10/14/2025
DA 25-0221 Case Number: DA 25-0221
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2025 MT 236N
AUSTIN JORGE INMAN,
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL E. SPREADBURY,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. CDR-2025-108 Honorable Kathy Seeley, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Michael E. Spreadbury, Self-Represented, Deer Lodge, Montana
For Appellee:
Austin Jorge Inman, Self-Represented, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: September 17, 2025
Decided: October 14, 2025
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Michael Spreadbury appeals from the March 5, 2025 Order on Appeal from
Municipal Court issued by the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, which
affirmed an order of protection granted by the Helena Municipal Court on February 13,
2025. We affirm.
¶3 Spreadbury owned property at 713 Poplar St. in Helena, where he lived and operated
his business, Helena Town Car. While living at 713 Poplar St., Spreadbury had several
confrontations with his neighbors, who he asserted were engaged in a conspiracy of hate
crimes against him. Spreadbury asserts he is a federal agent, a candidate for director of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, and was personally responsible for the
resignation of former FBI director Christopher Wray. One of the neighbors Spreadbury
contends was engaged in the conspiracy was Austin Inman, who lived at 708 Poplar St.
On January 22, 2025, Inman left his house and was yelled at by a “visibly angry”
Spreadbury from across the street. Inman went to pick up some tools from his workplace
near Van’s Thriftway. While driving home through the Van’s parking lot, Inman observed
Spreadbury, now in the Van’s parking lot, expressing “rage towards” him. Inman then
2 returned to his house, which was followed by Spreadbury angrily parking on the street
outside and approaching. Spreadbury yelled at Inman, who was video recording the
interaction on his phone, and retrieved a large piece of wood from his truck and waved it
at Inman saying, “if you fuck with me again I got this, all right, because I didn’t bring a
gun today.” Inman called the police after the incident. Spreadbury was not criminally
charged based on the incident.
¶4 On January 28, 2025, Inman filed a Sworn Petition for Temporary Order of
Protection and Request for Hearing in the Helena Municipal Court based on the January 22,
2025 incident and previous interactions with Spreadbury. That same day, the Municipal
Court granted Inman a TOP and set a hearing for February 12, 2025. Spreadbury was
served with the TOP on January 29, 2025. The Municipal Court held a hearing to determine
whether to continue or make permanent the order of protection on February 12 and 13,
2025. The court heard the testimony of Dakota Terry, Inman’s long-term live-in girlfriend;
Hans Hoelstad, another neighbor in the Poplar neighborhood; Inman; and Spreadbury.
Multiple videos, including Inman’s video of the January 22, 2025 incident, were played
during the hearing, and the court also received letters, a text message, notes, and pictures
as exhibits. At the close of the hearing, the Municipal Court granted Inman an order of
protection for 10 years, determining the January 22, 2025 incident constituted assault as
defined by § 45-5-201, MCA. The court also noted Spreadbury’s behavior was erratic and
he had repeatedly engaged with Inman, both at Van’s and throughout the community,
“without provocation.” Spreadbury appealed to the District Court, which “reviewed the
3 entire record,” determined the “Municipal Court properly weighed the evidence presented
and applied Mont. Code Ann. §§ 40-15-201, et seq.” and affirmed the Municipal Court.
¶5 Spreadbury appeals. We consider whether the Municipal Court abused its discretion
when it granted Inman a 10-year order of protection.
¶6 On appeal from a municipal court, the district court acts as an intermediate appellate
court. See §§ 3-5-303 and 3-6-110, MCA. We review a district court’s decision on an
appeal from a municipal court as if the appeal was originally filed in this Court. Fritzler
v. Bighorn, 2024 MT 27, ¶ 7, 415 Mont. 165, 543 P.3d 571 (citation omitted). We will not
overturn a court’s decision to continue, amend, or make permanent an order of protection
absent an abuse of discretion. Groenke v. Gabriel, 2025 MT 91, ¶ 14, 421 Mont. 465,
571 P.3d 86 (citing Fritzler, ¶ 7). “The question under this standard is not whether we
would have reached the same decision as the trial judge, but whether the trial judge acted
arbitrarily without conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason.” In re
Marriage of Lockhead, 2013 MT 368, ¶ 12, 373 Mont. 120, 314 P.3d 915 (citing Newman
v. Lichfield, 2012 MT 47, ¶ 22, 364 Mont. 243, 272 P.3d 625).
¶7 On appeal, Spreadbury rehashes several previous incidents involving neighbors,
contends the Municipal Court erroneously found there to be “stalking,” asserts he was
acting in self-defense when he brandished the wooden board outside of Inman’s residence
and was “the actual victim,” complains of a completely separate order of protection
apparently granted to a librarian in 2013 when Spreadbury says he was only “asking for
[their] help on a public sidewalk,” and sets forth the “Spreadbury Test” for orders of
4 protection, which he asserts this Court must implement to guide lower courts. Finding no
abuse of discretion in the Municipal Court’s determination that the January 22, 2025
incident met the elements of assault and Inman was entitled to an order of protection, we
need not address Spreadbury’s other issues.1
¶8 A person may petition for an order of protection—regardless of the person’s
relationship to the respondent—if the person is a victim of assault as defined in § 45-5-201,
MCA. Section 40-15-102(2), MCA. Section 45-5-201(1)(d), MCA, provides that a
“person commits the offense of assault if the person . . . purposely or knowingly causes
reasonable apprehension of bodily injury in another[.]” “The standard for determining
whether a person has ‘reasonably apprehended bodily injury is that of a reasonable person
under similar circumstances.’” State v. Vukasin, 2003 MT 230, ¶ 19, 317 Mont. 204,
75 P.3d 1284 (quoting State v. McCarthy, 1999 MT 99, ¶ 27, 294 Mont. 270, 980 P.2d
629).
¶9 A reasonable person could certainly “reasonably apprehend” bodily injury when
they are yelled at without provocation, followed throughout town by someone exhibiting
“rage towards” them, and threatened with a wooden board brandished by someone saying
they had the board because they didn’t bring their gun. In addition, though Spreadbury
asserts it was mere happenstance he ran into Inman at Van’s, claiming he came “directly
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10/14/2025
DA 25-0221 Case Number: DA 25-0221
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2025 MT 236N
AUSTIN JORGE INMAN,
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL E. SPREADBURY,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. CDR-2025-108 Honorable Kathy Seeley, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Michael E. Spreadbury, Self-Represented, Deer Lodge, Montana
For Appellee:
Austin Jorge Inman, Self-Represented, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: September 17, 2025
Decided: October 14, 2025
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Michael Spreadbury appeals from the March 5, 2025 Order on Appeal from
Municipal Court issued by the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, which
affirmed an order of protection granted by the Helena Municipal Court on February 13,
2025. We affirm.
¶3 Spreadbury owned property at 713 Poplar St. in Helena, where he lived and operated
his business, Helena Town Car. While living at 713 Poplar St., Spreadbury had several
confrontations with his neighbors, who he asserted were engaged in a conspiracy of hate
crimes against him. Spreadbury asserts he is a federal agent, a candidate for director of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, and was personally responsible for the
resignation of former FBI director Christopher Wray. One of the neighbors Spreadbury
contends was engaged in the conspiracy was Austin Inman, who lived at 708 Poplar St.
On January 22, 2025, Inman left his house and was yelled at by a “visibly angry”
Spreadbury from across the street. Inman went to pick up some tools from his workplace
near Van’s Thriftway. While driving home through the Van’s parking lot, Inman observed
Spreadbury, now in the Van’s parking lot, expressing “rage towards” him. Inman then
2 returned to his house, which was followed by Spreadbury angrily parking on the street
outside and approaching. Spreadbury yelled at Inman, who was video recording the
interaction on his phone, and retrieved a large piece of wood from his truck and waved it
at Inman saying, “if you fuck with me again I got this, all right, because I didn’t bring a
gun today.” Inman called the police after the incident. Spreadbury was not criminally
charged based on the incident.
¶4 On January 28, 2025, Inman filed a Sworn Petition for Temporary Order of
Protection and Request for Hearing in the Helena Municipal Court based on the January 22,
2025 incident and previous interactions with Spreadbury. That same day, the Municipal
Court granted Inman a TOP and set a hearing for February 12, 2025. Spreadbury was
served with the TOP on January 29, 2025. The Municipal Court held a hearing to determine
whether to continue or make permanent the order of protection on February 12 and 13,
2025. The court heard the testimony of Dakota Terry, Inman’s long-term live-in girlfriend;
Hans Hoelstad, another neighbor in the Poplar neighborhood; Inman; and Spreadbury.
Multiple videos, including Inman’s video of the January 22, 2025 incident, were played
during the hearing, and the court also received letters, a text message, notes, and pictures
as exhibits. At the close of the hearing, the Municipal Court granted Inman an order of
protection for 10 years, determining the January 22, 2025 incident constituted assault as
defined by § 45-5-201, MCA. The court also noted Spreadbury’s behavior was erratic and
he had repeatedly engaged with Inman, both at Van’s and throughout the community,
“without provocation.” Spreadbury appealed to the District Court, which “reviewed the
3 entire record,” determined the “Municipal Court properly weighed the evidence presented
and applied Mont. Code Ann. §§ 40-15-201, et seq.” and affirmed the Municipal Court.
¶5 Spreadbury appeals. We consider whether the Municipal Court abused its discretion
when it granted Inman a 10-year order of protection.
¶6 On appeal from a municipal court, the district court acts as an intermediate appellate
court. See §§ 3-5-303 and 3-6-110, MCA. We review a district court’s decision on an
appeal from a municipal court as if the appeal was originally filed in this Court. Fritzler
v. Bighorn, 2024 MT 27, ¶ 7, 415 Mont. 165, 543 P.3d 571 (citation omitted). We will not
overturn a court’s decision to continue, amend, or make permanent an order of protection
absent an abuse of discretion. Groenke v. Gabriel, 2025 MT 91, ¶ 14, 421 Mont. 465,
571 P.3d 86 (citing Fritzler, ¶ 7). “The question under this standard is not whether we
would have reached the same decision as the trial judge, but whether the trial judge acted
arbitrarily without conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason.” In re
Marriage of Lockhead, 2013 MT 368, ¶ 12, 373 Mont. 120, 314 P.3d 915 (citing Newman
v. Lichfield, 2012 MT 47, ¶ 22, 364 Mont. 243, 272 P.3d 625).
¶7 On appeal, Spreadbury rehashes several previous incidents involving neighbors,
contends the Municipal Court erroneously found there to be “stalking,” asserts he was
acting in self-defense when he brandished the wooden board outside of Inman’s residence
and was “the actual victim,” complains of a completely separate order of protection
apparently granted to a librarian in 2013 when Spreadbury says he was only “asking for
[their] help on a public sidewalk,” and sets forth the “Spreadbury Test” for orders of
4 protection, which he asserts this Court must implement to guide lower courts. Finding no
abuse of discretion in the Municipal Court’s determination that the January 22, 2025
incident met the elements of assault and Inman was entitled to an order of protection, we
need not address Spreadbury’s other issues.1
¶8 A person may petition for an order of protection—regardless of the person’s
relationship to the respondent—if the person is a victim of assault as defined in § 45-5-201,
MCA. Section 40-15-102(2), MCA. Section 45-5-201(1)(d), MCA, provides that a
“person commits the offense of assault if the person . . . purposely or knowingly causes
reasonable apprehension of bodily injury in another[.]” “The standard for determining
whether a person has ‘reasonably apprehended bodily injury is that of a reasonable person
under similar circumstances.’” State v. Vukasin, 2003 MT 230, ¶ 19, 317 Mont. 204,
75 P.3d 1284 (quoting State v. McCarthy, 1999 MT 99, ¶ 27, 294 Mont. 270, 980 P.2d
629).
¶9 A reasonable person could certainly “reasonably apprehend” bodily injury when
they are yelled at without provocation, followed throughout town by someone exhibiting
“rage towards” them, and threatened with a wooden board brandished by someone saying
they had the board because they didn’t bring their gun. In addition, though Spreadbury
asserts it was mere happenstance he ran into Inman at Van’s, claiming he came “directly
from his residence in Deer Lodge” to buy groceries and did not follow Inman there, Inman
1 We do note, however, that, contrary to Spreadbury’s representation on appeal, the Municipal Court did not “establish stalking in MCA 45-5-220 as an element of Order of Protection MCA 40-15-201.” The Municipal Court’s ruling was based on its determination that Spreadbury’s behavior on January 22, 2025, constituted assault and did not mention stalking at all. 5 testified Spreadbury was outside of the 713 Poplar St. residence and yelled at him before
Inman was later raged at by Spreadbury in the Van’s parking lot. “Because an assessment
of testimony is best made upon observation of the witness’s demeanor and consideration
of other intangibles that are only evident during live testimony, the fact-finder is uniquely
in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses[.]” State v. Barrus, 2025 MT 183,
¶ 33, 423 Mont. 391, 573 P.3d 1188 (internal citation omitted). “We accordingly defer to
the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their
testimony.” Barrus, ¶ 33 (citation omitted). The Municipal Court took the testimony,
observed the witnesses, and apparently determined Inman’s testimony to be more credible
on the matter. There is no abuse of discretion in the Municipal Court’s determination
Spreadbury’s behavior towards Inman during the January 22, 2025 incident—video of
which was viewed by the court—constituted assault. Accordingly, the Municipal Court
did not abuse its discretion when it issued Inman a 10-year order of protection against
Spreadbury, and the District Court did not err when it affirmed the order. Groenke, ¶ 22.
¶10 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
applicable standards of review.
¶11 Affirmed.
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
6 We Concur:
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA