International Business Machines Corporation v. Zillow Group Inc

Opinion

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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE 7 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION, 8 Plaintiff, 9 C20-0851 TSZ v. 10 ORDER ZILLOW GROUP, INC.; and 11 ZILLOW, INC., 12 Defendant. 13 THIS MATTER comes before the Court to construe certain claim terms of United 14 States Patent No. 7,631,346 (the “’346 Patent”) pursuant to Markman v. Westview 15 Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), and Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 16 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Having reviewed the parties’ respective opening and responsive 17 briefs and supporting materials, including the patent-in-suit, Ex. 48 to 2d Am. Compl. 18 (Dkt. 156-19), the Court enters the following order. 19 Background 20 Plaintiff International Business Machine Corporation (“IBM”) accuses Defendants 21 Zillow Group, Inc., and Zillow, Inc., (together, “Zillow”) of direct and indirect 22 1 infringement of the ’346 Patent. The ’346 Patent discloses a method, system, and 2 apparatus to improve single-sign-on technology. See 2d Am. Compl. at ¶ 31 (Dkt. 156);

3 ’346 Patent at 2:55–60. To access a web resource at a service provider on the Internet, 4 users typically must authenticate themselves with each service provider. See ’346 Patent 5 at 1:38–51. Single-sign-on technology facilitates a user’s connection to resources by 6 requiring only one authorization operation, or sign-on, during a particular user session. 7 See id. at 2:4–8. For example, in a single-sign-on environment, users could enter a 8 username and password on the homepage of a service provider and request multiple

9 protected webpages without reentering their credentials, as opposed to entering their 10 credentials multiple times. Id. at 2:19–42. 11 IBM alleges that Zillow infringes at least Claim 1 of the ’346 Patent through its 12 websites and mobile applications by providing a user with a single-sign-on experience. 13 Claim 1 of the ’346 Patent, which is an independent claim, discloses

14 A method for managing user authentication within a distributed data processing system, wherein a first system and a second system interact 15 within a federated computing environment and support single-sign-on operations in order to provide access to protected resources, at least one of 16 the first system and the second system comprising a processor, the method comprising; [sic] 17 triggering a single-sign-on operation on behalf of the user in order to obtain access to a protected resource that is hosted by the second 18 system, wherein the second system requires a user account for the user to complete the single-sign-on operation prior to providing access to 19 the protected resource; 20 receiving from the first system at the second system an identifier associated with the user; and 21 creating a user account for the user at the second system based at least in part on the received identifier associated with the user after triggering 22 the single-sign-on operation but before generating at the second 1 system a response for accessing the protected resource, wherein the created user account supports single-sign-on operations between the 2 first system and the second system on behalf of the user. 3 Patent at 43:39-61 (emphasis added to highlight disputed claim language). The □□□ 4 | Patent includes the following diagram of an embodiment of the invention in juxtaposition 5 with the prior art: 6 BANKING E-COMMERCE 195 137 Ci 9 ISP DOMAIN 191 ah 10 AUTHENTICATION | DOMAIN a = = 11 FIG. LE 2 (PRIOR ART) 13 ENTERPRISE A ENTERPRISE B ENTERPRISE C 14 204 206 208 USER HOME DOMAIN/ RELYING DOMAIN/

16 FIG. 2 17 18 Id. at Figs. 1E & 2 (modified). The prior art in Figure 1E shows how a user must sign on 19 (highlighted in yellow) multiple times to access different web domains (highlighted in 20 green). See id. at 10:30-45. The invention of the ’346 Patent, embodied in Figure 2, 21 shows how a user may sign on once (highlighted in yellow) to access multiple web 22 23

1 | domains (highlighted in green), each of which rely on the previous domain or service 2 || provider in the stack to authorize the user’s access. See id. at 12:3446. 3 The °346 Patent also includes the following diagram of an embodiment of the 4 || invention: 5 FIG. 3 USER 312 > 6 CLIENT DEVICE 314 BROWSER APPLICATION 316 OTHER 8 FEDERATION FRONT-END LEGACY APPLICATIONS OR 9 FOR ENTERPRISE/DOMAIN 340 BACK-END PROCESSING FOR ENTERPRISE/DOMAIN

10 AUTHENTICATION SERVICE 11 332 = 12 FEDERATED USER LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT (FULM) APPLICATION 352 13 SINGLE-SIGN-ON PROTECTED RESOURCES TRUST PROXY (TP) PROTOCOL SERVICE 335 (TRUST SERVICE) 344 (SPS) 354 4 ewan) || {SSSR | | useR SERVICE (STS) 346 ATTRIBUTE SERVICE REGISTRY eaeOn 15 (IAS) 356 338 336 16 17 || Jd. at Fig. 3 (modified). Figure 3 shows a user signing on (highlighted in yellow) to a

18 || device (highlighted in red). See id. at 13:59—-65. On that device, a user can access

19 || multiple browser applications or other mobile applications (highlighted in green). See id.

90 || at 13:66-14:7. In the patented method, the user signs on to one of the possible 91 || applications, and that application then goes through the authentication process 79 || (highlighted in blue). See id. at 14:77-55. Through a system of mutual trust, the first

1 application’s authentication process allows a user to interact with other applications 2 without signing in again. See id. at 14:56–67.

3 Discussion 4 The parties disagree about five of the claim terms in the ’346 Patent and provide 5 their proposed constructions for each term, namely “distributed data processing system,” 6 “federated computing environment,” “protected resource(s),” “single-sign-on operation,” 7 and “triggering a single-sign-on operation on behalf of the user.” The Court addresses 8 each term seriatim.

9 A. Claim Construction Standards 10 The Court has both the authority and the obligation to construe as a matter of law 11 the meaning of language used in a patent claim. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. In doing so, 12 the Court must consider the intrinsic evidence in the record, meaning the claims, the 13 specification, and the prosecution history.1 Id. The words of a patent claim are generally

14 assigned their “ordinary and customary meaning.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312.2 When the 15

16 1 The specification is “the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. If the specification reveals a definition given to a claim term that differs from the 17 meaning it would otherwise possess, the inventor’s lexicography trumps the ordinary and customary, or dictionary, construction. Id. at 1316. Similarly, the prosecution history evidences 18 how the inventor understood the terms used in the patent. Id. at 1317. Because the prosecution history, however, represents the “ongoing negotiation” between the United States Patent and 19 Trademark Office and the applicant, it might suffer from a lack of clarity and is often less useful for claim construction purposes than the specification. Id. In addition, although the prosecution 20 history “can and should be used to understand the language used in the claims,” it may not itself “enlarge, diminish, or vary” the limitations in the claims. Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. 21 2 The ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the definition ascribed to it by “a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 22 1 claim terms are clear enough to permit the trier of fact to perform its work, the Court 2 need not engage in further analysis or attempt to rewrite or otherwise alter the language

3 that has received the imprimatur of the United States Patent and Trademark Office 4 (“PTO”). See Ballard Med. Prods. v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 268 F.3d 1352, 1358 5 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Markman does not require a district court to follow any particular 6 procedure in conducting claim construction. It merely holds that claim construction is the 7 province of the court, not a jury. . . [a]s long as the trial court construes the claims to the 8 extent necessary to determine whether the accused device infringes, the court may

9 approach the task in any way that it deems best.” (emphasis added)); see also Static 10 Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 568, 575–76 (E.D. Ky. 11 2007). 12 B. Disputed Claim Terms 13 1. Distributed Data Processing System

14 The parties agree to the introductory phrase “computers connected through a 15 network” as a construction for a “distributed . . . system,” but the agreement stops there. 16 IBM asks the Court to define the “distributed data processing system” claim language as 17 meaning “computers connected through a network that perform data processing.” See 18 IBM Op. Br. at 2 (Dkt. 203 at 6). Zillow counters that “distributed data processing

20 1313. The context in which a claim term is used might also be instructive. Id. at 1314. In 21 addition, the other claims of a patent might illuminate the meaning of a term, through consistent usage of the same term, or inclusion in a dependent claim of an additional term not present in the 22 related independent claim. Id. at 1314–15. 1 system” should be understood as “computers connected through a network in which 2 application transaction programs distributed among interconnected processors of different

3 federation members in different network domains cooperate to complete a particular 4 transaction initiated by a user interaction with an application at a processor of one 5 federation member in one domain.” Zillow Op. Br. at 13 (Dkt. 201). 6 Zillow offers a definition that it cobbled together from two dictionaries, namely 7 the IBM Computing Dictionary and the Microsoft Computing Dictionary. See Ex. A to 8 Peaslee Decl. (Dkt. 202-1 at 6–7); Ex. B to Peasleee Decl. (Dkt. 202–2 at 4). In doing so,

9 Zillow overlooks the IBM Computing Dictionary’s first two definitions, “(1) Data 10 processing in which some or all of the processing . . . are dispersed among data 11 processing stations” and “(2) Processing that takes place across two or more linked 12 systems,” which more aptly fit this case. Ex. A to Peaslee Decl. (Dkt. 202–1 at 6). The 13 ’346 Patent uses the “data processing system” claim language to describe an environment

14 in which the patented technology performs its function. See ’346 Patent at 13:59–63 (“a 15 block diagram depicts the integration of pre-existing data processing systems at a given 16 domain . . .”). The claim language does not describe the behavior of the system itself, as 17 Zillow’s proposed construction suggests. 18 The errors in Zillow construction are not limited to misapplication of dictionary

19 definitions. Zillow’s proposed construction repeats verbiage that already appears in 20 Claim 1 of the ’346 Patent. Zillow asks this Court to define “data processing” in light of a 21 “federation member,” which ostensibly would be a member of the patent’s “federated 22 environment.” Zillow Op. Br. (Dkt. 201 at 3); ’346 Patent at 11:42–43. Thus, using 1 Zillow’s proposed claim construction would result in an unnecessary redundancy. The 2 Court will not define this claim term by referring to a different term that appears

3 elsewhere in the claims. See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 4 2016). 5 By contrast, IBM’s suggested language describes a network environment wherein 6 the technology described in the patent functions. See ’346 Patent at 43:39 (“. . . within a 7 distributed data processing system”). The agreed addition of “computers connected 8 through a network” is an accurate construction of the claim language, and the remainder

9 of IBM’s construction does not disturb the language approved by the PTO. See Ballard 10 Med., 268 F.3d at 1358; see also Static Control, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 575–76. The Court 11 therefore adopts IBM’s proposed construction. 12 2. Federated Computing Environment 13 The Federal Circuit’s previous construed of this exact language in this patent. See

14 Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Iancu, 759 F. App’x 1002, 1007–08 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In 15 Iancu, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) had previously construed “federated 16 computing environment” to mean: 17 an environment having a loosely coupled affiliation of entities that adhere to certain standards of interoperability; the federation provides a mechanism for 18 trust among those entities with respect to certain computational operations for the users within the federation. 19 Id. at 1007 (emphasis in original). In Iancu, Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s decision 20 and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 1012. In its review, the Federal Circuit 21 looked to the ’346 Patent’s specification, which states: “In the context of the present 22 1 invention, a federation is a set of distinct entities, such as enterprises, organizations, 2 institutions, etc., that cooperate to provide a single-sign-on, ease-of-use experience to a

3 user.” See id. at 1007 (quoting ’346 Patent at 10:62–64.) The Federal Circuit held that, 4 instead of the term “entities,” a federated computing environment “requires a plurality of 5 distinct enterprises.” Id. at 1008. 6 The Court takes its guidance from the Federal Circuit, as it must. Consistent with 7 IBM’s proposal, see IBM Op. Br. at 4 (Dkt. 203), as well as Zillow’s interpretation, see 8 Zillow Op. Br. at 16 (Dkt. 211–1),3 the Court construes “federal computing environment”

9 to mean: 10 an environment having a loosely coupled affiliation of a plurality of distinct enterprises that adhere to certain standards of interoperability; the federation 11 provides a mechanism for trust among those enterprises with respect to certain computational operations for the users within the federation. 12 3. Protected Resource(s) 13 IBM offers the construction that “protected resource(s)” means “an application, an 14 object, a document, a page, a file, executable code, or other computational resource, 15 communication-type resource, etc., identified by a Uniform Resource Locator (URL), or 16 more generally, a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI), that can only be accessed by an 17 authenticated and/or authorized user.” IBM Op. Br. (Dkt. 201 at 22). In response, Zillow 18 19

20 3 Zillow suggests substituting for “plurality of distinct enterprises” the phrase “plurality of 21 distinct entities, such as enterprises, organizations, institutions, etc.” Zillow Op. Br. at 16. The Court sees no substantive difference in the wording and opts for the simpler version, which was 22 articulated by the Federal Circuit. 1 offers the construction of “resource(s) controlled by a plurality of enterprises that can 2 only accessed by an authenticated or authorized user.” Zillow Op. Br. at 19 (Dkt. 211–1).

3 IBM’s definition comes directly from the specification,4 which is “the single best 4 guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. When “the 5 specification[] reveal[s] a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that 6 differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess . . . the inventor’s lexicography 7 governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. The specification states that 8 A protected or controlled resource is a resource (an application, an object, a document, a page, a file, executable code, or other computational resource, 9 communication-type resource, etc.) for which access is controlled or restricted. A protected resource is identified by a Uniform Resource Locator 10 (URL), or more generally, a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI), that can only be accessed by an authenticated and/or authorized user. 11 ’346 Patent at 5:60–67. The language of the specification normally would end the matter, 12 but as Zillow points out, the Federal Circuit also has spoken on the issue. The Court must 13 give that guidance due weight. 14 Zillow argues that the method of the ’346 Patent only makes sense if the 15 “protected resource(s)” to which a user seeks access are controlled by a plurality of 16 enterprises. In support, Zillow cites to Iancu, where the Federal Circuit said that the ’346 17 Patent seeks 18 to ease user authentications, through single-sign-on techniques, when the 19 resources to which a user seeks access are not within the unitary control of a single enterprise but, instead, are controlled by a plurality of enterprises who 20 must make cooperative arrangements to establish trust mechanisms to meet

21 4 Another district court has adopted the same construction. See Int’l Bus. Machines. Corp. v. 22 Priceline Grp. Inc., 2016 WL 6405824, at *19 (D. Del. Oct. 28, 2016). 1 the greater challenges of simplifying user access when unitary control is missing. 2 759 Fed. App’x at 1007. The Iancu Court added that “[b]eing federated . . . presupposes 3 the absence of the unitary control that a single enterprise could exercise over its own 4 resources.” Id. Zillow says that this language impliedly requires the inclusion of the 5 necessary limitation “controlled by a plurality of enterprises.” 6 Zillow misreads Iancu. In the above-quoted passage, the Iancu Court was 7 addressing the claim language “federated computing environment.” It was not addressing 8 the definition of a “protected resource.” In Iancu, the Federal Circuit explained that the 9 plurality of resources are controlled by a plurality of enterprises. It did not opine that each 10 individual resource is controlled by a plurality of enterprises. By improperly relying on 11 Iancu’s prescription regarding different claim language, Zillow seeks to add the 12 extraneous limitation that “protected resource(s)” must be “controlled by a plurality of 13 enterprises.” 14 Indeed, the ’346 Patent already includes the limitation that Zillow wishes to 15 include, albeit in a different place. The ’346 Patent already includes the limitation that the 16 transactions contemplated by the patent require multiple enterprises. The ’346 Patent 17 does so in the claim language “federated computing environment,” as Iancu discusses. 18 The ’346 Patent does not do so, however, in the language “protected resources.” Thus, in 19 addition to misinterpreting Iancu, Zillow’s proposed construction is duplicative. See 20 Apple, 842 F.3d at 1237. 21 22 1 Zillow’s proposed construction also contradicts the Federal Circuit’s instruction 2 that every term in a claim should be given meaning. See, e.g., Pause Tech., LLC v. TiVo,

3 Inc., 419 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 4 64 F.3d 1553, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Zillow defines “resource(s)” to mean “resource(s).” 5 Zillow Op. Br. at 17 (Dkt. 201). That proposed definition does not give the term meaning. 6 Zillow also gives no conceivable explanation for what makes these resource(s) 7 “protected,” other than their control by multiple enterprises. As such, Zillow’s proposed 8 construction does not give each claim term the “respect that it is due.” Pause, F.3d at

9 1334. The Court adopts IBM’s definition, which comes directly from the specification. 10 Iancu does not require a different result. 11 4. Single-Sign-On Operation 12 As with the claim language “federated computer environment,” the Federal Circuit 13 has spoken as to the claim language “single-sign-on operation.” While discussing the

14 ’346 Patent, the Federal Circuit held that a “‘single-sign-on operation’ . . . is one that 15 does not require the user to take [an] action to gain access to a second entity’s resources 16 after the user has been authenticated with a first entity.” Iancu, 759 F. App’x at 1009. The 17 Federal Circuit reasoned from the specification that the definition of “authentication” 18 means “the process of validating a set of credentials that are provided by a user or on

19 behalf of a user,” id. at 1008–09 (quoting ’346 Patent at 9:50–51), and that a user 20 “‘perform[s]’ an authentication when the user takes an action that provides credentials, or 21 that plays a role in launching a provision of credentials on the user’s behalf, to obtain 22 1 access to resources.” Id. at 1009. Given the Federal Circuit’s guidance, the Court 2 construes “single-sign-on operation” to mean:

3 a process by which a user is not required take an action that provides credentials, or that plays a role in launching a provision of credentials on the user’s behalf, to 4 gain access to a second entity’s resources after the user has been authenticated with a first entity.5 5 5. Triggering a Single-Sign-On Operation on Behalf of the User 6 Zillow proposes that the Court construe “triggering” to mean “automatically 7 initiating,” and “on behalf of the user” to mean “when an event occurs that requires an 8 authentication that the user has not requested.” These modifications are unnecessary and 9 the Court declines to adopt them. Zillow’s construction, particularly the second clause, 10 improperly imports limitations into the claims at issue. Armed with the Court’s 11 interpretation of “single-sign-on operation,” and the ordinary meanings of the words 12 “triggering” and “on behalf of the user,” a trier of fact could perform its work, and the 13 Court agrees with IBM that no further construction is necessary. 14 Conclusion 15 For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS: 16 (1) The term “data processing system” is interpreted as meaning “computers 17 connected through a network that perform data processing.” 18 (2) The term “federated computer environment” is interpreted as meaning “an environment having a loosely coupled affiliation of a plurality of distinct 19 enterprises that adhere to certain standards of interoperability; the 20 21 5 This interpretation is consistent with Zillow’s proposed instruction, see Zillow Op. Br. at 20 (Dkt. 211-1), but the clauses in Zillow’s construction have been reversed to conform with the 22 Federal Circuit’s guidance. 1 federation provides a mechanism for trust among those enterprises with respect to certain computational operations for the users within the 2 federation.” 3 (3) The term “protected resource(s) is interpreted as meaning “an application, an object, a document, a page, a file, executable code, or other 4 computational resource, communication-type resource, etc., identified by a Uniform Resource Locator (URL), or more generally, a Uniform Resource 5 Identifier (URI), that can only be accessed by an authenticated and/or authorized user.” 6 (4) The term “single-sign-on operation” is interpreted as meaning “a process by 7 which a user is not required take an action to provide credentials, or that 8 plays a role in launching a provision of credentials on a user’s behalf, to gain access to a second entity’s resources after the user has been 9 authenticated with a first entity.” 10 (5) In light of the Court’s other interpretations, the term “triggering a single- sign-on operation on behalf of the user” need not be further construed. 11 (6) The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order to all counsel of record. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 Dated this 28th day of October, 2022. 14 15 A

16 Thomas S. Zilly United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22