25CA0667 In Interest of AME 09-17-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0667 Douglas County District Court No. 08JV35 Honorable Ben L. Leutwyler III, Judge
In the Interest of A.M.E., n/k/a A.M.H., a Child, And Concerning J.L.E., Appellant, and J.J.H., Appellee.
ORDERS AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Grove and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 17, 2026
J.L.E., Pro Se Jennifer Anntoinette Rivera, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 J.L.E. (mother) appeals the district court’s March 2025 order denying her request to file a motion to enforce a default judgment regarding alleged child support arrearages and its April 2025 order denying her request for reconsideration. We affirm the orders and remand the case to the district court with directions.
I. Background
¶2 Mother and J.J.H. (father)1 have been litigating child support matters since 2008. Much of the extensive history of the litigation has been discussed in In Interest of A.M.E., (Colo. App. No. 22CA0728, Mar. 9, 2023) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (A.M.E. I), In Interest of A.M.E., (Colo. App. No. 24CA0828, Apr. 16, 2026) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (A.M.E. II), and other opinions.2
1 We recognize that J.J.H. is no longer the legal parent of the child
(now an adult) whom the support obligation concerns, as mother’s husband adopted the child over a decade ago. However, consistent with prior appeals involving the parties, we refer to J.J.H. as “father.” 2 Mother also brought appeals in In Interest of A.M.E., (Colo. App.
No. 20CA1338, June 24, 2021) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)), and In Interest of A.M.E., (Colo. App. Nos. 23CA1375 & 23CA2187, Apr. 16, 2026) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).
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¶3 As relevant here, the court originally established father’s support obligation in 2008. In 2009, the court ordered father to pay a lump sum of $5,000 per year, starting in 2010, toward an outstanding balance of $30,000 in retroactive child support until the balance was paid off (2009 judgment). Father paid the required $5,000 lump sum in 2010 and 2011.
¶4 Mother’s husband adopted the child in 2013; later that year, the court terminated father’s monthly child support obligation and entered judgment against him for $16,488.51 in arrearages (2013 judgment). In addition to the 2013 judgment, father still owed $15,000 under the 2009 judgment.
¶5 In 2015, the county child support enforcement unit notified the court that father had satisfied the 2013 judgment. In January 2018, father filed a motion for satisfaction of judgment, asserting he had paid the remainder of the 2009 judgment. Mother objected and filed an opposing motion for default judgment in which she asserted that father still owed her $9,821.85 in arrearages. Mother arrived at this amount in part by adding together the remaining $15,000 owed under the 2009 judgment and the $16,488.51 owed under the 2013 judgment, applying to that sum “any interest or additional
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obligations assigned by the courts,” and then deducting any payments father had already made. Mother asked the court to enter judgment in her favor in that amount.
¶6 In April 2018, the court entered a default judgment in mother’s favor in the amount of $9,821.85 after father failed to respond to mother’s motion (default judgment). About four months after the court entered the default judgment, father asked the court to set it aside. More than three years later,3 the court “declined to review” father’s request to set aside the default judgment because it found that the magistrate who entered the default judgment “did not fully resolve the issue when she granted [mother’s] Motion for Judgment while [father’s] Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment [was] still pending.” Thus, the court remanded the matter back to the magistrate for the magistrate to rule on father’s motion for satisfaction of judgment.
¶7 In December 2021, the magistrate held a hearing and found mother hadn’t provided credible evidence refuting the child support
3 Numerous other filings and hearings not relevant to this appeal
occurred between the time father filed his motion to set aside the default judgment and the time the court issued its ruling in 2021.
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enforcement unit’s notice that father had satisfied the 2013 judgment or demonstrating that father otherwise still owed arrearages. The court also found father credibly testified that he had timely paid the annual $5,000 lump sum required by the 2009 judgment in 2013, 2014, and 2015; thus, contrary to mother’s assertion otherwise, he didn’t owe interest on those payments. Accordingly, the magistrate entered an “Order of Satisfaction of Judgment” in father’s favor (December 2021 order).
¶8 Mother filed a petition for review of the December 2021 order and, a few months later, the district court adopted that order. Mother appealed the district court’s adoption of the December 2021 order in A.M.E. I. The division in A.M.E. I affirmed the December 2021 order, concluding that the record supported the magistrate’s findings. See A.M.E. I, slip op. at ¶ 18.
¶9 In February 2025, mother requested the court’s permission to file a motion to enforce the default judgment (motion to enforce).4 In an order issued the next month (March 2025 order), the court denied mother’s request, reasoning as follows:
4 The district court’s restrictions on mother’s ability to file are discussed in Part III.A below.
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The Court finds that there are no child support arrearages in this case. [The magistrate] made that finding [in the December 2021 order].
[Mother] sought review of the magistrate’s order and the district court . . . affirmed the magistrate’s order . . . . [Mother] then appealed the district court[’s] decision to the court of appeals, which affirmed the district court’s ruling . . . . This issue has been decided against [mother][,] and she may not re-raise the issue.
A couple of days later, mother filed a motion requesting the court to reconsider the March 2025 order. The court denied mother’s motion for reconsideration (April 2025 order).
¶ 10 Mother appeals the March 2025 and April 2025 orders.
II. Applicable Legal Principles
¶ 11 “The doctrine of res judicata encompasses both claim preclusion, which is true res judicata, and issue preclusion, more commonly called collateral estoppel.” In re Marriage of Mallon, 956 P.2d 642, 644 (Colo. App. 1998).
¶ 12 Issue preclusion “prevents the re-litigation of discrete issues, rather than causes of action,” meaning that “once a particular issue is finally determined in one proceeding, parties to [that] proceeding are barred from re-litigating that particular issue again in a second proceeding, even when the actual claims for relief in the two
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proceedings are different.” Foster v. Plock, 2017 CO 39, ¶ 13. Issue preclusion prohibits relitigating an issue if, in the prior proceeding, (1) the court entered a final judgment on the merits; (2) the adjudicated issue is identical to the issue in the current proceeding; (3) the party to be precluded “had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue”; and (4) the party to be precluded was also a party to the prior proceeding. Id.
¶ 13 Issue preclusion is a question of law that we review de novo. See Bristol Bay Prods., LLC v. Lampack, 2013 CO 60, ¶ 17.
III. March 2025 Order
¶ 14 Because she is self-represented, we broadly construe mother’s arguments “to ensure that [she] [is] not denied review of important issues because of [her] inability to articulate [her] argument like a lawyer.” Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5. However, we may neither rewrite her pleadings nor act as an advocate. See People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 34.
¶ 15 Keeping these principles in mind, we understand mother to argue that the court erred in concluding that issue preclusion barred her from enforcing the default judgment. In support, she asserts that the default judgment wasn’t properly before the
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magistrate in the hearing that resulted in the December 2021 order and no other order ever “adjudicated” the default judgment. Therefore, she reasons, the default judgment remained enforceable because it was neither set aside nor satisfied.
¶ 16 She further argues that her due process rights were violated because the court, having previously restricted her ability to file motions, then proceeded, in its March 2025 order, to treat the default judgment as satisfied “without any motion pending, without evidence, and without a hearing.”
¶ 17 We reject mother’s arguments because, as we discuss next, we discern no error in the court’s determination that her attempt to enforce the default judgment was barred by issue preclusion.
A. The Court Properly Considered Issue Preclusion
¶ 18 As an initial matter, while mother clearly challenges in her reply brief the court’s resolution of her motion to enforce on the basis of issue preclusion, it’s unclear to us whether she raises that issue in her opening brief. We usually won’t consider arguments that are raised for the first time in a reply brief or that seek to expand upon contentions raised in the opening brief. See In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 31. Nevertheless, exercising our
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discretion and construing mother’s opening brief arguments broadly, see Jones, ¶ 5, we discern no error in the court’s consideration of whether issue preclusion foreclosed mother’s requested relief.
¶ 19 A party who files a motion must identify the relief they are requesting and “state with particularity the grounds therefor.” C.R.C.P. 7(b)(1). The court, in turn, is empowered to determine motions as promptly as possible. See C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-15(4). And while a court should normally refrain from resolving a motion on a basis not presented by the parties, in some instances it may be appropriate to do so if it appears that the moving party can’t prevail as a matter of law. Cf. Schwartz v. Owens, 134 P.3d 455, 457 (Colo. App. 2005) (concluding that a court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte if it appears, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff failed to state a claim that could survive a motion to dismiss); see also People v. Lulei, 2026 CO 17, ¶ 30 (“[T]he party presentation principle is supple, not ironclad.” (quoting United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 376 (2020))).
¶ 20 Here, because of mother’s history of filing numerous “groundless and frivolous” motions, the district court entered an
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order restricting her ability to file without first obtaining approval from the court (restriction order). The restriction order required mother to submit a motion asking for permission to file — along with a copy of the proposed motion, which had to be supported by statute or case law and “relevant to a pending issue[] before the [c]ourt” — that the court would review before deciding whether mother would be allowed to proceed. The restriction order was affirmed by the division in A.M.E. II, slip op. at ¶ 22.
¶ 21 Thus, based on the legal principles generally applicable to a court’s authority to determine motions and the specific procedures unique to this case, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s consideration of issue preclusion. See Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. at 375 (a court’s alleged deviation from the party presentation principle is reviewed for an abuse of discretion).
¶ 22 Having concluded that the court didn’t err by considering issue preclusion, we next review de novo its application of that doctrine. Mother doesn’t dispute that she was a party to the prior proceedings. We therefore only consider the remaining elements of issue preclusion.
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B. The Court Entered a Final Judgment on the Merits
¶ 23 An order is final when it terminates a discrete proceeding embedded within another. In re Marriage of Wiggs, 2025 COA 10, ¶ 11; cf. Luster v. Brinkman, 250 P.3d 664, 667 (Colo. App. 2010) (a postjudgment collection order is final if it ends “the particular part of the action in which it is entered, leave[s] nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do in order to completely determine the rights of the parties as to that part of the proceeding, and [is] more than a ministerial or administrative determination”); see also § 14-10-122(1)(c), C.R.S. 2026 (a court-ordered child support payment becomes a final money judgment when it is due and not paid).
¶ 24 Mother asked the court to determine that father was responsible for $9,821.85 in arrearages related to the 2009 and 2013 judgments. The court granted mother’s motion and entered the default judgment in that amount. And while the court didn’t grant father’s request to set aside the default judgment, it directed the magistrate to also address father’s contention that his support obligations under the 2009 and 2013 judgments had been fully satisfied.
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¶ 25 Moreover, a default judgment isn’t a judgment on the merits of a case, and Colorado courts “have a long-established preference for resolving cases on the merits rather than through default judgments whenever possible.” J.B. v. MKBS, LLC, 2026 CO 50M,
¶ 27. The magistrate, in the December 2021 order, determined that both judgments had been satisfied after finding that father owed no outstanding arrearages under either. Thus, the December 2021 order was a decision on the merits of the issue of the child support arrearages claimed by mother that fully determined the parties’ rights. See Dooley v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply, Inc., 593 P.2d 360, 362 (Colo. 1979) (“[A] satisfaction of judgment is the last act and end of a proceeding.”). The finality element of issue preclusion is therefore satisfied.
C. The Issue Is Identical
¶ 26 The issue underlying mother’s motion to enforce is her contention that the default judgment remains unsatisfied because father hasn’t yet paid all arrearages owed under that judgment. Mother’s contention is primarily based on her assertion that father’s motion for satisfaction of judgment didn’t involve either the 2009 or 2013 judgments — the judgments upon which the default judgment
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is based. In support, mother points to the fact that the register of actions says the default judgment is “unsatisfied.”
¶ 27 We aren’t persuaded.
¶ 28 We acknowledge that the register of actions for this case says that the default judgment remains unsatisfied. But the register of actions is simply a clerical record of the court’s rulings. See C.R.C.P. 79(a), (d); see also Dill v. Cnty. Ct., 541 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Colo. App. 1975) (noting that the formal entry of a judgment is a “mere clerical or ministerial function”). “The judgment of the court is that which it pronounces. The record entry is not itself the judgment, but rather the evidence of the judgment, or its embodiment in visible and permanent form . . . .” Breene v. Booth, 40 P. 193, 194 (Colo. App. 1895). Accordingly, a court has authority to “change an inaccurate record into a true one,” regardless of the type of the inaccuracy. Id. at 193-94.
¶ 29 We likewise acknowledge that father’s motion for satisfaction appears to incorrectly reference the judgments he sought to have the court find were satisfied. Nevertheless, it’s clear that the December 2021 hearing — at which mother was present, testified, challenged father’s evidence, and presented her own evidence —
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involved the court’s consideration of whether father had satisfied the 2009 and 2013 judgments. Father testified that those were the judgments at issue, and mother didn’t object to that statement. Moreover, mother made a substantially similar argument when she appealed the merits of the December 2021 order; the division in A.M.E. I considered and rejected that argument. See A.M.E. I, slip op. at ¶¶ 13-18; see also In re Tonko, 154 P.3d 397, 405 (Colo. 2007) (an issue is “identical” when a party properly raised it “and a determination on that issue was necessary to the judgment”); Youngs v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2012 COA 85M, ¶ 54 (“An issue can be identical for issue preclusion purposes if either the facts or the legal matter raised is the same.”).
¶ 30 Accordingly, we conclude this element of issue preclusion is satisfied.
D. Mother Had a Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate
¶ 31 Whether a party has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue in an earlier proceeding depends on the extent to which the issues are identical, whether the party had sufficient incentive to “vigorously” litigate the issues, and whether the remedies and procedures of the first proceeding are substantially different from
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those of the second proceeding. Madalena v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2023 COA 32, ¶ 24.
¶ 32 All three factors are satisfied here. The issues are identical and there is an extensive history of litigation between the parties related to the establishment, modification, and enforcement of father’s support obligations. Throughout this case, mother has vigorously litigated the issue of father’s arrearages, and the procedures and remedies available to the parties have remained the same throughout this case.
E. Mother’s Motion to Enforce is Issue Precluded and the Default Judgment Must Be Vacated
¶ 33 Because the record demonstrates that all four elements of issue preclusion are satisfied, we discern no error in the court’s denial of mother’s motion to enforce on that basis.
¶ 34 The December 2021 order was a judgment on the merits of whether father still owed child support arrearages, and because the default judgment conflicts with that order, the default judgment must be vacated. See J.B., ¶ 40 (when a merits verdict conflicts
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with a default judgment based on the same allegations, the default judgment should be vacated).5
¶ 35 On remand, the court shall amend the register of actions to vacate the default judgment so that the register of actions no longer says that the default judgment dated April 18, 2018, is “unsatisfied.” See Breene, 40 P. at 193-94 (a court has authority to “change an inaccurate record into a true one” regardless of the type of the inaccuracy).
IV. April 2025 Order
¶ 36 Mother also appeals the April 2025 order; however, she fails to develop any arguments, supported by appropriate legal authority, regarding how the court erred by denying her request for reconsideration. Thus, we decline to further consider her challenge to the April 2025 order. See Taylor v. Taylor, 2016 COA 100, ¶ 13 (declining to address an underdeveloped argument); Fisher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2015 COA 57, ¶ 18 (Appellate courts don’t
5 Because we conclude that the default judgment must be vacated,
we decline to address mother’s argument that the March 2025 order “violat[ed] her due process and statutory [interest] enforcement rights” under section 14-14-106(1)(a), C.R.S. 2026 (providing for monthly compounding interest on child support debt due and owing before July 1, 2021).
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address “arguments presented . . . in a conclusory manner that are lacking citations to any supporting authority.”), aff’d, 2018 CO 39.
V. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs
¶ 37 Mother, citing section 13-17-102(2), (4), C.R.S. 2026, and C.A.R. 39.1, requests an award of attorney fees and costs. Because mother isn’t an attorney and hasn’t shown that father’s defense of this appeal was substantially groundless, frivolous, or vexatious, section 13-17-102 and C.A.R. 39.1 don’t provide a basis for her requested award. See Smith v. Furlong, 976 P.2d 889, 890 (Colo. App. 1999) (holding that there is no basis to award “attorney fees” to a self-represented litigant because no “attorney fees” exist in such situations). And given the disposition of this appeal, she’s not entitled to costs. See C.A.R. 39(a)(2).
¶ 38 Father requests an award of appellate attorney fees and costs under section 13-17-102, C.A.R. 38(b), C.A.R. 39, and C.A.R. 39.1.
¶ 39 Under section 13-17-102(6), a court shall not assess attorney fees against a party appearing without a lawyer “unless the court finds that the party clearly knew or reasonably should have known that the party’s action . . . was substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.” An appeal may be frivolous
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if it is “taken in a case in which ‘the judgment by the tribunal below was so plainly correct and the legal authority contrary to appellant’s position so clear that there is really no appealable issue.’” Castillo v. Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 292 (Colo. App. 2006) (citation omitted).
¶ 40 If an appellate court determines that an appeal is frivolous, then it may award appropriate damages, including attorney fees. C.A.R. 38(b); Castillo, 148 P.3d at 292 (“[A]n appeal ‘lacks substantial justification’ and is ‘substantially frivolous’ under [section] 13-17-102[] when the appellant’s briefs fail to set forth, in a manner consistent with C.A.R. 28, a coherent assertion of error, supported by legal authority.”).
¶ 41 Father asserts that mother (1) has unnecessarily expanded litigation in this case; (2) “should know she has no legal or substantial justification for her claim”; and (3) is abusing the legal process. Father asks us to award him $10,000 in attorney fees, arguing that if we remand this case to the district court for a determination of fees, mother “will just appeal the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s decision again.”
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¶ 42 Since the entry of the December 2021 order, the district court and this court have each told mother several times that there are no outstanding child support arrearages. Thus, mother knew or reasonably should have known that this appeal was frivolous because alleged outstanding arrearages were the basis of her motion to enforce. Accordingly, we conclude that father is entitled to appellate attorney fees under section 13-17-102(6) and C.A.R. 38(b). And because we affirm the orders, we also grant his request for appellate costs under C.A.R. 39(a)(2).
¶ 43 However, father hasn’t submitted any information from which we can conclude an award of $10,000 in attorney fees is reasonable. Therefore, the district court is in a better position to determine the reasonableness of father’s requested fees, and we remand this case to the district court for that purpose. See C.A.R. 39.1; see also SG Ints. I, Ltd. v. Kolbenschlag, 2019 COA 115, ¶¶ 40, 46 (remanding case to the district court for a determination and award of reasonable appellate attorney fees arising out of frivolous appeal).
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VI. Disposition
¶ 44 The orders are affirmed, and the case is remanded to the district court with directions to amend the register of actions to vacate the April 18, 2018, default judgment and award father his appellate costs and reasonable appellate attorney fees.
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.