303 Ga. 284 FINAL COPY
S18Y0348. IN THE MATTER OF SAM LOUIS LEVINE.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and
recommendation of the Review Panel, recommending that Sam Louis Levine
(State Bar No. 448738) be disbarred for his neglect of matters involving two
clients and his misconduct arising out of his contentious divorce proceeding.
The State Bar initiated this matter in September 2016 by filing three
formal complaints after Levine rejected notices of discipline. See Bar Rule 4-
208.4 (a). Levine, who was admitted to the Bar in 2004, acknowledged
service and filed answers and counterclaims. The Bar served written discovery
in December 2016. In early January 2017, Levine filed a notice of leave of
absence in all three matters, covering all but 22 weekdays of 2017; the notice
did not list any pending cases in which Levine was counsel of record, but stated
that Levine would be on vacation or attending CLE seminars. The notice
further stated, “[a]ll affected judges and opposing counsel shall have ten (10) days from the date of this Notice to object to it. If no objections are filed, the
leave shall be granted.” The notice cited Uniform Superior Court Rule 16 and
presumably intended to invoke USCR 16.1, which provides that under certain
circumstances a leave of absence of 30 days or less shall stand granted without
the necessity of a court order. 1 The Bar filed an objection, noting that Levine
had attempted to informally negotiate an indefinite stay of the disciplinary
proceedings with the first special master appointed, but had not filed a motion
for a stay. In mid-February 2017, the Bar filed a motion seeking sanctions for
Levine’s failure to respond to discovery.
Special Master Patrick H. Head set a hearing on the motion for sanctions
in all three matters for March 3, 2017. Upon Levine’s objection, the hearing
was rescheduled to March 31, because that was one of the days not listed in
Levine’s notice of leave of absence. Nonetheless, Levine did not respond to
the motion for sanctions and did not appear for the hearing; instead, at around
9:00 p.m. on March 30, he sent an email announcing that he would not appear.
The email stated that there was no provision under USCR 6.4 that allowed for
1 We have not previously considered whether the Uniform Superior Court Rules apply in Bar disciplinary proceedings and find no need to consider the issue in this case. a hearing on a motion for sanctions. But see Bar Rule 4-210 (11) (special
masters have power to exercise general supervision over discovery matters,
including to conduct hearings). The evidentiary hearing was held in Levine’s
absence, and following the hearing, the special master entered a detailed order
concluding that Levine’s failure to respond to discovery was willful and
intentional. As sanctions, the special master struck Levine’s answers,
defenses, and counterclaims, with the result being that the facts of the formal
complaints were deemed admitted. Rule 4-212 (a) (facts alleged and
violations charged in formal complaint shall be deemed admitted if respondent
fails to file an answer).
In May 2017, the special master issued his report and recommendation
with findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending disbarment. The
facts, as found by the special master and based on Levine’s default, show the
following. With respect to State Disciplinary Board Docket (“SDBD”) No.
6866, Levine was retained to defend a client in five civil actions. The client
paid Levine $1,750 to file answers and negotiate settlements. However,
Levine failed to file an answer in any of the actions, resulting in a default
judgment being entered against the client in one of the cases and his wages being garnished. Throughout the representation, Levine misled the client
about his actions, falsely telling him that he had obtained an extension of time
for filing answers and falsely telling him that he was in the process of
negotiating settlements. Levine also falsely told the Bar during the disciplinary
proceedings that settlement negotiations were ongoing and close to fruition.
The facts underlying SDBD No. 6878 involve Levine’s representation of
another client. Levine was retained by the client to file suit for damages
arising from an automobile accident. Levine filed the suit in April 2011,
dismissed it without prejudice in April 2012, and refiled it in October 2012.
Levine did very little work on the case for 18 months, and when the case was
placed on a trial calendar, Levine, who had another lawyer as co-counsel, filed
for a continuance on the day the pretrial order was due, stating that he was
unable to act as lead counsel for financial, mental, and physical reasons arising
out of his on-going divorce action and preexisting medical issues. In
communications with the trial judge, Levine admitted that he had not prepared
the case. After a pretrial conference at which the court instructed Levine to
designate lead counsel for trial, Levine submitted a letter to the court, asserting
that he had a conflict with another case, contrary to his first request for a continuance. The client then designated the co-counsel as lead counsel, but
Levine refused to abide by this direction and instructed co-counsel that he
would no longer be needed. Levine ultimately associated, with his client’s
acquiescence, another lawyer. This third lawyer conducted discovery,
including depositions of multiple physicians, and ultimately resolved the
matter with a substantial settlement in the client’s favor.
The facts underlying SDBD No. 6891 stem from Levine’s actions in and
related to his divorce case; Levine represented himself during most of the
divorce proceedings. The divorce decree awarded various items of property,
including the family dog, to Levine’s wife. Levine repeatedly refused to
allow his ex-wife to retrieve these items and challenged the divorce decree in
numerous collateral proceedings, most of which stemmed from Levine’s
insistence that the dog was a therapy dog that he was entitled to have under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. In pursuit of this unwavering belief, Levine
filed meritless federal lawsuits against two judges who at different times
presided over his divorce action; filed a discrimination complaint against one
of the judges; sent a threatening letter to the two judges, with copies to
numerous public figures, alleging that the judges had committed heinous crimes and were suffering from psychiatric disorders; filed meritless lawsuits
and police complaints against his brother, whom Levine had asked to act on
his behalf after Levine was incarcerated for contempt; filed meritless
applications for criminal warrants against his ex-wife and others; and filed
meritless applications for temporary protective orders and a separate civil
action against his ex-wife. Levine was ultimately held in contempt in the
divorce action and was incarcerated for three weeks when he continued to defy
the court’s orders. To obtain his release, his lawyer negotiated a consent
order, which included, at Levine’s mother’s request, a provision for a
psychiatric examination.
Based on Levine’s conduct in these three matters, the special master
concluded that Levine violated the following Georgia Rules of Professional
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303 Ga. 284 FINAL COPY
S18Y0348. IN THE MATTER OF SAM LOUIS LEVINE.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and
recommendation of the Review Panel, recommending that Sam Louis Levine
(State Bar No. 448738) be disbarred for his neglect of matters involving two
clients and his misconduct arising out of his contentious divorce proceeding.
The State Bar initiated this matter in September 2016 by filing three
formal complaints after Levine rejected notices of discipline. See Bar Rule 4-
208.4 (a). Levine, who was admitted to the Bar in 2004, acknowledged
service and filed answers and counterclaims. The Bar served written discovery
in December 2016. In early January 2017, Levine filed a notice of leave of
absence in all three matters, covering all but 22 weekdays of 2017; the notice
did not list any pending cases in which Levine was counsel of record, but stated
that Levine would be on vacation or attending CLE seminars. The notice
further stated, “[a]ll affected judges and opposing counsel shall have ten (10) days from the date of this Notice to object to it. If no objections are filed, the
leave shall be granted.” The notice cited Uniform Superior Court Rule 16 and
presumably intended to invoke USCR 16.1, which provides that under certain
circumstances a leave of absence of 30 days or less shall stand granted without
the necessity of a court order. 1 The Bar filed an objection, noting that Levine
had attempted to informally negotiate an indefinite stay of the disciplinary
proceedings with the first special master appointed, but had not filed a motion
for a stay. In mid-February 2017, the Bar filed a motion seeking sanctions for
Levine’s failure to respond to discovery.
Special Master Patrick H. Head set a hearing on the motion for sanctions
in all three matters for March 3, 2017. Upon Levine’s objection, the hearing
was rescheduled to March 31, because that was one of the days not listed in
Levine’s notice of leave of absence. Nonetheless, Levine did not respond to
the motion for sanctions and did not appear for the hearing; instead, at around
9:00 p.m. on March 30, he sent an email announcing that he would not appear.
The email stated that there was no provision under USCR 6.4 that allowed for
1 We have not previously considered whether the Uniform Superior Court Rules apply in Bar disciplinary proceedings and find no need to consider the issue in this case. a hearing on a motion for sanctions. But see Bar Rule 4-210 (11) (special
masters have power to exercise general supervision over discovery matters,
including to conduct hearings). The evidentiary hearing was held in Levine’s
absence, and following the hearing, the special master entered a detailed order
concluding that Levine’s failure to respond to discovery was willful and
intentional. As sanctions, the special master struck Levine’s answers,
defenses, and counterclaims, with the result being that the facts of the formal
complaints were deemed admitted. Rule 4-212 (a) (facts alleged and
violations charged in formal complaint shall be deemed admitted if respondent
fails to file an answer).
In May 2017, the special master issued his report and recommendation
with findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending disbarment. The
facts, as found by the special master and based on Levine’s default, show the
following. With respect to State Disciplinary Board Docket (“SDBD”) No.
6866, Levine was retained to defend a client in five civil actions. The client
paid Levine $1,750 to file answers and negotiate settlements. However,
Levine failed to file an answer in any of the actions, resulting in a default
judgment being entered against the client in one of the cases and his wages being garnished. Throughout the representation, Levine misled the client
about his actions, falsely telling him that he had obtained an extension of time
for filing answers and falsely telling him that he was in the process of
negotiating settlements. Levine also falsely told the Bar during the disciplinary
proceedings that settlement negotiations were ongoing and close to fruition.
The facts underlying SDBD No. 6878 involve Levine’s representation of
another client. Levine was retained by the client to file suit for damages
arising from an automobile accident. Levine filed the suit in April 2011,
dismissed it without prejudice in April 2012, and refiled it in October 2012.
Levine did very little work on the case for 18 months, and when the case was
placed on a trial calendar, Levine, who had another lawyer as co-counsel, filed
for a continuance on the day the pretrial order was due, stating that he was
unable to act as lead counsel for financial, mental, and physical reasons arising
out of his on-going divorce action and preexisting medical issues. In
communications with the trial judge, Levine admitted that he had not prepared
the case. After a pretrial conference at which the court instructed Levine to
designate lead counsel for trial, Levine submitted a letter to the court, asserting
that he had a conflict with another case, contrary to his first request for a continuance. The client then designated the co-counsel as lead counsel, but
Levine refused to abide by this direction and instructed co-counsel that he
would no longer be needed. Levine ultimately associated, with his client’s
acquiescence, another lawyer. This third lawyer conducted discovery,
including depositions of multiple physicians, and ultimately resolved the
matter with a substantial settlement in the client’s favor.
The facts underlying SDBD No. 6891 stem from Levine’s actions in and
related to his divorce case; Levine represented himself during most of the
divorce proceedings. The divorce decree awarded various items of property,
including the family dog, to Levine’s wife. Levine repeatedly refused to
allow his ex-wife to retrieve these items and challenged the divorce decree in
numerous collateral proceedings, most of which stemmed from Levine’s
insistence that the dog was a therapy dog that he was entitled to have under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. In pursuit of this unwavering belief, Levine
filed meritless federal lawsuits against two judges who at different times
presided over his divorce action; filed a discrimination complaint against one
of the judges; sent a threatening letter to the two judges, with copies to
numerous public figures, alleging that the judges had committed heinous crimes and were suffering from psychiatric disorders; filed meritless lawsuits
and police complaints against his brother, whom Levine had asked to act on
his behalf after Levine was incarcerated for contempt; filed meritless
applications for criminal warrants against his ex-wife and others; and filed
meritless applications for temporary protective orders and a separate civil
action against his ex-wife. Levine was ultimately held in contempt in the
divorce action and was incarcerated for three weeks when he continued to defy
the court’s orders. To obtain his release, his lawyer negotiated a consent
order, which included, at Levine’s mother’s request, a provision for a
psychiatric examination.
Based on Levine’s conduct in these three matters, the special master
concluded that Levine violated the following Georgia Rules of Professional
Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d): 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.7, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 4.1, 4.4,
8.1, and 8.4 (a) (4). The maximum sanction for violations of Rules 1.2, 1.3,
1.7, 3.3, 4.1, 8.1, and 8.4 (a) (4) is disbarment, and the maximum sanction for
violations of Rules 1.4, 3.1, 3.2, and 4.4 is a public reprimand.
The special master looked to the American Bar Association Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions for mitigating and aggravating factors and found that few mitigating but many aggravating factors applied. He
concluded that Levine’s personal or emotional problems were a mitigating
factor, describing them as “self-evident” but noting that Levine offered no
medical evidence in the disciplinary proceeding to support his claim of
disability. As aggravating factors, the special master found that Levine’s
misconduct demonstrated a dishonest and selfish motive; there was an
extensive pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses; Levine engaged in bad
faith obstruction of the disciplinary process by lying to the Bar, intentionally
refusing to comply with Bar rules governing disciplinary proceedings, and
engaging in deceptive practices; he refused to acknowledge the wrongful
nature of his misconduct; and he had substantial experience in the practice of
law. The special master noted Levine’s sole prior disciplinary offense, a
Letter of Admonition in 2009, but did not consider it an aggravating factor.
See ABA Standard 9.32 (m) (mitigating factors include remoteness of prior
offenses).
The special master recommended disbarment, and although he found that
the facts strongly suggested that Levine suffers from the want of a sound mind,
such that he would be subject to removal from the practice of law based on State Bar Rule 4-104 (a), he did not rely on that rule in making his
recommendation.
Levine sought review by the Review Panel. The Review Panel granted
Levine’s motion for oral argument, but ultimately issued a report and
recommendation rejecting all of Levine’s complaints about the procedure
before the special master, adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law
in the special master’s report, and recommending that this Court impose the
sanction of disbarment.
In this Court, Levine filed three separate exceptions to the report and
recommendation, despite there being only one consolidated case in this Court.
His filings, which fail to comply with this Court’s procedural rules, see
Supreme Court Rule 49, are largely duplicative of each other and contain
numerous exhibits, most of which are not included in the record established
before the special master and many of which are illegible. In addition to filing
exceptions to the Review Panel report, Levine filed three separate motions
styled “Motion to Dismiss Bar Complaint,” which he has supplemented in
various forms more than a dozen times. These filings—totaling hundreds of
pages—seek to relitigate his divorce and the underlying facts of the two client matters and make meritless claims challenging the Bar’s actions in these
disciplinary matters. He also filed a motion to have this Court pay for the
production and filing of the written and video transcripts of a hearing in the
divorce case, and a motion for appointment of counsel. 2
As we understand Levine’s position, he contends that the entry of the
sanctions order was improper and that in the absence of a default, he is entitled
to offer evidence to counter the factual allegations of the underlying
grievances. We agree with the Review Panel, however, that the special master
did not err in striking Levine’s pleadings and finding him in default for his
willful failure to participate in discovery. Additionally, there was no
requirement that the special master enter an order compelling Levine to
respond to discovery prior to entering sanctions for his failure to engage in the
discovery process. See In the Matter of Burgess, 293 Ga. 783, 784 (748 SE2d
916) (2013) (noting that special master struck respondent’s answers for failure
to respond to discovery requests and lack of evidence supporting mitigation);
In the Matter of Browning-Baker, 292 Ga. 809, 809-810 (741 SE2d 637)
(2013) (special master authorized to strike respondent’s answer after
2 These latter motions were denied by separate order entered January 30, 2018. respondent twice waited until the day before her scheduled deposition before
advising that she would not appear and after respondent failed to appear for
subsequently scheduled hearing before special master); In the Matter of Hawk,
269 Ga. 165, 166 (496 SE2d 261) (1998) (finding facts alleged in formal
complaint were deemed admitted based on special master’s striking of
respondent’s answers as sanction for failure to appear at depositions and to
produce documents). See also Rule 4-212 (c) (both parties may engage in
discovery under the rules of practice and procedure applicable to civil cases);
OCGA § 9-11-37 (b) (2) (C) & (d) (1) (upon failure to serve answers to
interrogatories or respond to request for inspection, court may make such
orders as are just, including an order striking pleadings or rendering a judgment
by default against disobedient party).
In addition to the misconduct in the underlying matters, which amply
supports disbarment, the record of the disciplinary proceedings and Levine’s
filings in this Court strongly support the special master’s belief that Levine is
not emotionally or mentally fit for the practice of law. Levine persistently
ignored Bar Rules that provide an orderly process for contesting allegations of
disciplinary violations and instead made multi-pronged, unauthorized attacks on the disciplinary process. For example, rather than responding to the Bar’s
discovery, Levine filed Bar complaints against the Investigative Panel member
assigned to investigate the grievances against him and against Bar counsel.
After the special master issued the sanctions order finding Levine in default,
Levine filed a motion to stay discovery, a motion to dismiss the disciplinary
proceedings, and a notice of appeal of the sanctions order, directed to the
Georgia Court of Appeals because the appeal “stems from a trial court’s Order
on a Motion.” After the special master issued his report and recommendation,
Levine filed a motion to disqualify Bar counsel; a motion to recuse the special
master based in large part on the special master’s prior service as a district
attorney;3 and objections to the report and recommendation, attaching
thousands of pages of exhibits that were never made a part of the disciplinary
record. Before the Review Panel, Levine submitted voluminous pleadings,
including a motion to dismiss and a motion to add his ex-wife, his brother, his
mother, and one of the judges who presided over the divorce proceedings as
parties in the disciplinary proceeding.
3 Levine also filed wholly meritless motions to recuse the members of the Review
Panel and the members of this Court, which motions were denied. We conclude, as did the special master and Review Panel, that Levine’s
misconduct in client matters and his extraordinary pattern of abuse of the
judicial system and disciplinary process authorize the sanction of disbarment.
This resolution is consistent with sanctions imposed in similar cases. See In
the Matter of Nicholson, 299 Ga. 737, 740 (791 SE2d 776) (2016) (disbarment
where attorney filed false affidavit in court and then engaged in pattern of
bizarre, “disrespectful and outrageous conduct throughout the disciplinary
process”); In the Matter of Koehler, 297 SE2d 794 (778 Ga. 218) (2015)
(disbarment where lawyer repeatedly asserted meritless claims in multiple
tribunals and made materially deceitful and misleading statements in court
filings); In the Matter of Minsk, 296 Ga. 152 (765 SE2d 361) (2014)
(disbarment where lawyer had pattern of making knowingly false statements
to his client, the court, and third parties); In the Matter of Rolleston, 282 Ga.
513, 513 (651 SE2d 739) (2007) (disbarment where lawyer repeatedly asserted
meritless claims in multiple tribunals, showed no remorse for actions, and
“continued to plague the judicial system with untenable claims for purposes
unbefitting of any member of this State’s Bar”).
Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of Sam Louis Levine be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the State of
Georgia. Levine is reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (c).
Disbarred. All the Justices concur.
Decided March 5, 2018. Disbarment.
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittelman,
William J. Cobb, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of
Georgia.