FILED JULY 16, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint ) No. 41018-8-III Petition of: ) ) MARK JAMEY BREMER, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Petitioner. )
HILL, J. — The Department of Corrections (DOC) issued Mark Bremer
two serious violations under WAC 137-25-030(813) and (814) while he was in the
Graduated Reentry Program (GRE). A DOC hearing officer found Bremer guilty of
both infractions. The DOC revoked some of Bremer’s good-time credits as a result.
Bremer now brings this personal restraint petition (PRP) seeking reversal of
the 814 violation and the restoration of his good-time credits. He argues his due
process rights were violated during the infraction proceeding. He further argues that
WAC 137-25-030(814) applies only to individuals in work/training release programs
and not to those in GRE. No. 41018-8-III In re Pers. Restraint of Bremer
We conclude Bremer was afforded all required due process protections in his
infraction proceeding. We also conclude WAC 137-25-030(814) applied to Bremer
while he was in GRE. We deny his PRP.
BACKGROUND
Mark Bremer was serving a sentence for burglary in the second degree when he
was allowed to participate in a GRE beginning on April 3, 2024. Bremer was required to
obtain employment in the community as a GRE participant.
By May 31, Bremer had not obtained employment. DOC mailed Bremer a letter
reminding him that DOC officials had spoken with him about this issue several times.
The letter also stated DOC was imposing a condition that he gain full-time employment
no later than June 20, 2024. When the date passed without Bremer securing employment,
DOC issued two violations under WAC 137-25-030(813) and (814). Only the 814
violation is relevant to this PRP. An inmate commits an 814 violation when they violate
a special condition—in this case, securing employment—imposed by DOC while in
partial confinement. See WAC 137-25-010, -030(814).
At Bremer’s violation hearing, the DOC hearing officer found Bremer guilty
of the 814 violation. Bremer appealed the decision to the DOC Appeals Panel. The
Appeals Panel upheld the 814 violation. Bremer then filed this PRP in February 2025.
He was released from DOC custody in April 2025.
2 No. 41018-8-III In re Pers. Restraint of Bremer
ANALYSIS
Mootness
DOC argues that we should dismiss this appeal on mootness grounds. “An issue is
moot if ‘a court can no longer provide effective relief.’” Doe v. Thurston County, 4
Wn.3d 906, 916, 569 P.3d 1101 (2025) (quoting AURC III, LLC v. Point Ruston Phase II,
LLC, 3 Wn.3d 80, 86, 546 P.3d 385 (2024)). DOC argues this court cannot afford
Bremer meaningful relief since he has been released from confinement and the relief he
seeks is the restoration of lost “good time.” Resp. of DOC at 1-2. We disagree. An
infraction imposes not only the restraint of possible physical confinement but also
imposes “a shadow over an inmate’s institutional history” that can be used against an
inmate when determining future sanctions on later infractions. Kozol v. Dep’t of Corr.,
185 Wn.2d 405, 410-11, 379 P.3d 72 (2016); see also WAC 137-28-350(3). So, while
Bremer has been released, the 814 infraction could still be used against him in the future.
We therefore address his PRP on the merits.
Unlawful Restraint
Bremer argues DOC violated his right to due process because a correctional
officer prevented his witness from testifying at the infraction hearing, and a correctional
3 No. 41018-8-III In re Pers. Restraint of Bremer
officer refused to approve the employment he had found. 1 We conclude Bremer was
afforded the requisite due process.
“The federal and Washington State constitution contain identical clauses
prohibiting the state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” In re Est. of Hayes, 185 Wn. App. 567, 603, 342 P.3d 1161 (2015); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3. Inmates have a liberty interest
in good time credits. In re Pers. Restraint of Erickson, 146 Wn. App. 576, 583, 191 P.3d
917 (2008); In re Pers. Restraint of Gronquist, 138 Wn.2d 388, 397, 978 P.2d 1083
(1999).
“A personal restraint petitioner has the burden of proving constitutional error that
results in actual prejudice or nonconstitutional error that results in a miscarriage of
justice.” In re Pers. Restraint of Waggy, 111 Wn. App. 511, 518, 45 P.3d 1103 (2002).
For a petitioner to obtain the relief they seek through a PRP, they “must show that more
1 Bremer also argues his due process rights were violated because he was “shackled” during the hearing. PRP at 14. Shackling may violate due process in a courtroom setting, see State v. Luthi, 2 Wn.3d 249, 549 P.3d 712 (2024), but Bremer provides no authority to extend this rule to a DOC violation hearing. Even if we were to do so and found shackling was in error in this case, the error would be harmless. The hearing officer addressed the restraints and indicated, “This is part of my job. I see people in jails, in prisons, in restraints, this doesn’t stand out as notable to me . . . I make a decision based on the information and the testimony provided right here and now . . . you being in restraints you being in a confinement setting . . . that’s part of my job. . . .” DOC’s Suppl. Resp., Ex. 1 at 42.
4 No. 41018-8-III In re Pers. Restraint of Bremer
likely than not he was prejudiced by the error. Bare allegations unsupported by citation
of authority, references to the record, or persuasive reasoning cannot sustain this burden
of proof.” State v. Brune, 45 Wn. App. 354, 363, 725 P.2d 454 (1986).
An inmate is afforded due process in a prison disciplinary proceeding if they:
(1) receive notice of the alleged violation; (2) be provided an opportunity to present documentary evidence and call witnesses when not unduly hazardous to institutional safety and correctional goals; and (3) receive a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action.
Gronquist, 138 Wn.2d at 396-97. Due process also requires that the conclusion of the
disciplinary proceeding to revoke good time credits be supported by “some evidence.”
Superintendent, Massachusetts Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S. Ct.
2768, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1985). This standard is met if there is “some reasonable
connection between the evidence and the inmate in order to support actions taken by the
prison disciplinary board.” In re Pers. Restraint of Anderson, 112 Wn.2d 546, 549, 772
P.2d 510 (1989).
DOC provided Bremer with notice of the alleged infraction via an infraction report
dated June 21, 2024, and Bremer signed the report, affirming he understood the
allegations, on July 2, 2024.
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FILED JULY 16, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint ) No. 41018-8-III Petition of: ) ) MARK JAMEY BREMER, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Petitioner. )
HILL, J. — The Department of Corrections (DOC) issued Mark Bremer
two serious violations under WAC 137-25-030(813) and (814) while he was in the
Graduated Reentry Program (GRE). A DOC hearing officer found Bremer guilty of
both infractions. The DOC revoked some of Bremer’s good-time credits as a result.
Bremer now brings this personal restraint petition (PRP) seeking reversal of
the 814 violation and the restoration of his good-time credits. He argues his due
process rights were violated during the infraction proceeding. He further argues that
WAC 137-25-030(814) applies only to individuals in work/training release programs
and not to those in GRE. No. 41018-8-III In re Pers. Restraint of Bremer
We conclude Bremer was afforded all required due process protections in his
infraction proceeding. We also conclude WAC 137-25-030(814) applied to Bremer
while he was in GRE. We deny his PRP.
BACKGROUND
Mark Bremer was serving a sentence for burglary in the second degree when he
was allowed to participate in a GRE beginning on April 3, 2024. Bremer was required to
obtain employment in the community as a GRE participant.
By May 31, Bremer had not obtained employment. DOC mailed Bremer a letter
reminding him that DOC officials had spoken with him about this issue several times.
The letter also stated DOC was imposing a condition that he gain full-time employment
no later than June 20, 2024. When the date passed without Bremer securing employment,
DOC issued two violations under WAC 137-25-030(813) and (814). Only the 814
violation is relevant to this PRP. An inmate commits an 814 violation when they violate
a special condition—in this case, securing employment—imposed by DOC while in
partial confinement. See WAC 137-25-010, -030(814).
At Bremer’s violation hearing, the DOC hearing officer found Bremer guilty
of the 814 violation. Bremer appealed the decision to the DOC Appeals Panel. The
Appeals Panel upheld the 814 violation. Bremer then filed this PRP in February 2025.
He was released from DOC custody in April 2025.
2 No. 41018-8-III In re Pers. Restraint of Bremer
ANALYSIS
Mootness
DOC argues that we should dismiss this appeal on mootness grounds. “An issue is
moot if ‘a court can no longer provide effective relief.’” Doe v. Thurston County, 4
Wn.3d 906, 916, 569 P.3d 1101 (2025) (quoting AURC III, LLC v. Point Ruston Phase II,
LLC, 3 Wn.3d 80, 86, 546 P.3d 385 (2024)). DOC argues this court cannot afford
Bremer meaningful relief since he has been released from confinement and the relief he
seeks is the restoration of lost “good time.” Resp. of DOC at 1-2. We disagree. An
infraction imposes not only the restraint of possible physical confinement but also
imposes “a shadow over an inmate’s institutional history” that can be used against an
inmate when determining future sanctions on later infractions. Kozol v. Dep’t of Corr.,
185 Wn.2d 405, 410-11, 379 P.3d 72 (2016); see also WAC 137-28-350(3). So, while
Bremer has been released, the 814 infraction could still be used against him in the future.
We therefore address his PRP on the merits.
Unlawful Restraint
Bremer argues DOC violated his right to due process because a correctional
officer prevented his witness from testifying at the infraction hearing, and a correctional
3 No. 41018-8-III In re Pers. Restraint of Bremer
officer refused to approve the employment he had found. 1 We conclude Bremer was
afforded the requisite due process.
“The federal and Washington State constitution contain identical clauses
prohibiting the state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” In re Est. of Hayes, 185 Wn. App. 567, 603, 342 P.3d 1161 (2015); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3. Inmates have a liberty interest
in good time credits. In re Pers. Restraint of Erickson, 146 Wn. App. 576, 583, 191 P.3d
917 (2008); In re Pers. Restraint of Gronquist, 138 Wn.2d 388, 397, 978 P.2d 1083
(1999).
“A personal restraint petitioner has the burden of proving constitutional error that
results in actual prejudice or nonconstitutional error that results in a miscarriage of
justice.” In re Pers. Restraint of Waggy, 111 Wn. App. 511, 518, 45 P.3d 1103 (2002).
For a petitioner to obtain the relief they seek through a PRP, they “must show that more
1 Bremer also argues his due process rights were violated because he was “shackled” during the hearing. PRP at 14. Shackling may violate due process in a courtroom setting, see State v. Luthi, 2 Wn.3d 249, 549 P.3d 712 (2024), but Bremer provides no authority to extend this rule to a DOC violation hearing. Even if we were to do so and found shackling was in error in this case, the error would be harmless. The hearing officer addressed the restraints and indicated, “This is part of my job. I see people in jails, in prisons, in restraints, this doesn’t stand out as notable to me . . . I make a decision based on the information and the testimony provided right here and now . . . you being in restraints you being in a confinement setting . . . that’s part of my job. . . .” DOC’s Suppl. Resp., Ex. 1 at 42.
4 No. 41018-8-III In re Pers. Restraint of Bremer
likely than not he was prejudiced by the error. Bare allegations unsupported by citation
of authority, references to the record, or persuasive reasoning cannot sustain this burden
of proof.” State v. Brune, 45 Wn. App. 354, 363, 725 P.2d 454 (1986).
An inmate is afforded due process in a prison disciplinary proceeding if they:
(1) receive notice of the alleged violation; (2) be provided an opportunity to present documentary evidence and call witnesses when not unduly hazardous to institutional safety and correctional goals; and (3) receive a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action.
Gronquist, 138 Wn.2d at 396-97. Due process also requires that the conclusion of the
disciplinary proceeding to revoke good time credits be supported by “some evidence.”
Superintendent, Massachusetts Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S. Ct.
2768, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1985). This standard is met if there is “some reasonable
connection between the evidence and the inmate in order to support actions taken by the
prison disciplinary board.” In re Pers. Restraint of Anderson, 112 Wn.2d 546, 549, 772
P.2d 510 (1989).
DOC provided Bremer with notice of the alleged infraction via an infraction report
dated June 21, 2024, and Bremer signed the report, affirming he understood the
allegations, on July 2, 2024. An infraction hearing was held, at which time Bremer
testified on his own behalf and presented a defense. Bremer alleges DOC prevented his
witness from testifying, but the record shows Bremer was allowed to call witnesses and
5 No. 41018-8-III In re Pers. Restraint of Bremer
did so. The hearing officer set forth in writing the findings and reasons as to why it
found him guilty of the violation.
The hearing officer’s determination that Bremer was guilty of an 814 violation for
not obtaining a job by June 20, 2024, is supported by “some evidence.” This evidence
included chronological reports, case manager testimony, and e-mails showing that
Bremer only had a conditional job offer and had not met all the conditions to begin work
by the deadline. We therefore conclude that Bremer was afforded all required due
process protections in the infraction proceeding.
GRE vs. Work/Training Release
Bremer also argues that WAC 137-25-030(814) did not apply to him because
he was in GRE and not in work/training release. Bremer provides no authority to
support this argument. On the contrary, WAC 137-25-010 indicates that incarcerated
individuals in partial confinement are subject to serious violations, which include
those under WAC 137-25-030(34). “Partial confinement” can include GRE. 2 See
RCW 9.94A.030(35).
2 “Partial confinement” also includes work release, home detention, work crew, and electronic monitoring. DOC submitted information that GRE participants are on electronic monitoring and must live at an approved address.
6 No. 41018-8-III In re Pers. Restraint of Bremer
CONCLUSION
We conclude Bremer’s arguments are without merit and deny his PRP.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in
the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
Hill, J.
WE CONCUR:
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
Murphy, J.