FILED MAY 9, 2023 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Guardianship of ) ) No. 34236-1-III DONALD RAYMOND MITCHELL, ) Consolidated with† ) and ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION SEVERAL OTHER SIMILAR CASES ) CONSOLIDATED ON APPEAL.† )
† No. 34311-1-III, In re Guardianship of Krista L. Blair; No. 34273-5-III, In re Guardianship of Ernest Bowen; No, 34295-6-III, In re Guardianship of Richard E. Bowers; No. 34288-3-III, In re Guardianship of Cleora K. Boyd; No. 34287-5-III, In re Guardianship of Linda S. Brangwin; No. 34251-4-III, In re Guardianship of David P. Campbell; No. 34303-1-III, In re Guardianship of Anna Carey; No. 34310-3-III, In re Guardianship of Jared Collier; No. 34297-2-III; In re Guardianship of Carisa M. Cornelius; No. 34248-4-III, In re Guardianship of Christopher Dean; No. 34289-1-III, In re Guardianship of Sarah DeMary; No. 34281-6-III, In re Guardianship of Catherine Desjardins; No. 34284-1-III, In re Guardianship of Steven Eberhart; No. 34247-6-III, In re Guardianship of Aaron Cory Eisenman; No. 34300-6-III, In re Trust of Minor Portia Elvidge; No. 34309-0-III, In re Guardianship of Lynn Fairbanks; No. 34253-1-III, In re Guardianship of Michael Fenske; No. 34272-7-III, In re Guardianship of Marlo Foster; No. 34294-8-III, In re Guardianship of Marlene Friesen; No. 34282-4-III, In re Guardianship of Alejandro Garcia; No. 34267-1-III, In re Guardianship of Ron Gehring; No. 34258-1-III, In re Guardianship of Thomas Getchell; No. 34296-4-III, In re Special Needs Trust of Jessica Harmon; No. 34237-9-III, In re Guardianship of Bart Harrington; No. 34299-9-III, In re Guardianship of Robert D. Harris; No. 34290-5-III, In re Est. of Rex Lee Hartley; No. 34256-5-III, In re Guardianship of Teresa C. Higgins; No. 34238- 7-III, In re Guardianship of Michaele Hood; No. 34242-5-III, In re Guardianship of Marjorie K. Hopper; No. 34269-7-III, In re Guardianship of Connie L. House; No. No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al.
SIDDOWAY, J. — Hallmark Care Services, Inc. and Lori Petersen assign error to
two sets of judgments and orders in these appeals. The appeals were commenced with
their notices of appeal of 76 judgments dated January 19, 2016, that were entered against
34241-7-III, In re Guardianship of Bertha L. Jenkins; No. 34255-7-III, In re Guardianship of Robert E. Loss; No. 34271-9-III, In re Guardianship of June I. Love; No. 34279-4-III, In re Guardianship of Bella Mally; No. 34301-4-III, In re Guardianship of Helen Martin; No. 34259-0-III, In re Guardianship of Murphy McCoy; No. 34265-4- III, In re Guardianship of Margaret McDirmid; No. 34260-3-III, In re Guardianship of Malcolm D. McLellan; No. 34240-9-III, In re Guardianship of Carl McMorris; No. 34275-1-III, In re Guardianship of Bernetta Melton; No. 34250-6-III, In re Guardianship of Thomas Miller, Jr.; No. 34268-9-III, In re the Guardianship of Sharon Westerman Moore; No. 34266-2-III, In re Guardianship of Gustavo Morales; No. 34264- 6-III, In re Guardianship of Ruth Morales; No. 34302-2-III, In re Guardianship of Rosalind Elena Morris; No. 34304-9-III, In re Guardianship of Clayton Nalley; No. 34285-9-III, In re Guardianship of Joseph H. Naylor; No. 34305-7-III, In re Guardianship of Louise L. Nichols; No. 34308-1-III, In re Guardianship of H. Kurt Olson; No. 34276-0-III, In the Guardianship of Barbara A. Oppegaard; No. 34244-1-III, In re Guardianship of Lewis Palmer; No. 34293-0-III, In re Guardianship of Sharon Louise Pitner; No. 34278-6-III, In re Guardianship of Lucas F. Rivero; No. 34270-1-III, In re Guardianship of Holly Mae Sanford; No. 34262-0-III, In re Guardianship of Janet Lynn Shaw; No. 34291-3-III, In re Nehemiah Daniel Slater; No. 34307-3-III, In re Guardianship of Judd Smelcer; No. 34286-7-III, In re Guardianship of Joan S. Smith; No. 34283-2-III, In re Guardianship of Leslie Stanich; No. 34239-5-III, In re Guardianship of Kristen Patrice Sternberg; No. 34245-0-III, In re Guardianship of Nanci Jo Stocker; No. 34249-2-III, In re Guardianship of Elvella Storrud; No. 34254-9-III, In re Guardianship of Margaret L. Sullivan; No. 34261-1-III, In re Guardianship of Jared Trimble; No. 34257-3-III, In re Guardianship of Robert W. Tuckerman; No. 34274-3-III, In re Guardianship of Arthur Underwood; No. 34263-8-III, In re Guardianship of Betty Vingo; No. 34246-8-III, In re Guardianship of Donna Vogel; No. 34298-1-III, In re Guardianship of Dawn Wesselman; No. 34280-8-III, In re Guardianship of Ralph Carl White; No. 34320-1-III, In re Guardianship of Jeffrey R. Williams; No. 34252-2-III, In re Guardianship of Walter L. Withers; No. 34292-1-III, In re Guardianship of Mary E. Wright; No. 34277-8-III, In re Guardianship of Linda Zauner; No. 34243-3-III, In re Guardianship of James Zingale.
2 No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al.
them and in favor of Spokane County as contempt sanctions (the contempt judgments).
After the superior court vacated the contempt judgments on its own motion in September
2019 and then denied Hallmark’s and Petersen’s requests for awards of costs, Hallmark
and Petersen appealed the cost orders, which this court treated as amending the 2016
notices of appeal. Representative copies of the original and amended notices of appeal
with the challenged contempt judgment and cost order are attached in an appendix
(Ex. A).
Also before us is a motion to dismiss this appeal as moot, which was filed by an
attorney for Spokane County’s Guardianship Monitoring Program.
We dismiss the appeals of the contempt judgments as moot. We affirm the trial
court’s orders denying Hallmark’s and Petersen’s requests for cost awards.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After Lori Petersen, a certified professional guardian, was disciplined by the
Certified Professional Guardianship Board with a 12-month suspension, review was
initiated in Spokane County Superior Court of guardianships in which two certified
professional guardianship agencies (CPGAs) by which she had been employed—
Hallmark Care Services, Inc. d/b/a Castlemark Guardianship and Trusts, and Hallmark
Care Services, Inc. d/b/a Eagle Guardianship and Professional Services (collectively
Hallmark)—were serving as court-appointed guardians. In re Guardianship of Holcomb,
3 No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al.
No. 33356-6-III, slip op. at 4, 7-8 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2018) (unpublished).1 The
Hallmark CPGAs and Petersen were removed as guardians, and in May and June 2015
Hallmark and/or Petersen filed notices of appeal in over 120 guardianships. They
challenged the court’s appointment of a special master, its removal of them as guardians,
and judgments entered against them for the cost of guardians ad litem in the cases in
which they were removed. Id. at 16-17. The appeals were consolidated, with
Guardianship of Holcomb serving as the anchor case.
In February 2016, Hallmark and Petersen filed this second set of appeals, seeking
review of contempt judgments entered against them in 76 guardianship matters. After
Hallmark’s and Petersen’s removals as guardian, the superior court had ordered them to
file accountings. When they failed to do so in the 76 cases, the court entered a $228
judgment as a contempt sanction in each case. Appeal of the contempt judgments was
stayed pending a decision and issuance of the mandate in Holcomb.
Early in the Holcomb appeal, a Spokane County deputy prosecutor moved for
permission to appear as amicus curiae for Spokane County’s Guardianship Monitoring
Program, an arm of the county’s superior court administrator’s office (hereafter “the
Monitoring Program”). He contended that the individual guardianships lacked the funds
1 Available at https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/333566_unp.pdf.
4 No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al.
to defend the court’s orders. The motion was granted by our commissioner, who ruled
that the prosecutor’s participation as special amicus would assist this court within the
meaning of RAP 10.6(a). In the same ruling, our commissioner held that orders
removing the Hallmark CPGAs as guardians were not appealable by them because the
CPGAs were not aggrieved parties.
This court’s opinion filed in Guardianship of Holcomb in October 2018 reversed
all of the judgments imposing guardian ad litem fees against Hallmark and Petersen,
concluding that the judgments were entered without affording Hallmark and Petersen due
process. The court’s reasons and more of the underlying facts are recounted in the
opinion in that first appeal. Following remand, Spokane County abandoned its earlier
effort to recover guardian ad litem fees from Hallmark and Petersen.
Following our decision in Guardianship of Holcomb and issuance of the mandate,
notification to the parties in this appeal of a briefing schedule prompted the deputy
prosecutor who had served as special amicus to seek leave under RAP 7.2(e) for the
Spokane County Superior Court to dismiss the contempt judgments on its own motion.
The prosecutor’s RAP 7.2(e) motion was supported by a declaration from then-superior
court presiding Judge Harold D. Clarke III, in which Judge Clarke explained:
6. Commissioner [Steven] Grovdahl issued sanctions to be [paid] to Spokane County at a rate of $3.00 a day for every day [Petersen] and her guardianship agencies failed to perform accountings in each
5 No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al.
Guardianship. Commissioner Grovdahl thereafter entered judgment in each of the Guardianships referenced in Attachment “A.” 7. Appellant never performed the accountings. .... 9. Having reviewed the issues in this case I am at this time respectfully requesting this Court to grant the Superior Court Jurisdiction pursuant to RAP 7.2 to enter an order vacating the orders imposing sanctions on Appellant. 10. The reason for vacating the orders at this time is that the sanctions were originally imposed to coerce Appellants to perform their legal obligations in preparing accountings in each of the Guardianships for which she was removed in the summer of 2015. 11. Civil Contempt Sanctions can be imposed only as long as it is possible for a party to purge themselves of the contempt by performing the Court’s directions. See In Re King v. Department of Social and Health Services, 110 Wn.2d 793, 804, 756 P.2d 793 (1988); United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 103 S. Ct. 1548, 75 L.Ed.2d 521 (1983). 12. Since Appellant and her businesses have not yet had control over the estates in question for a number of years, she would not presently be in a position to provide accurate accountings at this stage. Moreover, any accountings prepared at this point would be of no value to the present Guardians. It is therefore pointless to pursue sanctions at this juncture. 13. A copy of the Superior Court’s proposed order vacating the judgments imposing sanctions in these matters which the Court proposes to enter after a presentment hearing as soon as practical is attached hereto.
Mot. to Permit Super. Ct. to Enter an Ord., Ex. 2, Decl. of Harold D. Clarke, III at 2-4, In
re Guardianship of Mitchell, No. 34236-1-III (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2019) (on file with
court). Our commissioner granted the motion in a letter ruling on August 9, 2019.
The superior court’s proposed order vacated its October 2015 order imposing
sanctions and the resulting judgments. Hallmark and Petersen filed a response in the trial
6 No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al.
court in which they agreed that the orders and judgments should be vacated. But they
objected to the proposed order’s characterization of the order imposing sanctions as
“lawful” and to its characterization of the underlying claims in the case as being “fully
resolved.” E.g., Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 27972-27974. Hallmark and Petersen also filed a
declaration with the trial court identifying a total of $2,558.50 in statutory attorney fees
and other amounts that they asked be awarded to them as costs.2
Presentment of the proposed orders vacating the contempt judgments took place
before Judge Clarke on September 13, 2019. He entered orders vacating the October
2016 orders imposing sanctions and resulting judgments at that time, but took the cost
issue under advisement.
On September 23, 2019, Judge Clarke entered an “Order Re: Statutory Fees and
Costs” that denied Hallmark’s and Petersen’s requests for costs. He determined that
neither the superior court nor the Monitoring Program—against whom Hallmark and
Petersen sought to recover the costs—were parties to the guardianship cases. He also
determined that if Hallmark and Petersen were parties, they did not prevail in any
substantive way because the court had vacated the contempt sanctions on its own motion.
2 This amount consisted of $1,306.80 for “Copies, LAR0.7 Motion, Motion to waive fees, Motion for Stay 8712 copies x $.15 (22 service parties, 76 separate cases),” $100.00 for “Mailing Costs (22 service parties),” $290.00 for “Filing Fee - Court of Appeals,” $196.00 for “Transcription Costs - Statement of Arrangments [sic] (paid to Ct. Reporter),” and $665.70 for “Current motion 4438 x .[1]5 = 665.70.” CP at 27983.
7 No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al.
After the superior court vacated the contempt orders and judgments, but before
Hallmark and Petersen filed their amended notices of appeal, the Monitoring Program
moved to dismiss this appeal as moot. Hallmark and Petersen opposed the motion. It
was referred to the panel for decision. Hallmark and Petersen timely filed amended
notices of appeal of the cost orders.
ANALYSIS
I. APPEAL OF THE JUDGMENTS IMPOSING CONTEMPT SANCTIONS IS MOOT
The Monitoring Program moved to dismiss these appeals as moot, arguing that
since the superior court has vacated the orders imposing sanctions and resulting
judgments, this court can no longer provide effective relief. It cites State v. Gentry for
the propositions that “[o]rdinarily, this Court will not consider a question that is purely
academic,” and, “A case is moot if a court can no longer provide effective relief.”
125 Wn.2d 570, 616, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995).
Hallmark and Petersen argue that dismissal is unwarranted for two reasons: the
Monitoring Program lacks standing to bring the motion to dismiss, since it is neither a
party nor has it been recognized as amicus curiae in this appeal, and there is a matter—
specifically, their requests for costs—that has not yet been addressed. Hallmark and
Petersen also move to strike the attachments to the Monitoring Program’s motion to
dismiss, which they argue are not part of the trial or appellate record in this matter.
On the issue of standing, the motion to dismiss acknowledged that the deputy
8 No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al.
prosecutor filing the motion had been granted special amicus statute in different but
related appeals. It pointed out that this court had continued to give the deputy prosecutor
notice of these appeals, and evidently had not given notice to the individual
guardianships. According to the certificate of mailing attached to Hallmark’s and
Petersen’s amended notices of appeal, they directed copies of those notices to only the
deputy prosecutor. See, e.g., Appendix, Ex. B. This court’s amended perfection letter
dated November 19, 2019, was addressed to only two lawyers: the lawyer for Hallmark
and Petersen, and the deputy prosecutor. The amended perfection letter provided that
“[t]he Amicus Curiae Respondent’s brief is due in this court 30 days after service of the
appellant’s brief.” Letter, In re Guardianship of Miller, No. 34236-1-III (Wash. Ct. App.
Nov. 19, 2019) (boldface omitted) (available from court).
Amicus curiae status may be granted by motion or on the court’s request.
RAP 10.6. The motion for leave to file an amicus brief may be filed with the brief.
RAP 10.6(b). “The appellate court may ask for an amicus brief at any stage of review.”
RAP 10.6(c). The amended perfection letter sent to counsel in November 2019 implicitly
granted the deputy prosecutor’s request to file the motion to dismiss and authorized his
participation in these appeals as special amicus.
Turning to the motion to strike, RAP 17.4(f) directs a person who files a motion to
file all supporting papers with its motion. A motion to dismiss an appeal as moot will
9 No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al.
generally be supported by evidence that is not part of the appellate record. Unlike
attachments to briefs that are relevant to the substance of errors assigned on appeal,
evidentiary support for a motion to dismiss an appeal need not be added to the appellate
record.
Hallmark and Petersen contend this appeal should not be dismissed as moot
because they objected to the trial court’s basis for vacating its contempt orders and
judgments and because this court can still meaningfully review the order denying their
requests for awards of costs.
These appeals are moot with respect to the contempt judgments, the original object
of the appeals. “A vacated judgment has no effect,” and “[t]he rights of the parties are
left as though the judgment had never been entered.” In re Marriage of Leslie, 112
Wn.2d 612, 618, 772 P.2d 1013 (1989). Hallmark and Petersen objected to the trial
court’s reasons for vacating the orders and judgments, arguing that they should have been
vacated because the underlying court order that required the accountings to be filed was
not lawful. E.g., Rep. of Proc. (Sept. 13, 2019) at 53, 55. They explained that the
purpose of their response in opposition to the proposed orders was to make a record that
they disagreed that the trial court had a lawful basis for ordering the accountings.
Id. at 53, 55. That record has been made. This court can offer no other effective relief.
The appeal is not moot with respect to the orders denying Hallmark’s and
10 No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al.
Petersen’s requests for awards of costs, because effective relief can be granted: if they
successfully argue that the trial court erred in denying their requests, we can remand for
entry of cost awards.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. We
dismiss review of Hallmark’s and Petersen’s appeals of the contempt judgments. We
deny the motion to dismiss their appeals of the cost orders.
II. THE SUPERIOR COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO AWARD COSTS
The superior court denied Hallmark’s and Petersen’s requests for costs after
concluding (1) neither the superior court nor the Monitoring Program are “parties” to the
underlying proceedings; and (2) even if Hallmark and Petersen are parties, they are not
“prevailing parties” because the superior court vacated the contempt orders and
judgments on its own motion.
We review a decision denying costs for abuse of discretion. Fluke Cap. & Mgmt.
Servs. Co. v. Richmond, 106 Wn.2d 614, 625, 724 P.2d 356 (1986); Prosser Hill Coal. v.
County of Spokane, 176 Wn. App. 280, 292, 309 P.3d 1202 (2013). Discretion is abused
when its exercise is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons.
T.S. v. Boy Scouts of Am., 157 Wn.2d 416, 423, 138 P.3d 1053 (2006). A discretionary
decision is based on untenable grounds if the record does not support the court’s findings;
it is made for untenable reasons if the court applies the wrong legal standard or the facts
11 No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al.
do not satisfy the correct standard; and it is manifestly unreasonable if, based on the facts
and correct standard, it is outside the range of acceptable choices. In re Parentage of
Schroeder, 106 Wn. App. 343, 349, 22 P.3d 1280 (2001).
A. RCW 4.84.010, 4.84.030, and 4.84.090: a “prevailing party” is one who recovers an affirmative judgment in his or her favor
Hallmark and Petersen’s argument on the merits begins with RCW 4.84.030,
which provides that “[i]n any action in the superior court . . . the prevailing party shall be
entitled to his or her costs and disbursements.” “[T]he term ‘prevailing party’ is not
defined in the same manner in every statute.” AllianceOne Receivables Mgmt., Inc. v.
Lewis, 180 Wn.2d 389, 394, 325 P.3d 904 (2014). Determining who is a prevailing party
“‘depends upon the extent of the relief afforded the parties.’” Prosser Hill Coal., 176
Wn. App. at 293 (quoting Riss v. Angel, 131 Wn.2d 612, 633, 934 P.2d 669 (1997));
Durland v. San Juan County, 174 Wn. App. 1, 25, 298 P.3d 757 (2012).
“In general, a prevailing party is one who receives an affirmative judgment in his
or her favor.” Riss, 131 Wn.2d at 633. This is the case for RCW 4.84.010 and RCW
4.84.030, and seemingly RCW 4.84.090 as well. Burman v. State, 50 Wn. App. 433, 445,
749 P.2d 708 (1988) (RCW 4.84.030); Stout v. State, 60 Wn. App. 527, 528, 803 P.2d
1352 (1991) (RCW 4.84.010); see State ex rel. Lemon v. Coffin, 52 Wn.2d 894, 896-97,
332 P.2d 1096 (1958) (stating “By the terms of RCW 4.84.030, the prevailing party is
entitled as a matter of right . . . to other specific items as provided in RCW 4.84.090.”
12 No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al.
(emphasis added)).
Hallmark and Petersen did not receive affirmative judgments in their favor,
so the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to award them costs under
RCW 4.84.010, .030, and .090.
B. RCW 4.84.060: “Defendant” eligibility for costs
When a cost statute’s prevailing party determination does not depend on receipt of
an affirmative judgment, the determination turns on “whether the claimant meets the
conditions of the specific statute” that authorizes the costs. AllianceOne, 180 Wn.2d at
394. Hallmark and Petersen also claim entitlement to costs under RCW 4.84.060.
RCW 4.84.060 provides, “In all cases where costs and disbursements are not allowed to
the plaintiff, the defendant shall be entitled to have judgment in his or her favor for the
same.” (Emphasis added.) Chapter 4.84 RCW does not define “plaintiff” or
“defendant.” The ordinary meaning of “plaintiff” is “[t]he party who brings a civil suit in
a court of law”; the ordinary meaning of “defendant” is “[a] person sued in a civil
proceeding or accused in a criminal proceeding.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1391, 528
(11th ed. 2019).
Hallmark and Petersen characterize the superior court as having brought 76
actions against them, making the superior court a “plaintiff” and making them
“defendants” within the meaning of RCW 4.84.060. But the superior court plainly did
13 No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al.
not bring a civil suit; in entering the contempt judgments, it was exercising its authority
as a court to “impose a sanction for contempt of court under [chapter 7.21 RCW].”
RCW 7.21.020. Hallmark and Petersen were plainly not being sued in a civil proceeding
or accused in a criminal proceeding; they were being sanctioned as alleged contemnors.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to award Hallmark and
Petersen costs under RCW 4.84.060.
C. RCW 4.84.250 and RCW 4.84.270: in “actions for damages,” a defendant is a prevailing party only if there is an “entry of judgment” under which the plaintiff “recovers” nothing or less than was offered in settlement
Hallmark and Petersen also invoke RCW 4.84.250, the small claims statute, under
which, as of 2019, a prevailing party can be taxed and allowed a reasonable attorney fee
as part of the costs, “in any action for damages where the amount pleaded by the
prevailing party as hereinafter defined” is less than $10,000. (Emphasis added.)
RCW 4.84.270 provides that “[t]he defendant, or party resisting relief” shall be deemed
the prevailing party for purposes of RCW 4.84.250 where “the plaintiff, or party seeking
relief in an action for damages” recovers nothing, or the same or less than the amount
offered it in settlement. (Emphasis added.) In its controlling decision in AllianceOne,
the Washington Supreme Court held that “[w]ithout an entry of judgment by the court,
there is no recovery and there can be no prevailing party under RCW 4.84.250 and .270.”
180 Wn.2d at 396. AllianceOne holds that for a defendant or party resisting relief to
14 No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al.
recover reasonable attorney fees under RCW 4.84.250, it must show “(1) the damages
sought were equal to or less than $10,000, (2) [the defendant or party resisting relief] was
deemed the prevailing party, and (3) there was an entry of judgment.” Id. at 398.
Because AllianceOne had voluntarily dismissed its collection action against Lewis, the
Supreme Court held that Lewis failed the second and third requirements. Id. at 399.
These cases plainly did not involve an “action for damages”; they involved the
imposition of remedial sanctions. See RCW 7.21.030. In addition, AllianceOne compels
the conclusion that where the superior court vacated the contempt judgments on its own
motion, there was no entry of judgment and no prevailing party. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion by refusing to award Hallmark and Petersen a reasonable attorney fee
under RCW 4.84.250 and .270.
D. RCW 4.84.170: County liability where private parties would be liable
RCW 4.84.170 provides in relevant part that “[i]n all actions prosecuted . . . in the
name and for the use of any county . . . the . . . county shall be liable for costs in the same
case and to the same extent as private parties.” (Emphasis added.) Similar to the
inapplicability of RCW 4.84.060, the court’s imposition of a remedial sanction for
contempt is plainly not an “action prosecuted in the name and for the use of [the]
county.” Even if it were, Hallmark and Petersen would have to be able to point to the
basis on which a private party would be liable for costs “in the same case and to the same
15 No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al.
extent,” which they fail to do.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to award Hallmark and
Petersen costs under RCW 4.84.170.
E. RCW 4.84.080: Not a cost authorization provision
RCW 4.84.080 does not authorize an award of costs but merely sets the statutory
attorney fee amount. This section “is given force [only] in the context of related rules.”
AllianceOne, 180 Wn.2d at 394.
F. Due process
Finally, Hallmark and Petersen recount acts of alleged judicial misconduct below
that they contend amount to violations of due process. The alleged acts and violations are
untethered to any reasoned argument for costs that was advanced in the superior court. A
party is not entitled to an award of costs as a matter of due process; recovery of costs is a
matter of substance, not procedure, and “is purely a matter of statutory regulation.”
Platts v. Arney, 46 Wn.2d 122, 128, 278 P.2d 657 (1955) (citing State ex rel. Fosburgh v.
Ronald, 25 Wn.2d 276, 277, 170 P.2d 865 (1946)). We have reviewed and rejected all of
the statutory bases on which Hallmark and Petersen claim to be entitled to costs. Their
“‘naked castings into the constitutional seas are not sufficient to command judicial
consideration and discussion.’” State v. Johnson, 179 Wn.2d 534, 558, 315 P.3d 1090
(2014) (quoting State v. Blilie, 132 Wn.2d 484, 493 n.2, 939 P.2d 691 (1997)).
16 No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al.
We dismiss the appeals of the contempt judgments as moot. We affirm the trial
court’s orders denying Hallmark’s and Petersen’s requests for cost awards.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
Siddoway, J.
WE CONCUR:
Lawrence-Berrey, A.C.J.
Staab, J.
17 No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix
Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix
Guardianship of: Last Name First Name Trial Court # COA # Blair Krista L. 10-4-01235-6 343111 Bowen Ernest 97-4-00967-9 342735 Bowers Richard 02-4-00989-3 342956 Boyd Cleora K. 12-4-01327-8 342883 Brangwin Linda S. 00-4-9437-6 342875 Campbell David P. 11-4-00044-5 342514 Carey Anna 08-4-00665-6 343031 Collier Jared 10-4-01013-2 343103 Cornelius Carisa M. 05-4-00548-5 342972 Dean Christopher 06-4-01476-8 342484 Demary Sarah 08-4-01645-7 342891 Desjardins Catherine 10-4-00727-1 342816 Eberhart Steven 12-4-00510-1 342841 Eisenman Aaron Cory 07-4-00293-8 342476 Elvidge Portia 06-4-00102-0 343006 Fairbanks Lynn 10-4-00531-7 343090 Fenske Michael 11-4-04556-6 342531 Foster Marlo 95-4-01412-9 342727 Friesen Marlene 02-4-00384-4 342948 Garcia Alejandro 11-4-00300-2 342824 Gehring Ron 01-4-00294-7 342671 Getchell Thomas 01-4-01342-6 342581 Harmon Jessica 03-4-00764-3 342964 Harrington Bart 13-4-00268-1 342379 Harris Robert D. 05-4-01384-4 342999 Hartley Rex Lee NKA Jonathan Hartley 01-4-00821-0 342905 Higgins Teresa C. nka Teresa Horan 12-4-00250-1 342565 Hood Michaele 13-4-00267-3 342387 Hopper Margorie K. 12-4-00511-9 342425 House Connie L. 12-4-01004-0 342697 Jenkins Bertha L. 12-4-00690-5 342417 Loss Robert E. 02-4-01201-1 342557 Love June 94-4-00022-7 342719 Mally Bella 08-4-00968-0 342794 Martin Helen 06-4-01260-9 343014 McCoy Murphy 12-4-00405-8 342590 McDirmid Margaret 12-4-00964-5 342654 McLellan Malcom D. 97-4-01092-8 342603 McMorris Carl 12-4-01005-8 342409 Melton Bernetta 97-4-01239-4 342751 Miller Thomas 05-4-01226-1 342506 Mitchell Donald Raymond *** 00-4-09873-4 342361 Moore Sharon Westerman 14-4-00950-1 342689 Morales Gustavo 12-4-01459-2 342662 Morales Ruth 12-4-00610-7 342646 No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix
Guardianship of: Last Name First Name Trial Court # COA # Morris Rosalind Elena 07-4-00944-4 343022 Nalley Clayton 09-4-00820-7 343049 Naylor Joseph H. 12-4-00677-8 342859 Nichols Louise. L. 09-4-01110-1 343057 Olson H. Kurt 10-4-00513-9 343081 Oppengaard Barbara A. 03-4-01220-5 342760 Palmer Lewis 08-4-00098-4 342441 Pitner Sharon Louise 88-4-01012-1 342930 Rivero Lucas F. 07-4-01357-3 342786 Sanford Holly **** 92-4-00006-9 342701 Shaw Janet Lynn 96-4-01378-3 342620 Slater Nehemiah Daniel 02-4-01155-3 342913 Smelcer Judd 09-4-01453-3 343073 Smith Joan S. 12-4-00998-0 342867 Stanich Leslie 12-4-00381-7 342832 Sternberg Kristen Patrice 12-4-01415-1 342395 Stocker Nanci Jo 07-4-00756-5 342450 Storrud Elvella 06-4-01226-9 342492 Sullivan Margaret L. 12-4-00181-4 342549 Trimble Jared 12-4-00509-7 342611 Tuckerman Robert W. 12-4-00311-6 342573 Underwood Arthur 98-4-00390-3 342743 Vingo Betty 12-4-00595-0 342638 Vogel Donna 10-4-01437-5 342468 Wesselman Dawn 08-4-00910-8 342981 White Ralph Carl 09-4-00282-9 342808 Williams Jeffery R. 88-4-00487-2 343201 Withers Walter L. 04-4-00274-7 342522 Wright Mary E. 02-4-00316-0 342921 Zauner Linda 06-4-01018-5 342778 Zingale James 09-4-00704-9 342433 No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix
Exhibit A No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix
Exhibit B No. 34236-1-III In re Guardianship of Mitchell, et al. Appendix