In the Matter of T.T., Etc.

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0161-24

IN THE MATTER OF T.T., 1 FIRE FIGHTER (M1873W). ________________________

Submitted April 14, 2026 – Decided July 6, 2026

Before Judges Susswein and Augostini.

On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service Commission, Docket Nos. 2023-2197 and 2024-1626.

Weiner Law Group LLP, attorneys for appellant Township of Teaneck (Donald A. Klein and Yoksaidy Sutil, on the briefs).

Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission (Christopher Weber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Zachary L. Aboff, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

T.T., self-represented respondent.

PER CURIAM

1 We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings and the privacy interests of the party. See R.1:38-3(d)(3). Appellant Township of Teaneck (Township) appeals from the final agency

decision of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), reinstating respondent T.T. to

the firefighter eligibility list following a protracted dispute regarding his

psychological fitness for appointment. We affirm.

I.

T.T. applied to be a firefighter in the Township. In July 2022, T.T.'s name

was included on the list of eligible candidates for the title of firefighter. After

the list was certified, the Township extended a conditional offer of employment

to T.T., subject to completion of medical and psychological evaluations and a

background check.

In December 2022, the Township referred T.T. for a psychological

evaluation with Han Zhang Liang, Ph.D. Dr. Liang did not recommend T.T. for

the firefighter position. He concluded that T.T. was not psychologically suited

for the position and recommended that he be removed from the certified list of

candidates.

On March 16, 2023, the Township sent a notice to T.T. advising that he

had been removed from the firefighter eligibility list for failing to meet

psychological standards. T.T. requested an appeal before the Medical Review

Panel (MRP) pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.5, which the CSC granted. He also

A-0161-24 2 requested the opportunity to undergo another psychological evaluation with "a

different psychiatrist." The CSC advised T.T. to provide any additional

information he wished to have considered. On June 28, T.T. submitted to the

MRP a psychological evaluation by Karin Gepp, Psy.D., who recommended him

for the appointment of a firefighter.

On August 18, the MRP met to review T.T.'s appeal, and T.T. appeared.

The MRP noted that "Drs. Liang and Gepp came to [] differing conclusions

about [T.T.'s] fitness for the position." Dr. Liang, on one hand, "saw problems

in the areas of integrity, credibility, attention to safety, and overall prudent

judgment," while "Dr. Gepp did not see the same issues in [T.T.'s] history and

psychology test result[s]." The MRP concluded:

Taking into consideration Dr. Liang's and Dr. Gepp's evaluations, [T.T.'s] presentation, the psychological test results, and the behavioral record when viewed in consideration of the job specifications for Fire Fighter it indicates that [T.T.] should have an independent evaluation to further explore the issues noted above by the MRP.

T.T. and the Township objected to a third evaluation. On January 17,

2024, the CSC issued a decision, accepting the MRP's recommendation and

ordering T.T. to undergo an independent psychological evaluation with Robert

Kanen, Psy. D. It further directed the Township to pay the cost for the

A-0161-24 3 evaluation. The Township filed a request for partial reconsideration of that

decision, challenging the requirement that it pay the cost of the evaluation.

On February 12, 2024, Dr. Kanen issued a written report, finding T.T. to

be "functioning within normal ranges," and that "no psychopathology or

personality problems that would interfere with [his] work performance."

According to the personality testing administered by Dr. Kanen, T.T. "scored in

the category of likely to be recommended for employment in a public

safety/security position," and "likely to meet expectations." Thus, Dr. Kanen

concluded that T.T. "is psychologically suitable for employment as a firefighter

for the Town[ship]." Neither party filed exceptions.

On July 23, the CSC issued its final administrative decision, granting

T.T.'s appeal and denying the Township's request for reconsideration of the cost

of the independent evaluation. The CSC noted that it "is mindful that [T.T.'s]

suitability [for the position] will be further assessed during his working test

period . . . [which] will ultimately demonstrate whether he has the actual ability

to successfully perform the duties of a Fire Fighter." The CSC ordered the

Township to restore T.T. to the eligible list, and barring any disqualification

from an updated background check, T.T.'s appointment was mandated. The CSC

also ordered that upon T.T.'s successful completion of his working test period,

A-0161-24 4 he is to be granted retroactive appointment as of January 3, 2023. This appeal

followed.

The Township argues that the CSC's decision to order a third evaluation,

accept Dr. Kanen's recommendation, and find T.T. fit to serve as a firefighter

was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and not supported by credible

evidence. The Township also contends that the CSC erred as a matter of law in

requiring the Township to bear the costs of the third psychological evaluation.

II.

A.

Our review of the CSC's determinations is limited. Allstars Auto. Grp.,

Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (citing Russo v.

Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (citation

omitted)); see Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 143 N.J. 22,

25 (1995) ("In light of the executive function of administrative agencies, judicial

capacity to review administrative actions is severely limited."). "An

administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision will be sustained unless

there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that

it lacks fair support in the record." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007).

A-0161-24 5 The party challenging the administrative action bears the burden of making that

showing. Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014).

In reviewing an agency's decision, we consider:

(1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law;

(2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and

(3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.

[Allstars Auto. Grp., Inc., 234 N.J. at 157 (quoting In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (citation omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted).]

see In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Grp., 216

N.J. 370, 383 (2013); Mazza, 143 N.J. at 25. "When an agency's decision meets

those criteria, then a court owes substantial deference to the agency's expertise

and superior knowledge of a particular field." Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 28; see In

re Request to Modify Prison Sentences, 242 N.J. 357, 390 (2020) ("Wide

discretion is afforded to administrative decisions because of an agency's

specialized knowledge."). However, "[a]lthough administrative agencies are

A-0161-24 6 entitled to discretion in making decisions, that discretion is not unbounded and

must be exercised in a manner that will facilitate judicial review." In re Vey

(Vey I), 124 N.J. 534, 543-44 (1991).

B.

We begin with the Township's argument that the CSC violated express

and implied legislative policies and erred in ordering a third evaluation . The

Township asserts that Dr. Liang's evaluation properly identified the job

functions of a firefighter and analyzed those factors in the context of his

psychological findings of T.T. Therefore, the Township contends it was

arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable to order another evaluation. We disagree

with this contention.

The CSC is responsible for making civil service appointments "according

to merit and fitness." N.J. Const. art. VII, § 1, ¶ 2; see N.J.S.A. 11A:1-2. The

Civil Service Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 11A:1-1 to 11A:12-6, gives the CSC authority

to render the final administrative decision on appeals. N.J.S.A. 11A:2-6(a).

"[A] 'strong presumption of reasonableness attaches to the actions of the

administrative agenc[y].'" In re Caroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div.

2001) (quoting Matter of Vey (Vey II), 272 N.J. Super. 199, 205 (App. Div.

1993)).

A-0161-24 7 When an applicant appeals from his or her removal from an eligibility list

due to psychological disqualification reasons, the CSC is authorized to submit a

"psychological appeal[] to the [MRP]." N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.5(g). The MRP is

comprised of medical and psychological professionals with expertise in the

fields of psychology and psychiatry. Ibid. Thus, the CSC acted within its

regulatory authority in referring T.T.'s appeal to the MRP for further

consideration.

We reject the Township's assertion that Dr. Liang's report was adequate

and that the CSC gave "short shrift" to the disqualifying factors noted in his

report. The MRP recognized T.T.'s negative factors, including his negative legal

interactions, his motor vehicle accidents as well as the negative background

recommendations. The MRP considered all relevant factors and other relevant

information, and concluded:

Taking into consideration Dr. Liang's and Dr. Gepp's evaluations, [T.T.]'s presentation, the psychological test results, and the behavioral record when viewed in consideration of the jobs specifications for Fire Fighter, it indicates that the applicant should have an independent evaluation to further explore the issues noted above by the MRP.

An independent evaluation was also needed to resolve the contradictory

opinions of Drs. Liang and Gepp and to review issues not fully explored by

A-0161-24 8 either of these professionals. The MRP determined that an independent

evaluation was needed to more fully explore T.T.'s attention deficit

hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) difficulties, his driving and employment history,

to discern whether those issues reflect attention problems or poor decision-

making skills. We discern no error in the CSC's reliance on the MRP's expertise

and adoption of its recommendation for a third psychological evaluation to

explore potential psychological concerns.

The Township further contends the CSC erred in accepting Dr. Kanen's

finding of T.T.'s psychological fitness for the firefighter position because he did

not address the factual issues the MRP noted needed further exploration. For

example, the MRP and CSC noted T.T.'s driving history involving eight motor

vehicle accidents where T.T. was at fault for two. Although the Township

asserts T.T.'s driving record alone was sufficient to disqualify him for the

firefighter position, it argues that Dr. Kanen did not explore such factual issues.

Contrary to the Township's assertions, Dr. Kanen noted that T.T. had

"been involved in several motor vehicle accidents[,]" two of which were his

fault. He also noted that "[a]t present, there are no points on his license." He

also took note of T.T.'s ADHD history but concluded that T.T. had improved:

his "[t]hought processes were logical and coherent. There was no evidence of

A-0161-24 9 mental illness[,] . . . [and] [h]e is not currently taking medication for mental

health problems." Dr. Kanen considered T.T.'s prior employment history,

including his past resignation in lieu of termination, and his prior evaluations,

noting that he "failed [a prior] psychological evaluation" in 2021. The

Township's assertion that Dr. Kanen failed to address the concerning factual

issues is not supported by the record.

We also reject the Township's assertion that a remand is necessary to

resolve factual matters not properly addressed by the MRP, the CSC, or Dr.

Kanen's evaluation. The primary reason for the independent evaluation was to

determine T.T.'s psychological fitness for the position because the existing

record did not definitively answer that question. With Dr. Kanen's report,

however, the record provides sufficient support and satisfies the CSC's

determination that T.T. was indeed psychologically fit. There are no remaining

issues to be addressed on remand.

After reviewing the entire record, administering psychological testing and

conducting a clinical interview, Dr. Kanen concluded that T.T. is

"psychologically suitable for employment as a firefighter for the Town[ship]."

Relying on Dr. Kanen's evaluation, namely that T.T. was psychologically suited

for the position, the CSC ordered the Township to restore T.T. to the eligibility

A-0161-24 10 list and mandated his appointment to the firefighter position. We are satisfied

the CSC's determination to rely on Dr. Kanen's independent evaluation and

restore T.T. to the list was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. This

decision was well-grounded in the record's credible evidence.

The Township challenged T.T.'s psychological fitness for the job as a

firefighter, and it was the Township's burden to prove his unfitness. See (Vey

I), 124 N.J. at 540. Following its review of Dr. Kanen's findings, the CSC

determined that the Township had not met its burden. As a result, the CSC found

T.T. fit for the firefighter position, ordered his restoration to the eligibility list,

and mandated his retroactive appointment. The CSC's decisions were fully

supported by the record, in accordance with the Act, and neither arbitrary,

capricious, nor unreasonable.

III.

We next address the Township's remaining contention that the CSC erred

in holding it responsible for the cost of the third evaluation and denying the

Township's motion for reconsideration of the CSC's order assessing the cost of

the evaluation. The Township contends that because it did not request the third

evaluation, the CSC erred as a matter of law in assessing this cost against the

Township. We disagree.

A-0161-24 11 N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.3(b) provides that the appointing authority has the

burden of proof to establish that a candidate is medically or psychologically

unfit for a position. "Psychological examinations performed at the appointing

authority's request shall be at the authority's expense." N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.5(a)(3).

However, in the event of an appeal, the CSC may submit psychological appeals

to the MRP, who may request additional psychological . . . examinations.

N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.5(g). In the event of "the inadequacy of a professional report

necessitates an independent professional evaluation," the CSC may assess costs

against a party. N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.5(g)(5)

The Township asserts that the CSC erroneously described Dr. Liang's

report as inadequate when the MRP did not describe the report as such. The

MRP noted that "[t]he question for the evaluators and the MRP related to those

recommendations is whether there are psychological factors in [T.T.'s]

presentation, history, or testing that indicate that the candidate 'cannot be

trusted,' or that he is a 'loose cannon.'" The MRP detailed several areas that need

further exploration, for instance, areas around T.T.'s integrity, his motor vehicle

record, and history of ADHD. Neither the Township nor T.T. requested another

evaluation; however, the MRP, relying on their expertise, recommended an

A-0161-24 12 independent evaluation to further explore these issues and determine whether

T.T. is psychologically suitable for the position of firefighter.

Because the Township has the burden of proving T.T. was not

psychologically fit for the position and there remained areas in need of further

exploration and open questions, we are satisfied the CSC's decision to assess the

cost of the third evaluation against the Township was not arbitrary, capricious,

or unreasonable.

In sum, we conclude that the CSC complied with its regulatory obligations

to assess T.T.'s merit and fitness for the firefighter position, and there is

sufficient credible evidence in the record to support its final determination that

T.T. was psychologically fit for the firefighter position. We are satisfied the

CSC's decisions to return T.T. to the eligibility list and mandate his appointment

as a firefighter were not arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious and were

supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.

Affirmed.

A-0161-24 13