In the Matter of Julianne Wesley Holliday

839 S.E.2d 518, 308 Ga. 216
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedFebruary 28, 2020
DocketS20Y0065, S20Y0066, S20Y0067
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 839 S.E.2d 518 (In the Matter of Julianne Wesley Holliday) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In the Matter of Julianne Wesley Holliday, 839 S.E.2d 518, 308 Ga. 216 (Ga. 2020).

Opinion

308 Ga. 216 FINAL COPY

S20Y0065, S20Y0066, S20Y0067. IN THE MATTER OF JULIANNE WESLEY HOLLIDAY (three cases).

PER CURIAM.

These disciplinary matters are before this Court on three

notices of discipline, each of which seeks the disbarment of Julianne

Wesley Holliday (State Bar No. 362498), who has been a member of

the Bar since 1998. The State Bar attempted to serve Holliday by

mail at the address listed with the State Bar, and subsequently at

the same address personally, but a staff investigator was unable to

perfect personal service. The State Bar then properly served

Holliday by publication, pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (ii).

Holliday failed to file a Notice of Rejection. Therefore, she is in

default, has waived her right to an evidentiary hearing, and is subject to such discipline as may be determined by this Court. See

Bar Rule 4-208.1 (b).

The facts, as deemed admitted by virtue of Holliday’s default,

show that, as to S20Y0065, Holliday entered into a representation

agreement with, and accepted a fee from, a client to represent him

as to some traffic citations. Although aware of the limited time

available for filing a challenge to the suspension of the client’s

driver’s license, and despite repeated prompting from the client,

Holliday failed to file the required information, despite asserting that

she had done so, and the client’s license was suspended. The client

repeatedly attempted to contact Holliday but was ignored until

Holliday sent the client a message through social media informing

him that he could seek reinstatement of his license by attending a

DUI traffic school; the client subsequently learned from the

Department of Driver Services that reinstatement of his license

could not be pursued for one year. The client terminated Holliday

and hired new counsel, but Holliday has not refunded the client’s

fee, despite asserting that she would do so. Additionally, there was 2 evidence that during the relevant time Holliday served as a public

defender and thus was not authorized to represent private clients for

a fee.

By this conduct, the Bar asserts that Holliday has violated,

inter alia, Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4 (a) (3) and (4), 1.16 (d), 3.2, and 8.4

(a) (4) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. The maximum

sanction for a violation of Rules 1.4, 1.16, and 3.2 is a public

reprimand, while the maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.2,

1.3, and 8.4 (a) (4) is disbarment. In mitigation as to the appropriate

level of discipline, the State Bar noted only Holliday’s absence of

prior discipline; in aggravation, the Bar noted Holliday’s failure to

respond to the disciplinary proceedings, her failure to respond to her

client, her abandonment of her client’s case, her dishonesty toward

her client, and her substantial experience in the practice of law.

As to S20Y0066, Holliday was hired by a client to represent

him in a habeas corpus action. Despite being provided by the client

with a draft petition and being made aware of the client’s concerns

regarding preserving, via prompt filing, his right to subsequently

3 seek federal habeas relief, Holliday failed to file the requested

petition, and the client had to file the petition pro se to preserve his

rights. The client’s family attempted to contact Holliday, but were

told first that she was ill and then that she had moved out of state.

Since that time, neither the client nor his family have heard from

Holliday. By this conduct, the Bar asserts that Holliday violated,

inter alia, Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4 (a) (3) and (4), 1.16 (d), and 3.2. In

mitigation, the Bar considered Holliday’s lack of prior discipline; in

aggravation, it considered her failure to respond to the disciplinary

proceedings, her failure to respond to the client, her abandonment

of the client’s matter, and her substantial experience in the practice

of law.

As to S20Y0067, Holliday was hired by a client to complete

work undertaken by a previous attorney in a divorce case. During

the representation, the client learned that the counterparty’s

proposed divorce decree had been presented to the judge without the

client’s requested modifications or a quitclaim deed that was

supposed to be included. Although Holliday initially told the client

4 she did not understand what had happened, she later acknowledged

that she had failed to include the deed. Holliday promised the client

that she would remedy her error, but she failed to do so. Holliday

ignored the client’s attempts at communication for three months,

until the client requested a refund. Holliday refunded only $250 of

the $1,250 fee, withholding the rest under the pretense that it would

be her fee for her preparation of a Qualified Domestic Relations

Order, which she never prepared; Holliday did not return the

remaining $1,000 until the filing of the grievance underlying this

matter. Holliday also ignored the client’s requests for the client’s file

and relocated her office without notifying the client. Based on these

facts, the Bar asserts that Holliday violated, inter alia, Rules 1.2 (a),

1.3, 1.4 (a) (3) and (4), and 1.16 (d). In mitigation, the Bar considered

Holliday’s lack of prior discipline; in aggravation, it considered her

failure to respond to the disciplinary proceedings, her failure to

respond to the client, her abandonment of the client’s matter, and

her substantial experience in the practice of law.

Having considered the record, we agree that disbarment is the

5 appropriate sanction in this matter. See, e.g., In the Matter of Annis,

306 Ga. 187 (829 SE2d 346) (2019). Accordingly, it is hereby ordered

that the name of Julianne Wesley Holliday be removed from the rolls

of persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Holliday

is reminded of her duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

6 DECIDED FEBRUARY 28, 2020. Disbarment. Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, William D. NeSmith III, Deputy General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittelman, Wolanda R. Shelton, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.

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