Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education

750 S.E.2d 1, 230 N.C. App. 265, 2013 WL 5911705, 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 1147
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
DecidedNovember 5, 2013
DocketNo. COA12-1496
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 750 S.E.2d 1 (Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 750 S.E.2d 1, 230 N.C. App. 265, 2013 WL 5911705, 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 1147 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).

Opinion

McGEE, Judge.

Randal Long (“Long”), the football coach for Providence High School (“the school”), was driving an activity bus (“the bus”) owned by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (“Defendant”), on 5 October 2007, when the bus collided with the rear of a vehicle driven by Tyki Sakwan Irving (“Plaintiff’). At the time of the collision, Long was transporting the school’s football team to a game with another high school. Plaintiff was injured and alleges her injuries were the result of Long’s negligence.

Plaintiff filed a form NCIC-T-1, Claim for Damages Under Tort Claims Act, initiating this tort claims action with the North Carolina Industrial Commission (“the Commission”) on 29 September 2010. Following [266]*266multiple filings not relevant to this appeal, the Commission decided Defendant’s motion for summary judgment by order entered 8 August 2012. In that order, the Commission stated:

The parties’ disagreement primarily centers on whether the driver of the activity bus owned by [Defendant in this case “was at the time of the alleged negligent act or omission operating a public school bus or school transportation service vehicle in accordance with [N.C. Gen. Stat. §[ 115C-242inthe course ofhis employment[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-300.1 (2007) (emphasis added).

The Commission ruled that Long was not operating a public school bus or school transportation service vehicle in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 115C-242, because that statute did not

include or encompass transporting students in an activity bus owned by a county board of education to an extracurricular activity of the sort involved in Plaintiff’s claim, namely the transportation of a high school football team to and from a football game at another high school on a Friday evening.

For this reason, the Commission granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, based upon its ruling that the accident did not fall within the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 143-300.1 and therefore the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff appeals.

I.

Plaintiff argues on appeal that the Commission erred in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over the claim and in granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We agree.

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Review of summary judgment on appeal is de novo. The evidence must be evaluated in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Collier v. Bryant, _ N.C. App. _, _, 719 S.E.2d 70, 75 (2011) (citation omitted). The Commission “shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine tort claims against any county board of education or any city board of education, which claims arise ... as a result of any alleged negligent act or omission of the driver... of a public school bus or school transportation service vehicle when” certain criteria are met. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-300.1(a) (2011). If a negligent act by such a driver falls within the scope of the Tort Claims Act, the Commission has sole jurisdiction over [267]*267the matter. Stein v. Asheville City Bd. of Educ., 168 N.C. App. 243, 250-251, 608 S.E.2d 80, 85-86 (2005), reversed in part not affecting this citation, 360 N.C. 321, 626 S.E.2d 263 (2006).

H.

Resolution of this matter depends on whether, as required by N.C.G.S. § 143-300.1(a), (A) the activity bus operated by Long can be considered a “public school bus” or a “school transportation service vehicle” and, if so, (B) whether Long was operating the activity bus in accord with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-242 (2011). In light of sometimes inconsistent statutes and case law related to this question, we conduct an extended analysis.

A. “Public School Bus” or “School Transportation Service Vehicle”

The North Carolina State Board of Education (the State Board) formerly owned and operated school buses. Turner v. Board of Education, 250 N.C. 456, 463, 109 S.E.2d 211, 217 (1959). At that time, the State Board could be sued for torts involving school bus drivers serving local schools. Id. at 463, 109 S.E.2d at 216-17. Later, in the 1950’s, the State Board transferred ownership of these buses to the local boards of education and, at that time, the General Assembly declared that the State Board would not be liable for negligent acts associated with the operation of these buses. Id. at 463-64,109 S.E.2d at 217.

The provision was made by reason of the fact that the State Board of Education had previously operated the busses, and upon the transfer of ownership and operation the State was disclaiming responsibility for negligent operations after the transfer. As a corollary to the Act withdrawing liability of the State Board of Education for negligent acts of school bus drivers, the General Assembly placed the financial responsibility for such act squarely on the county and city boards of education. G.S. 143-300.1. The section, effective July 1,1955, amended the State Tort Claims Act by prescribing that claims against county and city boards for such injuries shall be heard by the North Carolina Industrial Commission under rules of liability and procedure as provided with respect to tort claims against the State Board of Education.

Id. at 464, 109 S.E.2d at 217. N.C.G.S. § 143-300.1 provided not only for tort claims act coverage for the negligence of drivers of “public school buses,” but also for the negligence of drivers of public “school [268]*268transportation service vehicles.” N.C.G.S. § 143-300.1(a). “School transportation service vehicles” are referred to as (1) “school transportation service vehicles” in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-42 (2011), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-255 (2011), and N.C.G.S. § 143-300.1, and as (2) “service vehicles” in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-240 (2011) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-249 (2011).

By authority granted it by the General Assembly: “The State Board of Education shall promulgate rules and regulations for the operation of a public school transportation system.” N.C.G.S. § 115C-240(a) (2011). Pursuant to the State Board Policy Manual: “Local Education Agencies (LEAs) [(local boards of education)] shall adopt and keep on file in the office of the superintendent rules, regulations and policies to assure the safe, orderly and efficient operation of school buses, including: (1) the use of school buses under G.S. 115C-242(5)[.]” 16 N.C. Admin. Code 6B.0103 (2011). N.C.G.S. § 115C-242(5) states in relevant part: “Local boards of education, under rules adopted by the State Board of Education, may permit the use and operation of school buses for the transportation of pupils and instructional personnel as the board deems necessary to serve the instructional programs of the schools.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-242(5) (2011). Defendant’s policy states:

EEAFA Extra Curricular Activity Buses Field Trips — Special Events Transportation

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Related

Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education
781 S.E.2d 282 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 2016)

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Bluebook (online)
750 S.E.2d 1, 230 N.C. App. 265, 2013 WL 5911705, 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 1147, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/irving-v-charlotte-mecklenburg-board-of-education-ncctapp-2013.