Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.A.R.L. v. Kingdom of Spain

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: August 12, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2018-1753
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES LUXEMBOURG S.A.R.L., et al.,

Petitioners, Civil Action No. 18 - 1753 (LLA) v.

KINGDOM OF SPAIN,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioners Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.A.R.L. and Energia Termosolar B.V.,

Luxembourg- and Netherlands-based companies, respectively, bring this action seeking to confirm

an arbitral award entered in their favor against Respondent, the Kingdom of Spain (“Spain”). ECF

No. 1. Pending before the court is Spain’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 18, which is fully briefed,

ECF Nos. 18, 19, 23, 25, 104, 105, 108, 109. For the following reasons, the court will deny the

motion to dismiss.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Energy Charter Treaty and the ICSID Convention

The Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”) is a multinational treaty that “establishes a legal

framework in order to promote long-term cooperation in the energy field, based on

complementarities and mutual benefits.” ECT Art. 2. Spain, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands are all among the ECT’s signatories.1 As relevant here, the ECT provides that when disputes

between signatories related to an energy investment arise, “each Contracting Party . . . gives its

unconditional consent to the submission of a dispute to international arbitration.” ECT

Art. 26(3)(a). And where “the Contracting Party of the Investor and the Contracting Party . . . to

the dispute are both parties to the ICSID Convention,” arbitration must occur under that

framework. Id. Art. 26(4)(a)(i).

The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals

of Other States (“ICSID Convention”), in turn, provides facilities and processes for “conciliation

and arbitration of investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other

Contracting States,” ICSID Convention Art. 1, including through adjudication by arbitration

tribunals, id. Sec. 2. When arbitration is appropriate, signatories to the ICSID Convention consent

to “arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy,” id. Art. 26, and agree that “award[s] shall be

binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those

provided for in th[e] Convention,” id. Art. 53(1). Parties to the Convention “may

enforce . . . [ICSID arbitration] award[s] in or through [their] federal courts and may provide that

such courts shall treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state.”

Id. Art. 54(1).

The United States, Spain, Netherlands, and Luxembourg are all parties to the Convention.

ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 11, 20. In the United States, the obligation to enforce ICSID awards is codified at

22 U.S.C. § 1650a, which provides that “pecuniary obligations imposed by [an ICSID] award shall

1 See International Energy Charter, Contracting Parties and Signatories of the Energy Charter Treaty, https://perma.cc/K6D3-WEQN.

2 be enforced and shall be given the same full faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment

of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several States.”

B. The Present Dispute

After Spain enacted legislation that aimed to attract investments in renewable energy

production through various financial incentives, Petitioners invested roughly 139.5 million euros

in solar power projects in Spain. ECF No. 1 ¶ 7. Spain later walked back the legislation,

eliminating the financial incentives that had led Petitioners to invest in the Spanish solar energy

projects. Id. Because these investments were protected under the ECT, id. ¶ 8, Petitioners

requested arbitration by an ICSID tribunal, “contend[ing] that Spain’s legislative actions that

resulted in the devaluation of Petitioners’ investments constituted a breach of Spain’s obligations

under the ECT,” id. ¶ 12. Spain argued that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because “Article 26 of

the ECT does not apply to investors from other [European Union (“EU”)] Member States and is

limited to investors from states that are not members of the EU.” ECF No. 18-1, at 9.

In June 2018, the ICSID tribunal issued an award in Petitioners’ favor, determining that

Spain had breached its duty to Petitioners under Article 10 of the ECT and ordering Spain to pay

112 million euros in damages plus interest and costs. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 14-15. The next month, Spain

submitted a Request for Rectification of the Award based on clerical errors in the tribunal’s

calculation. Id. ¶ 17. In February 2019, the panel ruled on this request, amending the award to

101 million euros. ECF No. 104, at 3 n.2. In May 2019, Spain applied for annulment of the award,

see ECF No. 35-1, and in July 2021, an ICSID committee denied the application, see ECF Nos. 46,

46-1.

While the ICSID proceedings were ongoing, Petitioners sought confirmation of the

arbitration award in this court. In July 2018, Petitioners filed a petition to confirm the award. ECF

3 No. 1. Spain moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, and

it additionally moved for a stay pending the outcome of annulment proceedings. ECF No. 18. The

court (Sullivan, J.) stayed the case, ECF No. 36, and the case remained stayed until January 2022,

see Jan. 28, 2022 Minute Order. In September 2022, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge

Upadhyaya. See Sep. 22, 2022 Minute Order. In September 2023, Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya

stayed the case pending the D.C. Circuit’s decision in three related cases that would become

NextEra Energy Glob. Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, 112 F.4th 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2024),

petition for cert. filed, Kingdom of Spain v. Blasket Renewable Invs. LLC, No. 24-1130. See Sep.

13, 2023 Minute Order.

The case was directly reassigned to the undersigned in December 2023. See Dec. 22, 2023

Minute Order. After the D.C. Circuit issued its decision in NextEra, Spain asked the court to

continue to stay the case while it sought certiorari, ECF No. 97, but the court denied the request,

ECF No. 103.2 Accordingly, in January 2025, the court vacated its referral to Magistrate Judge

Upadhyaya, lifted the stay, and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the effect

of the NextEra decision on the present case. See Jan. 27, 2025 Minute Order; ECF No. 103. The

parties submitted their supplemental briefs, ECF Nos. 104, 105, 108, 109, and several notices of

supplemental authority and responses, ECF Nos. 110 to 114. The court also accepted an amicus

brief from the European Commission. ECF No. 107. The matter is now fully briefed and ripe for

resolution.

2 Spain filed its petition for certiorari in May 2025. See Kingdom of Spain v. Blasket Renewable Invs. LLC, No. 24-1130 (U.S. May 1, 2025).

4 II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and it is generally presumed that “a cause

lies outside [of] this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.

375, 377 (1994). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the court must dismiss an action

unless the plaintiff can establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court possesses

subject-matter jurisdiction. Green v. Stuyvesant, 505 F. Supp. 2d 176, 177-78 (D.D.C. 2007). In

reviewing such a motion, the court “is not limited to the allegations set forth in the complaint” and

“‘may consider materials outside the pleadings.’” Morrow v. United States, 723 F. Supp. 2d 71,

76 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249,

1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). Additionally, when reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(1), the court is required to “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the

complaint and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that

can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 642 F.3d

1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).3

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court will dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

3 Spain also argues that the petition should also be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). ECF No. 18-1, at 19, 23. Under the FSIA, “[i]f service of process has been made under [28 U.S.C.] § 1608, personal jurisdiction over a foreign state exists for every claim over which the court has subject matter jurisdiction.” Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). Because the “FSIA collapses subject matter jurisdiction, in personam jurisdiction, and sovereign immunity into a single inquiry,” Price, 294 F.3d at 89 (discussing Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)), subject-matter and personal jurisdiction will be addressed together.

5 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In

evaluating a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations in the

complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Atherton v. D.C. Off.

of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Although the plausibility standard does not

require “detailed factual allegations,” it “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Nor will “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678 (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, a court may consider only the

facts alleged in the complaint and “any documents either attached to or incorporated in the

complaint and matters of which [the court] may take judicial notice.” N. Am. Butterfly Ass’n v.

Wolf, 977 F.3d 1244, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Hurd v. District of

Columbia, 864 F.3d 671, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).

III. DISCUSSION

Spain makes three main arguments in support of its motion to dismiss. First, it argues that

this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because the FSIA’s arbitration exception does not apply.

ECF No. 18-1, at 19-29. Next, it contends that even if this court had jurisdiction, Petitioners’

ICSID award is not entitled to full faith and credit. Id. at 29-33. Finally, it posits that this court is

barred from enforcing the ICSID arbitral award by the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine. Id.

at 34-35. The court considers each argument in turn.

6 A. Jurisdiction

The court begins, as it must, with jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,

523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998). Petitioners seek to enforce their award under 22 U.S.C. § 1650a, which

implements the ICSID Convention. ECF No. 1, at 1. Spain argues that the FSIA’s provision that

“a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States,” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1604, bars Petitioners’ suit unless one of the FSIA’s exceptions applies, ECF No. 18-1, at 19;

see Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989) (“[T]he FSIA

provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court[.]”).

Petitioners respond that the FSIA’s arbitration and waiver exceptions apply, stripping Spain of its

sovereign immunity. ECF No. 23, at 11. Guided by the D.C. Circuit’s recent precedent in

NextEra—which presented virtually identical facts and several identical questions of law—the

court easily determines that it has jurisdiction under the FSIA’s arbitration exception.

The FSIA’s arbitration exception applies:

in any case . . . in which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by the foreign state with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between the parties with respect to a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an award made pursuant to such an agreement to arbitrate, if . . . the agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force for the United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards[.]

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6). To assure itself that it has jurisdiction under this exception, “a district

court must find three ‘jurisdictional facts’: (1) an arbitration agreement, (2) an arbitration award,

and (3) a treaty potentially governing award enforcement.” NextEra, 112 F.4th at 1100 (quoting

Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, 795 F.3d 200, 204 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). A burden-shifting

framework applies to the evaluation of these facts: first, Petitioners must satisfy a burden of

7 production as to each fact, and then Spain must meet a burden of persuasion that requires it to

“establish the absence of the factual basis by a preponderance of the evidence.” Chevron, 795

F.3d at 204 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v.

Russian Fed’n, 528 F.3d 934, 940 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).

Here, Spain contests only whether an arbitration agreement existed. ECF No. 18-1, at 23.

As it did in NextEra, Spain contends that as a matter of EU law, it could not have formed an

arbitration agreement with Petitioners because an opinion of the European Court of Justice, Case

C-741/19, Republic of Moldova v. Komstroy LLC, ECLI:EU:C:2021:655 (Sep. 2, 2021), bars

intra-EU arbitration. ECF No. 105, at 15-16; see NextEra, 112 F.4th at 1102. The D.C. Circuit’s

opinion in NextEra soundly forecloses this argument. There, the Court explained that it did not

need to determine whether Spain had entered into arbitration agreements with the specific

petitioners because it could easily “conclude that [Spain] entered into an arbitration agreement—

the Energy Charter Treaty itself.” NextEra, 112 F.4th at 1102. And, because the ECT “is ‘for the

benefit’ of [Spain’s] investors . . . [it] therefore satisfies the FSIA’s arbitration exception. Id.

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)).

In its supplemental briefs, Spain concedes that the D.C. Circuit determined in NextEra that

the FSIA’s arbitration exception applies because the ECT itself is an agreement to arbitrate, ECF

No. 105, at 9-10, and it does not argue that NextEra is inapposite, see generally ECF Nos. 105,

108. Accordingly, this court determines that it has subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the

petition to enforce the ICSID’s arbitral award. And, because personal jurisdiction in FSIA cases

“exists for every claim over which the court has subject matter jurisdiction,” Price v. Socialist

8 People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b), and

service is proper,4 the court also finds that it has personal jurisdiction over Spain.

B. Full Faith and Credit

While Spain acknowledges the D.C. Circuit’s holding that this court has jurisdiction under

the FSIA’s arbitration exception to consider the petition, it points out that the D.C. Circuit did not

take a “position on the ultimate enforceability of the[] [arbitral] award[]” and declined to “address

the merits question whether [the ECT’s] arbitration provision extends to EU nationals and thus

whether Spain ultimately entered into legally valid agreements with the companies.” NextEra,

112 F.4th at 1105-06; see ECF No. 105, at 9-10. Spain maintains that the ICSID arbitrators lacked

jurisdiction to issue the award because “Spain never agreed to arbitrate anything with Petitioners”

and “the arbitrators exceeded any authority they supposedly had by awarding state aid.” ECF

No. 105, at 11. And because the “ICSID arbitrators lack[ed] jurisdiction,” Spain contends, “the

awards they issue[d] are not owed full faith and credit.” Id. The court disagrees.

Federal law instructs that “pecuniary” awards rendered pursuant to the ICSID Convention

“shall be enforced and shall be given the same full faith and credit as if the award were a final

judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several States.” 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a).

“[T]he full faith and credit obligation owed final judgments ‘precludes any inquiry into the merits

of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity of the legal principles

on which the judgment is based.’” Valores Mundiales, S.L. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,

Ministerio del Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores, 87 F.4th 510, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2023)

(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940)). Accordingly, “a court may not deny a

4 Spain does not argue that it was not properly served. See generally ECF No. 18-1.

9 judgment full faith and credit because ‘it disagrees with the reasoning underlying the judgment or

deems it to be wrong on the merits.’” Id. (quoting V.L. v. E.L., 577 U.S. 404, 407 (2016) (per

curiam)). That said, this court must “do more than rubber stamp” the ICSID award: to find that

the award merits full faith and credit, the court must assure itself that (1) “that it has subject-matter

and personal jurisdiction,” (2) “that the award is authentic,” and (3) “that its enforcement order

tracks the award.” Tethyan Copper Co. Pty Ltd. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 590 F. Supp. 3d

262, 268 (D.D.C. 2022).

The court has already determined that it has subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, see

supra Part III.A, and Spain cannot succeed on the merits by “recycl[ing] a losing jurisdictional

argument.” Tethyan, 590 F. Supp. 3d at 276. Even if it could, the terms of the ICSID Convention

bar a member state’s courts from examining “the ICSID tribunal’s jurisdiction to render the

award.” Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 863 F.3d 96, 102 (2d

Cir. 2017). And, as a general principle, “a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit—even as to

questions of jurisdiction—when the second court’s inquiry discloses that those questions have

been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court which rendered the original

judgment.” Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963). The ICSID tribunal considered Spain’s

jurisdictional arguments previously and rejected them. Award ¶¶ 194, 212-15. Because that matter

was “fully and fairly litigated,” Durfee, 375 U.S. at 111, and because this court has determined

that the FSIA does not bar its jurisdiction, the court is assured that the first prong is satisfied.5

5 Spain also briefly argues that 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a) extends full faith and credit only to “‘pecuniary obligations,’” and the ICSID “arbitrators’ assertion of their own jurisdiction is a non-pecuniary aspect of the award that gets no special deference.” ECF No. 105, at 11-12 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a)). Petitioners respond that Spain forfeited this argument by failing to include it in the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 109, at 3. The court agrees. See Abdullah v. Obama, 753 (continued on next page)

10 The parties do not dispute the authenticity of the award or express concerns that the court

would not be able to issue an enforcement order that tracks the award. See ECF Nos. 18, 19, 25,

104, 105, 108, 109. Having satisfied itself that it has jurisdiction, that the award is authentic, and

that the enforcement order can track the award, the court finds that the ICSID’s arbitral award is

entitled to full faith and credit.

C. Foreign Sovereign Compulsion Doctrine

Finally, Spain argues in its motion to dismiss, ECF No. 18-1, at 34-35, and maintains in its

supplemental briefing, ECF No. 105, at 19-20, that even if this court has jurisdiction over the

petition and finds that the award is entitled to full faith and credit, the court is barred from enforcing

it under the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine and “the principles of comity that underlie it,”

ECF No. 105, at 19-20. Several courts in this jurisdiction have assessed identical arguments in

suits against Spain to enforce ICSID arbitral agreements made pursuant to the ECT—both before

and after NextEra—and each has determined that the doctrine does not bar enforcement of the

arbitration awards. See Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 23-CV-2701,

2024 WL 4298808, at *13 (D.D.C. Sep. 26, 2024); 9REN Holding S.À.R.L. v. Kingdom of Spain,

No. 19-CV-1871, 2023 WL 2016933, at *11 (D.D.C. Feb. 15, 2023); NextEra Energy Glob.

F.3d 193, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that certain arguments were forfeited where they were not addressed until the reply brief). Even if preserved, the argument fails. When a court gives full faith and credit to a pecuniary award, it necessarily gives full faith and credit to the jurisdictional holding that underlies the award. That is why a district court may not consider the merits of the underlying jurisdictional holdings. See supra pp. 9-10; Valores Mundiales, 87 F.4th at 519.

11 Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, 656 F. Supp. 3d 201, 219 (D.D.C. 2023).6 This court joins in

that determination.

The foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine, which typically arises in the context of

antitrust litigation, “shields from . . . liability the acts of parties carried out in obedience to the

mandate of a foreign government.” Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,

1293 (3d Cir. 1979); see, e.g., Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 585 U.S.

33, 37 (2018). Spain argues that because “the European Commission has not yet authorized

payment of this award, . . . granting the petition would compel Spain to violate its EU-law

obligations,” thereby “subject[ing] Spain to ‘litigation in national courts’ as well as infringement

proceedings brought by the European Commission,” which could result in hundreds of millions of

euros’ worth of sanctions. ECF No. 105, at 20 (quoting ECF No. 105-1 ¶ 61).

To the court’s knowledge, the D.C. Circuit has never applied the foreign sovereign

compulsion doctrine by that name, and Spain offers no authority to support the application of the

doctrine in this context. See generally ECF Nos. 105, 108. That said, the D.C. Circuit has on

many occasions contemplated principles of international comity in other contexts, noting that it

“causes [it] considerable discomfort to think that a court of law should order a violation of law,

particularly on the territory of the sovereign whose law is in question.” In re Sealed Case, 825

F.2d 494, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731

F.2d 909, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying principles of comity in antitrust context).

6 9REN and NextEra (along with a third case which did not address the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine) were consolidated into a single appeal before the D.C. Circuit. See NextEra, 112 F.4th at 1088. The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part NextEra, reversed 9REN, and remanded the cases for further proceedings. The reversals did not hinge on the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine.

12 Nevertheless, the court is not convinced that general principles of international comity bar

the enforcement of the arbitral award in the present circumstances—to the contrary, they militate

in favor of enforcement. “[I]t is ‘the central precept of comity’ that ‘the decisions of foreign

tribunals should be given effect in domestic courts, since recognition fosters international

cooperation and encourages reciprocity, thereby promoting predictability and stability through

satisfaction of mutual expectations.’” Blasket, 2024 WL 4298808, at *13 (quoting Laker Airways,

731 F.2d at 937). Here, Spain asks the court to set aside this “central” principle, id., to avoid

“enforce[ment of] a decision rendered by a forum for international arbitration to which [Spain] has

voluntarily submitted itself,” Micula v. Gov’t of Romania, No. 20-7116, 2022 WL 2281645, at *2

(D.C. Cir. June 24, 2022). Spain cannot now argue that it is being unfairly compelled to follow

the strictures of a treaty that it signed, especially when that treaty expressly provides that final

awards are binding and unappealable. ICSID Convention Art. 53(1). As the Blasket court

observed, “comity concerns are essentially ‘baked in’ to the ICSID Convention and its

implementing statute,” 2024 WL 4298808, at *13, and the court cannot overlook them.

Finally, while it is true that principles of international comity counsel the court to consider

whether “compliance [with its judgment] would impose hardship on [a] party,” including possible

legal consequences, the court is not persuaded that the “hardships accompanying compliance”

here—possible financial penalties—weigh heavily against enforcement of the ICSID award

because they are merely “speculative.” In re Sealed Case, 932 F.3d 915, 932-33 (D.C. Cir. 2019);

see Blasket, 2024 WL 4298808, at *14. It is certainly possible that the European Commission will

bring enforcement proceedings against Spain for state aid violations that may result in financial

penalties, but there is no information before the court that suggests this will be the case. Indeed,

in its amicus brief, the European Commission does not even hint that Spain may be sanctioned as

13 a result of this court’s order. See generally ECF No. 107. The court therefore declines to withhold

judgment based on the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine or more general principles of

international comity.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,

ECF No. 18, is DENIED. The parties are directed to file a joint status report proposing next steps

in this litigation on or before September 9, 2025.

SO ORDERED.

LOREN L. ALIKHAN United States District Judge Date: August 12, 2025