Irene Grivas v.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: October 16, 2025
• Docket: 25-2441
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 25-2441 ___________

IN RE: IRENE GRIVAS, Petitioner ____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Related to Civ. No. 5:24-cv-06923) ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. on October 2, 2025

Before: BIBAS, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: October 16, 2025) ____________________________________ ___________

OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

Irene Grivas seeks a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to, among other

things, lift the stay it imposed in her federal lawsuit on abstention grounds pending the

conclusion of related state litigation. We will deny the petition.

In September 2021, the City of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, condemned one of Grivas’s

properties due to rodent infestation and a host of maintenance problems. Grivas eventu-

ally appealed the condemnation order to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. See

City of Lancaster v. Grivas, No. 398 CD 2025. The City also filed a nuisance action

against Grivas in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County to enjoin her from

renting out the property until she fixes the violations. The court granted the City’s in-

junction request, and Grivas appealed that decision to the Commonwealth Court as well.

See City of Lancaster v. Grivas, Nos. 1399 & 1703 CD 2024. All appeals remain pend-

ing.

Grivas believes that the state court proceedings violate her Fourth, Fifth, and Four-

teenth Amendment rights. To vindicate those rights, Grivas filed two federal lawsuits in

the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. She first

brought suit against the City in January 2024 in hopes of lifting the condemnation order,

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 2 changing the venue of the nuisance action, and obtaining damages. The District Court

abstained from hearing her claims for injunctive relief and stayed those for monetary

damages pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See Grivas v. City of Lan-

caster, No. 5:24-cv-0245, Doc. 31 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 2024). Grivas separately sued the

City and several municipal officials in December 2024, raising largely the same claims as

her original lawsuit, plus a few “only tangentially related to the condemnation.” See Gri-

vas v. Sorace, No. 5:24-cv-06923, Doc. 82 at 3 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2025). As in the previ-

ous case, the District Court dismissed Grivas’s request for an injunction, stayed the case

under Younger, and signaled its intent to consolidate both lawsuits upon resolution of the

state proceedings.

Grivas now seeks mandamus relief from the District Court’s order in the latter

case. She asks this Court to direct the District Court to vacate its stay, correct its docket

to reflect that she has only filed a first amended complaint, recognize her timely jury de-

mand, and instruct all parties to properly serve her. She also seeks an order reassigning

the case to a new judge “due to prejudice and prior harm” in her other federal lawsuit and

vacating “the improper sua sponte consolidation” with that case. See C.A. Doc. 1 at 1.

A writ of mandamus is a “drastic remedy” that may be granted only in “extraordi-

nary circumstances in response to an act amounting to a judicial usurpation of power.” In

re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

Petitioners must show that they have no other adequate means to obtain the relief desired,

that they have a clear and indisputable right to the writ, and that the writ would be appro-

priate under the circumstances. See Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir.

3 1992); see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam). Grivas

has not met this exacting burden.

Mandamus is not a substitute for appeal. In re Kensington Intern. Ltd., 353 F.3d

211, 219 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Younger abstention orders are final, immedi-

ately appealable orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because “the effect of such an order is to

surrender jurisdiction of the federal action to a state court.” Lui v. Comm’n, Adult

Entm’t, Del., 369 F.3d 319, 325 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v.

Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 (1983); Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 105 (3d

Cir. 1989)). Grivas thus has alternative means of obtaining the relief she desires with re-

spect to the District Court’s stay order.

Grivas does not flesh out any of her other grievances with the District Court’s docket

management or alleged prejudice in her petition. The manner in which a District Court

controls its docket is, of course, discretionary. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig, 685

F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982). For that reason, there can be no clear and indisputable right

to have the court handle a case on its docket in a certain way. See Allied Chem. Corp. v.

Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980). 1 And although our mandamus authority includes the

power to order a District Court to recuse in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 455, see In re

Antar, 71 F.3d 97, 101 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10

F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 1993), recusal is not appropriate when, as here, the allegations of

1 The District Court is free to address Grivas’s jury demand and service concerns in due course. We observe, however, that Grivas twice amended her complaint against the City and its officials, see ECF Docs. 3, 39, so her assertion that the court erroneously referred to her operative pleading as the “second amended complaint” is frivolous on its face. 4 bias pertain solely to “displeasure with legal rulings,” see Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v.

Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Liteky v. United States, 510

U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (adverse rulings alone generally do not constitute a sufficient basis

for holding that a judge’s impartiality is in doubt). To the extent Grivas charges the District

Court with bias, we conclude that her bald allegations are unsupported by the record and

that her request to have her cases reassigned is unwarranted. Accordingly, we will deny

her petition.