In the Matters of S.J., Boonton

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: July 1, 2026
• Docket: A-2333-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2333-24

IN THE MATTERS OF S.J., BOONTON. _______________________

Argued May 27, 2026 – Decided July 1, 2026

Before Judges Gilson, Firko and Vinci.

On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service Commission, Docket Nos. 2025-0910 and 2025-1080.

Anthony G. LoBrace argued the cause for appellant Town of Boonton (Cleary Giacobbe Alfieri & Jacobs LLC, attorneys; Adam S. Abramson-Schneider, of counsel; Anthony G. LoBrace, on the briefs).

Matthew A. Peluso argued the cause for respondent S.J.

Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Civil Service Commission (Andrew K. Hedin, Deputy Attorney General, on the statement in lieu of brief).

PER CURIAM

The Town of Boonton (Boonton) appeals from an October 16, 2024

decision by the Civil Service Commission (Commission) granting interim relief to S.J., a captain in the Boonton Police Department. The Commission ordered

that Boonton pay S.J., a civil service employee, back pay from June 3, 2024,

until he is either reinstated, or in the alternative, until Boonton re-issues the

charges set forth in the October 18, 2022 preliminary notice of disciplinary

action (PNDA), or brings new administrative charges against S.J. Boonton also

appeals from the Commission's March 19, 2025 decision denying its application

for reconsideration. Because the Commission's decisions were not arbitrary,

capricious, or unreasonable, and its factual findings were supported by

substantial credible evidence in the record, we affirm.

I.

We derive the relevant facts from the record. On April 18, 2022, Officer

J.W. filed a complaint with the Morris County Prosecutor's Office (MCPO)

against S.J. alleging he directed J.W. to take a sick day on March 25, 2022, so

S.J. could work and be paid overtime. An investigation revealed that S.J. also

directed two other officers to take sick days on March 25, and 28, 2022, so he

could work and receive overtime pay.

On October 18, 2022, Boonton issued S.J. a PNDA and suspended him

with pay pending a hearing for the conduct alleged in J.W.'s complaint.

Specifically, Boonton charged S.J. with insubordination, conduct unbecoming

A-2333-24 2 of a public employee, neglect of duty, other sufficient cause under N.J.S.A.

4A:2-2.3(a)(2), (6), (7), and (12), and misconduct in violation of N.J.S.A.

40A:14-147. Boonton also charged S.J. with violating multiple Boonton Police

Department Rules and Regulations, duty assignment, and overtime procedures.

On October 19, 2022, S.J.'s counsel requested a hearing to address the October

18, 2022 PNDA charges.

After the October 18, 2022 PNDA was issued, S.J. removed his personnel

and internal affairs files, confidential records, and computers from police

headquarters before he was suspended and banned from headquarters. As a

result of his conduct, S.J. was criminally charged on February 8, 2023, with

computer criminal activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-25(e); theft by unlawful taking or

disposition, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a); tampering with public records or information,

N.J.S.A. 2C:28-7(a)(3); and falsifying or tampering with records, N.J.S.A.

2C:21-4(a). Notably, the criminal charges were brought against S.J. prior to the

hearing on the October 18, 2022 PNDA.

On February 10, 2023, Boonton issued S.J. a second PNDA and modified

his suspension to an indefinite suspension without pay, pending disposition of

the criminal charges, and the newly filed charges. S.J. did not request a hearing

regarding the February 10, 2023 PNDA. On February 21, 2023, Boonton issued

A-2333-24 3 S.J. another PNDA imposing an indefinite suspension without pay, pending

disposition of the criminal charges.

On May 21, 2024, the Police Training Commission (PTC) suspended S.J.'s

law enforcement license pursuant to the Police Training Act (Act), N.J.S.A.

52:17B-66 to -77.19, and N.J.A.C. 13:1-16.2, based on the pending criminal

charges. The PTC determined S.J. was "unfit for duty, is a risk or danger to any

person or the public if permitted to remain licensed, and/or that an immediate

suspension [was] necessary to maintain public safety, health, order or effective

provision of law enforcement services."

On May 30, 2024, the Law Division dismissed the criminal charges

without prejudice and expunged "all records and information related to [S.J.'s]

arrest," pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6. Four days later, on June 3, 2024, Boonton

received notice that the criminal complaint against S.J. had been dismissed. As

a result of the dismissal of the criminal charges, S.J. requested to return to

employment with Boonton, which it denied.

On June 5, 2024, the Attorney General's Office of Public Integrity and

Accountability (OPIA) indicated that it intended to proceed with criminal

charges against S.J. In response, Boonton notified S.J. that he would remain

suspended without pay pending additional criminal charges contemplated by the

A-2333-24 4 OPIA. Further, Boonton noted that S.J. could not return to work because he no

longer possessed his law enforcement license.

On June 21, 2024, S.J. appealed to the Commission requesting interim

relief from his continued suspension without pay, reinstatement of his PTC

license, return to employment, and back pay on the basis that the criminal

charges were dismissed and no new charges had been filed. S.J. also argued that

he was not afforded a hearing in connection with the October 18, 2022 PNDA.

Boonton countered that the suspension without pay was proper because the

OPIA indicated it would file new criminal charges against S.J., and if not,

Boonton would proceed with an additional PNDA against S.J., which would

subject him to an unpaid suspension. Boonton pointed out that S.J.'s PTC license

was suspended, and therefore, he could not be reinstated or qualify for back pay.

On October 16, 2024, the Commission granted S.J.'s request for interim

relief in part and awarded him back pay from June 3, 2024 onward until Boonton

either: (1) issued a new PNDA providing for S.J.'s immediate suspension

without pay and setting forth the remaining administrative charges; (2)

converted the October 18, 2022 PNDA suspension with pay to a suspension

without pay; or (3) reinstated S.J. to his former position. The Commission

emphasized Boonton's inaction and undue delay in continuing to process the

A-2333-24 5 disciplinary charges against S.J. in support of its interim decision. Citing

N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.7(a)(2) and N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.7(b)(1), the Commission

determined Boonton could not continue to indefinitely suspend S.J. without pay

once the criminal charges were dismissed. The Commission held that Boonton

was not required to reinstate S.J.'s employment and did not rule on the merits of

the October 18, 2022 PNDA, potential administrative charges against him, or

S.J.'s appeal seeking to be returned to employment and be paid lost wages from

February 2023 onward.

On December 27, 2024, Boonton moved for reconsideration of the

Commission's decision pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.6(b), and S.J. cross-moved

for enforcement of the back pay award. In support of its request for

reconsideration, Boonton reiterated S.J.'s police license had been suspended,

and argued the statute precluded any entitlement to compensation during the

period of such suspension. Boonton also contended there was no undue delay

in processing or prosecuting S.J.'s disciplinary charges because it was

impossible for Boonton to proceed until the OPIA and MCPO had completed

their reviews and returned the matter to Boonton for disposition. Boonton

asserted that the OPIA and MCPO also had to provide all documents and

A-2333-24 6 information in their possession that would be necessary for any further

proceedings.

On January 3, 2025, the OPIA informed Boonton that it had concluded its

review and was not pursuing criminal prosecution against S.J. On January 13,

2025, the PTC reinstated S.J.'s police license that had been suspended on the

basis the pending criminal charges were resolved. Boonton did not return S.J.

to work, issue a "new" PNDA relative to the October 18, 2022 PNDA charges,

or pay him back wages. On January 21, 2025, Boonton served a notice of an

internal affairs complaint on S.J. regarding the allegations underlying the

dismissed criminal charges that had been brought against him.

On March 19, 2025, the Commission denied Boonton's request for

reconsideration and partially granted S.J.'s cross-motion for enforcement related

to his back pay from the dismissal of his criminal charges. Once again, the

Commission declined to order S.J.'s return to active employment or order back

pay dating to the issuance of the PNDA on February 10, 2023.

The Commission stated it was not addressing the merits of S.J.'s

grievance, but rather the "undue delay" caused by Boonton leaving him in

"limbo" regarding the October 18, 2022 PNDA after it was notified that the

criminal charges against him were dismissed. The Commission was

A-2333-24 7 unpersuaded by Boonton's contention that suspension of S.J.'s law enforcement

license precluded an award of back pay. The Commission determined that

Boonton's inaction since June 3, 2024, when it was notified of the dismissal of

S.J.'s criminal charges, was improper.

The Commission reasoned Boonton should have converted the October

18, 2022 PNDA into a suspension without pay or issued a new suspension setting

forth S.J.'s remaining administrative charges. The Commission reiterated S.J.

was entitled to back pay from June 3, 2024, until Boonton either: (1) converted

the October 18, 2022 PNDA into a suspension without pay; (2) issued a new

PNDA suspending S.J. without pay; or (3) reinstated S.J. to employment.

On April 17, 2025, Boonton moved before the Commission to stay its

award of interim relief. The Commission denied the application for a stay on

September 10, 2025. On October 23, 2025, Boonton moved before this court

for a stay, which we granted. This appeal followed.

Before us, Boonton raises two arguments: (1) the Commission's back pay

award is contrary to established law; and (2) the Commission's back pay award

was not based upon, and was contrary to, substantial credible evidence of record.

A-2333-24 8 II.

Our review of an agency determination is limited. Allstars Auto Grp., Inc.

v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018). An agency's

determination "is entitled to affirmance so long as the determination is not

arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, which includes examination into whether

the decision lacks sufficient support in the record or involves an erroneous

interpretation of law." Melnyk v. Bd. of Educ. of the Delsea Reg'l High Sch.

Dist., 241 N.J. 31, 40 (2020). The party challenging the administrative action

bears the burden of making that showing. Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171

(2014). We reverse an agency's factual findings only if "clearly . . . mistaken

. . . and so plainly unwarranted that the interests of justice demand intervention

and correction." Campbell v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 169 N.J. 579, 587-88 (2001)

(quoting Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 588 (1988)).

We defer to an agency's "[r]easonable credibility determinations." In re

Pontoriero, 439 N.J. Super. 24, 35 (App. Div. 2015). We are not bound by an

agency's statutory interpretations or other legal decisions. Melnyk, 241 N.J. at

40. However, "[w]hen resolution of a legal question turns on factual issues

within the special province of an administrative agency, those mixed questions

A-2333-24 9 of law and fact are to be resolved based on the agency's fact finding." Campbell,

169 N.J. at 588.

To determine whether an agency's determination is arbitrary, capricious,

or unreasonable, a reviewing court is generally limited to three inquiries:

(1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.

[Allstars, 234 N.J. at 157 (quoting In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)).]

"When an agency's decision meets those criteria, then a court owes substantial

deference to the agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field."

In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007); see also In re Request to Modify Prison

Sentences, 242 N.J. 357, 390 (2020) ("Wide discretion is afforded to

administrative decisions because of an agency's specialized knowledge.").

A.

We first address Boonton's contention that the Commission erroneously

granted S.J. back pay for a period of time when he did not hold an active PTC

license. Boonton argues the back pay award was not based upon substantial

A-2333-24 10 credible evidence in the record. Boonton also maintains the PTC suspended

S.J.'s police license on May 21, 2024, rendering him ineligible to serve and be

paid as a law enforcement officer under N.J.S.A. 52:17B-67.1, and the

Commission "exalt[ed] form over substance."

The Act governs the licensure of law enforcement officers and authorizes

the Commission to implement a statewide licensure system. N.J.S.A. 52:17B-

71a. The Act explicitly requires the Commission to revoke a police officer's

license if the officer has been convicted of a crime. N.J.S.A. 52:17B-71e(e).1

The Commission's regulations, adopted pursuant to the Act, similarly state t hat

"[p]roof of a conviction . . . shall result in the mandatory . . . revocation of

licensure." N.J.A.C. 13:1-12.1(g). This mandatory revocation requirement

supports the legislative goal of ensuring that police officers uphold the public

trust by meeting high standards of conduct and professionalism. N.J.S.A.

52:17B-66; see also In re Disciplinary Procs. of Phillips, 117 N.J. 567, 576

(1990) (quoting Township of Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560,

566 (App. Div. 1965)) (recognizing that a police officer is a "special kind of

1 N.J.S.A. 52:17B-71e(e) requires license revocation if an officer has been convicted of any offense listed in N.J.S.A. 52:17B-71b(a)(13)(a)-(c). That list includes any "crime in this State." N.J.S.A. 52:17B-71b(a)(13)(a). A-2333-24 11 public employee" subject to a high standard of conduct because they "represent[]

law and order to the citizenry").

As we have noted, the Law Division dismissed the criminal charges, and

the OPIA ultimately decided not to pursue criminal prosecution against S.J. The

uncontroverted record shows S.J. was never terminated by Boonton and remains

an employee of the Boonton Police Department. Boonton's contention that it

should not be ordered to pay S.J. back pay because his PTC license was

suspended lacks merit because the criminal charges against S.J. were dismissed

and expunged in the Law Division, and the OPIA declined to criminally

prosecute him. Accordingly, the basis for the suspension without pay ended.

S.J. was never convicted within the meaning of the Act. See, e.g., State

v. Compton, 28 N.J. Super. 45, 48 (App. Div. 1953) ("A conviction ensues

whether one pleads guilty to the charge or is found guilty by the court or a jury

as the result of a trial on the merits."); see also Schireson v. State Bd. of Med.

Exam'rs, 130 N.J.L. 570, 573 (E. & A. 1943) ("A conviction in ordinary legal

language consists of a plea of 'guilty' or verdict of guilty.").

Given this State's jurisprudence consistently interpreting "conviction" to

mean a guilty plea or judgment of conviction, which did not occur here, the

Commission did not act in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable fashion by

A-2333-24 12 concluding it was "unpersuaded" by Boonton's argument on the temporary

suspension of S.J.'s PTC license. Moreover, the Commission held Boonton "was

not strictly being ordered to reinstate [S.J.] to active law enforcement duties."

The Commission's interim decision is based upon substantial credible evidence

in the record and does not violate any express or implied legislative policies.

Therefore, we discern no basis to intervene.

B.

We reject Boonton's argument that the Commission's back pay award was

not based upon or contrary to substantial credible evidence in the record. The

Commission found Boonton was required to "promptly" serve a PDNA on S.J.

setting forth any administrative charges following the OPIA's decision not to

pursue criminal charges against him but had not yet done so.

In its October 16, 2024 decision, the Commission held S.J. was entitled to

back pay due to Boonton's "undue delay" in pursuing disciplinary charges

against him or reinstate him. At that time, the matter had been pending for two

years. Moreover, we note this matter has now been pending for almost four

years.

The Commission acted within its discretion in awarding back pay. As a

civil service employee, S.J. had the right to be apprised of the reason for his

A-2333-24 13 suspension without pay, be advised of the charges, supported by the evidence,

and given an opportunity to respond. N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.5(b). Moreover, an

appointing authority, such as Boonton, cannot extend a suspension beyond the

disposition of a criminal complaint under N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.7(a)(2), and must

issue another PNDA identifying the remaining disciplinary charges upon

disposition of the criminal charges. See N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.7(b)(1).

Here, Boonton failed to issue another PNDA identifying the remaining

disciplinary charges after S.J.'s criminal charges were dismissed. Therefore, the

Commission's decision to award back pay was proper because Boonton could

not continue to suspend S.J. without issuing a separate PNDA specifying the

remaining charges.

In summary, we see no reason to disturb the Commission's decisions

because its factual findings were supported by the credible evidence in the

record and the law. Therefore, we affirm the Commission's October 16, 2024

decision granting interim relief and its March 19, 2025 decision denying

Boonton's motion for reconsideration and granting S.J.'s cross-motion for

reconsideration.

Affirmed and remanded. The stay is vacated. We do not retain

jurisdiction.

A-2333-24 14