In the Matter of K.B., a Child v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-26-00090-CV

IN THE MATTER OF K.B., A CHILD

On Appeal from the County Court Donley County, Texas

Trial Court No. 206, Honorable John C. Howard, Presiding

August 31, 2026

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.

Appellant, K.B., a juvenile, appeals from the juvenile court’s order of January 30, 2026, modifying disposition and committing her to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department for an indeterminate term not to exceed her nineteenth birthday. Appellant’s appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw supported by an Anders1 brief, certifying she has not found any non-frivolous grounds for appeal. We affirm the modification order and deny counsel’s motion to withdraw.

1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).

BACKGROUND

Appellant was twelve years old when she was referred to juvenile probation in March 2024 for assault on a public servant.2 She was detained, then released to her mother on conditions of release, including counseling and medication management.

In October 2024, the State petitioned to adjudicate the March 2024 assault after Appellant continued to have problems at home and at school and was not benefiting from the services offered on conditions of release. The trial court found that Appellant had engaged in delinquent conduct, placed her on probation until her eighteenth birthday, and ordered her to complete the post-adjudication residential program at the Youth Center of the High Plains.

That placement ended with an unsuccessful discharge in September 2025. While at the facility, Appellant accumulated numerous safety-based and resident-initiated seclusions. She was also charged with a second felony assault on a public servant after biting a staff member. The probation department then contacted every TJJD-registered female post-adjudication facility. Fourteen in-state programs and two out-of-state programs declined to accept her. On October 23, 2025, the court modified disposition and placed her at the Letot Residential Treatment Center in Dallas.

2 The State alleged that Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly kicked her school superintendent, causing bodily injury. TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01.

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Appellant entered Letot on November 5, 2025, and was unsuccessfully discharged weeks later. The State again moved to modify disposition. At a January 30, 2026 hearing, Appellant pleaded true to three of the five violations alleged in the State’s motion:

• On December 3, 2025, she was placed on an egregious behavior plan for fighting, using profanity, threatening staff, and throwing her point sheet.

• On December 29, 2025, Appellant was placed into “safety” for provoking, fighting, and refusing to follow staff instructions.

• That same day, Appellant was unsuccessfully discharged from Letot because she could not meet the behavioral stability and accountability required to stay in the program.

The State waived the remaining two counts.

Shanna Floyd, Appellant’s juvenile probation officer, testified about the failed period of in-home supervision, two residential discharges, and the new felony charge. Floyd searched for a less restrictive placement that would accept Appellant and found none. A psychological evaluation of Appellant recommended continued intensive, structured treatment and did not support an immediate return home. Appellant testified that she wanted to return to her mother. She described trauma associated with her father’s death and stated that her insight and her behavior had recently improved.

The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Appellant violated a reasonable and lawful order of the court. It found that Appellant is in need of rehabilitation; that she and the public are in need of protection; that placement outside the home is in her best interest; that reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal and to make a return to home possible; that Appellant cannot receive at home the quality of care and level of support and supervision needed to meet the conditions of probation; and that she

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has behavioral-health or other special needs that cannot be met with resources available in the community. The court committed Appellant to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department for an indeterminate period not to exceed her nineteenth birthday. This appeal followed.

Anders Framework

The procedures announced in Anders apply to juvenile appeals. In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. 1998). When appointed counsel concludes, after a conscientious examination of the record, that an appeal is frivolous, counsel must file a brief identifying anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. This Court, in turn, must independently examine the entire record to determine whether any nonfrivolous issue exists. See In re Matter of K.A.E., 647 S.W.3d 791, 792 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, no pet.) (citing Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).

Counsel satisfied those requirements. She certified that she diligently searched the record and found no reversible error on which an appeal could be predicated. Her brief presents a professional evaluation of the record and explains why the single issue she identified—whether the trial court abused its discretion by committing Appellant to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department—is not arguable. Counsel furnished Appellant with copies of the brief, counsel’s motion to withdraw, and the appellate record, and she advised her and her parent of the right to file a response. In re A.W.T., 61 S.W.3d 87, 88 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.). By letter, this Court notified Appellant and her parent of that same right. No response has been filed.

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We have independently reviewed the record for any abuse of discretion by the trial court and have found none. In re J.P., 136 S.W.3d 629, 632 (Tex. 2004). A disposition based on a finding that the child engaged in felony delinquent conduct may be modified to commit the child to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department if, after a hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the child violated a reasonable and lawful order of the court. TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.05(f). The evidence sufficiently demonstrates that Appellant violated a reasonable and lawful court order.

Further, when the court commits the child to TJJD on modification, the order must include three determinations supported by evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.05(m). First, placement outside the home was in Appellant’s best interest. She was unsuccessful under supervision in her mother’s home. Appellant was then unsuccessful at Youth Center of the High Plains, where she assaulted a staff member, accumulated numerous seclusions, and was charged with a second felony assault on a public servant. She was then unsuccessful at Letot. Floyd testified that no safe, less-restrictive option remained available to the department. On that record, the court could conclude that a return home did not serve Appellant’s best interest.

Second, reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal and to make return home possible. Appellant was given reasonable conditions of release that included counseling. When those measures did not hold, the court ordered Appellant to complete the post-adjudication residential program at the Youth Center of the High Plains. When that placement ended in unsuccessful discharge, the department searched statewide for a female post-adjudication facility that would accept her. Fourteen in-state programs and two out-of-state programs declined. When Letot accepted her, the court again modified

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the disposition to place her there rather than commit her to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department.

Third, the home could not supply the care and supervision that probation required.

According to Floyd, Appellant’s mother reported she could not leave the juvenile unsupervised and needed more help than she could provide. Police had been called to the home. The psychological evaluation stated that a structured residential setting may be necessary before a safe return home. Two placements designed to furnish that structure had already ended in unsuccessful discharge. From that evidence, the court could find that the home remained unable to provide what the conditions of probation demanded.

Appellant’s testimony that her insight had improved and that she wanted to go home does not make the commitment an abuse of discretion. The trial court was entitled to weigh those assurances against similar promises that preceded the failed Youth Center of the High Plains and Letot placements. See In re M.A.S., 438 S.W.3d 803, 807 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.) (holding “a trial court is permitted to decline third and fourth chances to a juvenile who has abused a second chance.”).

We have also reviewed the remainder of the record, including notice and service, the taking of the pleas, the admission of the probation case summary, the form of the written order, and the performance of trial counsel. We find no arguable ground for reversal.

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CONCLUSION

The trial court’s Order Modifying Disposition to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department is affirmed.

We deny counsel’s motion to withdraw. Counsel’s duty of representation continues through the exhaustion of proceedings, which may include the filing of a petition for review in the Supreme Court of Texas that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.

Lawrence M. Doss

Justice