Irving H. Picard, Trustee for the Liquidation of B v. Nomura International PLC

Opinion

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT NOT FOR PUBLICATION SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION, No. 08-01789 (CGM)

Plaintiff-Applicant, SIPA LIQUIDATION

v. (Substantively Consolidated)

BERNARD L. MADOFF INVESTMENT SECURITIES LLC,

Defendant.

In re:

BERNARD L. MADOFF,

Debtor.

IRVING H. PICARD, Trustee for the Substantively

Consolidated SIPA Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff

Investment Securities LLC and the Chapter 7 Estate of

Bernard L. Madoff, Adv. Pro. No. 11-02759 (CGM)

Plaintiff,

v.

NOMURA INTERNATIONAL PLC,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

A P P E A R A N C E S : Attorneys for Irving H. Picard, Trustee for the Substantively Consolidated SIPA Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC and the Chapter 7 Estate of Bernard L. Madoff Baker & Hostetler LLP 45 Rockefeller Plaza New York, NY 10111 By: David Sheehan Matthew D. Feil Frank M. Oliva Andrew M. Serrao

Attorneys for Defendant Nomura International PLC SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP 599 Lexington Avenue New York, New York 10022-6069 By: Jeffrey Resetarits Randall Martin

CECELIA G. MORRIS UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s, Nomura International PLC (“Nomura” or “Defendant”), motion to dismiss the complaint of Irving Picard, the trustee (“Trustee”) for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“BLMIS”) seeking to recover subsequent transfers allegedly consisting of BLMIS customer property. Nomura seeks dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth herein, the motion to dismiss is denied. Jurisdiction This is an adversary proceeding commenced in this Court, in which the main underlying SIPA proceeding, Adv. Pro. No. 08-01789 (CGM) (the “SIPA Proceeding”), is pending. The SIPA Proceeding was originally brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the “District Court”) as Securities Exchange Commission v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC et al., No. 08-CV-10791, and has been referred to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and (e)(1), and 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(2)(A) and (b)(4). This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (F), (H) and (O). This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over these adversary proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157(a), the District Court’s Standing Order of Reference, dated July 10, 1984, and the Amended Standing Order of Reference, dated January 31, 2012. In addition, the District Court removed the SIPA liquidation to this Court pursuant to SIPA § 78eee(b)(4), (see Order, Civ. 08– 01789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008) (“Main Case”), at ¶ IX (ECF No. 1)), and this Court has jurisdiction under the latter provision. Personal jurisdiction has been contested by this Defendant and will be discussed infra.

Background The Court assumes familiarity with the background of the BLMIS Ponzi scheme and its SIPA proceeding. See Picard v. Citibank, N.A. (In re BLMIS), 12 F.4th 171, 178–83 (2d Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Citibank, N.A. v. Picard, 142 S. Ct. 1209, 212 L. Ed. 2d 217 (2022). This adversary proceeding was filed on October 6, 2011. (Compl., ECF1 No. 1). The Trustee filed an amended complaint on June 13, 2022. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 91). Via the amended complaint (“Amended Complaint”), the Trustee seeks to recover $24,449,920 in

subsequent transfers made to Defendant. (Id. ¶ 2). The subsequent transfers were derived from investments with BLMIS made by Harley International (Cayman) Limited (“Harley”).2 (Id. ¶ 2, 104). Nomura is a corporation organized under the laws of the United Kingdom and its principal place of business is in the United Kingdom. (Id. ¶ 21). Following BLMIS’s collapse, the Trustee filed an adversary proceeding against Harley to avoid and recover fraudulent transfers of customer property. (Id. ¶ 83); (See Compl., Picard v. Harley Int’l (Cayman) Ltd., Adv. Pro. No. 09-01187, ECF No. 1 (the “Harley Complaint”)). In November 2010, on a motion for default and summary judgment, the Court entered judgment against Harley avoiding the initial two-year transfers in the amount of $1,066,800,000. (Am.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to “ECF” are references to this Court’s electronic docket in adversary proceeding 12-1195-cgm. 2 The Trustee has filed a separate adversary proceeding against Nomura to address transfers Nomura received from Fairfield Sentry Limited and Fairfield Sigma Limited. This decision addresses only the transfers Nomura received from the Fairfield Funds. Compl. ¶¶ 83–91, ECF No. 104); (Adv. Pro. No. 09-01187, Order, ECF No. 15). The Trustee has not yet recovered any of the initial transfers from Harley. (Am. Compl. ¶ 91). The Trustee commenced this adversary proceeding following entry of judgment against Harley in order to recover the customer property. The Trustee alleges that Harley transferred $24,449,920 of customer property to Defendant. (Id. ¶ 92).

In its motion to dismiss, Defendant argues that the Trustee has failed to plead personal jurisdiction. The Trustee opposes the motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth herein, the motion to dismiss is denied. Discussion Personal Jurisdiction Defendant objects to the Trustee’s assertion of personal jurisdiction. (Mem. L., ECF No. 125). In the Complaint, the Trustee argues that Defendant purposefully availed itself to the laws of the United States and New York. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27–52). To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Trustee “must make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists.” SPV Osus Ltd. v. UBS AG, 882 F.3d 333, 342 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 34–35 (2d Cir. 2010)). A trial court has considerable procedural leeway when addressing a pretrial dismissal motion under Rule 12(b)(2). Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A., 722 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2013). “‘It may determine the motion on the basis of affidavits alone; or it may permit discovery in aid of the motion; or it may conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the motion.’” Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A., 722 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1981)); see also Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS), 594 B.R. 167, 187 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (same). “Prior to discovery, a plaintiff challenged by a jurisdiction testing motion may defeat the motion by pleading in good faith, legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction.” Dorchester Fin., 722 F.3d at 84–85 (quoting Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d

Cir. 1990)); Picard v. Fairfield Greenwich Grp. (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.), 627 B.R. 546, 565 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021) (same). In the absence of discovery, “a plaintiff’s prima facie showing of jurisdiction ‘may be established solely by allegations.’” Paroni v. GE UK Holdings Ltd., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148930 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Ball, 902 F.2d at 197). In this case, the Trustee has alleged legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction simply by stating that Defendant “invested in Harley with the specific purpose of having funds invested with BLMIS in New York and profiting therefrom.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 29). This allegation alone is sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of jurisdiction over Defendant in the pre- discovery stage of litigation. At the pre-discovery stage, the allegations need not be factually

supported. See Dorchester Fin. Sec. Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A., 722 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that an averment of facts is necessary only after discovery). That being stated, this was not the only allegation made by the Trustee. In order to be subjected to personal jurisdiction in the United States, due process requires that a defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum in which defendant is sued “‘such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Picard v. Bureau of Labor Ins. (In re BLMIS), 480 B.R. 501 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012), 480 B.R. 501, 516 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The pleadings and affidavits are to be construed “‘in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, resolving all doubts in their favor.’” Chloé v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Porina v. Marward Shipping Co., 521 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2008)); Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS), 594 B.R. 167, 187 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018). The Supreme Court has set out three conditions for the exercise of specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. First, the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State or have purposefully directed its conduct into the forum State. Second, the plaintiff's claim must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s forum conduct. Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable under the circumstances.

U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Bank of Am. N.A., 916 F.3d 143, 150 (2d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).

Purposeful Availment “[M]inimum contacts . . . exist where the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum and could foresee being haled into court there.” Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 883 F.3d 68, 82 (2d Cir. 2018). “Although a defendant’s contacts with the forum state may be intertwined with its transactions or interactions with the plaintiff or other parties, a defendant’s relationship with a third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.” U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Bank of Am. N.A., 916 F.3d 143, 150 (2d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). “It is insufficient to rely on a defendant’s random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or on the unilateral activity of a plaintiff with the forum to establish specific jurisdiction.” Id. A party “purposefully avail[s] itself of the benefits and protections of New York laws by knowing, intending and contemplating that the substantial majority of funds invested in Fairfield Sentry would be transferred to BLMIS in New York to be invested in the New York securities market.” Picard v. Bureau of Labor Ins. (In re BLMIS), 480 B.R. 501, 517 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). Minimum Contacts In the Complaint, the Trustee alleges that Defendant “invested in Harley with the specific purpose of having funds invested with BLMIS in New York” and that Defendant knew that the

Harley invested substantially all of their assets with BLMIS in New York. (Am. Compl. ¶ 29– 30, ECF No. 91). Defendant knew a great deal about Harley, including that BLMIS acted as “custodian” for substantially all of Harley’s assets and that any returns on its investments were to be earned in New York by BLMIS. (Id. ¶ 33–34). Defendant even informed third parties that its ability to make more investments in funds like Harley depended on exposure to Maddoff through those funds. (Id. ¶ 38). The Trustee alleges that Defendant signed subscription agreements with Harley, in which it “affirmed having read, understood, and accepted the terms set forth in the Harley Confidential Explanatory Memorandum.” (Id. ¶ 31). Based on having read the Harley Confidential

Explanatory Memorandum, Defendant understood that its “investments in Harley would be governed by the fund’s articles of association.” (Id. ¶ 35). The articles of association “in turn, provided that all disputes among Harley and its shareholders were subject to binding arbitration in New York pursuant to the rules established by the American Arbitration Association.” (Id.). The Trustee has alleged that Defendant maintained a bank account at Bank of America in New York. (Id. ¶ 43). Defendant used that New York bank account to receive redemption payments from Harley. (Id. ¶ 44). The Trustee also alleges that Defendant sent subscription payments to a New York correspondent bank account, both at JPMorgan Chase and at the Northern Trust Banking Corporation. (Id. ¶ 45). Where a defendant chooses to use a United States bank account, exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant for causes of action relating to those transfers is constitutional. Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Arcapita v. Bahrain Islamic Bank, 549 B.R. 56, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Bahrain Islamic Bank v. Arcapita Bank (In re Arcapita Bank B.S.C.(C)), 640 B.R. 604, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (stating that a bank submits to personal jurisdiction in the United

States when it is “free to accept or reject the proposed terms” and still chooses to use a United States bank account); see also Eldesouky v. Aziz, No. 11–CV–6986 (JLC), 2014 WL 7271219, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2014) (finding jurisdiction under New York long-arm statute based solely on defendant’s use of New York account to receive payment at issue: “receiving Plaintiffs’ money at a New York bank account suffices to establish personal jurisdiction over [Defendant].”); HSH Nordbank AG N.Y. Branch v. Street, No. 11 CIV. 9405 DLC, 2012 WL 2921875, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012) (“District courts in this Circuit have upheld personal jurisdiction based upon a defendant’s use of a correspondent bank account in New York where the use of that account was held to lay at the very root of the plaintiff’s action.”) (quoting Licci

ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 66 (2d Cir. 2012)); Dandong v. Pinnacle Performance Ltd., 966 F. Supp.2d 374, 382–83 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (same). Further, the Trustee has alleged that Defendant communicated via email and telephone FAM personnel in New York regarding Defendant’s investments with BLMIS through Harley. (Id. ¶ 49). The Trustee has alleged that Defendant personnel visited FAM’s New York office with meet with FAM personnel regarding Defendant’s investments with BLMIS through Harley. (Id. ¶ 50). Defendant even leveraged its access to BLMIS in marketing materials to attract investors. (Id. ¶ 51). The Complaint contains allegations that are legally sufficient to constitute a prima facie showing of jurisdiction over Defendant. Dorchester Fin. Sec. Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A., 722 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2013). “[A]lthough physical presence in the forum is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction, physical entry into the State—either by the defendant in person or through an agent, goods, mail, or some other means—is certainly a relevant contact.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S.

277, 285 (2014). Defendant “intentionally tossed a seed from abroad to take root and grow as a new tree in the Madoff money orchard in the United States and reap the benefits therefrom.” Picard v. Bureau of Labor Ins. (In re BLMIS), 480 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). Defendant’s alleged contacts with New York are not random, isolated, or fortuitous. Arise out of or relate to the defendant’s forum conduct As to the second prong, the suit must “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., __ U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1026, 209 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2021) (emphasis in original). “[P]roof that a plaintiff’s claim came about because of the defendant’s in-state conduct” is not required. Id. at 1027. Instead, the court

need only find “an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS), 594 B.R. 167, 190 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Where the defendant’s contacts with the jurisdiction that relate to the cause of action are more substantial, however, it is not unreasonable to say that the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction even though the acts within the state are not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.”) (internal quotations omitted). Here, the Trustee is asserting subsequent transfer claims against Defendant for monies it received from Harley. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 92–96, ECF No. 91). These allegations are directly related to their investment activities with BLMIS via Harley. BNP Paribas S.A., 594 B.R. at 191 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding that the redemption and other payments the defendants received as direct investors in a BLMIS feeder fund arose from the New York contacts such as sending subscription agreements to New York, wiring funds in U.S. dollars to New York, sending redemption requests to New York, and receiving redemption payments from a Bank of New

York account in New York, and were the proximate cause of the injuries that the Trustee sought to redress). The suit is affiliated with the alleged in-state conduct. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). Reasonableness Having found sufficient minimum contacts, the Court must determine if exercising personal jurisdiction over Defendant is reasonable and “comport[s] with fair play and substantial justice.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (internal quotations omitted). Factors the Court may consider include the burden on the defendants, the forum

State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Id. at 477. The exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. Defendant is not burdened by this litigation. Defendant actively participated in this Court’s litigation for over ten years. It is represented by U.S. counsel and intentionally invested in Harley. Further, Defendant held bank accounts in New York and agreed that disputes between Harley and its shareholders were subject to binding arbitration in New York.3 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35, 43–45). The forum and the Trustee both have a strong interest in litigating BLMIS adversary proceedings in this Court. Picard v. Maxam Absolute Return Fund, L.P. (In re BLMIS), 460 B.R. 106, 117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 474 B.R. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Picard v. Chais (In re BLMIS), 440 B.R. 274, 278 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); Picard v. Cohmad Sec. Corp. (In re BLMIS), 418 B.R. 75, 82 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009);

Picard v. Fairfield Greenwich Grp., (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.), 627 B.R. 546, 568 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021); see also In re Picard, 917 F.3d 85, 103 (2d Cir. 2019) (“The United States has a compelling interest in allowing domestic estates to recover fraudulently transferred property.”). By alleging that Defendant intentionally invested in BLMIS, the Trustee has met his burden of alleging jurisdiction as to each subsequent transfer that originated with BLMIS. And by alleging that Defendant used a New York bank account, the Trustee has met his burden of alleging jurisdiction over each transfer that received through that New York bank account. As recognized by the Second Circuit, “[w]hen these [subsequent transfer] investors chose to buy into feeder funds that placed all or substantially all of their assets with Madoff Securities, they

knew where their money was going.” In re Picard, 917 F.3d 85, 105 (2d Cir. 2019). The Trustee has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction with respect to all of the Harley subsequent transfers at issue in this Complaint. Conclusion

3 Even though this Court has held that a Defendant’s consent to jurisdiction in New York courts contained in subscription agreements could not be used as the sole basis for this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over an action by foreign liquidators to recover redemption payments under British Virgin Island law, the fact that Defendant agreed to arbitration in New York is certainly a relevant factor in determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over Defendant is reasonable. In Fairfield Sentry v. Theodoor GGC Amsterdam (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.), Case No. 10-13164 (SMB), Adv. No. 10-03496 (SMB), 2018 WL 3756343, at *12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2018) (“Defendants’ consent to the Subscription Agreement does not constitute consent to personal jurisdiction in the U.S. Redeemer Actions.”), aff’d, Fairfield Sentry Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A. London, No. 19-CV-3911 (VSB), 2022 WL 3644436, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2022). For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) is denied. The Trustee shall submit a proposed order within fourteen days of the issuance of this decision, directly to chambers (via E-Orders), upon not less than two days’ notice to all parties, as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9074- 1(a).

/s/ Cecelia G. Morris Poughkeepsie, New Vork (Co) Hon. Cecelia G. Morris ees U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Page 12 of 12