Ingress v. Merrimack Mortgage

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: February 8, 2012
• Docket: CV-11-373-PB
• Status: Published

Opinion

Ingress v . Merrimack Mortgage CV-11-373-PB 2/8/12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Jeanne L . Ingress

v. Civil N o . 11-cv-373-PB Opinion N o . 2012 DNH 40 Merrimack Mortgage Co., Inc., et a l .

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

After Jeanne Ingress stopped making her monthly mortgage

payments, a mortgage company instituted foreclosure proceedings

on her home. Ingress brought suit in state court, seeking to

enjoin the foreclosure. After she was ultimately unsuccessful

in that action, she filed a quiet title suit in state court

concurrently with this suit in federal court. Prior to my

consideration of her federal action, she was denied relief in

her second state action. In this suit, Ingress seeks money

damages against five mortgage companies and a law firm, alleging

the existence of defects in the chain of title to her mortgage

as well as fraudulent conduct and disclosure violations that

taint the mortgage and foreclosure. Defendants have filed

motions to dismiss all claims, and for the reasons below, I

grant those motions. I. BACKGROUND

On September 1 5 , 2005, Ingress borrowed approximately

$205,000 from Merrimack Mortgage Company, Inc. (“Merrimack”) and

mortgaged property in Wilton, New Hampshire as security for the

loan. Merrimack subsequently sold Ingress’s mortgage and

transferred the servicing rights. In late 2008 or early 2009,

Ingress stopped making her monthly mortgage payments. In March

2009, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee for Option One Mortgage

Trust 2006-1 Asset-Backed Securities, Series 2006-1 (“Wells

Fargo”) commenced foreclosure proceedings.

Seeking to stop the imminent foreclosure sale of her

property, Ingress brought suit (the first state action) in

Merrimack County Superior Court in November 2010 against

Merrimack; Wells Fargo; American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc.

(“American”), an intermediate assignee of the mortgage; and

Shechtman Halperin Savage, LLP (“Shechtman”), counsel to Wells

Fargo. Ingress argued that she was unable to discern the

identity of the current holder of her mortgage and that the

rising interest rates and monthly payments on her mortgage were

evidence that she had been the victim of unfair practices.

Ingress v . Wells Fargo Bank, N o . 10-E-571 at 1-2 (N.H. Super.

2 Nov. 2 9 , 2010), Doc. N o . 14-3. Chief Justice Robert J. Lynn

stated in his November 29 order that although he “agrees with

[Ingress] to a point, . . . the property in question clearly is

encumbered by a mortgage owed to some financial institution and

[Ingress] has, in effect, been living rent free in the property

for nearly two years.” Id. at 2 . He enjoined the foreclosure

sale scheduled for that day, but ordered that the injunction

would expire after ten days unless Ingress deposited with the

court the $41,400 she owed in unpaid mortgage payments and

continued to deposit $1,800 per month until the litigation was

concluded. Id.

On December 7 , two days prior to the date Ingress would

have been required to deposit the outstanding balance due on the

mortgage, a hearing was held before a different judge. Ingress

disputed the chain of title to the mortgage, contending that the

mortgage and accompanying notes had been improperly assigned.

Ingress v . Wells Fargo Bank, N o . 2010-EQ-0571 at 1 (N.H. Super.

Dec. 8 , 2010), Doc. N o . 14-10. The following day, Presiding

Justice Diane M . Nicolosi enjoined the foreclosure sale for

ninety days, explaining that the record was unclear as to who

could properly foreclose on the mortgage. Id. She vacated the

3 requirement that Ingress deposit $41,400 with the court, and

replaced it with a requirement that Ingress deposit $3,600 with

the court by January 1 , and an additional $1,800 each month

thereafter. Id. at 2 .

On February 1 5 , 2011, Justice Nicolosi granted the

respondents’ motions to dismiss Ingress’s claims. Ingress v .

Wells Fargo Bank, N o . 226-2010-CV-571 (N.H. Super. Feb. 1 5 ,

2011), Doc. N o . 14-15. She noted that Ingress had failed to

deposit any money with the court and that Ingress had conveyed

the property to John Ingress and so was no longer the real party

in interest in the case. 1 Id. at 1-2. On April 6, 2011, Justice

Nicolosi denied Ingress’s motion for reconsideration, explaining

that Ingress “has not provided any additional factual support

for her claims that Wells Fargo is not the mortgagee by valid

assignment.” Ingress v . Wells Fargo Bank, N o . 226-2010-CV-571

(N.H. Super. Apr. 6, 2011), Doc. N o . 24-7. On April 2 9 , the

case was closed.

In July 2011, Ingress brought this suit pro se in federal

court against the same four parties named in her original state

court action and one additional party, Sand Canyon Corp. (“Sand

1 The property has since been conveyed back to Ingress.

4 Canyon”). 2 Her complaint contains thirteen counts and alleges

that defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy, committed fraud,

and violated a number federal regulations and statutes,

including the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.,

the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., and

the Uniform Commercial Code.

On the same day she filed this case, Ingress also filed a

quiet title action in state court (the second state action),

naming the same defendants as in her federal complaint. On

December 7 , 2011, Presiding Justice Jacalyn A . Colburn ruled

against Ingress on all claims. Ingress v . Merrimack Mortgage

Co., N o . 2011-CV-0542 (N.H. Super. Dec. 7 , 2011), Doc. N o . 3 9 .

She first determined that Ingress had not asserted any viable

claims against Option One or Sand Canyon because Ingress

acknowledged that neither party had an interest in her property,

and because Ingress failed to include any factual allegations

about their actions. Id. at 4-5. She next determined that “the

2 In her complaint, Ingress names Sand Canyon and Option One Mortgage Corporation (“Option One”) as separate parties, but she acknowledges that Option One and Sand Canyon are actually the same entity, the former having become the latter by way of a corporate name change. Compl. ¶ 4 , Doc. N o . 1 . For clarity, I shall treat the corporation as a single entity, and shall refer to i t , regardless of its name at the time, as Sand Canyon.

5 doctrine of res judicata bars this suit or any further action

against Merrimack, Wells Fargo, A[merican], and S[hechtman].”

Id. at 6.

Justice Colburn’s comprehensive res judicata analysis

detailed how all three prongs required for its application had

been met: (1) the four defendants were identical to the

defendants in Ingress’s prior state court action; (2) despite

new theories of relief, Ingress’s action was based on “the same

factual transaction –- the mortgage, the foreclosure and

ownership and servicing of the note”; and (3) the prior action

was a final judgment on the merits. Id. at 7-8. She dismissed

Ingress’s claims with prejudice.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), I “accept as true the well-pleaded

factual allegations of the complaint, draw all reasonable

inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor and determine

whether the complaint, so read, sets forth facts sufficient to

justify recovery on any cognizable theory.” Martin v . Applied

Cellular Tech., 284 F.3d 1 , 6 (1st Cir. 2002). To survive a

6 motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the general

standard under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is

that the complaint must “state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v . Iqbal, 129 S . C t . 1937,

1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v . Twombly, 550 U.S. 5 4 4 ,

570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when it pleads

“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

(citations omitted).

When a plaintiff acts pro s e , this court is obliged to

construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the pro se party.

See Ayala Serrano v . Lebron Gonzales, 909 F.2d 8 , 15 (1st Cir.

1990) (citing Estelle v . Gamble, 429 U.S. 9 7 , 106 (1976)). That

review ensures that pro se pleadings are given fair and

meaningful consideration. See Eveland v . Dir. of C.I.A., 843

F.2d 4 6 , 49 (1st Cir. 1988).

The court may take into account the record in the original

action when a motion to dismiss is based upon a claim of res

7 judicata. Andrew Robinson Int’l, Inc. v . Hartford Fire Ins.

Co., 547 F.3d 4 8 , 51 (1st Cir. 2008).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Res Judicata

The four defendants who were parties to the first state

action argue that the doctrine of res judicata bars all claims

against them. For the same reasons advanced by Justice Colburn

in her recent decision, I agree.

In New Hampshire, res judicata bars a plaintiff from

relitigating matters that were actually decided, or that could

have been decided, in an earlier action between the same parties

for the same cause of action. Brooks v . Trustees of Dartmouth

Coll., 161 N.H. 685, 690 (2011). The purpose of the doctrine is

“to avoid repetitive litigation so that at some point litigation

over a particular controversy must come to an end.” E . Marine

Constr. Corp. v . First S . Leasing, 129 N.H. 2 7 0 , 273 (1987)

(quoting Bricker v . Crane, 118 N.H. 249, 252 (1978)). Three

elements must be met for res judicata to apply: (1) the parties

must be the same or in privity with one another; (2) the cause

of action must be the same; and (3) the prior action must have

8 been a final judgment on the merits. Brooks, 161 N.H. at 690.

Ingress does not contest the first or third elements, and thus

the dispositive question is whether this suit is based on the

same cause of action as the first state action.

A cause of action is broadly defined to encompass “all

theories on which relief could be claimed on the basis of the

factual transaction in question.” Id. at 694 (quoting E .

Marine, 129 N.H. at 274-75). So long as the factual transaction

is the same, a subsequent suit against the same party will be

barred even if the plaintiff is prepared to present new evidence

or offer new theories of relief, and even if the plaintiff seeks

different forms of relief than in the prior action. E . Marine,

129 N.H. at 275-76.

I determine that this suit is based on the same cause of

action as Ingress’s first state action. In that prior suit, the

factual transaction was the chain of events from mortgage

through foreclosure pertaining to the ownership and encumbrance

of the Wilton property. Because all of Ingress’s claims in this

case are based on that same factual transaction, they are

barred. It is of no moment that Ingress wishes to present new

evidence in this suit, nor that Ingress seeks monetary damages

9 now whereas she sought injunctive relief in the prior action.

See E . Marine, 129 N.H. at 275-76. I dismiss all claims against

Merrimack, Wells Fargo, American, and Schechtman on the basis of

res judicata.3

B. Claims against New Defendant

The sole defendant in this suit who was not a party to the

first action, and who therefore cannot avail itself of a res

judicata bar based on that action, is Sand Canyon. Nonetheless,

Ingress’s claims against Sand Canyon are barred by the res

judicata effect of her second state action.

The resolution of the second state action satisfies all the

requirements necessary to apply res judicata in this subsequent

suit. See Brooks, 161 N.H. at 690. First, the party in this

case, Sand Canyon, is the same as in the second state action.

Second, the claims in this case are based on the same cause of

action as in the prior suit. Both cases concern the same

3 Ingress also contends that res judicata should not apply because her new complaint “makes allegations not known to [her] at the time the previous complaint was brought forth.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 5 , Doc. N o . 4 2 . Ingress has not provided any detail, however, about which facts have recently come to light or why she was unaware of those facts previously. In light of Ingress’s failure to offer more than conclusory assertions, I need not entertain her argument.

10 factual transaction –- the ownership and encumbrance of the

Wilton property and the chain of events from mortgage through

foreclosure –- in which Sand Canyon is alleged to have been an

intermediary assignee of the mortgage. Third, the second state

action was a final decision on the merits. Justice Colburn

dismissed the claims against Sand Canyon with prejudice, and “a

dismissal with prejudice is deemed an adjudication on the merits

for purposes of res judicata.” Oriental Bank & Trust v . Pardo

Gonzalez, 509 F. Supp. 2d 1 2 7 , 135 (D.P.R. 2007); see Moulton-

Garland v . Cabletron Sys., Inc., 143 N.H. 5 4 0 , 542 (1999) (“A

judgment entered ‘with prejudice’ constitutes a judgment on the

merits of a matter[.]”).

Even if Ingress’s claims against Sand Canyon were not

barred by res judicata, however, I would dismiss them for

failure to state a claim. Although Ingress’s allegations about

Sand Canyon paint a less than clear picture of Sand Canyon’

exact role as an intermediate assignee, two important facts

emerge. First, Sand Canyon had no connection with Ingress prior

to or during the time Ingress entered into the mortgage

agreement. Second, Sand Canyon does not currently possess any

interest in Ingress’s property and has not been involved in the

11 foreclosure proceedings. In light of these facts, Counts I

through IX of the complaint all fail to state a claim against

Sand Canyon because they allege fraud and disclosure failures by

the original lender.4 The allegations in Count XI (titled

“Breach of Trust”) must also be dismissed because they set out

defenses pursuant to UCC § 3-305 against a party seeking payment

on an instrument, and Sand Canyon does not hold an instrument

and is not seeking to enforce payment.

Counts X and XII are allegations of fraud, which must be

alleged with particularity according to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 9 ( b ) . Mendez Internet Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v . Banco

Santander de P.R., 621 F.3d 1 0 , 14 (1st Cir. 2010). Count XII

fails to state a claim for mail fraud because Ingress has not

alleged that Sand Canyon mailed any documents.5 Count X alleges

fraud generally, and contains a brief explanation that a person

4 In responding documents addressed to the arguments of other defendants, Ingress also admits that Counts I through IX are barred by the statute of limitations. Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 2-3, Doc. N o . 4 1 . 5 In documents responsive to other defendants’ motions to dismiss, Ingress concedes that her mail fraud claim “either fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or [is] not a recognizable cause of action.” Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 3 , Doc. N o . 4 2 .

12 who enforces a note must be in possession of the note. To the

extent Ingress is raising a defense against enforcement of the

note, as seems to be the case based on her citation to UCC § 3-

305, her argument cannot be directed at Sand Canyon who does not

hold the note. To the extent Ingress is making a common-law

fraud accusation based on problems in the chain of title, her

vague allegation is insufficient to support the claim. She has

not alleged any facts that would establish her reliance on a

false representation by Sand Canyon. See Snierson v . Scruton,

145 N.H. 7 3 , 77 (2000) (describing elements necessary to plead a

claim of fraud). Moreover, under Ingress’s own account of

events, Sand Canyon did not interact with her at the two times

where one might expect a possibility of fraudulent conduct by a

mortgage company: at the signing stage or in the foreclosure

process.

Lastly, Count XIII, which alleges conspiracy, also fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.6 As best I can

discern, Ingress asserts that the defendants conspired to

6 As with the mail fraud claim, Ingress concedes in responses to other defendants’ motions to dismiss that her conspiracy claim “either fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or [is] not a recognizable cause of action.” Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 3 , Doc. N o . 4 2 . 13 deceive various mortgagors by leading them to believe that the

named Trustee (Wells Fargo) had been assigned the security

instruments well before the date the Trustee had actually been

assigned those instruments. Even assuming the veracity of that

allegation, Ingress has not asserted the facts necessary to

state a claim for conspiracy. See Jay Edwards, Inc. v . Baker,

130 N.H. 4 1 , 47 (1987) (listing elements of civil conspiracy).

Ingress’s allegations do not show how, even if defendants had

conspired to deceive her about the date Wells Fargo became

Trustee, such a deception has proximately caused her to suffer

damages. See id. (damages as proximate result of conspiracy is

element of claim). The foreclosure of the Wilton property was

not caused by any conspiracy to post-date assignment documents,

but by Ingress’s failure to repay her mortgage. Therefore, her

conspiracy claim fails as a matter of law.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Ingress’s claims are barred by

res judicata, and her allegations against Sand Canyon also fail

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendants’

motions to dismiss (Doc. Nos. 1 4 , 1 7 , 2 3 , 25) are granted. The

14 clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close the

case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge

February 8 , 2012

cc: Jeanne L . Ingress Joshua M . Wyatt, Esq. Alexander J. Walker, Esq. Daniel E . Will, Esq. Victor Manougian, Esq. Paula-Lee Chambers, Esq. Geoffrey M . Coan, Esq. Dean J. Wagner, Esq.