FILED MARCH 4, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
In re the Estate of DANNY L. SNAPP, ) No. 39925-7-III Deceased. ) ) C. WAYNE MAY, as Personal ) Representative of the Separate Estate of ) DANNY L. SNAPP, ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) LOREN W. SNAPP, ) ) Appellant. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Loren Snapp, the former personal representative of
the Estate of Danny Snapp, appeals the July 26, 2023 order entered with respect to the
Estate’s TEDRA1 petition. We affirm the order, conclude that the later-entered judgment
did not dispose of Snapp’s TEDRA petition, and remand.
1 Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act, chapter 11.96A RCW. No. 39925-7-III Est. of Snap
FACTS
Loren Snapp was appointed personal representative of the estate of his late father,
Danny Snapp. Almost one year later, Snapp was removed as personal representative and
replaced by C. Wayne May.
May filed this TEDRA petition, requesting that Snapp provide a full accounting of
his time and expenses. On July 10, 2023—two days before the TEDRA hearing—Snapp
filed his own TEDRA petition (under the same cause number), requesting that May
provide a full accounting of time and expenses and requesting damages against May. On
the same day as his TEDRA filing, Snapp responded to the Estate’s TEDRA petition by
filing six invoices for time and expenses purportedly incurred while he administered his
father’s estate.
At the July 12, 2023 TEDRA hearing, the superior court declined to also hear
Snapp’s TEDRA petition against May. The court advised the parties that Snapp’s claims
could be heard at a later date; Snapp did not object. The court heard arguments with
respect to the Estate’s TEDRA petition and took the matter under advisement to carefully
review Snapp’s invoices.
On July 26, 2023, a court commissioner heard Snapp’s TEDRA petition against
May. The commissioner asked the Estate if it objected to Snapp’s petition being brought
under the same cause number as the Estate’s TEDRA petition. The Estate noted the
2 No. 39925-7-III Est. of Snap
procedure was irregular, but waived objections. The commissioner then ruled that
portions of Snapp’s claims were barred from review and that it could not rule on the
remainder of Snapp’s claims until the superior court decided the Estate’s TEDRA
petition.
Later on July 26, 2023, the superior court entered an order with respect to the
Estate’s TEDRA petition. The order, which included several findings of fact, found that
Snapp’s six invoices were vague, not supported by receipts, and overstated a reasonable
amount of time for the tasks described. The court determined that “the sum of
$46,709.89 has not been accounted for, nor verified as being used for the benefit of the
estate.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 109. It concluded that the Estate was entitled to offset
$46,709.89 against any distribution Snapp otherwise would have received from the
Estate. The court additionally awarded the Estate its reasonable attorney fees and costs
against Snapp, in an amount later to be determined. On August 16, 2023, Snapp appealed
the superior court’s July 26, 2023 order.
A few weeks later, the Estate moved for entry of an award of reasonable attorney
fees and costs. The court commissioner who had heard Snapp’s TEDRA petition entered
judgment against Snapp for $64,845.89, which included the $46,709.89 award against
3 No. 39925-7-III Est. of Snap
Snapp, and $18,136.00 for the Estate’s reasonable attorney fees. Nothing in the judgment
disposed of Snapp’s TEDRA petition.2
ANALYSIS
Snapp, acting pro se, raises four arguments on appeal: (1) the superior court erred
by not hearing his TEDRA petition against May, (2) the court commissioner erred by not
fully hearing his TEDRA petition, (3) the commissioner erred when it entered judgment
despite his TEDRA petition against May not having been determined, and (4) the
judgment should be reversed because his requested time and expenses were reasonable
and necessary. We partly agree with Snapp’s third argument.
Disposition of first claim
Snapp’s first claim is that the superior court erred by failing to hear his TEDRA
petition against May. As explained below, we decline to review this claim.
The superior court declined to hear Snapp’s TEDRA petition against May and
explained that the petition could be heard later. Snapp did not object to this procedure.
2 The record, including the judgment, does not contain any order relating to Snapp’s TEDRA petition against May. We might infer various findings from entry of the judgment, but we refuse to do so. “As a rule, an appellate court ‘generally cannot make findings of fact, and will not endeavor to do so based on an incomplete record.’” Dalton M, LLC v. N. Cascade Trustee Servs., Inc., 2 Wn.3d 36, 53, 534 P.3d 339 (2023) (quoting Garcia v. Henley, 190 Wn.2d 539, 544, 415 P.3d 241 (2018)).
4 No. 39925-7-III Est. of Snap
RAP 2.5(a) generally precludes an appellate court from considering claims of error
not preserved by an objection. Because Snapp did not object to the procedure explained
by the superior court, we will not consider his first claim of error.
Disposition of second claim
Snapp’s second claim is that the court commissioner erred by not fully considering
his TEDRA petition against May. As explained below, we decline to review this claim.
The court commissioner ruled on only a portion of Snapp’s TEDRA petition
against May. Because Snapp’s other claims, in whole or in part, overlapped with the
Estate’s unresolved TEDRA claims, the commissioner declined to make a dispositive
ruling. Snapp’s TEDRA petition against May is still pending before the commissioner.
Disposition of third claim
Snapp’s third claim is that the court commissioner erred by entering the judgment
after Snapp filed this appeal. We agree in part.
To the extent Snapp is arguing the court commissioner erred by awarding attorney
fees against him after he filed his notice of appeal, we reject this argument. RAP 7.2(d)
permits a court to enter an award of attorney fees even after a notice of appeal is filed.
To the extent Snapp is arguing his TEDRA petition against May never has been
resolved, we agree. “A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in
5 No. 39925-7-III Est. of Snap
the action.” CR 54(a)(1). Where a judgment fails to dispose of all claims, it must be
treated for what it is, a partial judgment.
We remand to the court commissioner to fully consider Snapp’s TEDRA petition
against May and to enter any appropriate order.
Disposition of fourth issue
Snapp’s fourth claim is that the trial court erred by not fully crediting him for the
time and expenses he incurred for administering his father’s estate. In his argument, he
makes similar assertions he made to the trial court.
In general, an appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s findings of fact.
Kitsap County v. Kitsap Rifle & Revolver Club, 184 Wn. App. 252, 295, 337 P.3d 328
(2014).
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FILED MARCH 4, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
In re the Estate of DANNY L. SNAPP, ) No. 39925-7-III Deceased. ) ) C. WAYNE MAY, as Personal ) Representative of the Separate Estate of ) DANNY L. SNAPP, ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) LOREN W. SNAPP, ) ) Appellant. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Loren Snapp, the former personal representative of
the Estate of Danny Snapp, appeals the July 26, 2023 order entered with respect to the
Estate’s TEDRA1 petition. We affirm the order, conclude that the later-entered judgment
did not dispose of Snapp’s TEDRA petition, and remand.
1 Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act, chapter 11.96A RCW. No. 39925-7-III Est. of Snap
FACTS
Loren Snapp was appointed personal representative of the estate of his late father,
Danny Snapp. Almost one year later, Snapp was removed as personal representative and
replaced by C. Wayne May.
May filed this TEDRA petition, requesting that Snapp provide a full accounting of
his time and expenses. On July 10, 2023—two days before the TEDRA hearing—Snapp
filed his own TEDRA petition (under the same cause number), requesting that May
provide a full accounting of time and expenses and requesting damages against May. On
the same day as his TEDRA filing, Snapp responded to the Estate’s TEDRA petition by
filing six invoices for time and expenses purportedly incurred while he administered his
father’s estate.
At the July 12, 2023 TEDRA hearing, the superior court declined to also hear
Snapp’s TEDRA petition against May. The court advised the parties that Snapp’s claims
could be heard at a later date; Snapp did not object. The court heard arguments with
respect to the Estate’s TEDRA petition and took the matter under advisement to carefully
review Snapp’s invoices.
On July 26, 2023, a court commissioner heard Snapp’s TEDRA petition against
May. The commissioner asked the Estate if it objected to Snapp’s petition being brought
under the same cause number as the Estate’s TEDRA petition. The Estate noted the
2 No. 39925-7-III Est. of Snap
procedure was irregular, but waived objections. The commissioner then ruled that
portions of Snapp’s claims were barred from review and that it could not rule on the
remainder of Snapp’s claims until the superior court decided the Estate’s TEDRA
petition.
Later on July 26, 2023, the superior court entered an order with respect to the
Estate’s TEDRA petition. The order, which included several findings of fact, found that
Snapp’s six invoices were vague, not supported by receipts, and overstated a reasonable
amount of time for the tasks described. The court determined that “the sum of
$46,709.89 has not been accounted for, nor verified as being used for the benefit of the
estate.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 109. It concluded that the Estate was entitled to offset
$46,709.89 against any distribution Snapp otherwise would have received from the
Estate. The court additionally awarded the Estate its reasonable attorney fees and costs
against Snapp, in an amount later to be determined. On August 16, 2023, Snapp appealed
the superior court’s July 26, 2023 order.
A few weeks later, the Estate moved for entry of an award of reasonable attorney
fees and costs. The court commissioner who had heard Snapp’s TEDRA petition entered
judgment against Snapp for $64,845.89, which included the $46,709.89 award against
3 No. 39925-7-III Est. of Snap
Snapp, and $18,136.00 for the Estate’s reasonable attorney fees. Nothing in the judgment
disposed of Snapp’s TEDRA petition.2
ANALYSIS
Snapp, acting pro se, raises four arguments on appeal: (1) the superior court erred
by not hearing his TEDRA petition against May, (2) the court commissioner erred by not
fully hearing his TEDRA petition, (3) the commissioner erred when it entered judgment
despite his TEDRA petition against May not having been determined, and (4) the
judgment should be reversed because his requested time and expenses were reasonable
and necessary. We partly agree with Snapp’s third argument.
Disposition of first claim
Snapp’s first claim is that the superior court erred by failing to hear his TEDRA
petition against May. As explained below, we decline to review this claim.
The superior court declined to hear Snapp’s TEDRA petition against May and
explained that the petition could be heard later. Snapp did not object to this procedure.
2 The record, including the judgment, does not contain any order relating to Snapp’s TEDRA petition against May. We might infer various findings from entry of the judgment, but we refuse to do so. “As a rule, an appellate court ‘generally cannot make findings of fact, and will not endeavor to do so based on an incomplete record.’” Dalton M, LLC v. N. Cascade Trustee Servs., Inc., 2 Wn.3d 36, 53, 534 P.3d 339 (2023) (quoting Garcia v. Henley, 190 Wn.2d 539, 544, 415 P.3d 241 (2018)).
4 No. 39925-7-III Est. of Snap
RAP 2.5(a) generally precludes an appellate court from considering claims of error
not preserved by an objection. Because Snapp did not object to the procedure explained
by the superior court, we will not consider his first claim of error.
Disposition of second claim
Snapp’s second claim is that the court commissioner erred by not fully considering
his TEDRA petition against May. As explained below, we decline to review this claim.
The court commissioner ruled on only a portion of Snapp’s TEDRA petition
against May. Because Snapp’s other claims, in whole or in part, overlapped with the
Estate’s unresolved TEDRA claims, the commissioner declined to make a dispositive
ruling. Snapp’s TEDRA petition against May is still pending before the commissioner.
Disposition of third claim
Snapp’s third claim is that the court commissioner erred by entering the judgment
after Snapp filed this appeal. We agree in part.
To the extent Snapp is arguing the court commissioner erred by awarding attorney
fees against him after he filed his notice of appeal, we reject this argument. RAP 7.2(d)
permits a court to enter an award of attorney fees even after a notice of appeal is filed.
To the extent Snapp is arguing his TEDRA petition against May never has been
resolved, we agree. “A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in
5 No. 39925-7-III Est. of Snap
the action.” CR 54(a)(1). Where a judgment fails to dispose of all claims, it must be
treated for what it is, a partial judgment.
We remand to the court commissioner to fully consider Snapp’s TEDRA petition
against May and to enter any appropriate order.
Disposition of fourth issue
Snapp’s fourth claim is that the trial court erred by not fully crediting him for the
time and expenses he incurred for administering his father’s estate. In his argument, he
makes similar assertions he made to the trial court.
In general, an appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s findings of fact.
Kitsap County v. Kitsap Rifle & Revolver Club, 184 Wn. App. 252, 295, 337 P.3d 328
(2014). Here, the trial court found that Snapp’s invoices were vague, not supported by
receipts, and overstated a reasonable amount of time for the tasks described. We will not
disturb these findings.
A personal representative owes a fiduciary duty to the heirs of the estate and must
exercise the utmost good faith and diligence in administering the estate for the heirs’ best
interests. In re Estate of Boatman, 17 Wn. App. 2d 418, 427, 488 P.3d 845 (2021).
Although RCW 11.48.050 allows a personal representative all of their necessary
expenses in the administration of the estate, Snapp breached his fiduciary duty to the
Estate when he withdrew from the Estate monies well excess of his reasonable and
6 No. 39925-7-III Est. of Snap
necessary expenses.
“‘[T]he most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy require that the
wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created.’”
Moore v. Wash. State Health Care Auth., 181 Wn.2d 299, 314, 332 P.3d 461 (2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wenzler & Ward Plumbing & Heating Co. v.
Sellen, 53 Wn.2d 96, 99, 330 P.2d 1068 (1958)). A method for determining
compensation is properly rejected if it would not only result in a less accurate measure,
but would also result in the wrongdoer benefiting from their wrongdoing. See id.
(discussing damages, not compensation).
Here, Snapp failed to present accurate records of his time and expenses for
administering his father’s estate, and he provided no method for the superior court to
estimate his actual time and expenses. Faced between an all or nothing award, we cannot
say the superior court abused its discretion by awarding Snapp nothing.
Request for attorney fees and costs
The Estate, citing RCW 11.96A.150, requests its reasonable attorney fees and
costs on appeal. Here, the Estate prevailed on three of four claims. Subject to the
Estate’s compliance with RAP 18.1(d), we award it one-half of its reasonable attorney
fees and all of its statutory costs.
7 No. 39925-7-111 Est. ofSnap
We affirm the July 26, 2023 order, conclude that the later-entered judgment did
not dispose of Snapp's TEDRA petition, and remand.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
l .....,.. AV .. R>~ . . , c..~ Lawrence-Berrey, C.J. 1 WE CONCUR:
~~,.::r. Fearing, J. Staab, J.