Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Cheesman

116 U.S. 529, 6 S. Ct. 481, 29 L. Ed. 712, 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1793
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJanuary 25, 1886
Docket107
StatusPublished
Cited by63 cases

This text of 116 U.S. 529 (Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Cheesman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Cheesman, 116 U.S. 529, 6 S. Ct. 481, 29 L. Ed. 712, 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1793 (1886).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Miller

delivered the opinion of the court.

The Iron Silver Mining Company brought its suit in the nature of an action of ejectment against Walter S. Cheesman, "Walter S. Clarke, and Thomas Bennett,-to recover possession of a part of a vein or lode of mineral deposit, the right to which *531 it asserted under a patent from the United States. The action was commenced in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado. The defendants denied the title 'of the plaintiff to the vein at the point in controversy, and though they did not assert a claim under a patent, they did show such proceedings under the mining laws of the United States as justified their possession, unless plaintiffs had a better right.

There were three trials by jury in the case. The first resulted in a verdict in favor of the defendants. That was set aside, and. a new trial ordered under the statute .of Colorado, which gives the unsuccessful party in such actions an absolute right to this second trial. The second trial failed by reason of a divided jury; and on the third trial the verdict was again for ' the defendants. It is to review the judgment rendered on this verdict that the present writ of error is taken.

The plaintiff relies on the accepted proposition, that the owner of a mineral vein covered .by the superficial lines of his claim may not only pursue that vein perpendicularly within those lines, but may, when the vein passes beyond the side lines of this claim or survey, pursue that vein outside of a line drawn vertically from the superficial side lines, as far as the vein extends.

In pursuit of what is asserted to be a continuation of the vein on which its patent is located, but outside of the perpendicular of its side lines, the Iron Silver Mining Company, owning what it called the Lime lode and mining claim, came into collision with defendants, who were working the lode which they called the Smuggler. Of course the defendants, being in possession, could only be deprived of that possession by virtue of a superior title in the plaintiff. As the exterior surface lines of plaintiff’s patent, when extended vertically to the plane of this deposit, did not include the piece of mineral which is the subject of this controversy, plaintiff could only recover by showing that this was a part of the same vein which his patent did cover, which, passing from his side lines, was such a continuation of that vein as gave the right to pursue it. .

It seems to have been conceded throughout the long trials in the case, that if plaintiff could establish the sufficiency and con *532 tinuity of his Lime lode,' so as to make the defendants’ Smuggler lode identical with it, he' was entitled to recover; and on the other hand, if he did not do this, he had no right to the Smuggler lode, which was in that case a different lode, outside of the vertical extension of plaintiff’s side lines.

This involved the consideration of the true definition of a lode or vein as used in the acts of Congress on the subject, and under what circumstances of continuity and of interruption a vein may be followed in the surrounding rock in which it is found, so as to preserve its identity.

On this subject a large mass of testimony was given to the jury, and to this point the charge of the court was directed.

If there were exceptions taken to the admission of any of this evidence, or to the refusal to admit other evidence, no assignment of error is based upon such admission or refusal; but the errors assigned relate solely to the charge given by the court to the jury, and to the refusal to give twenty-eight several instructions asked by the counsel of plaintiff.

As we have already said, the only question for the jury, the one on which their verdict depended, was whether plaintiff had identified the Lime lode or vein, and traced it continuously from its connection, inside of the lines of its patent, as the same vein in which defendants were working under the name of the Smuggler lode.

As the charge of the court was very full and clear as to the rules of law by which this was to be determined, there is no occasion to inquire into the soundness, of each of the twenty-eight propositions of plaintiff on the same subject. If any of these propositions were covered by the charge made by the court, there was no obligation on the judge to repeat it in the language of counsel. If there was a conflict in the law as laid down by the court and that requested by plaintiff’s prayer for instructions, the correctness of the charge of the court is raised by the exceptions to that charge, and can be best considered in these exceptions. Clymer v. Dawkins, 3 How. 674, 689; Mills v. Smith, 8 Wall. 27; Indianapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291 ; Continental Improvement Co. v. Stead, 95 U. S. 161.

*533 The act of Congress which confers the right under which plaintiff claims is in the following language of the Revised Statutes:

“ Sec. 2322. The locators of all mining locations heretofore made, or which shall hereafter be made, on any mineral vein, lode, or ledge, situated on the public domain,' their heirs and., assigns, 'where no/adverse claim exists on the tenth day of May, eighteen- hundred and seventy-two, so long as they comply with the laws of the United States, and with state, territorial, and local regulations, not in conflict with the laws of the United States governing their possessory title, shall have the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of their locations, and of all veins, lodes, and ledges throughout their entire depth, the top or apelx of which lies inside of such surface lines extended downward vertically, although such veins, lodes, or ledges may so far depart from a perpendicular in their course downward ’as to extend outside the vertical side lines of such surface locations. But their right of possession to such outside parts of such veins or ledges shall be confined to such portions thereof, as lie between vertical planes drawn downward, as above described, through the end lines of their locations, so continued in their own direction tha such planes will intersect such exterior parts of such veins or ledges. And nothing in this section shall authorize the locator or possessor of a vein or lode which extends in its downward course beyond the vertical lines of his claim to enter upon the surface of a claim owned or possessed by another.”

It is obvious that the vein, lode, or ledge of which the locator may have “the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment ” is one whose apex is found inside of his surface lines extended vertically; and this right follows such vein, though in extending downward it may depart from a perpendicular and extend laterally outside of the vertical fines of such surface location.

What constitutes a lode or vein of mineral matter has been no easy thing to define.

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Bluebook (online)
116 U.S. 529, 6 S. Ct. 481, 29 L. Ed. 712, 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1793, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/iron-silver-mining-co-v-cheesman-scotus-1886.