International Paving Systems, Inc. v. Van-Tulco, Inc.

806 F. Supp. 17, 24 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1007, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17233, 1992 WL 332341
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedNovember 10, 1992
Docket88 CV 1066
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 806 F. Supp. 17 (International Paving Systems, Inc. v. Van-Tulco, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
International Paving Systems, Inc. v. Van-Tulco, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 17, 24 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1007, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17233, 1992 WL 332341 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HURLEY, District Judge.

Plaintiff International Paving Systems, Inc. (“IPS”) commenced this action against Van-Tulco, Inc. (“Van-Tulco”) and the additional defendants, Van-Tulco’s sureties on the payment bond which is the subject of this action. IPS is seeking $125,816.07 from Van-Tulco or its sureties for latex modified concrete (“LMC”) that IPS supplied to AVA Construction, Inc. (“AVA”), Van-Tulco’s subcontractor on a project (the “Project”) to build bus ramps for the New York City Department of Transportation (“NYCDOT”). NYCDOT is withholding payment of an outstanding contract balance on its general contract with Van-Tulco (the “General Contract”) pending a judicial determination as to the cause of the cracking and delamination of the LMC at the Project.

IPS currently moves for summary judgment on its claim for $125,816.07 on two *18 grounds: first, that the LMC met the specifications of the General Contract and was therefore not defective; and second, that IPS merely supplied the LMC, but did not oversee its installation or otherwise participate in the Project. As a result, IPS alleges that it is entitled to recover payment for the LMC. Defendants counter, inter alia, that the motion should be denied because there are triable issues of fact with respect to whether the LMC itself was defective and whether IPS provided faulty technical assistance and advisory services on the Project. The Court denies the motion for summary judgment for the reasons explained below.

Also before the Court is Van-Tulco’s cross-motion to consolidate this action with a related matter pending before this Court, captioned Donald J. Crecca, as trustee in bankruptcy for AVA Construction, Inc. v. Van-Tulco, Inc. et al., 90 Civ. 0531 (DRH) (the “Related Action”), on the ground that both actions involve common questions of law and fact. The Court grants this motion for the reasons stated below.

BACKGROUND

A. The Contracts

In June of 1983, the City of New York (the “City”) entered into a contract with Berger, Lehman Associates, P.C., Consulting Engineers, (“BLA”) pursuant to which BLA was to design and plan the work for a construction project involving the renovation of the bus ramps at the St. George Ferry Terminal in Staten Island, New York. A few weeks later, the City, acting through the NYCDOT, entered into the General Contract with Van-Tulco for work on the Project.

As part of the General Contract, Van-Tulco furnished a labor and material payment bond (the “Bond”) on which Van-Tulco acted as principal and defendants Reliance Insurance Company of New York, Reliance Insurance Company, American Reinsurance Company, North American Reinsurance Company and Employers Reinsurance Corporation acted as joint and co-sureties. Pursuant to the Bond, Van Tulco and the joint and co-sureties are jointly and severally liable for the payment of all entities furnishing materials for or performing labor in the work provided for in the General Contract.

As part of its efforts to comply with the General Contract, Van-Tulco entered into a subcontract with AVA Construction, Inc. (“AVA”) whereby AVA was to perform that portion of the work on the project involving the installation of the LMC. AVA entered into an agreement with IPS, as sub-subcontractor, pursuant to which IPS was to supply the LMC for the Project.

The placement of the LMC overlay at the Project took place in two phases: ramps five and six were poured in late May and June of 1986, and ramps three and four were poured in November of 1986. Subsequently, cracking and delamination was discovered on some portion of the ramps. 1 As a result, the City is currently withholding payment of an outstanding contract balance to Van-Tulco pending a judicial determination of, inter alia, the cause of the cracking and delamination.

B. The Actions on the Contracts

On or about April 7, 1988, IPS commenced this action against Van-Tulco, as principal, and the additional defendants, Van-Tulco’s sureties, to recover pursuant to the Bond. IPS is seeking from Van-Tulco or its sureties $125,816.07 which AVA failed to pay IPS pursuant to their sub-subcontract for the LMC.

In another action before this Court, Donald J. Crecca, as trustee in bankruptcy for AVA, is suing Van-Tulco for $238,099.83 due on its subcontract for the LMC supplied and installed at the Project. In that action, Van-Tulco has asserted a counterclaim and offset against AVA for at least $813,244.50 on the ground that the cracking and delamination of the LMC was due to defects in the workmanship and materials furnished by AVA. The sum represents the amount which the NYCDOT *19 claims is necessary to remedy the defects in the LMC. Van-Tulco also brought a third-party action against the City of New York asserting that Van-Tulco installed the LMC in accordance with the plans and specifications for the Project but that those plans and specifications were defective. Van-Tulco thus seeks to recover the outstanding balance due under the General Contract. The City, in turn, brought a fourth-party action against BLA asserting that if the plans and specifications were defective, it is BLA’s responsibility. Against this procedural back-drop, the Court turns to a discussion of the motions before it.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Applicable Standard

A motion for summary judgment may be granted only when it is shown that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire Comm’rs, 834 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir.1987). The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion”, and identifying which materials “it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; see Trebor Sportswear Co. Inc. v. The Limited Stores, Inc., 865 F.2d 506, 511 (2d Cir.1989). In determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences against the moving party, see Donahue, 834 F.2d at 57, and only “disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

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806 F. Supp. 17, 24 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1007, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17233, 1992 WL 332341, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/international-paving-systems-inc-v-van-tulco-inc-nyed-1992.