Ingram-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Geiger

71 So. 552, 71 Fla. 390
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedApril 5, 1916
StatusPublished
Cited by34 cases

This text of 71 So. 552 (Ingram-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Geiger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ingram-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Geiger, 71 So. 552, 71 Fla. 390 (Fla. 1916).

Opinion

Shackleford, J.

J. A. Geiger instituted an action at law against the Ingram-Dekle Lumber Company, a corporation, for the recovery of damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the negligence of the defendant. The amended declaration consists of two counts, the first of which is as follows:

“Whereas, on the 16th day of September, A. D. 1910, the defendant maintained and operated a railroad known as a log road in Pasco County, State of Florida; and on said date plaintiff was in the employ of the said defendant, and was directed by defendant, with other', employes of said defendant, to board a locomotive engine of the defendant, neither the plaintiff nor the said [393]*393employes so directed to board the said locomotive engine were employed on or about any locomotive engines or cars of defendant, and they were directed to ride on said locomotive engine to a point on said railroad of said defendant where another locomotive engine of the dependant had been derailed, and to assist the other said employes who boarded said engine with plaintiff in placing the said derailed locomotive on said railroad track; that in consideration of the performances of plaintiff’s sendees 'in connection with this employment it became and was the duty of the said defendant to use reasonable and proper care to provide the plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which to work, and not to subject him to any extraordinary hazard or risk in the course of his duty or employment, yet the said defendant heretofore, to-wit, on the 16th day of September, A. D. 1910, not regarding its duty in this behalf did not use reasonable and proper care to provide the plaintiff a reasonably safe place in which to discharge his duties and work, as aforesaid, but wholly failed to do so, and to the contrary did subject him to extraordinary risk and hazard in the course of his duty and employment in this, to-wit; that the said defendant through its agents and employes in charge of the operation of said lofcomotive engine upon which the plaintiff was .then riding, so negligently operated the same that it collided with the said derailed locomotive engine, and just prior to said collision plaintiff and the other said employes, who- were employed on or about the said locomotive engine, saw that a collision with said derailed locomotive engine could not be avoided, and in order to save his life plaintiff jumped from said locomotive engine upon which he was riding and in jumping therefrom plaintiff struck a stump standing close beside [394]*394the saicl track, which caused his said leg to be thrown back on the track, and by reason thereof it was mashed by the said locomotive engine; and by reason thereof the muscles and bones of the plaintiff’s said leg were so mashed, torn, and lacerated that it became necessary to amputate plaintiff’s said leg; and’ the plaintiff was thereby permanently injured, and was so greatly bruised, broken and damaged in his body and limbs that he became and was thereby made sick, sore and lame and disordered,, and so remained for a long space of time, to-wit; for four months; that the same will and does permanently affect and impair the health, strength and activities of the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff since the said accident has continuously suffered great pain of body and anguish of mind, and by reason of said accident plaintiff was compelled to employ the services of physicians, and was forced, to expend larg-e and divers sums of money in payment of the services of said phj'"sicians, nurse hire, and for medicine; that at the time of the said accident the plaintiff was forty-one years of age, and was earning $2.25 per day; and that by reason of said accident the said plaintiff is not able or in a condition to earn a livelihood; wherefore plaintiff claims he has sustained damages to the amount of fifteen thousand dollars.”

The second count of the declaration contains the allegations of the first count, except that the negligence of the defendant is particularized as follows: “that the said track and rails were wet, and the said locomotive engine and tender leaked in such a wajr the water therefrom fell upon the rails of said track, and the sand box on said locomotive engine was in such a defective condition that sand would not fall therefrom upon the rails of said track [395]*395by reason whereof the said locomotive engine upon which plaintiff was riding could not be stopped and collided with the said derailed locomotive engine.”

To this declaration the defendant interposed a demurrer, setting forth certain substantial matters of law to be argued in support of the same separately as to each count. This demurrer was overruled, whereupon the defendant filed the following pleas:

“And now comes the defendant in the above entitled cause by its attorney and for pleas to the amended first and second counts of the declaration says:
First. That it is not guilty in manner and form as in said counts is alleged.
Second. That if the plaintiff was injured in the manner complained of in said amended first and second counts, the injury was caused by the neglect or default of a fellow servant of the said plaintiff, for which this defendant is not legally responsible.
Third. That if the plaintiff were injured in the respect complained of by him, it was due to his own negligence in recklessly jumping from the locomotive and unnecessarily subjecting himself to' danger of injury.
Fourth. That the plaintiff was not injured through any negligence on the part of the defendant, but was injured solely through jumping from a moving locomotive and it was not necessary for said plaintiff to expose himself to the danger of injury from jumping from said locomotive as is alleged in said counts of said, declaration.
Fifth. That the plaintiff voluntarily entered upon the service mentioned in the declaration and in so doing had full knowledge of the surroundings and the dangers thereof, and thereby assumed all risk of injury incident thereto.”

[396]*396The cause was submitted to a jury upon the issues joined, with the result that a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $2,000.00, upon which judgment was entered and which judgment the defendant has brought here for review and has assigned numerous errors. We shall consider only such assignments as we d,eem necessary for a proper disposition of the case.

The evidence establishes that the defendant was engaged in the operation of a sawmill and as an incident to such business owned and operated a steam railroad about six or seven miles long, commonly known as a log road. This being true, it necessarily follows under the decisions of this court that the defendant is not a railroad comany within the terms and meaning of Sections 3148, 3149 and 3150 of the General Statutes of 1906. See Taylor v. Prairie Pebble Phosphate Co., 61 Fla. 455, 54 South. Rep. 904, and Stearns & Culver Lumber Co. v. Fowler, 58 Fla. 362, 50 South. Rep. 680. The right of the plaintiff to recover in the instant case must be based upon the common law liability of the defendant. As we have several times held, the common law is in force in this State, except where it has been modified by competent governmental authority. See Co-operative Sanitary Baking Company v. Shields, decided here at the present term, and prior decisions therein cited.

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Bluebook (online)
71 So. 552, 71 Fla. 390, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ingram-dekle-lumber-co-v-geiger-fla-1916.