In the Iowa Supreme Court
No. 24–1124
Submitted October 10, 2024—Filed December 13, 2024
Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board,
Complainant,
vs.
Patricia Jean Lipski,
Respondent.
On review of the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission.
In an attorney disciplinary action, the grievance commission recommends
suspension of the respondent’s license to practice law based on violations of our
attorney ethics rules. License Suspended.
McDermott, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen,
C.J., and Waterman, Mansfield, and Oxley, JJ., joined. Oxley, J., filed a
concurring opinion, in which Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, J., joined.
McDonald, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which May, J.,
joined.
Tara van Brederode, Allison A. Schmidt, and Alexis W. Grove for
complainant.
Alexander E. Wonio and David L. Brown of Hansen, McClintock & Riley,
Des Moines, for respondent. 2
McDermott, Justice.
This attorney disciplinary matter presents a failure in our attempts at
progressive discipline to prevent a lawyer from continuing to miss filing deadlines
in appeals. In the underlying termination-of-parental-rights case giving rise to
this disciplinary matter, we dismissed a mother’s appeal after her lawyer failed
to timely file both a notice of appeal and a petition on appeal. We now suspend
the lawyer’s license to practice law for thirty days.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Attorney Patricia Lipski is a solo practitioner in Washington County. She
has been licensed to practice law in Iowa since 2001. She focuses her practice
principally on juvenile court work, including child-in-need-of-assistance cases,
termination-of-parental-rights cases, juvenile guardianships, and juvenile (and
sometimes adult) mental health commitments. On rare occasions, she also
defends clients in misdemeanor criminal cases. Her cases principally come to
her through court appointments. She holds a contract with the state public
defender’s office to represent clients in juvenile proceedings in at least six
counties in southeast Iowa.
This disciplinary matter arises from a termination-of-parental-rights case
where Lipski was appointed to represent the child’s mother, “Alicia”
(a pseudonym). The juvenile court entered an order terminating Alicia’s parental
rights on January 30, 2023. Alicia, communicating with Lipski the next day
using a messaging app, asked Lipski to appeal. A party seeking to appeal a
termination of parental rights must first file a notice of appeal signed by the
client within fifteen days of the termination order. Iowa R. App. P. 6.101(1)(a)
(2023). A party must then file a petition explaining the basis for relief within
thirty days of the contested ruling. See id. r. 6.201(1)(b) (requiring the petition to 3
be filed fifteen days after the notice of appeal, for a total of thirty days after the
contested ruling).
Lipski and Alicia exchanged multiple messages to schedule a meeting to
sign the notice. Alicia lacked access to transportation, thereby creating a
situation where Lipski had to go to her. For reasons generally involving problems
with Lipski’s schedule (that she had to get home for an appointment, that her
week had been “shot to hell,” that her “day fell apart”), none of the scheduled
meetings materialized. Eventually, on the due date, Lipski drove from
Washington to Alicia’s residence in Ottumwa to procure the signature, but this
meeting similarly never materialized because Alicia apparently did not see or
respond to Lipski’s messages when Lipski arrived. As a result, Lipski still had
not obtained a signed notice by the February 14 deadline. On that date, Lipski
filed a noncompliant notice with “/s/” on the signature line instead of Alicia’s
signature. On February 17, we entered an order noting the absence of the client’s
signature and requiring an amended notice signed by the client within seven
days (i.e., February 24).
Lipski obtained Alicia’s signature on the amended notice on February 24.
Yet Lipski did not file it with our court until February 26, two days beyond the
deadline.
Lipski then filed the petition on appeal on March 6. But our order requiring
the signed notice within seven days did not extend the deadline to file the petition
on appeal. Our February 17 order made this point explicit: “This order does not
stay or affect any other pending deadlines, including the jurisdictional petition
on appeal deadline.” The deadline for the petition on appeal thus remained
March 1. As a result, the March 6 petition on appeal also was filed beyond the
deadline. Alicia messaged Lipski several times between March 1 and March 5, 4
including a message specifically asking about the status of the appeal. Lipski
never responded.
On March 7, we entered an order noting the late filing and requiring a
statement from Lipski’s client explaining why the appeal should not be
dismissed. The same day, the State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal citing
the untimely filings. Also that same day, Lipski filed a motion for a delayed
appeal. In her motion, Lipski explained that she had been focused on several
other matters in district court and that the untimely petition on appeal resulted
from her own failure to properly calendar the deadline.
Lipski did not communicate with Alicia about the fact her appeal
documents had been filed late, the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal, or our
order requiring an explanation and threatening dismissal. When, on March 20,
Alicia messaged Lipski about the status of her appeal, Lipski responded only:
“The appeal is still pending. Everything has been submitted for it.” Two days
later, on March 22, we entered an order denying the motion for delayed appeal
and dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Lipski did not contact Alicia to let her know. Over the ensuing weeks, Alicia
sent several messages to Lipski. Although Lipski appears to have communicated
regularly with Alicia before the appeal, during the appeal Lipski went dark. On
April 29, Alicia sent Lipski a message inquiring, “Still nothing about my
appeal[?]” Lipski did not respond.
On May 4, Alicia sent Lipski another message: “I’m getting nervous I
haven’t heard back from u.” Lipski finally responded. “Sorry. Been pretty crazy
last several weeks. The appeal was denied & dismissed. I’m so sorry.” Lipski did
not respond to several follow-up inquiries from Alicia about whether Alicia could
appeal again. Lipski never disclosed to Alicia the reason for the dismissal. 5
The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board filed a complaint
against Lipski with the grievance commission asserting multiple violations of the
Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct based on Lipski’s actions surrounding
Alicia’s appeal. The grievance commission held a contested hearing.
Lipski testified, among other things, about the circumstances surrounding
her representation of Alicia. The Board admitted exhibits showing the messages
exchanged between Alicia and Lipski from before and after the ruling terminating
Alicia’s parental rights. The Board also admitted exhibits containing information
about prior admonishments and discipline that Lipski received. The commission
received evidence about two private admonitions—one in 2018 and the other in
2020—for failing to timely file documents in appeals of termination-of-parental-rights
cases that, like here, resulted in the dismissal of appeals for several of her clients.
The commission also received evidence about a public reprimand imposed on
February 10, 2023. The public reprimand similarly resulted from Lipski’s failure
to timely file documents in appellate cases that had resulted in dismissal in two
clients’ termination-of-parental-rights cases.
Lipski testified that Alicia’s representation presented unique difficulties
because of Alicia’s general inability to communicate by means other than a
messaging app. When asked about her own lack of communication with Alicia
about the late filings in the appeal, Lipski said that she was embarrassed by her
mistakes and under significant stress from a variety of sources at the time. Lipski
conceded that, as of the date of the grievance commission hearing, she still had
not disclosed to Alicia the reason the supreme court dismissed the appeal. Lipski
also described some other challenges in her practice that have negatively affected
both her mental health and her ability to handle her caseload. She described the
emotional toll that comes with representing children and parents on such 6
consequential matters and how a lack of financial resources has prevented her
from hiring support staff. Lipski also described pro bono and other volunteer
work that she does.
Two district associate judges before whom Lipski frequently appeared were
subpoenaed to testify at the grievance commission hearing. Both judges testified
that they regularly appoint Lipski to handle juvenile cases in their courts, with
one of them noting that he’d just appointed her in a case earlier that week. Both
praised the quality of her legal work in juvenile court and “the experience and
the competence” that Lipski brings. Several pieces of testimony focused on
Lipski’s unique ability to communicate with challenging clients and that she
“is comfortable using social media and kind of meeting clients where they are in
a way that engages them in the process.” Both judges shared their appreciation
for Lipski’s willingness to take on appointments to represent indigent clients.
And both judges noted the dearth of lawyers in their area available for
appointments in juvenile cases and the critical need that Lipski thus fulfills.
“I need Ms. Lipski,” said one of the judges. Both judges’ experiences with Lipski
were limited to district court work; neither judge had personal knowledge of
Lipski’s work on appellate matters.
The grievance commission, in its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommended disposition, found Lipski sincere and her testimony credible. It
also noted its appreciation for the informed perspectives of both judges who
testified. But the grievance commission ultimately concluded that Lipski’s
actions in Alicia’s case violated each of the ethics rules that the Board charged.
These violations, coupled with Lipski’s prior discipline for essentially identical
misconduct, caused the commission to recommend a fourteen-day suspension
of Lipski’s license to practice law. 7
II. The Alleged Ethical Violations.
The Board charged Lipski with violating five of our rules of professional
conduct. In an attorney disciplinary case, we review de novo the alleged
violations and evidence to ensure that the Board has proved each allegation of
misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Iowa Ct. R. 36.22(4);
see Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wagner, 768 N.W.2d 279, 281–82
(Iowa 2009) (per curiam). The same underlying conduct may violate multiple
rules of professional conduct at once. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Conroy, 845 N.W.2d 59, 65 (Iowa 2014).
A. Diligence. Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.3 requires lawyers
to “act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”
Failing to comply with appellate deadlines can constitute a violation of this rule,
Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Adams, 749 N.W.2d 666, 669 (Iowa 2008),
particularly “when an attorney’s neglect results in the client’s loss of a right to
appeal,” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Turner, 918 N.W.2d 130, 145
(Iowa 2018).
We recognize that Lipski faced some logistical challenges in getting the
signed notice of appeal from Alicia that were not all of Lipski’s making, including
that Alicia lived about fifty miles away and apparently did not use email, have a
printer, or have access to transportation. But Lipski bears responsibility for
repeatedly canceling meetings to obtain Alicia’s signature, ultimately leaving too
little margin for mishaps at the deadline. And Lipski’s failure to file the signed
notice of appeal within the (effectively extended) deadline in our order, and her
failure to file the petition on appeal within the thirty-day deadline, were
indisputably within Lipski’s control. The circumstances show a lack of diligence
and promptness in violation of the rule. 8
B. Communication. Rule 32:1.4(a)(3) requires a lawyer to “keep the client
reasonably informed about the status of the matter.” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct
32:1.4(a)(3). And rule 32:1.4(a)(4) compels a lawyer to “promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information.” Id. r. 32:1.4(a)(4). Lipski never told Alicia
that she had made any late filings, that the State had filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal, that our court had entered an order requesting a statement
explaining the late filings, or that there were potentially dire consequences in
play. Lipski also never told Alicia why her appeal was dismissed. Lipski admitted
at the hearing that as far as she knows, Alicia still doesn’t know the reason. This
lack of communication about important developments in the case, particularly
in the face of Alicia’s repeated requests for information, establishes a violation of
both rules 32:1.4(a)(3) and (a)(4).
C. Expediting Litigation. Rule 32:3.2 states that “[a] lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the
client.” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:3.2. We have said that failing to comply with
appellate filing deadlines may violate the rule. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Weiland, 862 N.W.2d 627, 636–37 (Iowa 2015). The actual length of delay
in the litigation was arguably minimal, as Lipski missed each of the deadlines by
days. But in this case, the final words of the rule—“consistent with the interests
of the client”—bear some importance. Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:3.2. Our
appellate rules in parental-termination cases call for different, tighter deadlines
than in most other cases. Compare Iowa R. App. P. 6.101(1)(a), and id. r.
6.201(1)(b), with id. r. 6.101(1)(b), and id. r. 6.901(1)(a). These expedited
deadlines are an acknowledgment of the profound interests and time sensitivity
at stake in parental-termination cases. See In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 291 (Iowa
2021). To Lipski’s client, who had just lost the right to parent her child, even the 9
short delay with the filings prevented review of her appeal on the merits. We thus
find a violation of this rule.
D. Misrepresentation. Rule 32:8.4(c) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in
“conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Iowa R. of
Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). To show a violation, “the Board must prove ‘the attorney
acted with “some level of scienter” rather than mere negligence.’ ” Iowa Sup. Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Meyer, 944 N.W.2d 61, 69 (Iowa 2020) (quoting Iowa
Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Green, 888 N.W.2d 398, 403 (Iowa 2016)). We
must sort out “whether the effect of the lawyer’s conduct is to mislead rather
than to inform.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Haskovec, 869 N.W.2d
554, 560 (Iowa 2015). It is hard to read the eventual text message to Alicia about
what happened (“The appeal was denied & dismissed. I’m so sorry.”) as other
than an attempt to mislead or misinform about the reason for the appeal’s lack
of success. We find a violation of this rule.
E. Misconduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice. Rule
32:8.4(d) prohibits conduct “prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Iowa R.
of Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(d). Although there is no “typical” conduct that prejudices
the administration of justice, it includes conduct that “violates the
‘well-understood norms and conventions of the practice of law’ ” and thus
“hampers ‘the efficient and proper operation of the courts or of ancillary systems
upon which the courts rely.’ ” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Aeilts,
974 N.W.2d 119, 128 (Iowa 2022) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Rhinehart, 827 N.W.2d 169, 180 (Iowa 2013)). “Examples of conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice,” we have said, “include ‘paying an adverse expert
witness for information regarding an opponent’s case preparation, demanding a
release in a civil action as a condition of dismissing criminal charges, and 10
knowingly making false or reckless charges against a judicial officer.’ ” Iowa Sup.
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Taylor, 814 N.W.2d 259, 267 (Iowa 2012) (quoting
Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Iowa
2010)); see also Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Daniels, 984 N.W.2d 757,
765 (Iowa 2023) (finding a rule 32:8.4(d) violation for, as the Board characterized
it, a lawyer’s “persistent and inexorable pursuit of the same claims over and over
again against the same litigant, spanning more than a decade” that placed
“a drain on judicial resources and a blight on the justice system”).
Although we have held that the failure to comply with appellate deadlines
that results in a dismissal can constitute a violation of the rule, we have generally
done so when a lawyer has abandoned prosecution of the client’s appeal such
that the clerk, in light of the lawyers’ complete inaction, had to administratively
dismiss the appeal. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dolezal, 796
N.W.2d 910, 914–915 (Iowa 2011); Iowa Supreme Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
v. Wright, 758 N.W.2d 227, 230–31 (Iowa 2008). That didn’t happen in this case.
Though tardy, Lipski did in fact prepare and file both the client-signed
appeal notice and the petition on appeal. She filed a motion pursuing a late-filed
appeal the same day that we entered our order requesting her response. Lipski
never failed to appear for scheduled hearings, and any wasted investment of time
and energy by the courts was minimal. Cf. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Johnson, 988 N.W.2d 399, 414 (Iowa 2023) (finding a violation of rule 32:8.4(d)
where the lawyer’s repeated failure to meet deadlines and appear for scheduled
hearings “ ‘undoubtedly delayed court proceedings’ and ‘caused court personnel
to invest time and energy’ that they would not have otherwise” (quoting Iowa
Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barry, 908 N.W.2d 217, 226 (Iowa 2018))). The
dismissal of the appeal was an adjudication by our court, not a default entered 11
by the clerk after some long period of dormancy. Although Lipski missed
deadlines, she never abandoned her client’s cause. Cf. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. O’Brien, 971 N.W.2d 584, 590–91 (Iowa 2022) (finding a
violation of rule 32:8.4(d) when a lawyer “effectively abandoned [the client]
shortly after accepting the case” and “requir[ing] the opposing party to file a
motion to compel and for the court to hold both a hearing on the motion and a
related hearing on sanctions”).
A different case, Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Taylor,
presents a more analogous set of facts. 814 N.W.2d 259. In Taylor, the Board
charged multiple violations of our ethics rules when a lawyer failed to timely file
notices of appeal in a child-in-need-of-assistance case and a dissolution
modification case. Id. at 263–64. Although both appeals were dismissed after
opposing parties filed motions to dismiss, neither case was administratively
dismissed based on the lawyer’s abandonment of the case. Id. at 267–68. In both
cases, the lawyer was active in the appeal but through negligence “fail[ed] to
appreciate the applicability of the expedited deadlines.” Id. at 268. We concluded
that the lawyer’s conduct didn’t constitute a violation of rule 32:8.4(d). Id.
This is thus not the usual type of delay or dismissal for which we have
found “prejudice to the administration of justice” under rule 32:8.4(d). See
Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d at 914–15; Wright, 758 N.W.2d at 230–31. We do not find a
violation of the rule here.
III. Sanction.
The purposes of lawyer discipline include protection of the public, the need
for deterring other lawyers from similar misconduct, upholding the integrity of
the legal system, and assuring the fair administration of justice. See Iowa Sup.
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Beauvais, 948 N.W.2d 505, 516 (Iowa 2020); see also 12
Am. Bar Ass’n, Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions § 1.1, at 1
(2015). We have no standard sanction for particular types of misconduct. Iowa
Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Clarity, 838 N.W.2d 648, 660 (Iowa 2013). To
determine the appropriate sanction, we consider the nature of the ethical duties
that the lawyer violated, the lawyer’s mental state, the extent of the actual or
potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct, and any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Beauvais, 948 N.W.2d at 516.
We respectfully consider the grievance commission’s findings and
recommendations but may impose a greater or lesser sanction than what the
grievance commission recommends. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Stoller,
879 N.W.2d 199, 207 (Iowa 2016). The grievance commission recommends a
fourteen-day suspension. The Board asks us to impose a thirty-day suspension.
Lipski argues that her conduct did not violate any rules and asks for no sanction.
The misconduct in this case centers on neglect of Alicia’s appeal. Attorney
neglect cases typically result in sanctions anywhere from a public reprimand to
a six-month suspension. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kennedy,
837 N.W.2d 659, 675 (Iowa 2013). We tend to impose more severe sanctions
when neglect is accompanied by other violations or aggravating factors. Iowa
Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carpenter, 781 N.W.2d 263, 270 (Iowa 2010).
Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Sobel presents a
number of similarities to this case. 997 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 2023). In Sobel, a
lawyer neglected client matters, failed to communicate with clients, and failed to
comply with court deadlines, resulting in dismissal of a client’s case. Id. at
426–27. We found the lawyer’s legal work on behalf of underserved populations
to be a mitigating factor but found the fact that he had previously been
admonished or reprimanded for violations of the same rules and “was on notice 13
that similar conduct may warrant a sanction” to be an aggravating factor. Id. at
433–34. We imposed a thirty-day suspension. Id. at 434.
In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Dolezal, a lawyer
neglected three clients’ matters (causing a dismissal in a case), failed to
communicate with a client, and made misrepresentations to a client, violating
several of the same ethical rules as Lipski. 796 N.W.2d at 912–13. Unlike Lipski,
the lawyer had no recent disciplinary history involving similar misconduct, but
the lawyer had also had additional violations involving trust account
requirements. Id. at 920–21. We imposed a thirty-day suspension. Id. at 922–23.
In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Hoglan, a lawyer
failed to pursue four appeals on behalf of his clients, resulting in dismissals in
each case. 781 N.W.2d 279, 282–83 (Iowa 2010) (per curiam). Unlike Lipski, we
found insufficient evidence to conclude that the lawyer had misrepresented
matters to his clients. Id. at 285. But like Lipski, the lawyer had received a public
reprimand shortly before the misconduct in question and yet still failed to comply
with appellate deadlines. Id. at 286–87. We imposed a thirty-day suspension. Id.
at 287.
We turn to the mitigating and aggravating factors. Lipski’s considerable
service to an underserved population is a mitigating factor. Sobel, 997 N.W.2d at
433–34. The juvenile court judges testified at the hearing that Lipski’s
willingness to take appointments in juvenile cases has been critical to meet the
demand in this area and that any suspension of her license risks adversely
affecting the operation of the juvenile court system. Lipski’s other community
service and pro bono work are also mitigating factors. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Hier, 937 N.W.2d 309, 318 (Iowa 2020) (discussing community
service); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Said, 869 N.W.2d 185, 194–95 14
(Iowa 2015) (discussing pro bono work). The grievance commission noted Lipski’s
credibility and sincerity in her testimony, which comes through in our reading
of the transcript, as also a mitigating factor. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Liles, 808 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Iowa 2012) (finding the fact that the lawyer
“expressed sincere remorse” to be a mitigating factor).
The grievance commission declined to consider the mental health
challenges that Lipski raised in her testimony to be a mitigating factor,
concluding that Lipski failed to explain how her mental health conditions
brought about the particular misconduct in this case or what efforts she has
taken to try to ensure that her condition doesn’t result in similar problems
moving forward. We come to the same conclusion on this point. See Iowa Sup.
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Leitner, 998 N.W.2d 627, 647 (Iowa 2023) (declining
to find mitigation when there was no causal relationship shown between the
lawyer’s health and the misconduct at issue).
Client harm is an aggravating factor. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
v. Kingery, 871 N.W.2d 109, 122 (Iowa 2015). Alicia was clearly harmed by losing
her opportunity to appeal the termination of her parental rights. Lipski’s
experience as an attorney (now more than two decades) serves as an aggravating
factor. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Willey, 889 N.W.2d 647, 658
(Iowa 2017). Multiple rule violations, as we have here, are an aggravating factor.
Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Parrish, 925 N.W.2d 163, 181 (Iowa 2019).
Most aggravating is Lipski’s history of misconduct. Lipski’s private
admonitions in 2018 and 2020, followed by a public reprimand in 2023, all for
the same type of misconduct as in this case, give us no reason to believe that
our prior reformatory efforts have had the intended effect. As the grievance
commission noted, Lipski’s public reprimand was issued about a week before 15
she failed to timely file a valid notice of appeal in Alicia’s case. And we agree with
the grievance commission’s observation that Lipski in her testimony struggled to
point to specific remedial measures, beyond better attention to calendaring, that
she has implemented to prevent the same problems from happening again.
Although we are mindful of the district associate judges’ testimony about
the serious need for Lipski’s services in juvenile court cases in the counties where
she practices, other considerations—particularly the need to deter future
violations and protection of the public—outweigh that concern in this case. In
Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Capotosto, we similarly noted
a judge’s and county attorney’s letters describing the lawyer’s “importance as
one of few attorneys willing to accept court-appointed assignments in a
five-county area” and warning that a suspension could “severely and adversely
disturb[]” judicial operations in those counties. 927 N.W.2d 585, 590–91
(Iowa 2019). But we nonetheless imposed a sixty-day suspension, finding the
lawyer’s persistent neglect of probate matters and two prior public reprimands
for similar misconduct necessitated discipline beyond yet another public
reprimand. Id. at 591.
Lipski’s misconduct centers on a failure to timely file documents in
appellate cases. The Board’s briefing acknowledges that it “does not contest that
Lipski represents her clients well at the trial-court level,” even describing her
representation in trial court as “exemplary.” But as the Board also notes, Lipski
has a continuing duty to diligently represent clients in their appeals, and it is in
this area that she has neglected her duties. Another public reprimand, in our
view, is insufficient to address the problem in this case.
We thus suspend Lipski’s license to practice law for thirty days, effective
ten days from the date of this opinion. This suspension applies to all facets of 16
the practice of law under Iowa Court Rule 34.23(3). She must comply with the
notification requirements to her clients in Iowa Court Rule 34.24. We tax the
costs of this action to Lipski under Iowa Court Rule 36.24(1).
License Suspended.
Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, Mansfield, and Oxley, JJ., join this
opinion. Oxley, J., files a concurring opinion, in which Christensen, C.J., and
Waterman, J., join. McDonald, J., files an opinion concurring in the judgment,
in which May, J., joins. 17
#24–1124, Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lipski
McDonald, Justice (concurring in the judgment).
On August 20, 2024, the chief justice issued a Notice of Nonoral
Submission in this attorney disciplinary matter. The notice stated that “[n]o
notice of appeal has been filed, and the time for filing a notice of appeal has
expired” and cited Iowa Court rule 36.21(1). The notice further stated that
because this attorney disciplinary matter is proceeding pursuant to rule 36.21,
the parties “may file a statement in support of, or in resistance to, the grievance
commission’s recommended sanction.” Because this attorney disciplinary case
is proceeding pursuant to rule 36.21, it involves only the question of sanctions,
and the chief justice’s notice correctly directed the parties to file statements
regarding only the sanctions to be applied given the uncontested violations.
Despite our rules, the chief justice’s notice, and the lack of adversarial
briefing, the court nonetheless proceeds to analyze the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting each of the uncontested violations as if this matter were proceeding
as an appeal pursuant to rule 36.22. The court then finds that there was
insufficient evidence to find a violation of rule 32:8.4(d) even though Lipski did
not contest the violation and even though the Attorney Disciplinary Board was
not given the opportunity to brief the issue.
I disagree with this approach to resolving attorney disciplinary matters.
See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Yang, 6 N.W.3d 312, 325–26 (Iowa
2024) (McDonald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Iowa Sup. Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Tindal, 949 N.W.2d 637, 646–48 (Iowa 2020)
(McDonald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This court is the body
that drafts the rules. If the court does not like the rules as they presently exist,
then the court should amend the rules rather than ignore them to the prejudice 18
of the Attorney Disciplinary Board, which did not have an opportunity to
advocate for the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each of the alleged
violations.
“Because this matter only involves the question of sanctions under Iowa
Court Rule 36.21, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each of the ethical
violations is not properly before the court.” Yang, 6 N.W.3d at 325 (McDonald, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). I thus join only part III of the court’s
opinion regarding the sanctions to be applied in this case. See id. at 325–26;
Tindal, 949 N.W.2d at 646–48 (McDonald, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
May, J., joins this opinion concurring in the judgment. 19
Oxley, Justice (concurring).
I concur fully in the court’s decision in this case. I write separately to point
out that one of the reasons Lipski missed the appellate deadlines is the lack of
administrative assistance, and one of the reasons she lacked administrative
assistance was the lack of finances, and one of the reasons she lacked finances
was the fact that Lipski works almost exclusively as a contract attorney with the
public defender’s office taking court-appointed juvenile cases. Lipski is one of
only a half dozen contract attorneys in five counties in District 8A and the only
one who contracts in all five counties. Two district associate judges testified at
the commission hearing about the difficulty in getting enough attorneys to
represent the parties in juvenile cases needing court appointments and that they
regularly rely on Lipski. As one put it, “[S]he’s important. And she does good
work.” That judge attributed the challenges in getting attorneys to accept court
appointments to the “reimbursement rate by the State,” especially in the border
counties where attorneys can practice in a neighboring state that pays their
contract attorneys more money.
None of this excuses Lipski’s conduct in this case or the ramifications to
her client, who was denied a merits review of the order terminating her parental
rights. But this case does highlight the indigent defense crisis caused by the low
pay for contract attorneys in Iowa who can’t even afford the help of an
administrative assistant as they work to provide this invaluable service in our
rural counties.
Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, J., join this concurrence.