Industrial Energy Consumer Group v. Public Utilities Commission

2001 ME 94, 773 A.2d 1038, 2001 Me. LEXIS 95
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedJune 22, 2001
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 2001 ME 94 (Industrial Energy Consumer Group v. Public Utilities Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Industrial Energy Consumer Group v. Public Utilities Commission, 2001 ME 94, 773 A.2d 1038, 2001 Me. LEXIS 95 (Me. 2001).

Opinion

RUDMAN, J.

[¶ 1] The Industrial Energy Consumer Group, 1 (“IECG”) appeals from an order issued by the Public Utilities Commission approving a Stipulation between the Central Maine Power Company (“CMP”) and the Office of Public Advocate providing for an Alternative Rate Plan. We affirm the Commission’s order.

L BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] In 1991, Title 35-A M.R.S.A. § 3195 2 was enacted, conferring on the Commission the authority to establish rea *1040 sonable rate-adjustment mechanisms that promote efficiency in the transmission and distribution of utilities.

[¶ 3] In 1995, the Commission approved a stipulation, thereby implementing CMP’s proposed multi-year alternative rate plan. That plan, referred to by the parties as “ARP 95,” expired on December 31, 1999. When ARP 95 was implemented, CMP was an integrated utility providing generation, transmission, distribution, billing, and metering services.

[¶ 4] In 1997, the Legislature enacted Maine’s Electric Industry Restructuring Act. See 35-A M.R.S.A. § 3201, et. seq. The Legislature also enacted 35-A M.R.S.A. § 3202, which deregulated electrical generation and provided that “[b]e-ginning on March 1, 2000, all consumers of electricity have the right to purchase generation services directly from competitive electricity providers.” 35-A M.R.S.A. § 3202(1) (Supp.2000).

[¶ 5] Because the generation function was deregulated and since ARP 95 would soon expire, CMP filed a successor alternative rate plan, known as “ARP 2000,” on September 20, 1999. No action was taken on CMP’s filing by the Commission until March 2000. At that time, the Commission issued a Notice of Proceeding that provided interested parties with the opportunity to intervene. IECG was one such intervenor.

[¶ 6] ARP 2000 applies only to CMP’s distribution delivery rates and services and includes both productivity offsets and an earnings sharing provision. Although the ARP 2000 does not provide for a “top end” earnings sharing, it does provide that earnings below a specified return on equity from the prior calendar year are to be shared fifty-fifty between shareholders and ratepayers.

[¶ 7] The ARP 2000 Stipulation also includes eight service indicators. 3 In the event that CMP’s performance does not meet the established baseline for any indicator in a given year, CMP may be subject to considerable monetary penalties.

[¶ 8] After considering all proposals and testimony presented at the technical conferences, the Commission’s advisory staff filed a 174-page Bench Analysis on June 22, 2000. The Commission subsequently received a stipulation signed by CMP and the Office of Public Advocate. The stipulation incorporated many of the recommendations contained in the Bench Analysis and provided for CMP to furnish distribution services for seven years, from January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2007.

[¶ 9] The Commission issued a procedural order allowing all non-signing parties to file objections to the stipulation. Pursuant to that order, IECG objected to the ARP 2000 Stipulation, but the Commission, nevertheless, approved the stipulation. IECG appeals the Commission’s order approving the stipulation.

II. DISCUSSION

A.

[¶ 10] IECG argues that the Commission’s order approving the stipulation violates the statutory requirement that rates be just and reasonable. IECG contends that the only way to determine if rates are just and reasonable is to determine a fair rate of return for the utility. Accordingly, if the utility receives an ex *1041 cessive rate of return, IECG argues, then it follows that the customer’s rates are no longer just and reasonable.

[¶ 11] We “ ‘defer to the Commission’s choice of ratemaking methodologies or techniques.”’ Q uirion v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 684 A.2d 1294, 1297 (Me.1996) (quoting Public Advocate v. P.U.C., 655 A.2d 1251, 1253 (Me.1996)). Because of this limited and deferential standard of review, we will not lightly substitute our judgment for that of the Commission. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 448 A.2d 272, 279 (Me.1982) (citation omitted). It is “[o]nly when the Commission abuses the discretion entrusted to it, or fails to follow the mandate of the legislature, or to be bound by the prohibitions of the constitution, can [we] intervene.” Id. (citation omitted).

[¶ 12] The Commission’s authority is governed by Title 35-A, the purpose of which is

... to ensure that there is a regulatory system for public utilities in the State that is consistent with the public interest and with other requirements of law and to provide for reasonable licensing requirements for competitive electricity providers. The basic purpose of this regulatory system is to ensure safe, reasonable and adequate service and to ensure that the rates of public utilities are just and reasonable to customers and public utilities.

35-A M.R.S.A. § 101 (Supp.2000). The basic purposes then, are to (1) ensure safe, reasonable, and adequate services and (2) to ensure that rates are “just and reasonable” for both the customer and the public utility. We are only concerned here with the second purpose.

[¶ 13] In determining whether a rate is “just and reasonable,” the Commission “[s]hall provide such revenues to the utility as may be required to perform its public service and to attract necessary capital on just and reasonable terms[,]” 35-A M.R.S.A § 301(4)(A) (1988), and “[s]hall, to a level within the commission’s discretion, consider whether the utility is operating as efficiently as possible and is utilizing sound management practices, including the treatment in rates of executive compensation,” 35-A M.R.S.A. § 301(4)(B) (Supp. 2000).

[¶ 14] The ARP 2000 is a formula, or mechanism, that predicts distribution costs over a seven-year period and adjusts rates accordingly. The traditional annual rate-making procedure can be very costly to both rate-payers and the utilities. Conversely, the structure of ARP 2000, by its very nature, removes the administrative costs associated with traditional rate-making, as it has an agreed upon adjustment formula that occurs automatically every year. 4

*1042 [¶ 15] The plain language of the statute grants the Commission the authority to authorize ARPs, such as CMP’s ARP 2000, which promote efficiency in the distribution of electricity. See 35-A M.R.S.A. § 3195. The statute is permissive, i.e., “[r]ate-adjustment mechanisms may include ... [,]” see

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2001 ME 94, 773 A.2d 1038, 2001 Me. LEXIS 95, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/industrial-energy-consumer-group-v-public-utilities-commission-me-2001.