321 Ga. 681 FINAL COPY
S25Y0649. IN THE MATTER OF STEPHANIE DIANNE WOODARD.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for
voluntary discipline filed by Stephanie Dianne Woodard (State Bar
No. 233695) prior to the filing of a Formal Complaint. See Bar Rule
4-227 (b). Woodard has been a member of the State Bar since 1996
and served as the Solicitor-General of the Hall County State Court
for 15 years. In her petition, Woodard admits that, between July
2018 and September 2022, she received 11 improper
reimbursements from the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council of Georgia
and Hall County and that she entered a guilty plea to one
misdemeanor count of a violation of OCGA § 45-11-4 (b) (1) (a public
officer may be criminally charged for malpractice, misfeasance, or
malfeasance in office) and (b) (5) (a public officer may be criminally
charged for willfully and knowingly demanding more cost than she is entitled to by law), which constitutes a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (3)
and (a) (4) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”),
found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum sanction for a violation
of these Rules is disbarment. While acknowledging that her conduct
was a breach of her duty as a public official, Woodard asserts that
several mitigating factors are applicable and requests that the Court
impose a public reprimand for her Rule violations. In response, the
Bar states that Woodard’s request for a public reprimand is
appropriate but notes that the presumptive penalty for her
violations is a short suspension. Upon careful review, we decline to
accept Woodard’s petition for the reasons explained below.
In her petition, Woodard states that, on June 18, 2024, she was
indicted by a Hall County grand jury on 24 felony counts of criminal
misconduct, which was comprised of 13 counts involving alleged
violations of OCGA § 16-10-201 and 11 counts involving alleged
1 OCGA § 16-10-20 provides:
A person who knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; makes a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
2 violations of OCGA § 16-8-2.2 The 24 counts alleged that, on 11
occasions, Woodard — while serving as the Solicitor-General of the
Hall County State Court — made requests and received
reimbursement for expenses which were not official expenses for
which she was entitled to reimbursement. Specifically, Counts 1-11
related to reimbursements from the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council,
the circumstances of which Woodard contends she has “scant
information,” but believes may have resulted because she
improperly sought reimbursement from both the Prosecuting
Attorneys’ Council and Hall County. Counts 12 and 13 related to an
makes or uses any false writing or document, knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of state government or of the government of any county, city, or other political subdivision of this state shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000.00 or by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years, or both.
2 OCGA § 16-8-2 provides:
A person commits the offense of theft by taking when he unlawfully takes or, being in lawful possession thereof, unlawfully appropriates any property of another with the intention of depriving him of the property, regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or appropriated.
3 improper charge for the cremation of a dog, which Woodard contends
was an inadvertent and improper charge. Counts 14 and 15 related
to cleaning supplies provided to someone Woodard was “re-homing,”
which she contends was a legitimate reimbursement request
pursuant to the Legal Victim Assistance Program and which
resulted in an indictment because of the State’s misunderstanding
of the Program. Counts 16 and 17 related to a meal at a restaurant,
which Woodard also contends was a legitimate reimbursement
request. Counts 18-223 related to an improper charge for an LSAT
prep course for Woodard’s daughter, which she contends happened
because someone on her staff saw the receipt and mistakenly
pursued reimbursement. Counts 23 and 244 related to a pillow
purchased for Woodard’s son, which she contends happened because
she mistakenly used the wrong credit card. In total, the amount of
3 Woodard mistakenly states in her petition that only Counts 18-21 in
the indictment were related to the LSAT prep course, but Count 22 was also related to the same reimbursement. 4 Similar to the previous mistake, Woodard inadvertently omits Count
24 in her description of the counts in her petition, but Counts 23 and 24 are the correct counts related to the reimbursement for the pillow.
4 misappropriated funds was $2,219.28 (with $1,190.48 from the
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council and $1,028.80 from Hall County).
Following the indictment, Woodard and the State began
negotiations and agreed that the matter would be best settled by a
nolle prosequi of the felony charges and Woodard entering a guilty
plea to one misdemeanor count of a violation of OCGA § 45-11-4 (b)
(1) and (b) (5). According to Woodard, the State was concerned as to
whether there was sufficient evidence to prove scienter or intent, as
required for the indicted felony charges. Nevertheless, as Woodard
admitted that her conduct constituted a breach of her duty as a
public official, such that there was enough showing of criminal
culpability to sustain a misdemeanor conviction under OCGA § 45-
11-4, she entered her guilty plea under the First Offender Act and
received 12 months on probation, which was to be terminated upon
full and timely payment of restitution.5
5 Because Woodard provided full restitution at the time of the plea, no
probation sentence was ever initiated. Further, because Woodard fully complied with the Georgia First Offender Act, she is now exonerated and has no criminal record.
5 Based on her conduct, Woodard admits to violating Rule 8.4 (a)
(3) (it shall be a violation of the GRPC for a lawyer to “be convicted
of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying
conduct relates to the lawyer’s fitness to practice law”) and (a) (4) (it
shall be a violation of the GRPC for a lawyer to “engage in
professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation”). Further, relying on the ABA Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992), Woodard offers in mitigation
that she has no disciplinary history; that she lacked a dishonest or
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321 Ga. 681 FINAL COPY
S25Y0649. IN THE MATTER OF STEPHANIE DIANNE WOODARD.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for
voluntary discipline filed by Stephanie Dianne Woodard (State Bar
No. 233695) prior to the filing of a Formal Complaint. See Bar Rule
4-227 (b). Woodard has been a member of the State Bar since 1996
and served as the Solicitor-General of the Hall County State Court
for 15 years. In her petition, Woodard admits that, between July
2018 and September 2022, she received 11 improper
reimbursements from the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council of Georgia
and Hall County and that she entered a guilty plea to one
misdemeanor count of a violation of OCGA § 45-11-4 (b) (1) (a public
officer may be criminally charged for malpractice, misfeasance, or
malfeasance in office) and (b) (5) (a public officer may be criminally
charged for willfully and knowingly demanding more cost than she is entitled to by law), which constitutes a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (3)
and (a) (4) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”),
found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum sanction for a violation
of these Rules is disbarment. While acknowledging that her conduct
was a breach of her duty as a public official, Woodard asserts that
several mitigating factors are applicable and requests that the Court
impose a public reprimand for her Rule violations. In response, the
Bar states that Woodard’s request for a public reprimand is
appropriate but notes that the presumptive penalty for her
violations is a short suspension. Upon careful review, we decline to
accept Woodard’s petition for the reasons explained below.
In her petition, Woodard states that, on June 18, 2024, she was
indicted by a Hall County grand jury on 24 felony counts of criminal
misconduct, which was comprised of 13 counts involving alleged
violations of OCGA § 16-10-201 and 11 counts involving alleged
1 OCGA § 16-10-20 provides:
A person who knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; makes a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
2 violations of OCGA § 16-8-2.2 The 24 counts alleged that, on 11
occasions, Woodard — while serving as the Solicitor-General of the
Hall County State Court — made requests and received
reimbursement for expenses which were not official expenses for
which she was entitled to reimbursement. Specifically, Counts 1-11
related to reimbursements from the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council,
the circumstances of which Woodard contends she has “scant
information,” but believes may have resulted because she
improperly sought reimbursement from both the Prosecuting
Attorneys’ Council and Hall County. Counts 12 and 13 related to an
makes or uses any false writing or document, knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of state government or of the government of any county, city, or other political subdivision of this state shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000.00 or by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years, or both.
2 OCGA § 16-8-2 provides:
A person commits the offense of theft by taking when he unlawfully takes or, being in lawful possession thereof, unlawfully appropriates any property of another with the intention of depriving him of the property, regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or appropriated.
3 improper charge for the cremation of a dog, which Woodard contends
was an inadvertent and improper charge. Counts 14 and 15 related
to cleaning supplies provided to someone Woodard was “re-homing,”
which she contends was a legitimate reimbursement request
pursuant to the Legal Victim Assistance Program and which
resulted in an indictment because of the State’s misunderstanding
of the Program. Counts 16 and 17 related to a meal at a restaurant,
which Woodard also contends was a legitimate reimbursement
request. Counts 18-223 related to an improper charge for an LSAT
prep course for Woodard’s daughter, which she contends happened
because someone on her staff saw the receipt and mistakenly
pursued reimbursement. Counts 23 and 244 related to a pillow
purchased for Woodard’s son, which she contends happened because
she mistakenly used the wrong credit card. In total, the amount of
3 Woodard mistakenly states in her petition that only Counts 18-21 in
the indictment were related to the LSAT prep course, but Count 22 was also related to the same reimbursement. 4 Similar to the previous mistake, Woodard inadvertently omits Count
24 in her description of the counts in her petition, but Counts 23 and 24 are the correct counts related to the reimbursement for the pillow.
4 misappropriated funds was $2,219.28 (with $1,190.48 from the
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council and $1,028.80 from Hall County).
Following the indictment, Woodard and the State began
negotiations and agreed that the matter would be best settled by a
nolle prosequi of the felony charges and Woodard entering a guilty
plea to one misdemeanor count of a violation of OCGA § 45-11-4 (b)
(1) and (b) (5). According to Woodard, the State was concerned as to
whether there was sufficient evidence to prove scienter or intent, as
required for the indicted felony charges. Nevertheless, as Woodard
admitted that her conduct constituted a breach of her duty as a
public official, such that there was enough showing of criminal
culpability to sustain a misdemeanor conviction under OCGA § 45-
11-4, she entered her guilty plea under the First Offender Act and
received 12 months on probation, which was to be terminated upon
full and timely payment of restitution.5
5 Because Woodard provided full restitution at the time of the plea, no
probation sentence was ever initiated. Further, because Woodard fully complied with the Georgia First Offender Act, she is now exonerated and has no criminal record.
5 Based on her conduct, Woodard admits to violating Rule 8.4 (a)
(3) (it shall be a violation of the GRPC for a lawyer to “be convicted
of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying
conduct relates to the lawyer’s fitness to practice law”) and (a) (4) (it
shall be a violation of the GRPC for a lawyer to “engage in
professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation”). Further, relying on the ABA Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992), Woodard offers in mitigation
that she has no disciplinary history; that she lacked a dishonest or
selfish motive; that she was experiencing personal or emotional
problems due to suffering from a physical ailment and the death of
a family member; that she made a timely good faith effort to make
restitution and rectify the consequences of her misconduct; that she
cooperated fully with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation and the
State Bar and is petitioning for voluntary discipline; that her
character and reputation are good, as she has volunteered her time
6 in many laudable activities for her community;6 that she was
suffering a physical disability; that she received additional penalties
and sanctions for her conduct, including negative public attention in
the media and her resignation from her position as Solicitor-
General; and that she has expressed remorse for her misconduct.
See ABA Standard 9.32 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (g), (h), (k) & (l). Woodard
also notes in mitigation that the State and trial court recognized
that her conduct was more appropriately characterized as a
misdemeanor, as evident by the State agreeing to nolle prosequi all
24 felony counts and accept the plea to one count of a misdemeanor,
and the court sentencing Woodard as a first offender for which she
received a sentence of probation. Woodard does not state any factors
in aggravation.
In addressing the sanction to be imposed, Woodard requests a
public reprimand “instead of a harsher punishment” due to the
applicable mitigating factors and contends that this Court has
6 Woodard states that she has served as a member or in a leadership role
for several government entities and nonprofit organizations.
7 imposed public reprimands for similar Rule violations. Woodard
relies on In the Matter of Cherry, 305 Ga. 667 (827 SE2d 239) (2019)
— in which we accepted a petition for voluntary discipline seeking
public reprimand where the attorney admitted to violating Rule 8.4
(a) (4) by sending a letter to an insurance company in which she
falsified a signature — and In the Matter of Davis, 306 Ga. 381 (830
SE2d 734) (2019) — in which we imposed a public reprimand where
the attorney violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4) by improperly notarizing a
signature that he did not witness.
In response, the State Bar recommends that this Court accept
Woodard’s petition for voluntary discipline seeking a public
reprimand, although it states that the presumptive penalty for
Woodard’s violations is a short suspension. Further, the State Bar
notes that it agrees that eight out of the nine mitigating factors
Woodard listed in her petition apply to her case; the State Bar does
not address whether the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive was
applicable. Additionally, the State Bar found that two of the
aggravating factors listed in ABA Standard 9.22 are applicable —
8 substantial experience in the practice of law, and illegal conduct. See
ABA Standard 9.22 (i) and (k).
Although the State Bar supports Woodard’s request for a public
reprimand, we do not agree that a public reprimand for Woodard’s
violations of Rules 8.4 (a) (3) and (a) (4) is sufficient as “a penalty to
the offender, a deterrent to others, and as an indication to laymen
that the courts will maintain the ethics of the profession.” See In the
Matter of Dowdy, 247 Ga. 488, 493 (277 SE2d 36) (1981). As an
initial matter, we have explained that “a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4)
is among the most serious violations with which a lawyer can be
charged.” In the Matter of West, 300 Ga. 777, 778 (798 SE2d 219)
(2017) (cleaned up). We have also explained that for a Rule 8.4 (a)
(3) violation “either suspension or disbarment is an appropriate
sanction, depending on the circumstances.” In the Matter of
Gardner, 286 Ga. 623, 624 (690 SE2d 611) (2010). Further, as a
public official, Woodard was in a position of power and
responsibility, and when considering the appropriate sanction to
impose “[t]his Court is . . . concerned . . . about the public’s confidence
9 in the profession.” In the Matter of Blitch, 288 Ga. 690, 692 (706
SE2d 461) (2011). See also In the Matter of Skandalakis, 279 Ga.
865, 867 (621 SE2d 750) (2005) (noting in aggravation that the
attorney’s misconduct “arose out of his actions as an elected public
official”).
Additionally, the two cases upon which Woodard relies to
support her request for a public reprimand — Cherry and Davis —
are easily distinguishable from the situation here, as these cases
neither involved a lawyer being convicted of a misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude nor a lawyer’s repeated misuse of
government funds. Rather, we conclude that this case is most
similar to In the Matter of Williams, 284 Ga. 96 (663 SE2d 181)
(2008) — in which we accepted the petition for voluntary discipline
seeking a six-month suspension for the violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (3)
filed by an assistant district attorney who “participated in a scheme
initiated by his boss, the then-District Attorney, to obtain from [the
county] money to which the District Attorney was not entitled” and
“pled guilty to a single violation of OCGA § 45-11-5 (misdemeanor
10 for a public officer to receive money not due [to] him through the use
of his office).” Id. at 96-97. See also In the Matter of Adams, 291 Ga.
768, 768 (732 SE2d 446) (2012) (imposing 18-month suspension
where attorney misrepresented the number of hours worked
representing indigent clients and overbilled the judicial circuit’s
Indigent Defense Program over $10,000). Because Woodard’s case is
more akin to cases which resulted in six-month and 18-month
suspensions than to cases which resulted in a public reprimand, we
are rejecting Woodard’s petition without prejudice to allow her to file
a renewed petition seeking voluntary discipline more consistent
with the cases we cite as applicable.
We therefore reject the petition for voluntary discipline.
Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. Peterson, C. J., Warren, P. J., and Bethel, Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ., concur.
11 Decided May 28, 2025.
Petition for voluntary discipline.
Cathey & Strain, Dennis T. Cathey, for Woodard.
Russell D. Willard, General Counsel State Bar, William D.
NeSmith III, Deputy General Counsel State Bar, James S. Lewis,
Andreea N. Morrison, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State
Bar of Georgia.