Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-23-00358-CV
In the Matter of the Marriage of Brittany Lea Lannen and Clint Douglas Lannen
On appeal from the County Court at Law of Bosque County, Texas Senior Judge F.B. (Bob) McGregor Jr., presiding Trial Court Cause No. CV23-164
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In two issues, Brittany Lea Lannen appeals from the trial court’s “Order
Granting Defendant[ Clint Douglas Lannen]’s Special Exceptions and Motion
to Dismiss.” 1 We will reverse and remand.
Background
Clint and Brittany divorced in 2014. The final decree of divorce provided:
Agreement of Parties
The Court finds that the parties have entered into a written agreement as contained in this decree by virtue of having approved this decree as to both form and substance. To the extent permitted
1 Because the parties both have the same last name, we will hereinafter refer to each party by
his or her respective first name. by law, the parties stipulate the agreement is enforceable as a contract. The Court approves the agreement of the parties as contained in this Final Decree of Divorce.
The agreements in this Final Decree of Divorce were reached pursuant to the informal settlement process. This Final Decree of Divorce is stipulated to represent a merger of a[n] informal settlement agreement between the parties. To the extent there exist any differences between the informal settlement agreement and this Final Decree of Divorce, this Final Decree of Divorce shall control in all instances.
The divorce decree went on to describe the division of marital property between
Clint and Brittany. In relevant part, the divorce decree gave Brittany certain
real property and gave Clint
[t]he right to purchase the [certain real property] from BRITTANY L. LANNEN before any other person or entity is given the opportunity to purchase such land from BRITTANY L. LANNEN. This right to purchase the property is such that CLINT LANNEN must purchase the entire 69.5 acres should he exercise this right to purchase this property before the property is offered for sale to third parties. The 52 tract [sic] of this land will be sold at $1500 per acre to CLINT LANNEN should he chose [sic] to purchase the land. The remaining land will be sold at current market value to CLINT LANNEN to be determined by a relator [sic] agreed upon by the parties under this provision for sale of the property.
The divorce decree also contained the following relevant “Special Provision”:
IT IS ORDERED that BRITTANY LANNEN shall offer to sell the house and adjacent land at [the property’s address] to CLINT LANNEN at $1,500 an acre for the 52 acre tract of land and at fair market value for the tract of land with the house on it before selling such house or land to any other person or entity. IT IS ORDERED THAT the parties shall agree on a realtor to determine the fair market value of the house if and when BRITTANY LANNEN decides to sell the property, house and land at and adjacent to [the property’s address]. IT IS ORDERED
In re Marriage of Lannen Page 2 THAT if CLINT LANNEN decides to buy the 52 acres of land and House that he much [sic] purchase both the 52 acre tract of land and the house at the same time.
Several years after the divorce decree was signed, in 2023, Brittany filed
the present lawsuit—a petition for declaratory judgment under chapter 37 of
the Civil Practice and Remedies Code (the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act
(UDJA)). In her amended petition in the present suit, Brittany asserted that
the suit was being brought
to determine a question of construction and validity arising under the contractual language found in the Final Decree of Divorce and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations resulting from the Final Decree of Divorce. Specifically, BRITTANY LEA LANNEN seeks a declaration that any right previously asserted by CLINT DOUGLAS LANNEN to purchase real estate held by BRITTANY LEA LANNEN is invalid, or has been waived by Defendant.
Clint answered Brittany’s petition for declaratory judgment, generally
denying Brittany’s allegations. Clint thereafter filed special exceptions and a
motion to dismiss Brittany’s suit on the grounds that her cause of action was
an impermissible collateral attack on a prior judgment and that she therefore
had no viable claim or cause of action for declaratory judgment. Clint further
asserted that the defect in Brittany’s pleading could not be cured by
amendment and that Brittany’s suit should therefore be dismissed in its
entirety with prejudice.
In re Marriage of Lannen Page 3 Following a hearing, the trial court signed an “Order Granting
Defendant’s Special Exceptions and Motion to Dismiss,” which granted Clint’s
special exceptions and ordered that
because [Brittany] has no viable claim or cause of action pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act by which to collaterally attack, modify, or interpret the prior judgment (the Final Decree of Divorce), [and] this defect cannot be cured by amendment, [Brittany]’s claims and this lawsuit are hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice to the right of [Brittany] to refile same or any part thereof.
Issue One
In her first issue, Brittany contends that the trial court erred in granting
Clint’s special exceptions and motion to dismiss her amended petition for
declaratory judgment “by failing to apply contract law to a property agreement
incorporated into a Final Decree of Divorce.”
AUTHORITY
A motion to dismiss based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is the
functional equivalent of a plea to the jurisdiction. In re Elamex, S.A. de C.V.,
367 S.W.3d 891, 897 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, orig. proceeding); Anderson v.
City of San Antonio, 120 S.W.3d 5, 7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet.
denied). A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635,
638 (Tex. 2004). Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question
of law; therefore, we apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court’s ruling
In re Marriage of Lannen Page 4 on a plea to the jurisdiction. City of Dallas v. Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d 537, 538
(Tex. 2010) (per curiam).
A jurisdictional plea may challenge the pleadings, the existence of
jurisdictional facts, or both. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544
S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018). When the plea challenges only the pleadings, we
determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the
trial court’s jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d
217, 226 (Tex. 2004). We construe the pleadings liberally in the plaintiff’s favor
and look to the pleader’s intent. Id. If the pleadings are insufficient to
establish jurisdiction but do not affirmatively demonstrate an incurable defect
in jurisdiction, the plaintiff should ordinarily be given the opportunity to
amend. See id. at 226–27. But if the pleadings affirmatively negate the
existence of jurisdiction altogether, then a jurisdictional plea may be granted
without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Id. at 227.
If the plea challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider
relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the
jurisdictional issues raised, as the trial court is required to do. Id. If the
evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the
plea to the jurisdiction must be denied. See id. at 227–28. However, if the
relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the
jurisdictional issue, then the court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a
In re Marriage of Lannen Page 5 matter of law. Id. at 228. In ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction, a court may
not weigh the merits of the parties’ claims but must consider only the plaintiff’s
pleadings and the evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry. County of
Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002).
Under the UDJA,
[a] person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 37.002(a), .004(a). The purpose of a
declaratory-judgment action is “to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty
and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.” Id. §
37.002(b). But a declaratory judgment is appropriate only if a justiciable
controversy exists as to the rights and status of the parties and if the
controversy will be resolved by the declaration sought. Bonham State Bank v.
Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. 1995). Otherwise, the trial court’s judgment
will constitute no more than an impermissible advisory opinion. Martin v.
Dosohs I, Ltd., Inc., 2 S.W.3d 350, 353 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet.
denied).
“Collateral attacks on final judgments are generally disallowed because
it is the policy of the law to give finality to the judgments of the courts.”
In re Marriage of Lannen Page 6 Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2005). “A collateral attack is
an attempt to avoid the binding force of a judgment in a proceeding not
instituted for the purpose of correcting, modifying, or vacating the judgment,
but in order to obtain some specific relief which the judgment currently stands
as a bar against.” Id. at 346. Accordingly, Texas courts have generally held
that the use of a declaratory-judgment action to attack, modify, or “interpret”
a prior judgment, including a final divorce decree, is an impermissible
collateral attack on the prior judgment. 2 Martin, 2 S.W.3d at 353–54; see, e.g.,
Segrest v. Segrest, 649 S.W.2d 610, 611–13 (Tex. 1983) (disapproving of use of
declaratory judgment as tool to collaterally attack final divorce decree); Cohen
v. Cohen, 632 S.W.2d 172, 173–74 (Tex. App.—Waco 1982, no writ) (holding
final divorce judgment not subject to collateral attack by subsequent
declaratory-judgment suit); Wilbourne v. HFE Dev. Corp., No. 03-08-00430-CV,
2009 WL 4757451, at *5–7 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 9, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(holding declaratory-judgment action to declare prior judgment
“unenforceable, discharged and satisfied” was barred as impermissible
collateral attack). Only a void judgment may be collaterally attacked.
Browning, 165 S.W.3d at 346.
2 The Texas Supreme Court has explained that “[a] suit to ‘interpret’ a judgment is usually a
guise to obtain review or modification of a judgment outside of the appellate process or an attempt to collaterally attack a judgment.” Bonham State Bank, 907 S.W.2d at 468.
In re Marriage of Lannen Page 7 On the other hand, the Family Code specifies that the trial court that
rendered the final divorce decree generally retains continuing subject-matter
jurisdiction to clarify and to enforce the divorce decree’s property division. See
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.002, 9.008. This authority generally includes the
power to enforce any contractual provisions under the terms of an agreement
incident to divorce that was approved by the court. 3 Id. § 9.002. The Family
Code expressly states, however:
A court may not amend, modify, alter, or change the division of property made or approved in the decree of divorce or annulment. An order to enforce the division is limited to an order to assist in the implementation of or to clarify the prior order and may not alter or change the substantive division of property.
Id. § 9.007(a).
Additionally, the Texas Supreme Court has explained: “A marital
property agreement, although incorporated into a final divorce decree, is
treated as a contract and its legal force and meaning are governed by the law
3 Section 7.006 of the Family Code, entitled “Agreement Incident to Divorce or Annulment,”
provides in pertinent part:
(a) To promote amicable settlement of disputes in a suit for divorce or annulment, the spouses may enter into a written agreement concerning the division of the property and the liabilities of the spouses and maintenance of either spouse. The agreement may be revised or repudiated before rendition of the divorce or annulment unless the agreement is binding under another rule of law.
(b) If the court finds that the terms of the written agreement in a divorce or an annulment are just and right, those terms are binding on the court. If the court approves the agreement, the court may set forth the agreement in full or incorporate the agreement by reference in the final decree.
Id. § 7.006(a), (b).
In re Marriage of Lannen Page 8 of contracts, not the law of judgments.” Allen v. Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311, 313
(Tex. 1986). Accordingly, Texas courts have held that a trial court has subject-
matter jurisdiction over a post-divorce action brought under legal authority
other than the Family Code, including under the UDJA, when the post-divorce
action is to enforce a party’s contractual rights to property acquired under the
terms of a marital property agreement, even though the agreement is
incorporated into the final divorce decree. See, e.g., id. (affirming trial court’s
judgment in favor of plaintiff in post-divorce action for reformation of marital
property agreement incorporated into final divorce decree); Dailey v. McAfee,
No. 01-18-01060-CV, 2020 WL 4758429, at *2, 6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Aug. 18, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding probate court had subject-
matter jurisdiction over post-divorce declaratory-judgment action to enforce
contract rights acquired under final divorce decree); Chavez v. McNeely, 287
S.W.3d 840, 842, 844–45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.)
(concluding district court that did not render final divorce decree had subject-
matter jurisdiction over post-divorce breach-of-contract action that was based
on agreement incorporated into final divorce decree); Buck v. Rogers, 709
S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tex. App—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1986, no writ) (holding
trial court had jurisdiction to render declaratory judgment regarding property
settlement agreement incorporated into parties’ prior divorce decree, noting
agreement, which was approved by the court, is treated as contract). But even
In re Marriage of Lannen Page 9 so, a trial court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over a post-divorce
action to change the terms of the property settlement agreement and divorce
decree. See Segrest, 649 S.W.2d at 611–13 (disapproving of use of post-divorce
declaratory-judgment action seeking determination of validity and
enforceability of portion of property settlement agreement incorporated into
final divorce decree as collateral attack on final judgment); Lee v. Johnson, 858
S.W.2d 58, 59–61 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ) (concluding
declaratory-judgment action could not be used to change terms of property
settlement agreement and divorce decree into which agreement was
incorporated).
DISCUSSION
Brittany argues that her declaratory-judgment action was appropriate
because she was not seeking to attack, modify, or interpret the final decree of
divorce but was seeking to declare her contractual rights under the property
agreement that was incorporated into the final decree of divorce.
Here, Brittany filed her amended petition with exhibits attached. See
generally State v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 290 S.W.3d 345, 349–50 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2009, pet. denied) (“In resolving the jurisdictional challenges presented
by the plea, we may . . . consider evidence that the pleader has attached to its
petition or submitted in opposition to the plea.”). The exhibits included a copy
of the final divorce decree, which shows that, in the divorce proceeding, Clint
In re Marriage of Lannen Page 10 and Brittany reached an agreement regarding the division of their marital
property, which was then incorporated into the divorce decree. The property
settlement agreement between Clint and Brittany should therefore have been
treated as a contract, and the trial court thus had subject-matter jurisdiction
over Brittany’s post-divorce declaratory-judgment action as long as it sought
to construe the property settlement agreement and not to change the
agreement and divorce decree. Compare Allen, 717 S.W.2d at 313, and Dailey,
2020 WL 4758429, at *2, 6, and Chavez, 287 S.W.3d at 842, 844–45, and Buck,
709 S.W.2d at 285, with Segrest, 649 S.W.2d at 611–13, and Lee, 858 S.W.2d
at 59–61.
Brittany did not indicate in her amended petition for declaratory
judgment that either the property settlement agreement or the divorce decree
was erroneous when it was signed. Rather, construing Brittany’s amended
petition liberally in her favor, we conclude that the basis of her declaratory-
judgment action was to clarify her and Clint’s contractual rights under the
option contract/right of first refusal included in the property settlement
agreement in order to then determine compliance with the agreement.
Accordingly, Brittany’s declaratory-judgment action was to construe the
property settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce decree, not to
collaterally attack the divorce decree by attempting to change the agreement
and divorce decree. Cf., e.g., Lee, 858 S.W.2d at 59–61.
In re Marriage of Lannen Page 11 The trial court therefore had subject-matter jurisdiction over Brittany’s
declaratory-judgment action. See, e.g., Allen, 717 S.W.2d at 313; Dailey, 2020
WL 4758429, at *2, 6; Chavez, 287 S.W.3d at 842, 844–45; Buck, 709 S.W.2d at
285. Thus, the trial court erred in granting Clint’s special exceptions and
dismissing Brittany’s declaratory-judgment action. Brittany’s first issue is
sustained. 4
Issue Two
In her second issue, Brittany contends that the trial court erred in
granting Clint’s special exceptions and motion to dismiss her amended petition
for declaratory judgment by failing to allow her an opportunity to amend her
pleadings. Having sustained Brittany’s first issue, we need not address her
second issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the trial court’s “Order Granting Defendant’s
Special Exceptions and Motion to Dismiss” is reversed, and this cause is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
4 We express no opinion on the merits of Brittany’s declaratory-judgment action. See Brown, 80 S.W.3d at 555 (“In deciding a plea to the jurisdiction, a court may not weigh the claims’ merits but must consider only the plaintiffs’ pleadings and the evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry.”).
In re Marriage of Lannen Page 12 MATT JOHNSON Chief Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: January 29, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Reversed and remanded CV06
In re Marriage of Lannen Page 13