In the Matter of Tape City, U.S.A., Inc., Debtor. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corporation v. Tape City, U.S.A., Inc.

677 F.2d 401, 7 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 121, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 19617, 9 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 280
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit·Decided April 30, 1982·No. 81-3428·Published·Cited by 20 cases

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Tape City, U.S.A., Inc. (Tape City) appeals from a District Court judgment af *402 firming the decision of the Bankruptcy Court. On the baseball theory of three strikes, you’re out, we affirm.

Borg-Warner Acceptance Corporation (Borg-Warner) in December 1979 entered into an agreement with Tape City to finance part of Tape City’s inventory in its New Orleans area stores. Suppliers sold merchandise to Borg-Warner, which paid them, but they shipped directly to Tape City. Borg-Warner and the suppliers executed various security devices including an assignment of the suppliers’ Louisiana vendor’s privilege to Borg-Warner, 1 with Tape City’s approval.

On June 18, 1980, Tape City filed for bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. No trustee was appointed; Tape City continued in possession of its property. 2 On July 28, 1980, Borg-Warner filed a complaint seeking modification of the debtor’s stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). 3 It alleged that its vendor’s privileges constituted a secured claim against Tape City and demanded adequate protection of its interests in the merchandise. The Bankruptcy Court held the vendor’s privilege valid and ordered Tape City to furnish adequate protection. Tape City appealed, arguing that the bankruptcy proceedings should not recognize the vendor’s privilege. 4

Both the Bankruptcy Court and District Court recognized that In re Trahan, 283 F.Supp. 620 (W.D.La.1968), aff’d on opinion below, 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Bernard v. Beneficial Finance Co., 394 U.S. 930, 89 S.Ct. 1189, 22 L.Ed.2d 459 (1969), accord, in re Wallace Lincoln-Mercury Co., 469 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1972), governs the instant action unless the new Bankruptcy Code, passed in the interim, establishes the contrary.

We begin with § 545, 5 the successor to § 67(c). Under § 545 a trustee is “clothed *403 with various powers to protect the general unsecured creditors from the effect of .. . liens whose enforcement might be unfairly prejudicial to the bankruptcy estate.... None of these powers, however, permit the trustee to displace an otherwise valid statutory lien.” Rubin and Rubin, supra, note _ at 61. Section 545 grants secured creditors, those with such valid statutory liens upon the debtor’s property, the right to have their claims recognized first. “Where the lien created by law is a perfected, as distinguished from an inchoate, lien, such lien remains valid.” 4 Collier’s on Bankruptcy at 545-5 (15th ed. 1981). While Louisiana law determines the nature of a vendor’s privilege, the Code determines whether it constitutes a secured claim in bankruptcy. Trahan, supra. In Louisiana, a vendor of movable property which has not been paid has a vendor’s privilege on the price of his property so long as the article remains in the possession of the original vendee. L.S.A.-C.C.Arts. 3217(7) and 3227. 6 That privilege is not a spurious one, as the Trahan court and both the Bankruptcy and District Courts here pointed out. Rather, it is a “non-consensual lien that arises solely by operation of law”, a “right which the nature of a debt gives to a creditor and which entitles him to be preferred over other creditors.” Rubin and Rubin, supra, at 62-63.

A debtor in possession in Chapter 11 Reorganization is treated like a Chapter 7 (straight bankruptcy) trustee for purposes of § 545. 7 “For the purposes of testing statutory liens under this provision [§ 545(2)], the trustee is thus given the status of a hypothetical bona fide purchaser and he acquires that status as of the date of the filing of the petition.” 4 Collier’s on Bankruptcy at 545-19. A bona fide purchaser may avoid the privilege, but only if physical possession of the property has passed. “Only the concurrence of both transfer of title and physical delivery vitiates the vendor’s privilege; the privilege remains if either has not occurred.” Rubin and Rubin, supra, at 62. Tape City argues that as a debtor in possession, it is transformed into a bona fide purchaser and may therefore avoid the vendor’s privilege. Trahan considered and rejected a similar argument. Even if Tape City is considered a trustee who, under the legal fiction of the Code, takes as a bona fide purchaser, we cannot accept Tape City’s argument that *404 the mere filing of bankruptcy somehow transfers physical possession of the goods.

Since the trustee cannot terminate a vendor’s privilege, see supra, it follows that Tape City may not do so, either. The new Code effected no substantive change in this regard, so Trahan controls.

AFFIRMED.

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In the Matter of Tape City, U.S.A., Inc., Debtor. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corporation v. Tape City, U.S.A., Inc., 677 F.2d 401, 7 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 121, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 19617, 9 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 280 (5th Cir. 1982).

677 F.2d 401 (In the Matter of Tape City, U.S.A., Inc., Debtor. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corporation v. Tape City, U.S.A., Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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