Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Karmen R. Anderson

• Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decided: May 16, 2025
• Docket: 24-1894
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Iowa Supreme Court

No. 24–1894

Submitted April 16, 2025—Filed May 16, 2025

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board,

Appellee,

vs.

Karmen R. Anderson,

Appellant.

On appeal from the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance

Commission.

In an attorney disciplinary action, the grievance commission recommends

an attorney’s license to practice law be suspended for multiple violations of the

rules of professional conduct. Attorney Reprimanded.

McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined.

Jesse A. Macro, Jr. of Macro Law, LLP, Des Moines, for appellant.

Sarah C. Tupper and Alexis W. Grove, Des Moines, for appellee. 2

McDonald, Justice.

This matter raises the question of the appropriate sanction for an attorney

who admittedly failed to comply with appellate deadlines in numerous appeals

over a period of almost four years. We conclude a public reprimand is the

appropriate remedy here, but we caution that, going forward, an attorney’s

repeated failure to comply with the appellate deadlines may warrant suspension.

From December 2019 through October 2023, attorney Karmen Anderson

failed to act diligently in twenty-four appellate matters. In those twenty-four

cases, Anderson missed forty-two appellate filing deadlines, was issued twenty-

four default notices by the clerk of the appellate court, and was removed from

four of those cases by this court. She paid the accrued $150 penalties assessed

for each default, totaling $3,600. Although Anderson’s conduct delayed or

potentially delayed the disposition of these appeals, none were dismissed due to

her lack of diligence.

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board charged Anderson

with violating Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.3 (requiring lawyers to

“act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client”), 32:3.2

(“A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the

interests of the client.”), and 32:8.4(d) (prohibiting conduct “prejudicial to the

administration of justice”). After a contested hearing, the grievance commission

found the Board proved each of the charged violations. The commission

recommended that Anderson’s license to practice law be suspended for forty-five

days and that Anderson complete continuing education related to law practice

management as a condition of reinstatement. The commission recommended

suspension because, among other things, Anderson had been previously

disciplined for similar conduct. Specifically, this court publicly reprimanded 3

Anderson in September 2019 for the same rule violations after she missed

appellate filing deadlines and was issued default notices in eleven different

appeals between November 2017 through January 2019.

Anderson timely filed this appeal from the grievance commission’s

recommendation. Our review is de novo. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.

Neff, 5 N.W.3d 296, 303 (Iowa 2024). We give respectful consideration to the

commission’s findings and recommended sanctions, but we are not bound by

them. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Tindal, 949 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Iowa

2020).

Anderson does not contest that the Board proved each of the alleged

violations by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Nor could she

realistically. Anderson’s failure to meet forty-two appellate filing deadlines

resulting in twenty-four default notices clearly violated rules 32:1.3, 32:3.2, and

32:8.4(d). See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Eichmann, 18 N.W.3d 460,

467 (Iowa 2025) (“The same underlying conduct may violate multiple rules of

professional conduct at once.” (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.

Lipski, 14 N.W.3d 751, 757 (Iowa 2024))); Lipski, 14 N.W.3d at 757–58 (stating

that the failure to comply with appellate filing deadlines can constitute violations

of rules 32:1.3 and 32:3.2); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Fenton, 12

N.W.3d 352, 362 (Iowa 2024) (“We have concluded that an attorney

violates . . . rule [32:8.4(d)] when they miss deadlines.”); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y

Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 988 N.W.2d 399, 410–11, 413–14 (Iowa 2023)

(finding a violation of rules 32:3.2 and 32:8.4(d) where the lawyer’s repeated

failure to meet deadlines delayed court proceedings and caused court personnel

to expend unnecessary time and energy); Tindal, 949 N.W.2d at 642–43 (holding 4

that an attorney violated rules 32:1.3, 32:3.2, and 32:8.4(d) when he missed

filing deadlines resulting in default notices in thirteen appeals).

The parties do contest the appropriate sanction for Anderson’s conduct.

Anderson argues that a public reprimand is appropriate. However, she requests

that if we conclude that suspension of her license is appropriate, the court

suspend her license for no more than thirty days instead of the recommended

forty-five days. The Board contends that the court should suspend Anderson’s

license for thirty days and requests that the court require Anderson to complete

continuing legal education regarding law practice management as a condition to

reinstatement.

“There is no standard sanction for a particular type of misconduct . . . .”

Neff, 5 N.W.3d at 314 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Earley, 729

N.W.2d 437, 443 (Iowa 2007)). We “determine an appropriate sanction based on

the particular circumstances of each case.” Earley, 729 N.W.2d at 443. Relevant

considerations include the “nature of the alleged violations, the need for

deterrence, protection of the public, maintenance of the reputation of the bar as

a whole, and [the attorney’s] fitness to continue in the practice of law.” Iowa Sup.

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Laing, 832 N.W.2d 366, 367–68 (Iowa 2013)

(alteration in original) (quoting Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State

Bar Ass’n v. Kaufman, 515 N.W.2d 28, 30 (Iowa 1994)). Also relevant are the

“aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Earley, 729 N.W.2d at 443.

Although the appropriate sanction is based on the particular facts and

circumstances of each case, we do “seek a degree of consistency in our

disciplinary cases with respect to sanctions.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary

Bd. v. Taylor, 814 N.W.2d 259, 268 (Iowa 2012). Like cases should be treated

alike. 5

The most analogous case to this one is Iowa Supreme Court Attorney

Disciplinary Board v. Tindal, 949 N.W.2d 637. Attorney Tindal was privately

admonished for lack of diligence in an appeal after he was issued two default

notices for missing appellate filing deadlines. Id. at 640. In a later disciplinary

proceeding, the board again charged Tindal after he was issued twenty-one

default notices and penalty assessments in sixteen different appeals, all for

missing filing deadlines. Id. at 640–41. We publicly reprimanded Tindal for that

conduct in 2018. Id. at 641. After the 2018 public reprimand, the board charged

Tindal with additional rule violations after Tindal missed more appellate filing

deadlines and was issued default notices in thirteen more appeals. Id. We

concluded that Tindal’s repeated failure to comply with the appellate deadlines

violated rules 32:1.3, 32:3.2, and rule 32:8.4(d). Id. at 642–43. On the question

of sanctions, we were “troubled that Tindal missed several more appellate

deadlines after being publicly reprimanded for such conduct.” Id. at 645. We

considered Tindal’s prior private admonition and his 2018 public reprimand as

aggravating factors. Id. We also considered Tindal’s twenty years of experience

in practicing law as an aggravating factor. Id. As for mitigating factors, we noted

that Tindal “frequently represent[ed] clients from an underserved part of the

community,” had “discontinued taking criminal or postconviction appeals,” and

had “taken corrective measures within his office to better track deadlines and

ensure timely filings.” Id. We concluded that a second public reprimand was

appropriate. Id. The “lack of harm to Tindal’s clients [was] a key mitigating

factor.” Id. We explained that there was a lack of cases “suspending an attorney

solely for default notices cured without dismissal of the appeal.” Id.

As in Tindal, there are aggravating circumstances here. Anderson was

admitted to practice in 2010, and her fifteen years of experience is an aggravating 6

factor. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Parrish, 925 N.W.2d 163, 181

(Iowa 2019). Anderson’s prior disciplinary history is an aggravating factor. See

id. This factor is significant here because Anderson’s 2019 public reprimand was

based on the same or similar conduct at issue in this case. “These current

violations demonstrate that [Anderson] has not learned from [her] previous

disciplinary history.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weiland, 885 N.W.2d

198, 215 (Iowa 2016). While Anderson’s prior disciplinary history is significant,

it is less significant than Tindal’s, who had been privately admonished and

publicly reprimanded for missing appellate deadlines prior to being reprimanded

a second time. See Tindal, 949 N.W.2d at 640–41. Also aggravating here is

Anderson’s conduct during the disciplinary proceeding. During this disciplinary

proceeding, Anderson did not timely file her answer to the Board’s amended

complaint, did not comply with some of the Board’s discovery requests, failed to

comply with an order granting the Board’s motion to compel discovery, and was

sanctioned for failing to comply with the grievance commission’s order

compelling discovery.

Anderson cites several personal circumstances in support of her claim of

mitigation. Specifically, she contends that her practice was stressed and that she

missed filing deadlines because of a variety of personal circumstances. See, e.g.,

Weiland, 885 N.W.2d at 215 (considering the attorney’s testimony regarding

personal stressors, including that his mother was in and out of the hospital);

Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. Wenger, 469

N.W.2d 678, 680–81 (Iowa 1991) (en banc) (considering the attorney’s stressors,

including his new responsibility as the primary caretaker of his newborn child

because of his wife’s hospitalization and his depressive disorder). She was the

sole caretaker of her ailing mother, who had been diagnosed with terminal cancer 7

and who passed away in 2021. Anderson also became ill during the time at issue.

See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. West, 901 N.W.2d 519, 527 (Iowa 2017)

(“Personal illnesses . . . do not excuse a lawyer’s misconduct but can be

mitigating factors and influence our approach to discipline.” (quoting Iowa Sup.

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marks, 759 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Iowa 2009))). She was

twice infected with COVID-19 and had long-term symptoms from those

infections, including memory problems and fatigue. She also suffered from

appendicitis and had to undergo an appendectomy. Anderson also had familial

stressors. She and her husband moved overseas for a period of time due to his

work, and she was forced to work remotely. When she returned to the country,

she and her husband fostered a young man with Down syndrome who required

constant care and supervision. While we have empathy for Anderson’s personal

circumstances, we conclude that these circumstances are only mildly mitigating

here, if at all. The Board persuasively showed that these personal issues did not

have a strong correlation, if any, to the deadlines Anderson missed. See, e.g.,

Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Leitner, 998 N.W.2d 627, 647 (Iowa 2023)

(declining to find mitigation when there was no causal relationship shown

between the lawyer’s health and the misconduct at issue).

Although Anderson’s personal circumstances are only mildly mitigating, if

at all, there are other mitigating considerations here. Anderson accepted court-

appointed work and did work for low-income clients. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y

Disciplinary Bd. v. Heggen, 981 N.W.2d 701, 713 (Iowa 2022) (concluding that

the attorney’s provision of legal services to an “underserved and vulnerable

population” was a mitigating factor). She completed pro bono work on a regular

basis. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Said, 869 N.W.2d 185, 194–95

(Iowa 2015) (discussing pro bono work). She participated in the expungement 8

clinic and volunteered to judge moot court. Anderson is active in community

service, serving on the board of Tandem Services, a company that places

intellectually disabled adults in family homes. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y

Disciplinary Bd. v. Hier, 937 N.W.2d 309, 318 (Iowa 2020) (discussing

community service). The “key mitigating factor” in this case, however, is the lack

of prejudice to Anderson’s clients. Tindal, 949 N.W.2d at 645; see also Iowa Sup.

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Boles, 808 N.W.2d 431, 442 (Iowa 2012). None of the

appeals at issue were dismissed due to Anderson’s conduct. See Tindal, 949

N.W.2d at 641. No client filed a complaint with the Board. Anderson paid the

penalty assessments associated with the notices of default. Generally, we are

reluctant to suspend attorneys “solely for default notices cured without dismissal

of the appeal.” Id. at 645.

After taking account of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, we

conclude that a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction here. “Our primary

purpose when imposing sanctions is to protect the public, not to punish the

lawyer.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Vandel, 889 N.W.2d 659, 669

(Iowa 2017). It appears that many of the personal issues Anderson faced during

the relevant time were isolated incidents unlikely to recur or incidents that have

now been resolved. Anderson has taken corrective action to help prevent her

from missing appellate filing deadlines going forward. She has voluntarily

reduced her workload. See Tindal, 949 N.W.2d at 645. Anderson quit accepting

new postconviction-relief cases and limited the number of other new matters she

is willing to accept. Her firm implemented staffing changes that moved

administrative matters (bill collection, trust account management, etc.) that stole

precious time away from Anderson’s representation of her clients to

administrative staff. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Nelson, 838 9

N.W.2d 528, 543 (Iowa 2013) (noting that “employing additional administrative

help” is a corrective, mitigating measure). Anderson also implemented a new

calendaring system to better track appellate deadlines in her pending matters.

See id. Under these circumstances, we conclude that suspension of Anderson’s

license is not necessary to protect the public.

While we conclude a second public reprimand is the appropriate sanction

consistent with our precedents, we note that missing deadlines is not consistent

with the duties required of Iowa lawyers and that, going forward, suspension

may be appropriate in future cases involving this type of wholesale neglect of

filing deadlines. “[U]sing the appellate clerk’s notices of default ‘as a private

tickler system is unacceptable behavior for an attorney.’ ” Tindal, 949 N.W.2d at

642 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weiland, 862 N.W.2d 627,

642 (Iowa 2015)).

Attorney Reprimanded.