Industrial Communications & Electronics, Inc. v. O'Rourke

582 F. Supp. 2d 103, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82248, 2008 WL 4601657
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedOctober 16, 2008
DocketCivil Action 05-12320-WGY
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 582 F. Supp. 2d 103 (Industrial Communications & Electronics, Inc. v. O'Rourke) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Industrial Communications & Electronics, Inc. v. O'Rourke, 582 F. Supp. 2d 103, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82248, 2008 WL 4601657 (D. Mass. 2008).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOUNG, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2005 Industrial Communications and Electronics, Inc 1 . (“Industrial”) brought *104 this action challenging the denial by the defendant Town of Somerset Zoning Board of Appeals (“ZBA”) of its special permit application to install a telecommunications tower. Industrial sought relief pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (1996) (“Telecommunications Act”), and under chapter 40 of the Massachusetts General Laws. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment and agreed to treat these motions as a case stated. During the case stated hearing, held in 2006, Industrial agreed to explore other sites where it possibly could install the tower; the case was, thus, administratively closed. After exploring other sites, Industrial found but one alternative. It filed another request, which the ZBA also denied, for a special permit with the Town of Somerset as to this second site. Industrial now reopens this action arguing that the ZBA has no substantial evidence supporting the denial of a permit with regard to either site and that it has effectively prohibited the provision of wireless services in violation of the Telecommunications Act. Industrial further asserts any further attempts to obtain a permit would be futile. The parties have once again filed cross-motions for summary judgment that, with the agreement of the parties, the Court treats as a case stated.

A. Procedural Posture

At the hearing on July 31, 2006, Industrial agreed to make additional efforts to locate alternative sites for a telecommunications facility. The case was administratively closed without prejudice to its being re-opened at the request of any party [Doc. No. 31].

On September 21, 2007, Industrial filed a Motion to Reopen Case [Doc. No. 34], a Motion to Supplement Complaint [Doc. No. 33], and an Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”)[Doc. No. 32], The Court granted these motions. On October 5, 2007 the ZBA filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 37].

On March 14, 2008, the ZBA filed a Supplemental Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 41], a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 48], a Supplemental Statement of Material Facts [Doc. No. 42], and various affidavits in support [Doc. Nos. 43-47].

On that same day, Industrial filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment (“Indus. Suppl. Mem. for S.J.”)[Doc. No. 49], a Local Rule 56.1 Statement (“Indus. Stmnt. Facts”) [Doc. No. 50], and affidavits in support [Doc. No. 52], including the affidavit of Donald Cody (“Cody Aff.”). It further filed on March 17, 2008 another Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, which is virtually identical to the one already filed [Doc. No. 53]. On March 28, 2008, Industrial filed a reply brief [Doc. No. 54] and an Opposition to Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 55], together with another statement of undisputed facts [Doc. No. 56] and affidavits in support. [Doc. Nos. 57-58].

B. The Case Stated

The parties agreed in 2005 to treat this case as a “case stated.” Therefore, the Court may, unlike in the context of summary judgment, engage in fact finding and may draw reasonable inferences based on the record to decide the case. E.E.O.C. v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594, 603 (1st Cir.1995); Continental Grain Co. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., 972 F.2d 426, 430 n. 7 (1st Cir.1992); Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank v. Secretary of Dep’t of Hous. and Urban *105 Dev., 768 F.2d 5, 12 (1st Cir.1985) (Breyer, J); Federacion De Empleados Del Tribunal Gen. De Justicia v. Torres, 747 F.2d 35, 36 (1st Cir.1984) (Breyer, J.).

C. Federal Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this action presents a federal question under the Telecommunications Act. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the Massachusetts state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

Industrial is a Specialized Mobile Radio licensee, providing a variety of land mobile communications services in New England. It provides communications services for commercial and public entities for which Industrial has erected systems of communications towers and facilities throughout Massachusetts and New England. Industrial is therefore a Personal Wireless Service Provider pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 332(1) and a Public Service Corporation as defined by the Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy. The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) authorizes Industrial to operate 70 discrete 900 MHz frequencies under separate license call signs for the provision of specialized mobile radio services for the Boston Major Trade Area (“BMTA”). As a BMTA licensee, Industrial has a limited period of time in which to build its stations. If it fails to meet the coverage requirements it risks losing its license. It also builds wireless service facilities, including communication towers, with the intent to lease space to providers as “co-location” sites to reduce tower proliferation and advance provision of wireless services.

In 2005 Industrial conducted propagation studies of radio frequency signals in Somerset, Massachusetts. Based on these studies, Industrial determined that a significant coverage gap existed in Somerset for all personal communications service and cellular service providers, particularly along Route 138 (“Coverage Gap”). Only sites within a defined area along Route 38 (“Search Area”) could provide coverage to the Coverage Gap.

A. The First Tower Site

After reviewing hundreds of properties in the Search Area, Industrial eventually located a 2.3 acre lot available for purchase that could adequately provide coverage in the Coverage Gap (“First Tower Site”). It was the only site that Industrial found suitable as it provided adequate coverage in the Coverage Gap, was available for purchase or lease, fully met the dimensional and set back requirements of the Somerset Zoning Bylaw (“By-law”), and was suitable for tower construction.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
582 F. Supp. 2d 103, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82248, 2008 WL 4601657, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/industrial-communications-electronics-inc-v-orourke-mad-2008.