OPINION
GRAY, Justice.
Derek and Virginia Ince were divorced in 1987. Almost thirteen years later, Derek filed a petition for bill of review seeking to set aside certain portions of the divorce decree, alleging fraud on the part of Virginia. After a pretrial hearing, the court denied the petition for bill of review and [189]*189dismissed the action. On appeal, Derek challenges the dismissal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
The divorce decree entered in 1987 found that Derek and Virginia Ince were the parents of one child born during the marriage. Derek did not contest the issue of paternity at any time during the proceedings. The decree appointed conservators, provided for periods of possession, and ordered Derek to pay child support. Eleven years later, after three modifications regarding child support and visitation, Derek asked the court to allow DNA testing on the child to determine if she had a genetic problem. The court order granting Derek’s motion specified that the testing was to be for medical reasons only and advised that paternity of the child had been judicially determined by previous court order.1
When the DNA tests excluded Derek as the father, he filed his petition for bill of review seeking to disestablish his paternity of the child and to vacate the order for support. Derek claimed that Virginia’s fraudulent concealment of the child’s true father prevented him from contesting paternity because that defense was unknown to him at the time of the divorce.2 His petition for bill of review states that:
1.He had no reason to doubt his paternity;
2. He did not ignore any warning signs that would indicate that Virginia had engaged in an extra-marital affair;
3. He did not discover, nor could he have discovered, that the child was not his biological daughter until the paternity results were reported; and
4. He was not intentionally faulty or negligent in failing to discover Virginia’s adultery.
After conducting a pretrial hearing, the court concluded that the alleged fraud was intrinsic in nature and would not support a bill of review. The court further held that the bill of review was barred by the four-year statute of limitations. Derek claims that the court erred in dismissing his petition because (1) the court should not have made any determination regarding the nature of the fraud prior to trial and (2) the statute of limitations was tolled by the fraud.
BILL OF REVIEW
A bill of review is an independent equitable action that challenges the validity of a judgment that is no longer appeal-able. Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex.1979). Courts have long recognized the importance of the finality of judgments. As a result, the grounds for setting aside an otherwise final judgment are limited. Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex.1984). In Baker, the Supreme Court required the bill of review complainant to file an adequate petition [190]*190and then to present a meritorious prima facie defense at a pretrial hearing. Only upon satisfaction of both requirements will the court grant a new trial. Otherwise, the court will automatically dismiss the case without motion or request from either party. Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408.
Derek asserts that he met both Baker requirements. We disagree.
Adequate pleading
To invoke the equitable powers of the trial court, the complainant must file a petition alleging factually and with particularity that, through no negligence of his own, he was prevented from asserting a meritorious defense to the original cause of action as a result of fraud, accident, wrongful act or official mistake. Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408. Fraud, as it applies to attacks upon final judgment, may be either intrinsic or extrinsic. Intrinsic fraud relates to issues that were presented and resolved-or could have been resolved — in the former action. Fraudulent instruments and perjured testimony are considered intrinsic fraud because these are matters presented to and considered by the court in the original proceeding. Tice v. City of Pasadena, 767 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex.1989). Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is wrongful conduct practiced outside of the adversary trial — such as keeping a party away from court, making false promises of compromise, denying a party knowledge of the suit — that affects the manner in which the judgment is procured. Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996, 1002 (1950). Only extrinsic fraud supports a bill of review. Tice, 767 S.W.2d at 702.
Derek asserts that the court is not required to determine whether the alleged fraud is intrinsic or extrinsic prior to the trial on the merits. The Supreme Court has held, however, that failure to plead extrinsic fraud will result in denial of the right to a trial by bill of review. See Tice, 767 S.W.2d 700; Transworld Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Briscoe, 722 S.W.2d 407 (Tex.1987). The Tice court found that the petition of complainant City of Pasadena fell short of meeting the requirements for a bill of review because Pasadena pled only intrinsic fraud:
The fatal flaw in Pasadena’s claim is that all of these issues were in controversy in the original trial, and were fully litigated or. could have been fully litigated had Pasadena asserted its legal rights. A careful examination of the record in the original trial bears out the fact that all of the alleged “meritorious defenses” were fully presented or could have been fully presented in the original trial.
Tice, 767 S.W.2d at 704. The court held that Pasadena could therefore not proceed to a new trial on the merits. Id. at 705.
In Transworld, the complainants alleged attorney negligence in their petition. The trial court dismissed the cause because the petition failed to allege extrinsic fraud, and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court:
We hold that a bill of review petitioner who alleges that he suffered an adverse judgment because of the fraudulent or wrongful acts of his attorney is not excused from the necessity of pleading and proving extrinsic fraud on the part of his opponent.
Transworld, 722 S.W.2d at 408. Therefore, to determine if a complainant has fulfilled the threshold Baker requirement of filing an adequate petition, the court must first determine if the complainant has alleged extrinsic fraud.
Derek’s petition has the same fatal flaw as Pasadena’s petition in Tice. Paternity, although not contested, was an issue addressed and resolved by the trial court in 1987. The divorce decree establishes [191]*191Derek as the child’s father and provides for child support, conservatorship, and visitation.
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OPINION
GRAY, Justice.
Derek and Virginia Ince were divorced in 1987. Almost thirteen years later, Derek filed a petition for bill of review seeking to set aside certain portions of the divorce decree, alleging fraud on the part of Virginia. After a pretrial hearing, the court denied the petition for bill of review and [189]*189dismissed the action. On appeal, Derek challenges the dismissal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
The divorce decree entered in 1987 found that Derek and Virginia Ince were the parents of one child born during the marriage. Derek did not contest the issue of paternity at any time during the proceedings. The decree appointed conservators, provided for periods of possession, and ordered Derek to pay child support. Eleven years later, after three modifications regarding child support and visitation, Derek asked the court to allow DNA testing on the child to determine if she had a genetic problem. The court order granting Derek’s motion specified that the testing was to be for medical reasons only and advised that paternity of the child had been judicially determined by previous court order.1
When the DNA tests excluded Derek as the father, he filed his petition for bill of review seeking to disestablish his paternity of the child and to vacate the order for support. Derek claimed that Virginia’s fraudulent concealment of the child’s true father prevented him from contesting paternity because that defense was unknown to him at the time of the divorce.2 His petition for bill of review states that:
1.He had no reason to doubt his paternity;
2. He did not ignore any warning signs that would indicate that Virginia had engaged in an extra-marital affair;
3. He did not discover, nor could he have discovered, that the child was not his biological daughter until the paternity results were reported; and
4. He was not intentionally faulty or negligent in failing to discover Virginia’s adultery.
After conducting a pretrial hearing, the court concluded that the alleged fraud was intrinsic in nature and would not support a bill of review. The court further held that the bill of review was barred by the four-year statute of limitations. Derek claims that the court erred in dismissing his petition because (1) the court should not have made any determination regarding the nature of the fraud prior to trial and (2) the statute of limitations was tolled by the fraud.
BILL OF REVIEW
A bill of review is an independent equitable action that challenges the validity of a judgment that is no longer appeal-able. Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex.1979). Courts have long recognized the importance of the finality of judgments. As a result, the grounds for setting aside an otherwise final judgment are limited. Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex.1984). In Baker, the Supreme Court required the bill of review complainant to file an adequate petition [190]*190and then to present a meritorious prima facie defense at a pretrial hearing. Only upon satisfaction of both requirements will the court grant a new trial. Otherwise, the court will automatically dismiss the case without motion or request from either party. Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408.
Derek asserts that he met both Baker requirements. We disagree.
Adequate pleading
To invoke the equitable powers of the trial court, the complainant must file a petition alleging factually and with particularity that, through no negligence of his own, he was prevented from asserting a meritorious defense to the original cause of action as a result of fraud, accident, wrongful act or official mistake. Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408. Fraud, as it applies to attacks upon final judgment, may be either intrinsic or extrinsic. Intrinsic fraud relates to issues that were presented and resolved-or could have been resolved — in the former action. Fraudulent instruments and perjured testimony are considered intrinsic fraud because these are matters presented to and considered by the court in the original proceeding. Tice v. City of Pasadena, 767 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex.1989). Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is wrongful conduct practiced outside of the adversary trial — such as keeping a party away from court, making false promises of compromise, denying a party knowledge of the suit — that affects the manner in which the judgment is procured. Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996, 1002 (1950). Only extrinsic fraud supports a bill of review. Tice, 767 S.W.2d at 702.
Derek asserts that the court is not required to determine whether the alleged fraud is intrinsic or extrinsic prior to the trial on the merits. The Supreme Court has held, however, that failure to plead extrinsic fraud will result in denial of the right to a trial by bill of review. See Tice, 767 S.W.2d 700; Transworld Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Briscoe, 722 S.W.2d 407 (Tex.1987). The Tice court found that the petition of complainant City of Pasadena fell short of meeting the requirements for a bill of review because Pasadena pled only intrinsic fraud:
The fatal flaw in Pasadena’s claim is that all of these issues were in controversy in the original trial, and were fully litigated or. could have been fully litigated had Pasadena asserted its legal rights. A careful examination of the record in the original trial bears out the fact that all of the alleged “meritorious defenses” were fully presented or could have been fully presented in the original trial.
Tice, 767 S.W.2d at 704. The court held that Pasadena could therefore not proceed to a new trial on the merits. Id. at 705.
In Transworld, the complainants alleged attorney negligence in their petition. The trial court dismissed the cause because the petition failed to allege extrinsic fraud, and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court:
We hold that a bill of review petitioner who alleges that he suffered an adverse judgment because of the fraudulent or wrongful acts of his attorney is not excused from the necessity of pleading and proving extrinsic fraud on the part of his opponent.
Transworld, 722 S.W.2d at 408. Therefore, to determine if a complainant has fulfilled the threshold Baker requirement of filing an adequate petition, the court must first determine if the complainant has alleged extrinsic fraud.
Derek’s petition has the same fatal flaw as Pasadena’s petition in Tice. Paternity, although not contested, was an issue addressed and resolved by the trial court in 1987. The divorce decree establishes [191]*191Derek as the child’s father and provides for child support, conservatorship, and visitation. Derek failed to allege any act on the part of Virginia that prevented him from contesting the issue of paternity. Derek had the option to contest paternity at the final divorce hearing. He was never denied the defense. At most, he was denied the evidence of Virginia’s adultery that would have assisted in proving the defense. As the Tice court pointed out, each party must exercise due diligence to guard against adverse findings upon issues directly presented. Tice, 767 S.W.2d at 702. We find that Derek alleges only intrinsic fraud because his “meritorious defense” could have been fully presented at the original trial.
Recently, the Eastland Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in a remarkably similar case when it found that lying about the parentage of children during a divorce proceeding was not extrinsic fraud. The court held that appellant’s allegations of such fraud were “allegations of intrinsic fraud concerning an issue that was admitted, uncontested, and settled in the divorce proceeding: parentage of the children born of the marriage.” Wise v. Fryar, 2001 Tex.App. LEXIS 2756, 49 S.W.3d 450 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2001, no pet. h.).3
Because intrinsic fraud will not support a bill of review, the trial court did not err in dismissing Derek’s petition after the pretrial hearing.
RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT
The dissent would characterize this case as public policy lagging behind the ability of DNA to prove with certainty that an individual is not the biological parent of a particular child. The conclusiveness of biological paternity is not the issue. Being a parent has always meant more than simply proving the DNA necessary to create human life originated from a particular individual.
When Derek and Virginia were married they created a legal relationship. When they were divorced a judgment was rendered that terminated that legal relationship. In the same judgment terminating the marital relationship, a legal relationship of parent and child was, to the extent that it had not previously been formally decreed by a court of law, recognized and confirmed. It is this portion of the judgment of divorce that Derek is now attacking almost thirteen years later.
The relationship of parent and child was thus recognized, confirmed and became final under all the rules and with the formalities and solemnities accorded the creation and recognition of other legal relationships. The judgment at issue in this case should not be set aside because one of the individuals involved has become unhappy with the continued existence of it. More should be required to terminate the parent-child relationship than simply establishing that the individual is not the biological parent.
Finally, we do not “fault” Derek for not contesting paternity 13 years ago. We do not lay blame on him because the law does not inquire into his motives for not contesting paternity then, or his reasons for contesting paternity now. The legal relationship of parent and child recognized in a final judgment so long ago should not so easily be put aside.
[192]*192CONCLUSION
Because we have determined that the trial court had sufficient grounds to support its dismissal of the petition, we do not need to address Derek’s other contention that the trial court erred in dismissing the case on the defense of limitations. We therefore overrule Derek’s sole point of error and affirm the decision of the trial court.