Institute of Living v. Board of Tax Review

13 Conn. Supp. 372, 1945 Conn. Super. LEXIS 65
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas
DecidedAugust 22, 1945
DocketFile No. 43836
StatusPublished

This text of 13 Conn. Supp. 372 (Institute of Living v. Board of Tax Review) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Institute of Living v. Board of Tax Review, 13 Conn. Supp. 372, 1945 Conn. Super. LEXIS 65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1945).

Opinion

PICKETT, J.

It is conceded that from 1822, when the plaintiff was specially chartered by the Legislature, until December 22, 1943, “the Institute has never paid or been compelled to pay local property taxes of any kind in Hartford, and its properties m said town have never been included on the grand list of taxable property” (except for a few years on the Washington School District list under a special legislative provision) .

It is also conceded that the Institute has consistently claimed exemption from city and town taxes and has duly filed its claim for exemption on forms prescribed by the Tax Commissioner of the State in manner and time as provided by statute.

It is alleged and admitted that by vote of December 22, 1943, the Board of Tax Review, after due hearing, voted to place the properties of the plaintiff on the list of taxable properties of the city, whereupon the Board of Assessors included such property in the grand list of July 1, 1943, in the amount of $1,484,140 at a tax rate of 30V2 mills.

It is from this action of the Board of Tax Review that plaintiff appeals.

The now outstanding and controlling provision of plaintiff’s special charter as it relates to tax liability or exemption is: “Any estate so held shall_be subject to taxation and entitled to tax exemption only in accordance with the provisions of the general statutes” (Special Laws of 1927, No. 379, p. 390.)

[374]*374Thus it is clear and conceded that plaintiff’s status for pur' poses of taxation is controlled by section 1163 of the General Statutes, Revision of 1930, and such special exemptions or in' elusions as from time to time were enacted in the various amendments to plaintiff’s charter are not the law of the case but only a part of the historic background of the institution and to a more or less extent evidential of the policy of the State toward it.

Plaintiff claims exemption under subdivision (7) of section 1163 of the General Statutes. Defendant claims that as matter of fact plaintiff does not meet the conditions of subdivision (7) in any event and further that subdivision (7) is not applicable to the plaintiff’s status, even if all that is claimed, but that the only hospital exemption granted by the statute is to hospitals receiving regular State grants. Defendant’s brief baldly states the proposition: “It is our claim that no hospital is entitled to exemption under this statute unless it is supported wholly or in part by state appropriations.”

It is defendant’s further claim that subdivision (7) of section 1163 does not apply to any hospital and that only subsection (14) of the act grants any tax exemption to hospitals.

If this contention is true the plaintiff is at once out of court for it appears in evidence .that the State does not now and has not for many years contributed by appropriation to the support of the Institute. Furthermore the Institute has based its claim for exemption before the assessors, the Board of Tax Review and the court solely on subdivision (7).

It is appropriate, therefore to deal with this claim at the outset.

Section 1163 and the various legislative acts from which it culminates, contain a lengthy list of property of various kinds, uses and ownership which are defined as tax exempt either in toto or up to stated values. I regard these as categories, not exclusions. That property which falls within any of the stated categories is exempt under the statute. The mere fact that a State'aided hospital is specifically exempted does not exclude a non'State'aided hospital which qualifies under some other cate' gory defined in the statute. *

In Boardman vs. Burlingame, 123 Conn. 646, the Supreme Court of Errors had before it an action against this plaintiff [375]*375Institute. To be sure the issue did not involve tax exemption. It did, however, involve the question of tort liability or exemption therefrom by a charitable institution. The court held, at page 653, “Reasonable men could come to no other conclusion on the evidence than that the .Retreat is a charitable institution and it was entitled to the substance of the charge requested. The test applied in Canterbury School Inc. v. New Milford, 111 Conn. 203, 149 Atl. 685, as suggested by the plaintiff, referred to the sense in which the Legislature used a carefully drawn definition of a tax exempt institution. If this test is insisted on, it appears that this institution is tax exempt. The question of tax exemption is not in issue here, however, and the testimony is uncontradicted that the Retreat is organized and operated for the public welfare without profit to itself or any individual. The mere fact that some patients pay for part or all of their care does not destroy its charitable character. Yale University v. New Haven, 71 Conn. 316, 328, 42 Atl. 87.”

The language above quoted does not of course determine the factual issue now before the court. It does clearly indicate that on the facts then before the Supreme Court of Errors the plaintiff Institute fell within the category of a charitable corporation as defined by the statute and by necessary implication the statute covers not merely State-aided hospitals but any hospital which meets the test of subsection (7). I so hold and cite further Brown, State’s Attorney ex rel. Gray vs. Quintilian, 121 Conn. 300, 304; St. Alban’s Hospital vs. Town of Enosburg, 96 Vt. 389, 120 Atl. 97.

Since the court holds that subdivision (7) is a category which includes hospitals if so organized and conducted as to meet the statutory conditions, it is convenient to state the conditions to be met by the plaintiff to entitle it to exemption and consider whether those conditions are in fact met.

The conditions stated in section 1163, subdivision (7), are three, which may be concisely stated as: (1) that the Institute is a Connecticut corporation organized exclusively for scientific, educational or charitable purposes, or for two or more of such purposes; (2) that its property is used exclusively for carrying out one or more of such purposes; and (3) that no officer, member or employee receives or at any future time shall receive any pecuniary profit from the operation thereof except reasonable compensation for services.

[376]*376Plaintiff is a Connecticut corporation. It was first chartered by special legislative act in 1822. Its charter has from time to time been amended but it has at all times been a Connecticut corporation operating under legislative special act and charter. Thus one requirement of the statute is met.

The next element to be considered is, for what purpose was it organised? The evidence establishes that: “In May 1821 the attention of the President and Fellows .of the Connecticut Medical Society was directed to the helpless condition of • the insane and their families. The members of that Society knew full well that insanity, at all times a fearful malady had been for many years extending its ravages. They knew also that its treatment is attended with difficulties which neither ingenuity or perseverance on their part are sufficient to remove nor did they hesitate to adopt such measures as promised to relieve themselves of embarrassment, and to give their patients better prospect of recovery.

“The subject was referred to a committee who reported in favor of a Public Asylum to be established on humane principles and superintended by a Society of Patrons.” (Plaintiff’s Exhibit A.)

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Related

Canterbury School, Inc. v. Town of New Milford
149 A. 685 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1930)
Healy v. Loomis Institute
128 A. 774 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1925)
Schusler's Appeal From County Commissioners
70 A. 1029 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1908)
Boardman v. Burlingame
197 A. 761 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1938)
Mitchell v. Reeves
196 A. 785 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1938)
Brown, State's Attorney, Ex Rel. Gray v. Quintilian
184 A. 382 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1936)
Blodgett v. Bridgeport City Trust Co.
161 A. 83 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1932)
American Academy of Arts & Sciences v. President of Harvard College
78 Mass. 582 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1832)
New England Sanitarium v. Inhabitants of Stoneham
91 N.E. 385 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1910)
American Asylum at Hartford v. President of the Phoenix Bank
4 Conn. 172 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1822)
Yale University v. Town of New Haven
42 A. 87 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1899)
St. Albans Hospital v. Town of Enosburg
120 A. 97 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1923)

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Bluebook (online)
13 Conn. Supp. 372, 1945 Conn. Super. LEXIS 65, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/institute-of-living-v-board-of-tax-review-pactcompl-1945.