Bay Ferries, LTD. v. Board of Commissioners for the Port of Portland

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: June 1, 2018
• Docket: CUMap-17-48
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. AP-17-48 BAY FERRIES, LTD., ) ) Plaintiff ) ) V. ) ) BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S RULE 80B THE PORT OF PORTLAND ) APPEAL ) md ) · STATEOF--MA&Nt; ) CumhAri;md ~ Cler~s Of,ce PORTLAND PILOTS, INC., ) ) JUN o12018 I ~55fM Defendants . ) RECEIVED Before the Court is Plaintiff Bay Ferries' Rule 80B appeal of Defendant Board of

Commissioners for the Port of Portland's ("Board") November 28, 2017 approval of increased

pilotage fees charged by Defendant P01iland Pilots ("Pilots"). Oral argument was heard on this

matter on May 7, 2017. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's appeal is granted.

I. Background

Bay Ferries operates a roundtrip ferry service between Yarmouth, Nova Scotia and

Portland, Maine aboard a vessel named HSV Alakai, commonly referred to as "The CAT." The

CAT operates seasonally five days a week. State law requires The CAT to take a licensed pilot

each time it enters and departs from Portland Harbor. P. & S.L. 1981, ch. 98, § 5.2. Defendant

Pilots are the only pilots operating in Portland Harbor. For its pilotage services, Bay Ferries must

pay to Pilots a minimum pilotage fee, which is set by the Board. The Board is "a public body

corporate and politic and is charged with responsibility for the regulation of navigation and

commerce within Portland Harbor .... " P. & S.L. 1981, ch. 98, §\2. Pilotage fees are the product of

the pilotage rate multiplied by the number of pilot units (a unit of measurement based on the size

1 of 11 Bay Ferries-Matthew Warner, Esq./ Harold Pachios, Esq. Board of Commissioners-Jennifer Thompson, Esq. Portland Pilots-Twain Braden, Esq. (

and dimensions of the vessel being piloted). In 2016, the the Board set the pilotage rate at $7.09

per pilot unit, with each vessel subject to compulsory pilotage under the Portland Harbor Law

required to pay for a minimum of 100 pilot units each time it took a pilot. (R. Tab 57 at 5.)

During the spring of 2017, at the request of the Pilots, the Board purported to raise the

minimum pilotage fee fr01n $709 to $1200. Bay Fenies appealed the Board's decision on

procedural grounds, citing lack of notice and the Board's failure to follow proper ratemaking

procedures. That appeal was consolidated with this proceeding, and decision on the validity of the

spring 2017 rate increase is currently pending.

Presumably in response to Bay Ferries' objections to the initial ratemaking procedures, the

Board instituted another ratemaking proceeding in the fall of 2017. On September 25, the Board

announced it would hold a public hearing on October 12 dming which it "may vote to propose a

change in the authorized pilotage fee ...." (R. Tab 3 at 0001.) On October 12, the Board,

maintaining it was acting on its own initiative, proposed to set a minimum pilotage fee of $1200.

Over the course of the next month leading up to the Board's final vote, the Board investigated

pilotage rates at other New England ports. The Pilots provided to the Board evidence of the Pilots'

operating expenses, but insisted that information about the Pilots' income was irrelevant to the

proceedings, despite Bay Fenies' persistent assertion that evaluation of the Pilots' income was

necessary to the determination of a just and reasonable rate. After taking evidence and hearing

from Bay Fenies and Pilots on November 2 and November 16, the Board voted to set the new

pilotage rate at $7 .18 per pilot unit with a minimum of 150 pilot units, resulting in a minimum

pilotage fee of $1077. The Board thereafter entered formal written findings and conclusions on

November 28, 2017. Bay Ferries filed this appeal on December 20, 2017.

II. Standard of Review

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The decision of a fact-finding and decision-making body in an 80B appeal is reviewed for

errors of law, abuse of discretion, or findings not supported by substantial evidence. Aydelott v.

City of Portland, 2010 ME 25, ,r 10, 990 A.2d 1024. The party seeking to overturn the decision

bears the burden of persuasion. Id. The court will "accord due consideration to the [agency's)

interpretation and application of technical statutes and regulations and will overturn the [agency's]

action only if the statute or regulation plainly compels a contrary result." Dyer v. Superintendent

of Ins., 2013 ME 61, ,r 11, 69 A.3d 416 (quoting Anthem Health Plans of Me., Inc. v.

Superintendent of Ins. , 2012 ME 21, ,r 13, 40 A.3d 380). In reviewing factual findings, the court

will "determine whether the [agency] made findings not supported by substantial evidence in the

record [and] will examine the entire record to determine whether the agency could fairly and

reasonably find the facts as it did, even if the record contains other inconsistent or contrary

evidence." Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

III. Discussion

The Board's power to establish pilotage fees is derived from statute, which provides: "The

commission may fix and establish by rule the compensation for the services of the pilots as may,

from time to time, be deemed just and reasonable." P. & S.L. 1981, ch. 98, § 5.2. In opposing the

new minimum fee, Bay Ferries' primary argument is that the Board could not have determined

what constitutes a just and reasonable rate without reference to the Pilots' revenues, which the

Pilots have refused to disclose. Bay FeITies expands on this argument by highlighting several fact

findings made by the Board that expressly or impliedly find a decrease in revenues, a proposition

which Bay Ferries argues has no support in the record. These findings include:

• [TJh.e number of vessels entering Portland Harbor has decreased substantially over the last 18 years, resulting in a reduction in the demand for pilotage services and in revenues earned by pilots;

3 of 11 • The reduction in vessels has made it more difficult for pilots to sustain their business and to provide reliable and safe pilotage services; • Portland Pilots foresees significant financial challenges for pilots continuing to provide services in Portland Harbor given the reduced traffic if rates arc not increased to a level that is comparable to other ports.

(R. Tab 57 at 6.) The Court agrees that the record does not contain substantial evidence supporting

a loss of revenue to the Pilots warranting a 50% rate increase, and further finds that evidence of

declining maritime traffic in Portland Harbor over the last 18 years and of rates charged by other

regional ports is likewise insufficient to support the Board's conclusions.

To supp01i its position that revenues must be considered in setting a just and reasonable

rate, Bay Ferries cites to authority discussing ratemaking in the public utilities and milk industries.

Defendants counter that ratemaking in these industries is irrelevant to setting pilotage rates and

that the "just and reasonable" directives given to ratemaking bodies in these other industries are

contained within more complex regulatory schemes, while the P01iland Harbor Law offers no

further guidance on the means by which the Board is to set just and reasonable compensation.

Thus, argue Defendants, the Board, as the authority empowered to set rates, may decide which

factors to consider in setting rates.

The Court agrees with Bay Ferries that "just and reasonable" is a term of art, the contours

of which have been defined in case law both in the U.S. Supreme Court and in Maine courts. In

the public utilities context, referring to the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis of 'just and reasonable"

ratemaking in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natuml Gas Company, 320 U.S. 591, 603

( 1944 ), the Law Court laid out four factors that must be considered when setting utility rates:

1. what are the enterprise's gross utility revenues under the rate structure examined; 2. what are its operating expenses, including maintenance, depreciation and all taxes, appropriately i11clll:red to produce those gross revenues; 3. what utility propeLty provides the service for which rates are charged and thus represents the base (rate base) on which a return sbm1Id be earned; and

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4. what percentage figure (rate of return) should be applied to the rate base in order to establish the return (wages of capital) to which investors in the utility enterprise are reasonably entitled.

New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm 'n, 390 A.2d 8, 14 (Me. 1978). This analysis

begins with an examination of gross revenues and ends with an evaluation of a reasonable rate of

return . The Maine Milk Conunission is likewise subject to a 'just and reasonable" standard when

setting milk prices and must conduct an in-depth financial examination of the milk market in

execution of its statutory duties. See 7 M.R.S.A. § 2954(2); Cumberland Farms Northern, Inc. v.

Maine Milk Comm 'n, 377 A.2d 84, 89-91 (Me. 1977).

Defendants correctly note that ratemaking in these industries is governed by complex

statutory schemes, while the Board is mandated only to establish just and reasonable compensation

without further statutory guidance as to how to carry out that directive. In their briefs, Defendants

urge that pilotage fees are not analogous to prices for public utilities and milk because pilots

provide a highly specialized service and are not simply a fungible product. At oral argument, the

Board argued that pilotage fees are more analogous to legal fees, noting that comis do not ask

attorneys to produce evidence of their income when deciding if an attorney's fees are reasonable.

While this argument can be appreciated by members of the bar and bench alike, the fact remains

that attorneys do not have a monopoly within their communities. In the city of Portland, as in

virtually any locale in the U.S., attorney's rates are dictated by a free and open legal market, and

the courts merely serve as a check to ensure individual attorneys are charging fees that are

commensurate with t~e relevant market. As explained by Bay Ferries, the Pilots are a monopolistic

enterprise, and the judgment of the Board is meant to serve as a stand-in for competition. When

setting rates, the Board certainly may consider other factors such as the great skill demanded of

pilots and the desirability of compensating them in a mam1er that aclmowlcdges that skill.

5 of 11 Nonetheless, it is apparent that when the Legislature uses the term "just and reasonable" with

regard to ratemaking, an evaluation of revenues lies at the core of the intended analysis.

In further support of its position, Bay Ferries called upon Dr. Robert Silkman as an

economics expert to testify as to the factors the Board ought to consider in ratemaking. In short,

Dr. Silkman explained that information about Pilots' revenues was necessary to reach a

determination that the pilotage fee was not unreasonably high. Although Defendants called into

question Dr. Silkman's credibility, expert testimony is not may not be necessary to explain a

concept that can be understood through simple reasoning. The Board has a duty to determine that

the pilotage rate is neither unreasonably low nor unreasonably high. See Indus. Energy Consumer

Grp. v. Public Utils. Comm 'n, 2001 ME 94, ~ 16, 773 A.2d 1038; New England Tel. & Tel. Co.,

390 A.2d at 30. An unreasonably low rate is determined vvith reference to operating expenses,

while a determination of what an unreasonably high rate would be necessitates an inquiry into how

much income'the Pilots stand to generate given a particular fee. Any intelligent exposition of a

significant rate increase must by the rules of basic arithmetic include more than expenses, which

are only half of the equation.

The court concludes that for the Board to properly discharge its duty of setting a just and

reasonable "compensation for the services of the pilots" it must know the e).'tent to which the Pilots

are actually compensated for the particular work that they do. Based on information provided by

the Pilots, the Board concluded "the number of vessels entering Portland Harbor has decreased

substantially over the last 18 years, resulting in a reduction in the demand for pilotage services and

in revenues earned by pilots." (R. 57 at 6.) The Board further recognized, "With the decrease in

the number of larger vessels requiring pilot services, Portland Pilots has reduced the size of its

operations from 5 full time employees in 2000 to 2 full time employees in 2017. It has also reduced

6 of 11 its overhead by eliminating office space." (R. 57 at 6.) There has been no assertion that the Pilots

require more full-time employees to handle the number of vessels calling on the port; rather,

trimming the staff is an expected response to lower demand for pif otage services. Nor has any

party provided evidence that the two pilots currently operating in Portland are not reasonably

compensated. Defendants pressed the argument that rates in Portland should match rates in other

regional ports in order to stay competitive and attract highly qualified pilots to Portland; however,

this argument is unsupported by evidence, as there ·is no information in the record regarding the

income of pilots in Portland or the income of pilots in other regional ports. This tautological

conclusion begs the question rather than answers it

In an October 10, 2017 letter from the Pilots' attorney to the Board's attorney, the Pilots'

attorney refers to "the need for a minimum fee that actually covers the Pilots' minimum expenses.

(In truth, the minimum fee of $1,200 per trip is somewhat less than the minimum expense ($1,300

per day) to run, crew, and insure a pilot vessel.)." (R. Tab 6 at 0026.) In an October 19, 2017 letter

from the Board's Chair to the Pilots' Captain Mark Klopp, the Chair quotes this language in

requesting evidence of the Pilots' minimum expenses. (R. Tab 14.) This point was reiterated at

oral argument. To the extent this statement by the Pilots' attorney was intended to imply that a

minimum fee of $1200 would be insufficient to cover Pilots' minimum expenses, it is misleading.

Presumably more than one vessel per day is piloted in Portland Harbor, and many vessels pay far

more than the minimum fee due to their size. The Pilots do not explain why it is reasonable to

expect the pilotage of a single vessel paying the minimum fee to cover an entiTe day's worth of

expenses.

The Board maintains that the Pilots should not be singled out to produce evidence of their

income because the fee applies to any pilots operating in Pmiland Harbor, not just Portland Pilots,

7 of 11 and because the increase was proposed by the Board, not by the Pilots. The Court is not persuaded

by either of these arguments. Although it is true that the fee would theoretically apply to any pilots

operating in Portland Harbor, it is undisputed that Portland Pilots are cunently the only pilots

doing so, and there is no evidence indicating that this has not been the case for many years.

Furthermore, although the Board insists the fee increase was done on the Board's own initiative,

the Court cannot ignore the fact that the fee originally proposed by the Board was identical to the

fee proposed by the Pilots _in March 2017. This Court has already found the spring proceedings

and the fall proceedings to be so closely related that they should be - and have been- consolidated

into one case. It is clear that the Pilots' attorney did not misspeak when he stated at the November

2 hearing: "Again the purpose of this hearing is to reaffirm the rates that the pilots requested back

in March of 2017." (R. 55 at 19:23-24.) To that end, the Board's assertion that "[i]f ... an

application is submitted by the Portland Pilots ... requesting an increase, [f]inancial records,

including revenue, may well be needed in that instance" (R. 57 at 9 fn. 5) provides all the more

reason for this Court to remand this matter to the Board for consideration of the Pilots' income.

There is an ablmdance of inforn1ation in the record regarding pilotage rates at other New

England ports. (See R. Tab 5.) Defendants take the position that the new fee approved by the Board

is reasonable because it puts fees in Portland more in line with pilotage fees in other regional p01is.

While not entirely irrelevant, fees charged by other ports are not, standing alone, conclusive as to

whether the fee in Portland is just and reasonable. The record contains minimal information

regarding how fees in other ports were set. Did these other ratemaking bodies consider ex.penses

incurred by pilots in these po1ts? Did they consider income generated by pilotage operations? Did

they consider the number and size of vessels calling on their respective ports? The number of pilots

and other staff receiving compensation? The number of vessels maintained by the pilots? The ti me

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it takes to pilot a vessel into and out of the harbor? There is simply no basis on which to conclude

that the cost of pilotage services in Boston Harbor, for example, should be equivalent to the cost

of pilotage services in Portland Harbor. Tellingly, while all pilotage rates in Maine except rates in

Portland are set by the Maine Pilotage Commission ("ivfPC"), data in the record from eleven Maine

ports indicates that rates charged in Maine ports are variable in terms of the base pilotage fee, the

minimum number of pilot units, and the types of additional fees assessed. (R. Tab 5 at 0011-0015 .)

Although the record ,, contains minimal information regarding how the MPC arrived at the rates for each port, it is clear that the question investigated by the MPC when setting rates is more searching

than "What do other regional ports charge?"

In fact, examining data from other ports tends to suggest that-the Board's approval of a

50% increase of the minimum pilotage fee was out of step with ratemaking processes in other

ports. There is ample evidence to support the conclusion that when regional ports increase pilotage

fees, it is done in modest incremental fashion, typically increasing fees by no more than 25%, often

over a period of years. (See, e.g., R. Tab 5 at 0012 (increasing minimum fee by 23% over 4 years);

R. Tab 5 at 0014 (increasing rate by 18% over 4 years); R. Tab 5 at 0015 (same).) A 50% increase

in the minimum fee implemented in a single year strikes the Court as questionable at best,

particularly without the benefit of a record that includes an analysis of revenues.

Indeed, considering the most recent rate increase requested by Pilots and approved by the

Board occurred in 2016, one would almost have to conclude that if the new foe were just and

reasonable, the 2016 fee that was 50% lower was not just and reasonable. However, unlike the

ratemaking proceedings currently under review, the 2016 ratemaking proceedings were

uncontested. For this reason, the Comi finds a lookback of 18 years is arbitrary, and evidence of

harbor traffic prior to 2016 is largely inelevant. The record is bereft of evidence indicating what

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conditions have changed since 2016 that necessitate such a dramatic rate increase. While the Pilots

are correct that the Board is entitled to a presumption of regularity, see Conservation Law Found

v. Dep 't ofEnvtl. Prot., 20~3 ME 62, ~ 32, 823 A.2d 551, it is clear from examining ratcmaking

proceedings in other ports that a 50% rate increase implemented over the course of a single year

is highly irregular.

The Court does not decide today whether or not the minimum fee set by the Board is just

and reasonable. Certainly, if Bay Ferries is correct that the fees to be paid by The CAT and Eimskip

alone would cover nearly all of the Pilots' operating expenses, the fee is probably unreasonable.

(Pl. 's Brief at 8-9.) As discussed above, the steep and immediate rise in the fee is also a red flag.

On the other hand, a fee increase may be warranted if indeed revenues have dropped to

unsustainable lows due to decreased vessel traffic in Portland Harbor. There was some evidence

presented to the Board that the Pilots' vessels are in need of repairs; nonetheless, this fact alone is

not sufficient to justify a 50% rate increase. The fact remains that given the cuiTent record, neithet

the Court nor the Board has sufficient information to draw a conclusion as to the reasonableness

of the new fee. The Court only concludes that the Board's decision was not b~sed on substantial

evidence supporting the determination of a just and reasonable fee. The only means by which the

Board can confidently deteniline a just and reasonable fee is to examine, among other things, the

costs of providing pilotage services in Pmtland Harbor in relation to how much income pilots stand

to generate given a particular fee scheme and the number and types of vessels calling upon this

port.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Rule 80B appeal is GRANTED. The November 28,

2017 decision of the Board of Harbor Commissioners for the Po1i of P01tland is VACATED, and

10 of 11 this matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Clerk is

directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by referencA to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).

Dated: I /R / I jf' _ lu_,.., La ce E. Walker, Justice Maine Superior Court

Entered on the Docket:~ / yv,.c

t. I

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