to authorize a decree covering the entire agreement. “When real property is involved in the same contract as personal property, the jurisdiction to grant specific performance of a contract in regard to the real property carries the right to give entire relief by specific performance of the contract in relation to the personal property, even though it might not, independently, be a proper subject for such relief.” 49 Am. Jur. 150, § 126.
The defendant contends that the personal property is not sufficiently described, to form the basis for a decree of specific per[639]*639formance. The agreement granted the plaintiff the option to purchase the property “as described in said lease.” The personal property so described is as follows: “All equipment in [Hotel Hangar] dining room except one iron safe. . . All furniture now in Hotel Hangar rooms and Hotel Hangar lobby . . . but W. L. Irwin is to remove from Hotel Hangar basement all furniture, one sink, filing cabinets, draperies, linens, etc. that is: everything except plumbing and heating in use and attached to building.” It also was agreed that “all furniture, electric stoves, and electric refrigerators, pianos, etc. in apartments fifteen and sixteen except one electric refrigerator now in apartment fifteen” belonged to a third party and could be removed at any time. The contract, therefore, described all furniture in Hotel Hangar rooms, dining room, and Hotel Hangar lobby at the time of the execution of the agreement, except that which it was specifically provided could be removed. The petition alleges that in 1952 the plaintiff took possession of all the property described in the agreement and has been continuously in possession thereof since that time. Under the allegations of the petition, it is not necessary that the property be located and ascertained for the purpose of delivery to the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleges that he has possession of the property ánd has had possession thereof continuously since 1952, and that possession thereof was delivered to him by the defendant under their agreement. The agreement with respect to the personal property to be conveyed is not too vague and indefinite to form the basis of a decree for specific performance.
For the reasons given above, the trial court did not err in overruling the defendant’s general demurrer to the petition.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Duckworth C. J., and Grice, J., who dissent.